Preface

In many ways, the post-bipolar period is radically different from the preceding eras. Just consider the changed nature and ever-widening range of challenges, risks and threats, or the world order that, after a brief unipolar period, has taken on a multipolar character, with power centres in all parts of the world. An equally important change in the post-Cold War era is the widening circle of actors shaping security, which strongly underpins the need for this volume. Nowadays, states, as the traditional actors in international relations, are far from being the only ones shaping world political events. The range of actors shaping security has been extended to include a number of sub-state and supranational actors, and international organisations are among the key players in the latter.

Today, there is hardly a researcher, security policy expert or politician who would question the role of international organisations in international politics, although the extent of their influence, their positive or negative impact, their independence and bias varies from organisation to organisation. The aim of this volume is to present and evaluate the structure, functioning and areas of activity of the most important organisations from a security policy perspective, namely the world organisation, and the organisations of the Euro-Atlantic area and the other continents. It does so in a coherent structure that first introduces the reader to the organisation itself and its operational characteristics, and then, in a chapter immediately following, to the crisis management activities of the organisation. The United Nations is the first of these organisations to be introduced as the only universal international organisation. The reader gets an insight into what the theoretical construct of collective security means and how it works in practice, both within the framework of the organisation and in the UN's peace operations. The authors then introduce four organisations that are key to the Euro-Atlantic area: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and then examine the mission activities of each organisation. The authors have devoted the three concluding chapters of the volume to an introduction to the security organisations of the three continents, Africa, Asia and the Americas.

The activities of international organisations are important not only for global policy-making, but also for the security of our country. Hungary is now a member of all the major international organisations in our region, which has brought about changes in our daily lives that would have been unimaginable before. This change has clearly improved the security situation of our country and has also positively shaped our bilateral and multilateral relations.

The world of international organisations is gradually taking shape, as are other forums for intergovernmental cooperation. The nearly 80 years, since the end of the Second World War have shown that, while organisations cannot always respond quickly and adequately to all challenges, they can contribute to maintaining or, where necessary,

restoring international peace and security by providing a forum for interstate interaction and by channelling disputes. In today's turbulent world, international security organisations are the safe haven to which we can turn in the most difficult times and which may be capable of solving the most serious problems.

Editors

Péter Stepper

International Organisations and Security: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives

Introduction

Hungary has been a member of the United Nations since 1955, joined the NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004. Budapest works with partners in different multinational institutions such as the OSCE and supports regional cooperation primarily through the V4 (Rada–Stepper 2019: 172–194; Bartha–Rada 2014: 14–21). These memberships affect our security, and international organisations became part of our life. This book chapter introduces some fundamental features of multilateral organisations, which are connected to international security. To analyse this topic, the chapter uses the tenets of various international relations theories, not exclusively realism, liberalism and constructivism, but also some forms of critical security theories.

In academic debates, there is a tendency to formulate distinctive sub-fields of research connected to (EU) integration studies, regional security and international organisations. There are several well-written books available both in English (Karns–Mingst 2010) and Hungarian (Szálkai et al. 2019; Balogh et al. 2015; Molnár et al. 2019), which deal with this topic. However, focusing on security institutions requires a special approach. Hence, this textbook serves the purpose of explaining the realm of institutions and regimes by prioritising the language of security over the legal and the political.

This volume does not seek to duplicate works on international organisations, rather to analyse the security perception of certain institutions, the structure and the *modus operandi* as well as organisational features. It is almost unavoidable to have a certain level of overlapping agenda with the previously existing literature, but the main goal is to distinguish ourselves from the wide range of studies on international organisations.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2022) identified more than a few hundred regional security cooperations, which might be shaped differently but all of them contribute to peace and security studies. Alas, in the shadow of great power competition, we tend to forget how paramount institutions can be and how they facilitate cooperation and build trust among parties. The idea of collective security and the United Nations helped to change the mindset about international armed conflicts and led humanity to a new era of peace. However, regional cooperation has its utmost importance to build functioning security communities all around the world and prevent conflicts between neighbours.

Figure 1: Map of intergovernmental organisations
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_intergovernmental_organizations#/media/File:Alliances_expansive_Map.png

Concepts of international security

One of the most essential theoretical questions about international relations is whether humanity can overcome international violence, and the history of mankind could be different from the last couple of hundred years. Fukuyama wrote his famous essay about the end of history, which argued that with the end of communism, the battle of ideologies is over, hence the history – as we know it – came to its end. However, it reflected upon a unique moment of U.S. hegemony in the aftermath of Soviet dissolution and his original arguments are not necessarily valid anymore (RADA 2019: 1–10). There are two radical viewpoints on this subject matter. The first group of scholars argue that international politics is still full of violence by nature, while the other group puts more emphasis on the fact how rarely wars and armed conflicts occur in the 21st century. The big question is that globalisation and the increasing interdependency, which is an inevitable feature of our era, helped to decrease the number of violent acts significantly, or not. Liberal interdependency theories claim that the more globalisation mankind witnesses, the safer place the world will become.

Another important methodological problem has been also highlighted by the traditionalist-behaviourist (scientist) debate in political science (BAYLIS et al. 2021: 357). The question is if the causes of war(s) are unique or can be described by general features. Unlike historians, political science analysts often argue that there is an overarching pattern which explains international politics with clearly identified constant variables (like power, resources, anarchical system, etc.).

Neorealists like quantitative, data-based methodology, and they argue that systemic causes are fundamental. Hence, the behaviour of any state can be explained by analys-

ing the international system, which is basically determined by the relative distribution of power (WALTZ 1959). The international system can be described as an anarchical place, where units (primarily states and non-state actors to a limited extent) fight for their survival via self-help and *ad hoc* cooperation.

Historians tend to deny this approach, highlighting that every single armed conflict has unique reason(s) to start, and resource wars as a concept is the product of neorealist oversimplification.

Armed conflicts start by decisions of men, decision-makers being responsible for the consequences. Scientifically, the expert could only understand these decisions after a certain amount of time, by analysing the personalities, and the historical context of the given era. The decolonialisation process of the 1960s helped a lot to neorealism to surpass this viewpoint and use mathematics, and data analysis as their primary tool to understand international politics.

Decision-makers, at first liked their methods, but it does not mean they were right in everything. Structural realism could not explain numerous post-Cold War armed conflicts, or the absence of them. Changes in power distribution happens all the time, but it is not necessarily followed by armed conflicts. After the transition in the 1990s, there were no wars in Central Asia over water resources, and Central Europe could experience velvet revolutions instead of bloody fights over political power. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh region is a place of constant violence, and Ukraine has been illegally attacked by the Russian Federation in 2014 and 2022. Structural realism is fashionable, because it explains most of the problems related to armed conflicts, but not all of them.

Idealist scholars after World War I firmly believed in the capacity of mankind to overcome violence (IKENBERRY et al. 2009). The eruption of World War II, the constant fear from nuclear apocalypse during the Cold War led to the birth of human nature realism, structural and strategic realism, which pushed back idealism for a long time. Even if the détente period in the 1970s and the unipolar moments of the 1990s restored the credibility of neoliberal arguments, the current international environment helped again realist scholars to win this debate. Alas, the failure of U.S. long-wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the re-emerging great power competition, and the Russian aggression against Ukraine reminds us that violence is still part of international politics. Our question is therefore, how to define international security. Without analysing the concept of security, it is hard to understand the functions of international organisations related to international security.

Most of the scholars (see BUZAN–HANSEN 2009; PEOPLES–VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS 2021) agree upon the contested nature of the definition of security. One of the first trials to define the problems by Arnold Wolfers (1952) served as the basis of a lot of other concepts. According to him, security is the absence from threats against (any) values. There is a debate, however, about the type of threats and values (global, international, national) we are talking about here. During the Cold War, research was focusing on military capabilities necessary to counter any threat from the enemy. This was a narrow field of research, having ethno-centrist features, revolving around the interests of the

Western world. Barry Buzan struggled to transform this approach by his book *People, States and Fear* published in 1983 and incorporated new dimensions, such as political, economic, societal and environmental sectors.

Another interesting problem is the connection between national and international security. Some might argue that there is a tension between the two and maximising security on national level might cause its own problems for international peace. Others argue that international security after all represents the national interests of the current hegemon of the system, which does not cause any problem, if its position is unquestionably strong as the U.S.'s was in the 1990s. The decline of the hegemon, however, may lead to future problems, as the world is more and more multipolar with the rise of China.

But not every scholar accepts the significance of this connection between national and international security. The functionalist school of regional integration theories denies this (MITRANY 1971: 532–543), and one part of the constructivist academic community thinks that societal security is more important than the above-mentioned structural features like the balance of power or hegemony. The first group of scholars focus on the EU integration, which showed us that regional cooperation and national sovereignty are not exclusionary terms. States (like post-Nazi Germany) could gain more sovereignty on international level by sacrificing some sovereignty on national level. Also, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were in the forefront of constructivist research as the primary examples of artificial political communities, disintegrated states, where the ethno-national groups proved to be better referent objects (ROE 2005), and units of analysis than the larger political community.

These oft-criticised viewpoints were most of the times seen as mere exceptions in the matters of world politics. Realists were afraid of broadening the concept of security to such an extent, which could eventually lead to irrelevant conclusions, not so useful for decision-makers (WALT 1991). According to another counterargument, states are basically the political communities, which are the echoes of ethno-national groups. The will of the people (at least in democracies) is expressed by them; therefore, it is unnecessary to examine the behaviour of any sub-national unit.

The examination of sub-state level and ethno-national groups have also been criticised by the globalist movement. It is a quite radical viewpoint, which believes that the global community will eventually enforce the building of international security to tackle planetary threats like nuclear catastrophes, ecological degradation, or collapse of the international financial system. The last few years, however, did not show us solidarity on global scale at all. Political communities during the Covid crisis expected solutions from their own political leaders, but also the Russian aggression against Ukraine has not been unanimously condemned by all UN member states (not to mention the sanction regime, which is supported only by the West).

Definitions of security

A nation is secure until it is not threatened by any risk to give up its fundamental values to avoid a war; and even if war happens, the nation is still capable of preserving those values by winning this war. (Walter Lippmann)

Objective security is the level of risks against acquired values, subjective security is the lack of fear from a future attack against those values. (Arnold Wolfers)

In case of security, dialogue is due to maintain the absence of any threats. When this happens in the framework of international system security is about how states and societies are able to preserve their identity and functional integrity. (Barry Buzan)

Individuals and groups can only build stable security if they do not prevent others from having it; it can happen only if security is seen as an emancipatory process. (Booth-Wheeler)

Source: Baylis et al. 2021: 359.

Collective security

The concept is the product of the 20th century, even if certain scholars like Pierre Dubois, or Immanuel Kant could be used as reference points for peace studies. According to this concept, the answer for the reoccurring problem of interstate violence is neither self-help/self-defence, nor the balance of power. According to Woodrow Wilson, one of the founding fathers of collective security, the long-term solution to prevent conflicts is a creation of a rules-based international order. It creates obligations for community members and deters aggressive powers from taking reckless actions (Marsai et al. 2019: 9–17). This concept focuses on the internal problems of a universal community, thus the prevention of potential conflicts among members is key. It works only if the organisation (and any member) is able and willing to impose sanctions if one broke the basic rule of non-interference and the prohibition of aggression. If any member(s) of the community were threatened by an aggressor, the UN (members) would be ready to help, even considering all available options including the use of force, if necessary. Collective security thus prepares for an attack within, and the potential "enemy" is not predefined precisely. It depends on the actions of a potential aggressor, who is ready to break the peace and legal regulations underlined by the UN Charter (Gärtner 2005).

Common values are established in a statutory document, which contains the largest common denominator of the 193 member states. Classic examples for collective security are the League of Nations and the United Nations. The latter was created by 51 founding members with the signature of the UN Charter in 1945. Two of its main bodies, the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly are entitled to order the use of force in specific cases. The framework of cooperation as most of the liberal institutionalist IR scholars might argue, is very useful for small states, which would not be able to defend themselves from the aggression of great powers otherwise.

According to Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919): "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

According to Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."

Treaties, as it can be seen above, explicitly authorised the organisation to the use of force, but the implementation is in the hand of member states every single time. Therefore, there is always a deterrence element or sanction related to the concept. The whole idea is based on the concept of international cooperation collectively. The strength and significance of the UN has always been dependent on the willingness of member states. If they are ready to serve its purpose, because of, or despite their specific national interests, the UN is considered to be a strong toolbox. However, most of the times, the organisation looks more like as a dispersed toolbox, and the members are looking for other approaches to defend their sovereignty and power from any form of aggression. The League of Nations proved to be unsuccessful in its effort to preserve peace, considering the aggression in Manchuria (1931), Ethiopia (1935), the Rhein district (1936), the Anschluss in Austria (1938) and Czechoslovakia (1939). These failures underlined the problem of political willingness, and the divergence of security and defence policy perception in the world, which contributed to World War II.

Despite the tragic failure of the League of Nations, the Allied Powers decided to give another chance for collective security by establishing the UN right after World War II. The most fundamental difference can be seen in the procedures of the UN Security Council, which earned the responsibility to decide on the question of peace and security.

Most of the conflicts which required UN peacekeepers since then were of internal nature (civil wars and non-international armed conflicts). Many scholars criticised the concept of collective security either from the realist or liberal side of IR theories. All these perspectives will be introduced comprehensively in the next sections. It is enough to say that because of the shortcomings in the collective security concept, a lot of unwanted violence remained present, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, in the 1990s, a new set of institutions was established to tackle those challenges, some rooted in the idea of *détente* and peaceful co-existence. These initiatives like the nuclear non-proliferation regimes, MBFR, CFE, or the OSCE themselves are signs of the increasing importance of cooperative security.

Cooperative security

Cooperative security (Zagorski 2010) is different from collective security. It is a toolbox of a group of states against threats, perceived as threats by all states in the organisation. This definition might look a bit simple but catches the essence of political cooperation. This works based on common political will to define certain problems as threats and reassure each other to tackle them together. It has an institutional character if the states create a political and legal network of connection, which helps them to increase their own security. This is the *sine qua non* of a common institutional system. This is the most general form of cooperation among nation states, and it was created to offer an alternative to the traditional forms of cooperation. It is not necessarily established by allies, rather by political rivals, or even potential enemies. Its primary focus is mutual arms reduction, but the whole range of activities might differ from that. If we define collective security and use of force as a measure of last resort, cooperative security is more like a preventive method to ensure that conflict will not be necessary. It is less than collective security, because it excludes military measures from the agenda, and covers less fields.

The concept of cooperative security is in connection with the non-alignment movement of the 1980s and was supported by a significant number of small states, who had agency in the question of nuclear non-proliferation, but did not have the toolbox to influence the debate between the two superpowers. A common European security area was the only option for them if they wanted their voice to be heard. The idea of a European security architecture is fundamentally liberal, and realists did not forget to criticise this concept, highlighting the importance of balance of power, hegemony, great power competition, which are all important factors of credibility.

OSCE and ASEAN are good examples, worth to mention, when it comes to cooperative security. OSCE aims to maintain peace, help democratic development, avoid new political divides, and resolve security problems. ASEAN has been created under different circumstances in Southeast Asia, where liberal democracy does not exist, and there were no other common identities/common institutions. Just as in the case of the OSCE, the primary goal was mutual trust building to prevent future armed conflicts. Institution building, however, required a certain level of common identity, and now we can argue that there is an 'ASEAN path' to development (norms, processes, institutions) and peaceful negotiations are the way to manage conflicts.

Cooperative security demands a lot of factors to work together. Primarily, a common perception about future expectations is key, and members must see each other as partners and not rivals in the first place. Interdependency in the 21st century helped a lot to create a framework in Europe, where global, regional and local problems (terrorism, organised crime, natural disasters) need common solutions.

However, it is hard to miss the global and regional developments of great power competition, which transforms cooperative security institutions. Some organisations (OSCE) are in decline, while others (like SCO, ASEAN) show unexpected potential. On the global scale, the Sino–American rivalry creates a new Cold War, where European countries, including Russia and Turkey, but all the others must choose sides. This

choice will be based on their security perception, and there will be differences among the 57 participating states of the OSCE. On regional level, the Russian aggression against Ukraine (in 2014 and 2022) was the turning point, which led to the dissolution of previously functioning regimes, like the INF Treaty, Open Sky Treaty, and other core elements of European security architecture. Of course, the OSCE is still the (only) most improvement platform of the West to negotiate with Russia if any other channels fail to exist, which is especially true after the suspension of the NATO–Russia Council. But this is a step-back from the historic achievements of the OSCE.

Origins of international (security) organisations

The demand for any regional security cooperation is significantly higher if there is some economic or political interdependence (BÖRZEL–RISSE 2019: 1231–1252). The best example for such connection has been the transatlantic relations in the aftermath of World War II: the land-lease system and the Marshall plan, which changed the relations between Europe and the U.S. fundamentally. There are other less obvious connections either if we examine intra-European trade and industrial relations most notably between France and Germany. But also, the Asia-Pacific region offers several platforms from the China-led SCO to the U.S.-led QUAD, which reflects the effects of economic dependency leading to political cooperation.

Demand for more regional cooperation increases if participants suffer from some negative external effects (BÖRZEL–RISSE 2019: 1231–1252), so they might try to minimise their losses together. History of European integration started with the deep recession of the 1950s, which required cooperation in the field of coal and steel, which eventually led to the creation of the free market and finally the European single market. It is also beneficial for regime security if certain political actors, most probably small states present themselves as members of a wider political and defence cooperation, which gives them more credibility and leverage, what anyone might expect from their actual defence capabilities (BÖRZEL–RISSE 2019: 1231–1252). The presumptions that small states benefit more from membership in international cooperations are true in case of East Central European and Baltic countries, protected by NATO collective defence principles.

Regional security cooperations build a sense of belonging to a community, exceptionalism, identity and sometime even elitism. Any power transfer of the sovereign to an international organisation presumes a relatively high level of trust and community. It is however debatable that a collective identity is the reason, or the consequence of this.[1] Mutual trust is one of the most important elements, which helps to avoid creating a security dilemma (HERZ 1950: 157–180), and lead us to build a security community (DEUTSCH 1957). One of the most frequent references is the transformation of Franco–

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[1] NATO embraces the idea of building a collective identity, see e.g. the media campaign of 'We are NATO' at the official website of the organisation (www.nato.int/wearenato/).

German relations after 1945 into the most stable and reliable partnership in the realm of economy and defence.

A good and functional regional (security) cooperation can be known by its best practices and attractivity. While NATO enlargement and partnership projects are considered to be a huge success story of the last 30 years, other Asian alternatives like the CSTO or the SCO struggled of attract new members into their club until now. A significant number of African and South American regional cooperations use the EU Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights as role models for their own tribunals. On a much smaller but still significant scale, the Western Balkan countries keep learning from the Visegrád group when it comes to knowledge transfer related to EU and NATO accession talks.

Therefore, it is easy to argue that international organisations, and especially security organisations (like NATO, SCO, CSTO, OSCE, etc.) are important actors in the field of international relations. They shape world politics fundamentally, but theoretical explanations of their behaviour might differ through time. In the following section, some different approaches of IR will be examined with the special focus on the presumptions toward international conflict and cooperation, and of course international organisations.

Theoretical perspectives on international (security) organisations

The nature of different types of regional (security) cooperations are a topic of discussion in IR theories regularly. Neorealism and neoliberalism consider the structure of the international system and its interaction an independent variable, which influences international actions. Political relations are defined by functional differences, distribution of capacities, ultimately the share of power, the latter is deeply influenced by world order. Theories could compare the bipolar and multipolar structures and test their assumptions before and after the 1990s.

While the neoliberal institutionalism imagined a rule-based order, neorealism prefers the term of hegemon stability to describe global politics. Others like Henry Kissinger perceive the return of global power competition, thus the good old balance of power (KISSINGER 2014). All the approaches, even if they differ significantly, argue that our world can be analysed by understanding the structural effects and elements.

Neorealists do not consider international cooperation a primary solution for their problem, in other word, they do not prefer cooperating just for the sake of cooperation but are always making a cost–benefit calculus when it comes to the issue of choosing between peace and conflict. They believe in the utmost importance of nation states, sovereignty, and self-interest. They find cooperation difficult to maintain because states usually calculate with relative (individual) and not absolute (collective) gains. Win–win scenarios do exist, but the bigger player always wins a bit more than the smaller. Of course, they do not deny the importance of alliances, but prefer to explain them as the toolboxes of great powers. Most of the realist scholars argue that international organisations were established to serve the interest of certain state(s), and not the community of humankind.

Neoliberalism, however, believes in the rationale of collective security. They argue that states are capable of cooperating for absolute gains and reward of international peace and security. Harmonisation of interests is not a dream, or a utopia, but a real possibility if the political willingness is there.

Neorealists argue that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (1952) was the product of the Cold War, a classic example for confidence- and security-building measures among European allies. Mainstream realism perceives the ECSC as a toolbox to balance the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization (1955) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) (1949) (Kelstrup–Williams 2000). Of course, they cannot deny the results of the ECSC and the European Communities in the field of customs, free trade, internal market, but they want to remind us of the fact that it was originally created to control German military industry through the cooperation in the field of coal and steel production. So, the whole idea was connected to the military and defence dimension. Other realist scholars predicted the downfall of the cooperation in the European Union (Mearsheimer 1990: 5–56), because in the post-Cold War world, relative gains, again, will be much more important and state rivalry will eventually return (Grieco et al. 1993: 727–743).

Neoliberal scholars presume that non-state actors influence the international system, thus its conflictual nature can be regulated. Non-state actors are not interested in conflicts, but in profit, and they have enough power to push state actors into the direction of a rule-based order. International regimes, institutions help to maintain this order. Furthermore, by the increase of the number of linkages, and interdependence, they help to create a more and more stable system, where the chance of armed conflicts and violence remain lower by each year. The point of any regional (security) cooperation is to create diplomatic channels which help regular communication, increase trust and decrease the chance of any misunderstanding, which are the primary cause of any conflict.

Common rules are followed, because every actor is afraid of losing the benefits related to the system, and it is much less expensive, than having rounds of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic talks with each relevant partner year by year separately. Cost–benefit calculus, expectations and relative gains are in the focus of this approach. Realising the importance of these factors eventually leads to creating political communities. Karl Deutsch described political communities as institutions and practices, strong and widespread enough to meet the expectations of the society for peaceful changes and non-violent negotiations (Deutsch 1957).

Realism

The history of the UN can be described in several distinguishable phases. At first, great powers imagined an organisation through which the four policemen can guard international peace and security. Later, the Cold Ward realities revealed the dysfunctionalities deriving from the UNSC veto system, and the lack of political willingness to rely on this format when it comes to peacekeeping operations. The post-Cold War era, however,

opened new possibilities for the UN to fulfil its original role in the field of maintaining peace in the 21ˢᵗ century. IR theories have different explanations for the different phases; here I focus on the realist arguments.

The fundaments of realism have been built upon the thesis of unavoidable conflict, the critique of liberal utopia and idealism, especially in the field of international cooperation, most notably the idea of collective security manifested in the organisation of the League of Nations. Edward H. Carr argued in his book, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* that the problem was mixing utopia and reality, and underlined that most of the time the main cause of international violence was based on wishful thinking (CARR 1939). According to him, some idealist politicians believe that harmony of interest can exist. This wrong presumption was one of the main reasons, which led to the eruption of World War II. It is easy to see why scholars under the tenet of realism remain sceptical towards the successor of this institution, the United Nations. Especially the Russia-experts in the U.S. were extremely cautious to support the UN, like George F. Kennan, who believed that maintaining peace is primarily the responsibility of the sovereigns, and to transfer this power to a supranational level is nothing more than a dream.

Even if universal international cooperation (the UN) is regularly criticised by realist scholars, there are other formats of cooperation, which they find useful. Especially defensive (neo)realism supports the idea of regional international cooperations and alliances to maintain hegemony and world order. Already during the Cold War, Stephan Walt did his well-known research about the origins of alliances (WALT 1987), which is still a reference point for many 21ˢᵗ century realist scholars. Fellow realists in the Trump era emphasised that it is still in the interest of the U.S. to support his allies even if it comes with expenses. Grygiel and Mitchell argue that financing the defence of the 'Unquiet frontier' in the Eastern flank of NATO is much less expensive for the U.S. than to wait for its global rivals rising. 'Using' local allies to fight for U.S. hegemony is much more beneficial from the defensive realist perspective (GRYGIEL–MITCHELL 2017). One of the main realist reasons to support international security cooperation is the action radius problem, which is the burden of every 'empire'.

Global power projection is a costly business, especially if you do it on your own. Furthermore, the strategic overstretch can cause unexpected or unwanted consequences for peace and security. As Németh highlights, strategically important locations can attract all kinds of great powers to build military bases. One of the best examples is Djibouti with the presence of five foreign military powers (the U.S., France, Italy, China and Japan) (NÉMETH 2019: 27–46). It serves the original goal to secure the chocking point of Bab el-Mandeb Strait, but can also raise tensions between the U.S. and China. Triggering the rivals with the expansion of an international alliance is something what great powers should avoid, argued by many realist scholars like John J. Mearsheimer. He was one of the few scholars who warned against NATO Eastern expansion in the 1990s (MEARSHEIMER 1990). Other realists like Mandelbaum raised the attention to the cost–benefit calculus of maintaining an international security cooperation. Expenses of the hegemon will become eventually a huge burden if its economy starts to decrease, but the costs of preserving supremacy remain the same or even begin to increase (MANDELBAUM 2005).

Figure 2: Foreign military powers in Djibouti
Source: www.dw.com/en/tiny-but-mighty-djiboutis-role-in-geopolitics/a-57136069

Security environments in the 21st century transformed, hence realism adapted to new realities. Neoclassical realism focuses more on the processes of domestic politics, and the interdependency of defence and wider politico-economic dynamics. This way, these scholars can explain the new, so-called transactionalist foreign policy of the U.S. administration since the election of Donald Trump. The Trump Administration cut the U.S. budget contribution to the UN and oftentimes criticised multilateral diplomacy, but the U.S. remained the most important supporter of UN institutions proportionally (Almqvist 2017). Despite his critical rhetoric about NATO being obsolete, Trump preserved the foundation of the alliance, for it helps U.S. capability of global power projection.

Liberalism

(Neo)liberal scholars often argue that various kinds of non-state actors have a significant effect on the international system, thus the conflictual nature of the interstate arena can be restrained. Primarily international regimes, institutions can help to achieve this goal, and the number of these will increase because of increasing interdependence. The effects of global interdependence became visible right after the oil crisis of 1973 and several publications emphasised its long-term effects on the nature of conflict and cooperation (Keohane–Nye 1973: 158–165).

The point of any international cooperation is to create channels through which the parties can communicate, thus they decrease the level of mutual distrust. Trust-building is the first step to conflict prevention. Common rules are respected, because members might be afraid of losing future gains, and using a system is cost-effective for them. There is no need to maintain several bilateral channels if multilateral channels also work. The realisation of these profits can lead to the establishment of political (and security) com-

munities. Karl Deutsch defined political communities as institutional practices, strong enough to make a long-term impact on societal expectations to peaceful changes and non-violent negotiations (Deutsch 1957).

Moravcsikian intergovernmentalism theory is also based on presumptions of liberalism, but unlike the functionalist approaches, which believe in bottom-up development, it focuses on interdependence of governments. It perceives international cooperation as a top-down process, where governments have a key role in the negotiations. Unlike liberal institutionalist scholars, Moravcsik does not think that nation states cooperate just because of creating global common goods. They cooperate because they know that even if the international system is defined by competition, it is not exclusively a zero-sum game. Governments try to achieve mutual gains, even if they compete with each other at the same time. In a nutshell, any type of regional (and global) integration is the product of cooperation and competition (Moravcsik 1993: 473–524).

Neofunctionalist theories explain regional integration by the success of practical day-to-day routines, standard procedures, which basically make those developments irreversible. Intergovernmental theory, however, focuses on the process of big intergovernmental conferences, *travaux préparatoires* of international treaties, where the political willingness and national interest can finally be revealed. They both agree on the significance of economic profitability and the fact that it is in the interest of transnational and national lobby groups to facilitate the deepening of existing cooperations (Hooghe–Marks 2009: 1–23).

Constructivism

Constructivism is only a 30-year-old theory, which became popular because mainstream theories failed to explain the velvet revolutions in the post-Soviet space and the rare moments of American unilateralism in the 1990s. Neither the tenets of realism (anarchy, self-help, survival) nor the ideas of liberalism (interdependence, regimes, democratic peace) could give adequate response to post-Cold War changes. Realism (especially Malthusianism) expected different types of military confrontations over natural resources, while liberalism forecasted the global victory of liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992), yet to be seen (Rada 2007: 23–41).

The most well-known stream of constructivist literature, led by the Copenhagen School, created a 'new framework for analysis' in the field of security studies (Buzan et al. 1998). They incorporated the realist/English school traditions (security sectors and regionalism) and a dynamic approach offering new methods like discourse analysis (securitisation).

A little less popular are the constructivist works focusing on the functioning of international institutions. Three core elements of all constructivist approaches are norms, values and (cultural/collective) identities. The international system, according to constructivist theories is not shaped by military power or economic interdependence, but by the norms and rules, which are products of intersubjective interactions (Wendt 1992: 391–425). States

and the international structure affect each other. Unlike the realist or intergovernmental approach, constructivism believes that this connection is mutual. International organisations can be either dependent or independent variables, or simply being norm-makers or norm-takers.

Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argued that organisations have their own realm. They "are bureaucracies that have authority to make rules and so exercise power […] such bureaucracies can become obsessed with their own rules, producing unresponsive, inefficient, and self-defeating outcomes. Authority thus gives international organizations autonomy and allows them to evolve and expand in ways unintended by their creators".

Both the concept of Wendt and Barnett and Finnemore serves as a bridge between the realist and liberal understanding of international organisations. What is different from mainstream theories and post-structural constructivism is the question of responsibility. Constructivism criticises structural approaches because of their blindness to ethical problems. The decision on war and peace has always been in the hands of men. Even if we accept the effects of security organisations on the international system, political responsibility is always a burden of decision-makers. And they are always free to choose international cooperation over conflict.

Conclusions

International (security) organisations can be either the cause or the consequence of peace in international relations depending on the theoretical viewpoint. Realists believe in the supremacy of power and the primary role of states, when it comes to international politics. Thus, they see organisations as the derivatives of state behaviour, nonetheless important actors to maintain the *status quo,* which favours the current hegemon. The liberal approach on the other hand argues that international organisations create norms, and behavioural patterns on their own, adopt rules, which are costly to break, hence they contribute to international peace significantly. Constructivism highlighted the flaw in the logic of structural theories, both realism and liberalism. They argued that 'anarchy [in international systems] is what states make of it', so cooperation and conflict is everything but inevitable consequence of the feature of international system (WENDT 1999). Following this logic, it is quite clear that neither the international (security) organisations nor the nation states are responsible for peace or violence alone. Inter-subjective processes (agent/structure model), slowly changing (cultural/political) identities, and of course the actual people (politicians) are responsible for certain decisions in international politics.

International organisations have formed part of our lives since 1945, and regardless of our theoretical viewpoint, they must be considered important variables of analysis. Naturally, the UN is the most important organisation related to international security by providing guidance on international law, facilitating peaceful negotiations between nation states, and as a last resort it is entitled to enforce peace by any means if necessary. Intergovernmental regional institutions cover all our world from the Pacific (ASEAN, SCO, Pacific Alliance), the Euro-Atlantic area (NATO) to the Middle East and Africa

(Arab League, African Union, SADC). Some of them are primarily defence alliances like NATO and SCO or contributing to international security by providing peacekeeping forces like the AU, or the EU.

For small and middle-sized states like Hungary, with an economy very open to world markets, membership in different international organisations is one of the most important tools for survival. Either from the realist, liberal or constructivist perspectives it is quite logical for Hungarian leaders to enhance partnerships and connectedness as much as possible. The first step to achieve this goal is to understand the nature and functioning of those institutions, and hopefully this book will contribute to this process as much as possible.

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