

UN Peace Operations

Introduction

Peace operations are one of the most visible and well-known activities of the United Nations, despite the fact that peace operations do not figure as such in the founding document of the organisation. They evolved during the practical application of the UN Charter. The regulations which stand the closest are in Chapters VI and VII. Chapter VI is on the pacific settlement of disputes (let it be via negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, with the help of regional agencies, etc.), whereas Chapter VII is entitled *Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression*. Article 39 in fact empowers the Security Council to evaluate and decide on the nature and seriousness of a conflict, whether it is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression and make the necessary steps (diplomatic, economic or other non-military sanctions and ultimately, the use of force). Peace operations tend to be between peaceful settlement and the use of force, that is between Chapters VI and VII, and are often referred to as Chapter VI and half, a term attributed to the 2nd Secretary General of the organisation, Dag Hammarskjöld (UN 2008a).

Different generations of peace operations

UN peace operations have been going on since the end of the 1940s. The change in the international environment, in the nature and number of conflicts as well as experience gathered over the decades led to the evolution of these activities. Accordingly, different generations of peace operations are distinguished “on the basis of three main factors: the level of force used by the operations’ military pillar; the type and depth of the tasks conducted by its civilian pillar; and in case of the latest generation, increased UN load-sharing with regional organizations” (KENKEL 2013: 125). Despite these criteria, it is not easy to draw a clear line between generations (KIANI 2004: 177; KENKEL 2013: 124), due to the fact that there is a constant development of these activities. Generations are built upon each other, and even within one mission it is possible to find various generations of peace operations. Hence, there exist various classifications, using 3, 4 or 5 generations (ERDŐS 2013; SZENES et al. 2019: 15–16). Nonetheless, there is a consensus on the important change that has been taking place in peace operations, which tended to shift from a more passive, reactive approach to a more pro-active one, growing both in size and complexity.

First generation peace operations, also called traditional or limited peacekeeping, cover the deployment of a small UN force with a restricted mandate to be positioned between opposing forces to monitor the ceasefire, separate the two sides and prevent

any possible recess to armed conflict. Tasks could also include monitoring demilitarised zones and borders. The goal is to prepare the ground for a political solution (MOLNÁR 2019: 35; SANDLER 2017: 1879; HILLEN 1998: 22). The above-mentioned operations were launched in case of interstate conflicts in the Cold War. UN forces were required to display a neutral stance in the conflict and they were not allowed to use arms unless in self-defence. Requisites for the deployment of the UN mission included the agreement of all involved parties, in particular the host states. Most of these operations were created by the Security Council, for example the United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) established by the Security Council Resolution no. 47 in 1948 to supervise the ceasefire between the two countries; and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was set up by Security Council Resolution no. 50, also in 1948, following the Arab–Israeli War. However, due to reduced cooperation among the veto-wielding powers (P-5) in the Security Council in the Cold War, the body was rendered ineffective on various occasions. Consequently, in 1950 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 377, also called *Uniting for Peace*, which allowed it to circumvent the deadlock in the Security Council by permitting the General Assembly to enter a special emergency session in case of necessity and thus establish peace operations. Resolution 377 has been evoked few times, because, by leaving it aside, it erodes the power of the Security Council, one of the main bodies of the UN; and therefore, it could weaken the organisation as a whole. Yet, for example in 1956, it was resorted to. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was created by the General Assembly to help solving the Suez Crisis.

The end of the bipolar confrontation went on in parallel with the end of various civil wars which resulted in an increased need for UN operations. This was also a time of improved international relations when the P-5 could work together more efficiently in the Security Council, facilitating UN activities. All the above resulted in a spectacular growth in peace operations. Deployed peace missions grew more than threefold (from 5 to 17) between January 1988 and December 1994. During the same period the military personnel sent to these operations increased more than sevenfold (from 9,570 to 73,393) and civilian police sixtyfold (from 35 to 2,130) (UN 1995). This clearly shows a shift in the composition of UN forces, which corresponded to a change in goals.

The missions from the end of the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s are usually called *second generation peace operations*, or multifunctional operations in which military duties were complemented by civilian ones (HILLEN 1998: 140–141), carried out by non-military personnel in order to help political transition and settlement. These tasks could include the organisation of referendums and elections and activities related to refugees, reintegration of ex-combatants into society, disarmament, demobilisation and government capacity building (KENKEL 2013: 129). The spectacular surge in the number of police was due to the need to provide law and order in the post-conflict period and also train local forces.

There tended to be a big gap between the ambitious goals of these missions and the available resources, especially financial ones. Another challenge was that second generation peace operations did not have a wider mandate with respect to the use of force,

compared to first generation ones, which meant that their degree of accomplishment depended heavily on the attitude of the host countries. Peace operations such as United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) or the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) achieved considerable success. The decade of the 1990s, however, also brought about the biggest fiascos in UN peacekeeping: the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Srebrenica massacre in 1995 and also the heavy losses that UN forces suffered in Somalia.

Secretary General Kofi Annan insisted in a 1998 speech that “while impartiality is a vital condition for peacekeeping, it must be impartiality in the execution of the mandate, and not just an unthinking neutrality between the warring parties” (UN 1998). The painful experience of the 1990s and the lessons learnt contributed to the evolvement of *third generation peace operations* or peace enforcement operations. They typically appeared in case of failed states where there was no stable central government to call for UN involvement. As the name peace enforcement suggests these operations moved away from the original idea of self-defence only, to imposing some kind of force. The importance of the security of states started to be overshadowed by a shift in the security paradigm towards what the UN Human Development Report of 1994 introduced as human security, which increasingly linked the concept of security to individuals rather than to territories and states and stressed the importance of development over arms.

Fourth generation peace operations are usually “robust peacebuilding operations that combine elevated permission to use force with enhanced civilian tasks” (KENKEL 2013: 132). They can even result in a UN transitional administration, when the international organisation provisionally assumes the role of the government, for example in the case of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), both formed in 1999 (STROMSETH et al. 2006: 103–105). The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) also included tasks of similar nature. These missions are often carried out together with other organisations, such as NATO, EU or the African Union, and therefore could be considered fifth generation operations.¹

Increasing tasks, limited financial resources, better knowledge of local conditions by regional organisations as well as the reluctance to Western UN members to deploy great numbers of personnel to missions led to a desire for increased burden-sharing. These hybrid operations might be a) integrated (under single or joined command); b) coordinated (UN and other organisations have separate but coordinated command structures); c) parallel (no formal coordination among the participating organisations; and d) sequential (UN precedes or follows in time other organisations). However, their most important feature, underlined by the scholars Bruce Jones and Ferydal Cherif (2004: 17–18), is being highly flexible and *sui generis* in nature.

¹ For example, the African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), established in 2007.

Reform process of UN peace operations

Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali elaborated a report in 1992 entitled *Agenda for Peace*, upon the request of the Security Council, on preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping, adding a new, originally not contemplated field: post-conflict peacebuilding. The Secretary General emphasised that “since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead. The United Nations was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes – 279 of them – cast in the Security Council” (UN 1992), but the end of the Cold War, improved East–West relations could bring new possibilities of cooperation and was therefore an opportunity to seize. In 1995, on the 50th anniversary of the birth of the United Nations, he came up with a position paper: *A Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*. The purpose was not to correct or complement the previous report but “rather, to highlight selectively certain areas where unforeseen, or only partly foreseen, difficulties have arisen and where there is a need for the Member States to take the ‘hard decisions’” (UN 1995). At the turn of the millennium Secretary General Kofi Annan entrusted the ex-Foreign Minister of Algeria, Lakhdar Brahimi to lead a 10-member high-level panel to make a comprehensive review of UN peace and security activities and elaborate proposals (see DURCH et al. 2003; GRAY 2001: 267–288). The resulting 58-page Brahimi Report (2000) contained numerous recommendations, including better coordination among the Security Council, the Secretary General and involved states; the setting up of UN peacekeeping troops only when resources (human and financial) are available; clear and feasible mandates; good balance between mandate and resources; faster deployment of forces, among others. It also suggested a shift in financing, arguing that peacekeeping is a core function of the UN, therefore it should be financed via the biennial regular budget of the organisation (UN 2000: 33–34), a change that has not been carried out (yet).

There has been a constant reviewing of peace operations by the UN in the 21st century to improve them, set certain norms, and provide this crucial activity with more impetus and professionalism. In response to failures of UN peace operations and with the aim of preventing mass atrocities, the responsibility to protect doctrine (R2P), was adopted as an international norm at the UN World Summit in 2005. It declared the responsibility of the international community to act in order to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (UN s. a.). This was followed in 2008 by a document elaborated by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS), entitled *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, “a doctrine that sits on top of the large number of directives, guidelines, standard operating procedures, manuals and training materials issued by DPKO and the new Department of Field Support (DFS) over the years, not unlike the capstone of an arch or other structure that locks it together through the authority of its downward pressure” (DE CONING et al. 2008: 1). A year after, in 2009, the two above-mentioned UN departments disclosed a non-paper, called a *New Partnership Agenda. Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*. In 2010, a report of the Secretary General

called the *Global Field Support Strategy* was released. The document emphasised that “protecting and nurturing a fragile peace is a critical role of the United Nations”. The degree of success depends on the common work of various actors, in particular, “the Security Council, in terms of setting mandates; the Member States, in their commitment of personnel and financial and material resources; the host countries, and their consent and cooperation; and the Secretariat and its own ability to stand up, support and sustain operations” (UN 2010: 1). In 2014 Secretary General Ban Ki-moon set up a committee made up of 16 independent experts under the leadership of Nobel Peace prize winner East Timorese politician, José Ramos-Horta,² to propose reforms on peace operations. The resulting High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations submitted its report *Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People* in summer 2015. The HIPPO report (named after the acronym of the commission) stressed that “a number of peace operations today are deployed in an environment where there is little or no peace to keep. In many settings today, the strain on their operational capabilities and support systems is showing, and political support is often stretched thin. There is a clear sense of a widening gap between what is being asked of United Nations peace operations today and what they are able to deliver. That gap can be, must be, narrowed” (UN 2015: 9). The report contains numerous recommendations, including a “more field-oriented and people-centred” UN, building “stronger global and regional partnership for peace and security”, including “modalities for capacity enhancement and burden-sharing, as well as mechanisms for monitoring and accountability”. In autumn 2015, Ban Ki-moon disclosed his report, *The Future of UN Peace Operations*, to reinforce the recommendations of the HIPPO report and help change. The latest development of the 2010s was the Action for Peace (A4P) program, put forward by Secretary General António Guterres, coupled with institutional changes within the UN Secretariat. Accordingly, since 2019, peace-keeping operations have been supported through the Department of Peace Operations (forerunner: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1992–2019) and the Department of Operational Support (forerunner: Department of Field Support, 2007–2019).

Financing

Most peacekeeping operations are financed through a special budget³ to which UN member states must contribute based on Article 17 of the UN Charter. The rates of contributions are assessed on the capabilities (mainly economic) of the countries and the role they have in maintaining international security. Thus, the P-5 are required to pay more. The top contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations for 2020–2021 were the United States (27.89%), the People’s Republic of China (15.21%), Japan (8.56%), Germany

² (1949–). Minister of Foreign Affairs (2002–2006), Prime Minister (2006–2007), President of East Timor (2007–2012, 2022–).

³ The very first UN missions are exceptions, the UNTSO and the UNMOGIP are financed through the regular budget.

(6.09%), the United Kingdom (5.79%) and France (5.61%).⁴ Unlike the regular biennial budget of the UN, the peacekeeping budget cycle lasts only one year and runs from 1 July to 30 June. The approved peacekeeping budget for 2021 to 2022 was 6.38 billion USD. This has to cover operational costs (transport, logistics) and staff costs. Each country pays its own soldiers, whereas the UN provides them with a standard reimbursement. In July 2019 it was 1,428 USD per month per soldier.⁵

Statistics

From 1948 to date, the UN has established a total of 71 operations. As of 30 June 2022, there are 12 active missions around the world, with a total deployed force of 87,122 peacekeepers participating in these 12 missions. The distribution of actively participating peacekeepers is as follows: Experts on mission: 1,004; Police: 7,624; Staff Officers: 2,040; Troops: 62,936. Civilian personnel currently reaches almost 12 thousand people (11,996), added to the participation of UN Volunteers (1,264) (UN 2022).




Figure 1: Breakdown of United Nations peacekeeping forces by continent, 1990–2018

Source: Compiled by Rodrigo Guajardo based on the International Peace Institute: IPI Peacekeeping database (as of 29 September 2022)

Figure 1 presents a stacked area graph that details the total size of active UN peacekeeping forces between 1990 and 2018. An important initial predominance can be seen in

⁴ Source of data for the whole paragraph UN 2022.

⁵ To compare, the average monthly wage in the USA was 5,911 USD in 2021, whereas in Bangladesh it equalled to approximately 75 USD (World Data s. a.).

the contributions of European and Asian personnel with numbers peaking in the middle of the 1990s. After a nadir at the turn of the millennium, numbers started to increase again, but this time with growing proportions of African and Asian contributions which currently form the bulk of the contingents.

In terms of contributions by country, the Global South dominates the ranking: the current top three countries are Bangladesh (6,692), Nepal (5,790) and India (5,768). Each of the top 10 countries send more than 2,000 peacekeepers, China figuring on place 10 with 2,241. Devoted to UN goals, 176,000 km²-sized Uruguay with a population of only 3.5 million, is on place 18 (!), with a contribution of approximately 1,000 personnel (UN 2022). There is no Global North country in the top 20 contributors (in 2022).

Hungary participated in four missions as of September 2022: UNIFIL in Lebanon, UNFICYP in Cyprus, MINURSO in Western Sahara and UNMIK in Kosovo, with a total of (only) 34 personnel, including experts on mission, staff officers, troops and individual police.⁶




Figure 2: Ranking of contributions by country (as of 31 May 2022)

Source: UN 2022; UN s. a.

⁶ World Data s. a. For more on the course and evolution of Hungarian participation in peacekeeping operations see SZENES 2007: 121–133.

The number of personnel in UN missions shows a gradually decreasing tendency since the middle of the 2010s (Figure 3). However, the ratio among military personnel (over 70%), police, civilians and UN volunteers have not altered in a significant way.




Figure 3: UN peacekeeping total personnel, 2016–2022

Source: Compiled by Rodrigo Guajardo based on UN 2022

“To ensure that the uniformed component of United Nations peacekeeping is diverse and inclusive of women, reflecting the communities the United Nations serves” (UN 2018: 2), female participation is encouraged in missions. The proportion of women in the military component of peacekeeping operations have grown from 1.4% (December 2006) to 6.8% (October 2022) but is still low. In 2022 female uniformed personnel (military and police) made up 8.1% of the grand total (UN 2022). The Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018–2028 set the following ambitious goals: by 2028 the percentage of women serving in troop contingents should reach 15%; 25% in contracted military staff, 20% in Formed Police Units (FPU) and 30% among Individual Police Officers (IPO) (UN 2018: 4–6).

Regarding human losses, the total number of fatalities in all (71) peacekeeping operations since 1948 has been 4,210, a considerably low number compared to the total number of fatalities in (the 12) active operations: 1,553 (UN 2022). Behind this growth in fatalities, the most important reason is “the increases in the number and scale of UN peacekeeping operations” (SEET–BURNHAM 2000: 602). Additional factors include the location of the missions and more complex security environment. The most dangerous missions, according to fatality figures, are UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNAMID (Darfur) and MINUSMA (Mali) (UN 2022).

Table 1: Most important data of current UN missions in 2022

Mission	Location	Established	Total Personnel (2022)	Total Fatalities (as of Aug. 2022)	Top 3 military contributors (May 2022)	Top 3 Police contributors (May 2022)	UN Special Representatives	UN Force Commanders
MINURSO	Western Sahara	April 1991	456 (245)*	20	Egypt, Ghana, Pakistan	Ghana, Kenya	Alexander Ivanko (RU)	Commodore Faustina Boakyewaa Anokye (GH)
MINUSCA	Central African Republic	2014	16,241 (17,420)*	167	Bangladesh, Pakistan, Rwanda	Senegal, Rwanda, Cameroon	Valentine Rugwabiza (RW)	Lieutenant General Daniel Sidiki Traoré (BF)
MINUSMA	Mali	April 2013	17,612 (15,209)*	288	Bangladesh, Egypt, Chad	Senegal, Togo, Bangladesh	El Ghas-sim Wane (MR)	Lieutenant General Cornelis Matthijssen (NL)
MONUSCO	DR of the Congo	July 2010	17,783 (16,316)*	252	Pakistan, India, Bangladesh	Senegal, Egypt, Jordan	Bintou Keita (GN)	General Marcos De Sá Affonso Da Costa (BR)
UNDOF	Golan	May 1974	1,155	56	Nepal, India, Ghana	–	–	Brigadier General Anita Asmah (GH)
UNFICYP	Cyprus	March 1964	1,015	183	Argentina, UK, Hungary	Ireland, BIH, China	Colin Stewart (CA)	Major General Ingrid Gjerde (NO)
UNIFIL	Lebanon	March 1978	10,638 (13,000)*	325	Indonesia, Italy, India	–	–	Major General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz (ES)
UNISFA	Abyei	June 2011	2,433 (4,190)*	50	Ghana, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe	Rwanda, Kenya, Nigeria	–	Major General Benjamin Olufemi Sawyerr (NG)
UNMIK	Kosovo	June 1999	351 (18)*	56	Austria, Czech R., Germany	Germany, Russian F. Austria	Caroline Ziadeh (LB)	Major General Angelo Ristuccia (IT)
ISS	South Sudan	July 2011	17,982 (19,101)*	114	Rwanda, India, Nepal	Rwanda, Ghana, Nepal	Nicholas Haysom (ZA)	Lieutenant General Mohan Subramanian (IN)
UNMOGIP	India and Pakistan	January 1949	111	12	Croatia, R. Korea, Philippines	–	–	Rear Admiral Guillermo Pablo Ríos (AR)
UNTSO	Middle East	May 1948	387	52	Finland, The Netherlands, Switzerland	–	–	Major General Patrick Gauthat (CH)

Source: Compiled by Rodrigo Guajardo based on UN 2022

Note: *Total uniformed personnel.

UN stabilisation mission – Haiti case study

Haiti became independent of France in 1804, being the second independent state in the Americas after the United States. However, the peculiarity of this state is that its foundations lie in the remarkable revolution that began there with a massive uprising of the enslaved in 1791 (DUBOIS et al. 2020: 7), which did not only create Haiti as a sovereign country, but also turned its social structure upside down. This resulted in international isolation by France, supported by other European powers and the U.S. (SERRANO CABALLERO 2007: 183).

20th century Haitian history was marked by the family dictatorship of the Duvalier. François Duvalier came to power in 1957, appointing himself president for life in April 1964, and transferring this title at the end of his life, in 1971, to his son Jean-Claude Duvalier, only 19 years old then (COUPEAU 2008: 94). “Baby Doc” used his father’s dictatorial methods, plunging the country into further repression and hunger, which led almost a million Haitians to leave the country (PIERRE-CHARLES-GRÜNER 1999: 42; MARÍN SANABRIA – PAREJA BLANCO 2018: 96–97).

As a result of disturbances in November 1985, which caused the death of protestors at the hands of the police forces, new demonstrations began that quickly spread nationwide. Duvalier was forced to leave the country in February 1986. His fall was followed by a period of intermittent democratisation, linked to Jean Bertrand Aristide. However, he was overthrown via a coup d’état in September 1991.

The fall of Aristide generated an international response; an international mission of the United Nations was deployed in conjunction with the Organization of American States in 1993; after the Haitian political power agreement, a pact was celebrated to re-establish the lost constitutional regime. In this way, the first peace mission organised by the Security Council began in September of that year. So far, until 2022, six Peacekeeping Missions (PKO) and four Special Political Missions (SPM) have been deployed in Haiti under UN mandate (MARÍN SANABRIA – PAREJA BLANCO 2018: 97).

Until the late 1980s, traditional peacekeeping focused on ensuring security and stability. Since the early 1990s, UN peacekeeping operations have undergone a significant evolution in policies, mandates, functions and tasks, focusing primarily on peacebuilding. In this context, the case of Haiti exemplifies the changes and the lessons learnt by the UN.

As of 2022, there is still an active UN special political mission taking place on the island. Although UN presence did contribute to governmentality and to providing a more stable and secure environment, there is much to be done, as Haiti is still the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, whose growth potentials and stability are seriously endangered by widespread corruption (164 out of 180 countries in the 2021 CPI index) extreme levels of poverty (60% of the population lives under the poverty line), and low education (40% of the population cannot read or write) (CIA 2022).

Table 2: *Peacekeeping Missions (PKO) and Special Political Missions (SPM) in Haiti*

Mission	Type	Established	Total personnel	Military and police contributor countries
UNMIH	PKO	Sept. 1993 – June 1996	Initially it considered 567 United Nations police observers and a military construction unit with approximately 700 members, including 60 military instructors, reaching a maximum contingent (June 1995) of 6,065 troops and military support personnel, and 847 civilian police, supported by international and local civilian staff	Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Canada, Djibouti, France, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Mali, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, the Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and the United States
UNSMIH	PKO	June 1996 – July 1997	Initially it considered 600 military and 300 civilian police personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff (in addition, the UNSMIH military element included approximately 800 additional personnel), reaching a maximum contingent (Nov. 1996) of 1,297 military and 291 civilian police personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff	Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Canada, Djibouti, France, India, Mali, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States
UNTMIH	PKO	July 1997 – Nov. 1997	250 civilian police personnel and 50 military personnel (a number of additional military personnel, provided on the basis of voluntary funding, were also attached to UNTMIH's military component)	Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, the United States
MIPONUH	PKO	Nov. 1997 – March 2000	300 civilian police personnel, including a special police unit, supported by a civilian establishment of some 72 international and 133 local personnel and 17 United Nations Volunteers	Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, the United States
MINUSTAH	PKO	June 2004 – Oct. 2017	It considered an initial military force of 6,700 men, 1,622 civilian police officers, and additional civilian personnel; at the end of the mission (August 2016) the military component consisted of 2,361 troops and 844 civilian police personnel	Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, DR Congo, Equator, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Grenada, India, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Togo, Turkey, the United States, Uruguay, Yemen

Mission	Type	Established	Total personnel	Military and police contributor countries
MINU-JUSTH	PKO	Oct. 2017 – Oct. 2019	351 civilian staff, up to seven Formed Police Units (FPUs) (comprised of 980 FPU personnel) and 295 Individual Police Officers (IPOs)	Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Djibouti, El Salvador, France, Germany, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, the United States, Uruguay
MICAH	SPM	March 2000 – Feb. 2001	150 members, who unlike their MIPONUH predecessors, did not carry weapons	N/A
ONUVEH	SPM	Aug. 1990 – 1991	N/A	N/A
MICIVIH	SPM	Feb. 1993 – April 2000	N/A	N/A
BINUH	SPM	June 2019 – Active	N/A	N/A

Source: Compiled by Rodrigo Guajardo based on UN Security Council 2004; UN 2022

Conclusions

UN peacekeeping operations have existed since the 1940s and formed a crucial part of the activities of the United Nations. They have gone through a significant evolution during the course of time, and based on their principal characteristics, they can be grouped into different generations. Similarly to their past behaviour, peacekeeping operations will keep changing, evolving and adapting. Presently they need to cope with the post-Covid situation, the constraints on financial resources as well as with increasing global tensions and worsening relations among great powers, hindering cooperation and common action within the United Nations. According to Cedric de Coning (2021: 211–224), in the mid-term, peacekeeping operations will need to adjust to “geopolitical power shifts”. These could lead to more uncertainty and tensions, and paradoxically, an increased demand for peacekeeping activities. In the long run de Coning expects a change in the global order, to which UN peacekeeping would be able to adapt in a successful manner, also coping with new security challenges brought about by climate change and the emergence of new technologies, among others.

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