Foreign and Security Policy Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe

Edited by
PÉTER MARTON

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Meeting, Managing and at Times Failing Expectations: The Mixed Record of the Transformation of Foreign and Security Policy Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe

Péter Marton[1]

Abstract

The following chapter offers, first of all, a discussion of the countries overviewed in the present volume as to what may render it intriguing to examine similarities and dissimilarities between them, in how their foreign and security policy institutions evolved since the beginning of the 1990s. Secondly, it offers a list and an evaluation of the challenges commonly faced by these countries in the process, including the management of interethnic co-existence, lustration, civil-military relations, the downsizing of "people's armies", the acceptance of a "new security agenda", engaging in foreign military missions and participating in international burden sharing to the end of global public goods production, building interoperability with a view to this and other purposes, and the acceptance of the role of the civil society and public opinion in the policy process. Reflections on these issues are sought in the studies of this volume, and pointed out in decision-makers' thoughts as well as in formal strategic documents. As visible from the list, we understand institution building with reference to the concept of "institutions" used in the social sciences: i.e. for us, institutions are constituted by norms and rules, written or informal, governing the conduct of government and/or society in a specific issue area.

Introduction: On the sample of countries studied in the present volume

With the exception of Austria, given that it has effectively become a part of the West, even as a neutral country, all of the countries covered in the National University of Public Service's (NUPS) project, that the present volume of studies is a part of, have undergone democratic transitions along varying trajectories and to a varying extent, along with the introduction of market economics and general economic liberalisation.

The starting point for each of them was very different, of course.

Ukraine is the only post-socialist as well as post-Soviet country in the sample. Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are former constituent members of larger

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entities, i.e. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia – separation here occurred according to a largely ethno-centric logic and the related quest to build independent nation states in a cultural sense; at the same time real and perceived grievances as to what was not fair about the previous co-existence in a single state with the other parties involved also informed the strategic choices of the key actors in the process.

The change of system proceeded differently across the cases in the volume: e.g. in Poland and Hungary, negotiated transitions occurred, leading at first to an only partially free arrangement of elections in Poland, but leading directly to free elections in Hungary; Romania, in contrast, saw violent upheaval and the execution of the head of the party state.

The departure of Soviet troops was strongly wished for. They were generally not too reluctant to depart from Hungary (albeit this also took a long drawn-out process, and at times highly petty negotiations about financial and other details), whereas in Ukraine the presence of nuclear assets of the former Soviet Union, largely under the control of predominantly Russian forces, was a far more delicate situation that eventually required international mediation and involvement to guarantee a favourable outcome – favourable at the time; notwithstanding the fact that in 2014 the concerning international agreement, the Budapest Memorandum, was quickly superseded by developments, to put this mildly.

Amidst all the differences (and more that may be rightly pointed out) it is also worth focusing in an opening chapter of this kind on the points that may connect the countries studied in this volume. Even as starting points as well as current positions show significant variation, the processes that unfolded in the region, and the challenges faced during their course, were not so dissimilar as to not allow for the identification of certain common features as organising principles for interpreting the contents of the present book.

Unfortunately, not all of the countries mentioned above will be covered in this particular volume. NUPS launched what is in regional terms a megaproject: a quest to produce a 10-volume series on various aspects of foreign and security policies of Central and Eastern European countries.[2] Finding suitable authors, in a region where the number of competent experts (the larger set), those with adequate writing skills in English (a smaller set), and those available at the time (an even smaller set) is limited, proved to be a tough challenge; all the more so in a context where editors of the ten volumes competed with each other, to some extent, in trying to recruit members of the smallest set alluded to above. Accordingly, some chapters were left un-included in the present volume. This shall, hopefully, not detract from the value of this volume as a compilation of studies that may allow for drawing certain conclusions regarding common patterns and key differences with a comparative logic in mind.

It is to this end that below a discussion follows about the challenges commonly faced by the countries of the region in the institution building process that has taken place since the beginning of their transformation, back in the 1990s. This may inform readers' expec-

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[2] A note concerning terminology: the term "Central and Eastern Europe" is preferred here to name the region in the focus of this study, as in fact neither the boundaries nor the names of regions (nor the fundamental issue of whether there *is* indeed a region to speak of in the first place) may be regarded as unquestionable, unambiguous, or even objective at all in any way. Regions are socially constructed in a process where key actors carry more influence than others (e.g. decision-makers, bureaucracies and scholars), but even these actors act to assert their influence under the impact of various incentives, ranging from geopolitical interests and career advantages to naïve beliefs.

tations, and may even advance certain conclusions, suggesting the formulation of some important lessons in advance – conclusions and lessons that the contributors' chapters will then confirm, qualify or possibly question, case by case.

Common challenges

The internal transformation of the countries concerned had to occur in a context that itself was transforming in major ways. The Cold War superpower conflict ended with a new era in the relations between the West and Russia ("East and West") under Russian President Boris Yeltsin's early period of leadership. Even as the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia seemed to threaten broader Central and Eastern Europe with the spread of instability affecting even powers external to the region (Western Europe and the U.S.), a whole wide world's problems were also reinterpreted with the sum of reinterpretations translated into a rationale for a "new security agenda".

From a "managerial" perspective on global governance, one often taken by Western leaders, the required tasks were clear: 1. help and incentivise the self-sought democratisation and liberalisation processes in Central and Eastern Europe as this corresponded with the fundamental values of liberal democracy and the progressive liberal utopia strongly informing expectations at the time; 2. contain the instability between these countries by confining it to the former Yugoslavia and eventually tackling it there as well, so that international stability may provide a permitting context for the realisation of the first objective (with a view to which Hungary and its neighbours were encouraged, even pressured, lightly, to sign so-called basic treaties regulating their relationships); 3. respecting the will of the countries concerned, but not independently of the West's own interests; to be integrated into the EU and NATO structures once this did not conflict with international stability; 4. transform them, i.e. modernise and enable them to become "security providers" as opposed to "security consumers", so they can ultimately serve as useful auxiliaries in dealing with the "new security challenges" arising on the peripheries of an unstable world globally.

As I have discussed elsewhere before in a conference paper (Marton 2007), a key question facing any external manager of processes in Central and Eastern Europe is formulated in the language of the English School of international relations, whether the countries of the region may form a society of states without the completion of cultural nationalist projects, or if – at least in certain places – certain local actors' ethno-nationalist utopias (of "ethnically pure(r)" nation states) may need to be tolerated; in other words, whether in governing the region one can strive without compromises for a society of states where states are neutral providers for their citizens (as democratic standards demand).

In the end, the results are mixed. In the Visegrád countries – albeit admittedly not without their actually increased ethnic homogeneity in the wake of the post-World War II changes – democracies have been built that generally give equal rights to their citizens and where ethnic clashes are not present for the moment. This, however, is not to say that conditions have always been, or are perfect within them. Slovakia under the Mečiar era springs to mind, with its markedly more ethno-centric approach to nation building; or in fact, the general conditions of the groups of Roma populations in the countries where they are present in larger numbers (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania).

Elsewhere, in the former Yugoslavia, the issue of interethnic coexistence had drastic and violent implications that are so obvious they may require no extensive commentary. In Ukraine, the issue of the Crimean Peninsula, and the presence of ethnic Russians there, was in effect a long-simmering conflict that culminated in the annexation of the area by Russia, the issue of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers being a general factor of vulnerability for the fragile Ukrainian state – a fault line that Russia proved more than willing to instrumentalise with a view to its own interests, and one that does not help Ukraine's relationship with its other ethnic minorities, including Poles and Hungarians.

Besides the issue of whether the newly independent (Ukraine) or "newly truly autonomous" (NI and NTA) states (post-socialist countries of the former Eastern bloc) would be willing or capable to become neutral providers for their citizens, the completion of the democratic project faced other challenges as well, of course.

Not without significance to NATO, intelligence and military reform (as well as the reform of governance in general) had to grapple with the dilemmas posed by the continued presence of the officials, officers and agents of the former socialist party regimes. Certainly not all of those concerned were of an unamenably or inflexibly anti-democratic view of the world, and many may have been genuinely ready to work towards the reformulated goals of their NI and NTA countries. Even so, they posed the risk of the presence of anti-democratic elements, as well as influencers and informants connected to Russia, too close to power for comfort. Per implication of these risks, they may have been in a position to destabilise politics, to obstruct democratic reforms, or to be complicit in democratic backsliding from case to case. Upon working with, and eventually becoming a part of the NATO alliance, it was also a concern that they may leak strategic sensitive information to third parties (mostly to Russia).

Having said that, lustration and the vetting of state civilian and military personnel occurred only partially and very unevenly across the countries concerned. The new political elites (where they were truly new elites) had to rely on the competences of these former bureaucratic elements. In many cases, the politics of the commemoration of, and even political parties' actual personal connections to the past have impeded this process, a case in point being Hungary itself where there is only incomplete transparency regarding the past up to this day.

A more often considered challenge in the transition process concerned one of the most obvious risks related to the possibility of a democratic reversal: a military coup d'état and takeover of government, not unheard of in the region, e.g. with a view to General Jaruzelski's regime in Poland in the 1980s, and events in Moscow in 1991 as well as 1993. This implication is frequently left undiscussed (at least in an explicit form), but is obviously relevant to the programme of reforming the "civil-military" relationship that was the focus of attention for NATO throughout the period of working with Partnership for Peace and, ultimately, NATO aspirant countries. It shall be no surprise that most of the chapters in the present volume give due (and, proportionally speaking, significant) attention to the subject.

A similarly important element of military reform was the need to downsize the large "people's armies" to smaller, and yet more agile forces, in an age when the general expectation with a view to the strategic competition is to have "leaner but meaner" forces that are sufficiently modernised and where personnel costs, accordingly, do not take up an overwhelming share of the defence budget. The wisdom of this is not, to this day, being revisited in any major way. Ending conscription was generally seen by many as being in conformity with a liberal social order where one may only willingly have to subject oneself to the workings of

a hierarchical authority-based institution such as the military. Up to this day, many issues regarding how the military may restrict one's political freedom remain to be settled decisively – noteworthy in this respect is how, upon the formation (and short-lived existence) of the paramilitary Hungarian Guard, the permissibility for a member of the military of belonging to organisations of civil society/voluntary associations became a subject of debate (Visnovitz 2010). The downsizing of armies and the end to conscription was only contested from time to time by more conservative political forces who may have seen a means of nation building and the building of social cohesion in mandatory military service, and – with more regularity – by fringe nationalist forces that may have seen an unwelcome weakening of national power in this (note how far right organisations, including paramilitary organisations in Hungary often make a point of referring to the past downsizing of the Hungarian military as the rationale for the need for some kind of societal self-defence capability as justification for their own existence[3]).

A more interesting, and actually strategic, question may be whether the "people's armies" of the past may have been better able to handle stabilisation tasks where time and again the modern, capability and effects-focused militaries have proved rather weak, e.g. in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as, to some extent, in the Balkans. A tentative answer may be that there is certainly power in the numbers, and that the culture of a people's army may perhaps permit better outcomes in societal engagement in target countries; nevertheless, the corruption generally seen in people's armies certainly would not have favoured sound operation, e.g. in the context of insurgencies or in a fragile multi-ethnic social environment.

With this question, we already arrive at the discussion of one of the more significant challenges remaining, with relevance to the reshaping of institutions and institutional practices: namely, the general transformation of the security agenda. As the chapters of this volume will show, eventually all countries of the region, not without a level of synchronisation with the leading Western powers and the evolving general consensus in NATO, unanimously mention new security issues in their national security and other strategic documents. Terrorism, energy security, state failure (and the implications of state weakness and state failure) are just some of the relevant examples of this. It may be documented that a whole new generation of leaders as well as bureaucrats was effectively re-socialised into thinking in according terms, open to the consideration of the newly incorporated items as the actual priority challenges facing the political community of the West. Others have joined in this, at least paying lip service to the importance of the canon and the related new ways of approaching the issue of security overall.

The capacity for and the readiness to engage in the military missions that stemmed out of the new thinking have been more uncertain at times. The need to stabilise the Balkan region was never significantly questioned by anyone in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan was already a bridge too far in some respects. The need to justify to the public as well as the international community at large the crossing of international law in Iraq, and even the mere presence of one's forces in a country as far away as Afghanistan, was a major challenge. When two Hungarian UXO (Unexploded Ordnance) specialists were killed in a short time in Afghanistan in 2008, one Hungarian politician, future Defence Minister István Simicskó opined that since no Afghan specialists

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[3]   See for example István Dósa, a former leading figure of the Hungarian Guard movement, saying this (Szegő 2007).

help Hungarians dispose of World War II-era unexploded ordnance in Hungary, Hungarians should not be risking their lives in Afghanistan either (STANGA 2008) – the implication being, when unpacked in its entirety, that comparatively poor Central and Eastern European countries that themselves require assistance in some respects, ought not sacrifice money and lives on trying to improve conditions in Afghanistan whose problems they are not in any way to blame for. In other words, while there was clearly a very rational effort in the quest by the West to turn the new Central and Eastern European allies into security providers in global missions themselves, and in fact they proved in many ways useful auxiliaries as such, this has not come without a sort of blowback in the way of negative sentiments in certain segments of the public concerned as well as politicians and decision-makers.

Note that the discussion of the above problems only concerns the issue of being there in foreign missions, and does not yet imply that there is a readiness to think in terms of a burden sharing logic in the production of global public goods. For many in post-socialist countries, the West has remained the perennial benchmark in terms of what is a "rich country", a benchmark that in some ways they would always, up to this day and in the foreseeable future, fall short of, remaining "poor countries" as such, as "countries that have not benefited from the Marshal Aid" (as Western Europe did). Against such a backdrop, it is very hard to initiate an honest debate as to what exactly would constitute equitable burden sharing in efforts at global public goods production with the West – simple GDP-proportionate counts (as in the case of the defence budget), or troop numbers in foreign missions will not do but nominally. Leaders/decision-makers will often agree in principle to have this as key indicators of how much a country is doing in a given military mission or in general for the defence of the NATO Alliance, but both in their societies and (even) amongst decision-makers, negative sentiment is bound to remain as to whether anything may be rightly expected from these countries at all.

Even if working with the Alliance in its overseas missions is at times fundamentally questioned, there has, at least, never been any doubt about the need for the ability to operate together with the Alliance's forces, or more simply: as to interoperability, given the obvious utility of this in the eventuality of an attack on NATO or any of its members. The NATO security guarantee is still appreciated by the public across the post-socialist countries, and for this guarantee to amount to anything meaningful, interoperability is certainly required, as are efforts to get there (even as perfect outcomes are practically unattainable in this respect).

Finally, it may be worth it to devote a few words to certain open-ended processes that can be observed in the region at the time of writing this. There is, currently, worry about the finality and fullness of democratic consolidations, and, regardless of whether the criticisms in this regard are entirely correct, the role of the civil society is relevant to address in this context. In many countries, politicians do not hold back when criticising those NGO organisations' work that are critical of their own record in any way. They do not refrain from using the language of securitisation against them, deeming NGOs and the civil society a threat, in some cases even when speaking from authoritative state positions. This is worrying. NGOs should certainly not be above criticism. But if an independent civil society is criticised without fine distinctions, collectively, or when the aim of this is apparently to decrease pressure on governments to be transparent about their activities, or when the possibility of restrictive legislation, looking to curb NGOs' activities, is looming, and when all of this takes place in an atmosphere of public hostility stoked up against NGOs, that is detrimental to democracy.

This may be particularly important to note in a region where civil society actors have never had great influence on policy-making – in fact, the policy process has been characterised by an avoidance of public debates and decision-making in informal cabinets is more the rule than the exception.

On the structure of the book and the composing chapters

The ensuing studies follow a simple and (hopefully) highly convenient, three-fold structure (besides the alphabetical ordering of countries assessed in the respective chapters).

The chapters of this book will thus provide, firstly, a historical overview of how the dominant security/threat perceptions evolved since 1989, with reference to how official documents reflected these changes (including a view to domestic threats, if applicable). The concerning sections will also introduce readers to the major foreign policy decisions taken during the period in question, reorganisations of the most relevant ministries and state agencies, with special regard to the ministries of foreign affairs and defence, reforms in the field of defence and the military, and in the field of intelligence, as well as the fundamental trends relating to budgetary conditions – the latter having key relevance for any drive for the modernisation of militaries, for example.

This is then followed by a consideration of the key stakeholders in decision-making. The key actors in the field of executive power are discussed, providing an introduction of the institutions in foreign and security policy at present, including the competences of the Head of State/Government, their cabinet(s), the relevant ministries and other agencies, and the organisation of the military. The section also outlines how this is determined and affected by constitutional rules and other relevant legislation. Furthermore, attention is also paid to key domestic interest groups with any observable significance in the field of security policy, as well as to the dynamics and impact of public opinion.

The third and final parts of the studies in this volume will then offer the readers two detailed case studies each. The authors were requested to present one case of a major foreign policy decision that they mention in the overview of their case at the beginning of their chapters, and one other, lesser known case, to thus illustrate the role of key actors and factors examined in the first two sections of their studies.

The countries covered in this volume are, understandably, highly different in some respects, and case selection could not always follow the simple scheme explained above – deviations were therefore flexibly tolerated, in the interest of the reader, as in some of the chapters cases selected based on alternative considerations may have been either more informative, more illustrative of key points that the authors sought to make, or, simply, more convenient to discuss – e.g. if these could be significantly better documented than other cases where decision-making and the role of different actors and factors may have been too obscure. As is often the case in Central and Eastern European countries.

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Key Actors, Institutions and Decision-making in the Croatian Foreign and Security Policy

Zvonimir Mahečić[1]

Abstract

Building the security sector related institutions and organisations in Croatia as a part of the much wider democratic transition of the country at the beginning of the 1990s was a very difficult and not always and entirely a successfully implemented task, marked among other issues by the looming and protracted war and defence of the country. Unfortunately, during this process, up until today – one could even argue especially today – one of the most important weaknesses is the level of achievements in the fields of democracy, rule of law, human rights and political freedoms, already existing among the nations of the democratic world. It could be argued that even today, almost 30 years after achieving independence and spending the same time trying to reform its security sector (SSR), Croatia still has underdeveloped security institutions, comparatively low standards of transparency, accountability and openness. It is sometimes hard to say if security sector actors are dominating the political structures or the political structures are abusing and misusing security sector structures for their own purposes and benefits. Even worse, quite often it looks like political structures are not pursuing their policies for the benefit of the majority of the citizens, especially those vulnerable among them, but are pushing strongly to appease those with the most rigid and conservative political and societal agenda. Accession to NATO and the EU had some beneficial effects during the pre-accession period, when Croatia was obliged to show improvement in all required fields. Afterwards, it reverted to the prior state of affairs and even deteriorated in many respects.

Introduction

Croatia started its life as an independent state full of hope for a better future. According to some studies at the beginning of the 1990s, we were the third most successful and today we may be the second worst transitional state (Podgornik 2017). Great hopes were invested in the transition to a democratic political system as well as the introduction of the free market economy. Alas, unlike most other post-socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe, where the change of the political system signalled the starting point of deeper changes in their societies (Anderson et al. 2000), Croatia had to take a more difficult path, marked,

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among other elements, by the fight for its survival by military means, as well as the fight for recognition of its sovereignty and territorial integrity within the framework of international organisations and bilateral international relations.

Historical overview

The analysis of the process of the security sector reform (SSR) in the Republic of Croatia could be broadly divided into sections covering five major periods. The key events and activities undertaken during these periods mark more or less significant milestones that have determined the way Croatia – its society and political and security institutions developed. The periods to be considered are as follows:

- 1990–1995: Attack and aggression on the Republic of Croatia, the occupation of more than one quarter of the country's territory, the first multiparty elections, forming the Armed Forces and the intelligence agencies and other security-related institutions as a part of the much broader initiation of the national state building process
- 1995–2000: The end of the war and liberation of the occupied territories, peaceful reintegration of the rest of the occupied territories, death of the first president, Franjo Tudjman, and consequently the end of the reign of the HDZ (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica* – Croatian Democratic Union)
- 2000–2016: The end of the semi-authoritarian regime, changing the role and the authority of the President of the country and giving more strength and influence to the Government, ensued by three changes of government, the first of these subsequent governments led by the SDP (*Socijal-demokratska partija* – Social Democratic Party), the second by the HDZ, and the third by the SDP again; the beginning of what, at least initially, seemed like real transition, with the beginning of the process of accession to the Euro-Atlantic community (firstly accession to NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and later to the EU, the European Union)
- 2016 – present: Institutional hiatus and backwardness in terms of the social and ideological values informing governance in a broad sense, with the strong influence of a rigid conservative right wing (politicians and small political parties connected to the HDZ and the Catholic church)

Croatia's security sector and its armed forces in particular had been built from scratch, although the framework of the Republic's territorial defence and its militia from the time of the former Yugoslavia served as the first building blocks in the process. The first form of anything resembling the armed forces was created in the first half of 1991 under the auspices of the ZNG (*Zbor Narodne Garde* – Croatian National Guard).[2] ZNG was initially placed under the organisational and institutional structure of the Ministry of the Interior mostly because of political and legal reasons, while its units were under the operational command of the Ministry of Defence.

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[2] The Decree of the formation of the Croatian National Guard was approved on 18 April 1991.

Obviously, the fact that two ministries were responsible for the same structure compounded to operational and practical problems encountered at the time. Additionally, the human capital of the newly formed structure was dubious at best, on the one hand because of the lack of trained military personnel in operational as well as staff positions alike, and, on the other hand, because a pretty visible friction existed between the so-called "new soldiers" and those inherited from the army of the previous state.

However, the most important hindrance, strongly felt not only during the war, or in the years immediately following the war, but even today, was the fact that the complete security sector structure was fighting in a very unfavourable environment for the protection of the state and its citizens, fighting obviously a much stronger and better-equipped adversary. In such an environment, given the almost sacrosanct importance of the security sector, its organisational structure and the quality of its personnel went undisputed. Coupled with democratic deficits inherited from the previous state, an atmosphere was created in which it was very difficult, even impossible, to promote the idea of democratic oversight of the security sector, while control over security institutions was abused to serve the needs and ideas of the then President and the ruling party (HDZ).

This was especially troublesome in case of intelligence and counterintelligence structures, whose personnel showed in way too many cases an almost criminal behaviour. For example, they frequently claimed apartments used by former or then members of the Army, confiscating their property illegally. Also, the lack of clear legal provisions, less than clear command authority and the overlapping authority of several state agencies effectively reduced the ability of civil society organisations and other components of the civilian sector to work for the benefit of citizens and society as a whole (Zunec–Domisljanovic 2000, 125).

So the first moment when there was a realistic possibility that Croatia could finally undertake the path of serious SSR and democratic institution building came only after the SDP-led coalition of six political parties won the parliamentary elections in the very beginning of 2000. They consequently ousted the HDZ from power, and soon after this their candidate, Stjepan Mesić, won the presidential elections. All of this happened following the sudden death of Franjo Tudjman.

Four key issues were needed to be solved in a fast and effective manner.

Firstly, during the first ten years of its existence, Croatia had a semi-presidential political system with a lot of power concentrated in the hands of the President of the Republic and delegated by him to his staff, sidelining the Government in many issues. Parliament served as a mere rubber-stamping machinery for the decisions of the President.

Secondly, and following from the above, there was a need to finally place much more authority in the hands of the Parliament. Not only regarding the passing of legislation but also at least as importantly in shaping in general the policies and strategies pursued by the state institutions.

Thirdly, there was little in the way of opportunity for the civil sector or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), to take a proper role in the process of preparations and public discussions of major decisions and strategic documents. This was key for the civil society to take its rightful role and position within the process of the democratic oversight of the security sector institutions and state bodies as a whole.

Fourthly, there was a need to try to catch up with the other transitional states on their way to accession to NATO and the EU. Because of the blindness of the leadership during

the first ten years of independence, being also, partially, the result of the protracted war, all attempts to join these two organisations were stalled to the point that external observers had to wonder if the Croatian leadership was actually expecting to be begged to join. Of course, this affected very negatively foreign and security affairs and relations, which was never more apparent than during the protracted quarrel with Slovenia about the border in the Bay of Piran or *Savudrijska vala*. Not to mention that this element also contributed greatly to the lack of an attempt to improve the state of affairs in the field of the democratic oversight of the security sector institutions. All of this contributed significantly to the overall lack of transparency and accountability of the security structures (Zunec–Domisljanovic 2000, 127–133).

Only the first issue has been more or less successfully resolved by stripping the President of the Republic of overly excessive powers. In the two other fields, progress has been symbolic at best, and there may have been backsliding, even, when it comes to the effort some politicians and parties invested in sidelining NGOs and in hindering their attempts to carry out their roles, by constantly reducing available financing and putting every imaginable obstacle in their way. At the same time, Croatia's accession to the EU has been dealt by crushing blows repeatedly, and only the agreement on international arbitration managed finally to calm down tensions, thus giving Croatia the opportunity to become member of the EU.

Instead of a serious attempt at SSR, there was a practical and pragmatic emphasis on the reduction, i.e. the downsizing of all security sector organisations, most notably the armed forces, coupled with overzealous attempts at cost-cutting, to the point where the sheer functionality of these organisations was imperilled. Military spending, for instance, which initially (during the war and shortly thereafter) reached more than 8% of GDP,[3] has been reduced to approximately 1.5% of the GDP by today. There is a lot of talk every now and then that security and military expenditure in particular should be brought back to the level of 2% of GDP, which is considered by many as a requirement in NATO. However, it is not really clear at what costs to the other chapters of the state budget this could be achieved, having in mind the protracted, long-lasting economic crisis and stagnation that Croatia is passing through. While it cannot be disputed that the processes of reduction, reorganisation, cost-cutting and downsizing were necessary, unfortunately they were at the end presented and used as replacement, as "Ersatz" for the real transformation that would have been necessary.

What followed at home were constitutional changes that have taken place in the 2000s. These reduced the excessive authority of the President of the Republic. In the international arena Croatia began the process of accession to NATO, and later the EU, through the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). As an interim step, Croatia became a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) during the first half of the 2000s, and later became an active participant within the framework of the Membership Action Plan (MAP). This was to show to the nation "the light at the end of a tunnel" and to stimulate pro-European forces to undertake whatever was necessary to finally qualify Croatia for membership in the two organisations. After protracted negotiations made even more of a

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[3] Although this has to be taken with a grain of salt because during the war and the existence of the semi-presidential political system, it was very hard to obtain real figures which thus could have been quite possibly even bigger.

chore by right-wing conservative hardliners and their supporters within society, and also by blocks thrown frequently on our path to the EU membership by Slovenia because of the unresolved question of the borders, Croatia became a member of NATO in 2009 and a member of the EU in 2013.

Also during the same period, Croatia for the first time produced a National Security Strategy (Narodne Novine 2002), passed by the Parliament in 2002, and renewed after a lot of struggle and failed attempts mostly due to political manoeuvring in 2017. In the meantime, Croatia also passed a Strategic Defence Review in 2005, and again in 2013 (Narodne Novine 2013), and these documents were mostly taken as replacements for the National Security Strategy in the absence of its long-protracted update and upgrade. The most visible result of all the bargaining and the less than qualified discussions within the political structures among the media and the general public was the abolition of military conscription and the change to an all-volunteer force during the first half of the 2000s. Yet renewed attempts appeared at the time of writing this article by some politicians to promote a return to conscription.

In recent years, a major trend that may be observed is a conceptual shift, with less than fully understood and appreciated implications, to the notion and concept of homeland security, instead of national security and/or human security. This topic alone is something that could speak volumes about the intentions of at least a part of the political nomenclature, because it shows how our political leaders are more than willing to go wherever their counterparts from countries considered "strategic partners" would lead them.

Stakeholders in the decision-making process

The majority of the security sector institutions have been established in the years following independence, but obviously, the beginning of the process took place during the time of war. Clearly, a wartime environment does not represent the most favourable framework for such an endeavour. After the year 2000, however, finally some steps have been taken in the process of accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures. From that point onwards, the process of adjusting the institutional framework of the security sector went hand in hand with the processes of accession to NATO and the EU. The merger of these processes had strong beneficial effects for the development of the state institutions in general and the security sector structures in particular.

The main stakeholders, institutions and organisations alike, within the framework of the security sector are:

- The Croatian Parliament
- The Government of the Republic of Croatia
- The President of the Republic of Croatia
- The National Security Council
- The Office of the National Security Council
- The Council for the Coordination of Counterintelligence and Intelligence Agencies
- The Operational and Technical Centre for Surveillance of Telecommunications
- The Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia
- The Counterintelligence and Intelligence Agency

- The Military Counterintelligence and Intelligence Agency
- The Council for Civilian Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies[4]

The above list represents the result of the protracted changes within the security sector framework. During the last quarter of the century, some of the stakeholders were merged, cancelled or established anew, according to the needs and beliefs of the then political elites, and also according to the relative power of the political institutions and political parties. For instance, the National Security Council started its life as a National Defence and Security Council headed by the then President of the Republic, and only in 2002 became known by its present name when the Government got a more prominent role in deciding security matters. Also, initially there were four intelligence/counterintelligence agencies – two civilian and two military, and today there are two with attempts to move everything under the auspices of the so-called Homeland Security Structure.

While it could be interesting to speak at great lengths about the institutions themselves and their historical development, it is much more important to understand their roles, especially those focused on achieving democratic control and oversight of the security sector. The main institution tasked with legal and democratic oversight of the defence and intelligence structures is the Parliament as the legislative body.

However, the civilian oversight of the security structures is described very vaguely in the Constitution and the corresponding laws. Democracy may depend less on the occasional parliamentary and local elections. What may be more important is to have a firm structure of independent non-governmental organisations that will constantly monitor the development within and between the state structures and react accordingly if they notice abuse or misuse of power and authority.

The Parliamentary Council for Civilian Oversight of the Security and Intelligence Agencies is a body with representatives of almost all of the important branches of society (academia, civil society, media, etc.). It is supposed to play its role on behalf of the civil society, but in reality, it plays its role mostly to the "benefit" of the major political party/parties and its leadership. The HDZ is the biggest culprit here because formal and informal connections of the party leadership with members of the security agencies have been well documented and widely known publically. After all, heads of the important branches and departments within the security structures are dominantly coming from the ranks of the HDZ. Once it was established by civilian experts and analysts, its work had been faced with a kind of informal or unspoken disregard at the beginning of the 2000s, and the chairman of the committee had resigned. Worse, after this the Council continued its work, while officially not electing a new chairman, under the oversight of the Parliamentary Committee for Internal Affairs and National Security, which was a far cry from the initial intentions and expectations, and practically subjugated it to another body of nominally equal importance and position. It is clear that such a resolution of affairs for all the practical consequences abolished its democratic independency. Formally, democratic oversight exists, but the civil society is largely sidelined in the process.

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[4]   These stakeholders represent only the most important institutions and do not represent the Security Sector in its entirety.

As it turned out, NATO and EU accession not only did not guarantee improvement in this field, but what happened after the accession was a serious reversion to the habits known from the times when Croatia had a less than democratic semi-presidential political system. Most notably, instead of following the path towards more transparency and cooperation with other societal structures, we are again witnessing sidelining of the media and preventing the NGO's from having any insight in what the agencies are doing, and especially how they undertake their job.

The civil society, with a multitude of NGOs, is today in a much worse position, and its chances to have considerable impact are almost negligible. They are suffering from a lack of capacity and an inadequate political culture in which they are not perceived as welcome and equal partners from the side of state administration. They are often derided by some politicians and media outlets as national traitors if they point a finger to discrepancies or wrongful acts committed by the state structures. The war veterans, a group that acquired a lot of non-institutional might and power within the society, have a multitude of organisations, and all the financing they could wish for, but they seem to be organised mainly for the purpose of taking care of their own financial interests (pensions, privileges, etc.). For instance, Vukovar city that was completely destroyed during the war, with its roughly 30,000 inhabitants has 28 different veteran organisations registered (BRADARIĆ 2015), while the number at the national level reaches hundreds. They care only for the perpetuation of their own positions and the suppression of any opposing thought that could possibly ask questions about their role and significance today. They are today mostly supporters of the most rigid and conservative forces and ideas within the society and political system.

The Croatian Intelligence Agencies are formally accountable for policy and operations to the Heads of the State and the Government, President and Prime Minister. During the first decade of the new millennium, their management and guidance fell under the authority of the National Defence and Security Council, which was an *ad hoc* body consisting of the President, the Prime Minister and other high-ranking officials responsible for defence and security. However, this Council held its meetings very seldom, mostly twice in a year, usually only when some exceptional events took place with potentially very alarming or scandalous implications.

The operational accountability of the intelligence and counterintelligence structures was the responsibility of the Council for the Coordination of Intelligence Agencies, which held sessions very rarely. Financial accountability was in the hands of the Government and Parliament.

As for Parliament and its role in the democratic/legal oversight of the Security sector, it has to be said that for a quite prolonged period of time parliamentary bodies did not have a professional staff capable of offering expertise and support to MPs on issues related to national security. The same situation existed within the Government, whereby some groups within the intelligence structures, both formally and informally, were taking on the role of expert and advisory groups. Obviously, this cannot be understood as an independent advisory mechanism.

All of these problems are underlined and made even more alarming having in mind the roles and authorities of the Parliament. The Croatian Parliament, being the highest body of the legislative branch of power, enjoys a number of authorities in the field of national security. The Croatian Parliament decides on war and peace and also adopts the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy (Narodne Novine 2001, Article 80). Other au-

thorities, which are given to the Parliament in accordance with the same article, are being worked out in detail in the acts concerning national security, which, as an issue, is more or less considered within the frame of defence activities. Based on such a classification, Parliament is authorised to "supervise the work of the Government of the Republic of Croatia and other holders of public authority responsible to the Croatian Parliament, in conformity with the Constitution and Law". This illustrates that the Croatian Parliament has significant authorities in the field of national security.

The Constitution mentions some of the strategic documents and the role of the main political institutions in the process of their adoption, while the rest of the strategic doctrines, planning and operational documents, as well as the authorities and responsibilities of the political institutions, ministries and agencies in their preparation are prescribed by assorted Laws. For instance, the parliament is authorised to pass the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (the already mentioned Article 80).

While this may be considered a terribly important issue by some authors and academics, in reality it does not matter so much. Although looking quite clear and democratically acceptable, some of these norms are the results of the overzealous attempt of the Parliament to have a dominant role in certain issues that should have been left to the executive branch. In case of the Republic of Croatia, it could be argued that this came in compensation for the first decade of independence, when Parliament has been neglected in dealings of the security sector, for which amends were made after the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2000. The pendulum swung too far out on the other side, however, resulting in the outcome that the basic strategic, i.e. security and defence related documents were, and are still being passed by the Parliament.

The Parliament has the power of the purse in its hands, it appoints the ministers, it can start the process of revoking the whole Government, its Committees are strongly involved in the process of appointments of certain security and defence related officials as well as the preparation and advance discussion of security and defence policies, so it was not really necessary for the Parliament to insist on passing the country's key strategic documents. By doing so, Parliament loses the possibility to hold executive branch officials responsible for creating and pursuing wrong security and defence policies, because at the end of the day they were created by the Parliament itself. Having in mind that the Parliament can start the process of discharging any minister or high ranking official if not satisfied with the underlying policy, including the approach to the strategic documents, its involvement in the passing of the same documents cannot be considered a necessary or optimal solution, because in effect this mixes the authorities and responsibilities of different branches of state power.

Because of the public and media perception that security/defence structures and their personnel defended Croatia and its citizens during the war, which gave them some special position and aura within the society, nobody was really willing to give the issue of democratic control and oversight the appropriate importance. Such a position sits well among some members of the security and defence structures, especially soldiers who actively participated in the war, because it perpetuates their own high regard for themselves and makes it easy for them to retain privileges.

Croatia spent a lot of time and effort in battles fought between the Government and the President over who should have the upper hand in the decision-making process. The President of the Republic is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces, and the Government (through

the institution of a civilian minister) is in control of the security and military institutions under the MoD – budget, planning etc. This makes for a pretty strange situation where the Commander-in-Chief is responsible for the defence of the country but does not have a say when it comes to the armed forces' or intelligence agencies' planning, financing and budgeting. Not to mention that certain defence, intelligence and foreign affairs acts have to be signed both by the President and the Prime Minister which serves as a constant source of tension between them (for instance appointing heads of the intelligence agencies or ambassadors).

It could be argued that the printed and electronic media is largely free and independent at first sight. However, a clear division can be seen among the media when it comes to support to this or that part of the political spectrum, in the form of a strongly partisan outlook. Additionally, reporters are also dependent on the owners of the media, who at the end of a day pay their checks. Therefore, it is not a rare occurrence to hear reporters arguing that the level of freedom they enjoy today is significantly smaller than what they had during the last 10–20 years of Yugoslavia, which was, as we all know, run by the Communist party. At the end, security and defence issues are covered by the media in a pretty partisan and fan-like manner, with only the potential scandals receiving serious treatment, while reporters in general simply do not have knowledge or expertise to cover the security sector professionally and impartially.

It would be simple to say that SSR in Croatia falls predominantly within the category of a post-authoritarian context (BRYDEN–HÄNGGI 2004). This could be almost true if we would not see authoritarian tendencies among certain political parties and certain politicians in power even today. Furthermore, there is still a feeling of a general lack of interest in the security sector, owing to the fact that the society is more concerned with issues related to economy, employment and the standard of living of citizens.

Cases

It is almost impossible to choose the best cases, or the worst for that matter – or the most important case of misjudged long-term decision, policy and/or strategy. There were so many of the latter that may be candidates for this dubious title.

A noteworthy case is most certainly the Croatian involvement in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), along with the creation of parallel Croatian authorities, in what was an internationally recognised state. It was true that at some point the existence and territorial integrity of the BiH were in serious question, but everything official Croatian authorities did, led by Franjo Tudjman and the HDZ traded the image of the victim in order to appease the long-standing historical aspiration to parts of this country among hardliner nationalists in Croatia and BiH.

All decisions and their operationalisation were made by a handful of top political leaders and military commanders, starting with late president Franjo Tudjman and his Minister of Defence, Gojko Šušak. Citizens, representatives of the civilian community, and even most of the state representatives were not only asked for their opinion, but also expected to support the execution of a policy fraught with dangers by turning the blind eye. It could be argued that it was during wartime, and, as usual in circumstances like that, interests of national security prevail over all other rational considerations.

The sad truth is that decisions like these affect negatively and adversely not only the development of democratic processes, but also the development of the society as a whole. This can be best seen taking into account the sad state and treatment of professional journalism, media as such, and reporters. While independent media are often sidelined or sued in courts for large sums of money for very dubious reasons, the so-called public media organisations, printed and electronic alike, are abused and misused for particular political purposes and made servants of the political elite and parties. In such a circumstance, it is impossible to expect events of security, defence or international affairs to be treated impartially and professionally.

However, faced with a need to choose, we can underline two decisions as serious contenders for a dubious title of failed decision-making process and consequent decision.

The first is the saddest state of affairs regarding the conscript or professionally based armed forces. During the first ten years of its independence, Croatia had a conscript based military. When the SDP-led coalition won the parliamentary elections at the beginning of the 2000s, we witnessed frequent statements of the then defence leadership that conscript service had to be abolished.

Nevertheless, what we saw was quite a hypocritical approach to solving this issue. What then minister of defence did was to relax heavily the criteria for the so-called civilian service of the conscript obligation. Basically, before that time potential conscript soldiers were allowed to serve they conscript obligation as civilians, working in hospitals, taking care of the elderly population, based mostly on their religious beliefs and in very limited numbers.

Usually, up until then there were a couple of hundred applications annually for civilian service. After relaxing the criteria for civilian service, the very next year the numbers surged to a couple of thousand, and the third year to almost one third of the usual annual number of conscripts (in a region of 15,000–20,000).

After that, the leadership of the Ministry of Defence flatly announced that the Defence Law and the Law on military service in the armed forces would be changed because obviously (!) people do not want to fulfil their military conscript service. It was clear that politicians did everything to set the environment and then to use the obvious and only possible outcome as a proof and vindication for pursuing their agenda.

It was even stranger because two other elements had to be considered to get a better picture. First, political structures pushed very strongly the idea that conscript service was too expensive, and consequently Croatia, as a country that endured war and by then spent ten years in economic crisis and recession, could not afford conscript service. For them, having professional armed forces from their point of view was much cheaper and cost effective.

However, having in mind the sad state of affairs regarding the neglect of the military infrastructure, barracks, and the even worse state of affairs of the military equipment and armament, it was very strange to hear such explanations. Add to that the fact that conscript service soldiers are not on a pay roll and professional soldiers have to be paid reasonably well to ensure them not only the quality of life in the barracks but also of their families, therefore, the line of thinking politicians expressed was striking.

Second, being a country that had to go through a considerable war experience, politicians from the left and even more from the right side of the political spectrum liked very much to emphasise, especially during the process of accession to NATO, and afterwards, that new downsized and more efficient armed forces will include and implement the les-

sons and values of the war of independence in future strategic, doctrinal and operational documents. Although it may seem logical and seductive, when it came to clear delineation what those values and lessons were, things became a little bit fuzzier. In fact, no one ever produced a clear and comprehensive set of those values and lessons, let alone proposed how to implement them unequivocally within the framework of the reorganised and restructured armed forces.

That is not to say there was not at least one lesson and/or value that could have been drawn from the experience of fighting the war of independence. At the beginning of the war, during 1991, most of the heavy equipment, tanks, artillery, helicopters and fighting airplanes were in the hands of the attacking Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). Croatian forces could rely only on the very scarce source of light equipment and hand armament thus far stowed for the use of territorial defence. However, there was no shortage of personnel because almost every Croatian citizen had to spend from 12 to 15 months as a conscript in the JNA. So, when the war broke out, we had a large pool of relatively well trained soldiers, not only foot soldiers but also those trained for some specialities, anti-aircraft defence, communications, artillery, armoured vehicles, etc., and those in their 20s or 30s, coming relatively recently from the military service, represented the first line of defence, soldiers that could put the relatively scarce equipment to a good and effective use. That process was fostered once the newly born military and police units managed to seize some ex-JNA barracks with some heavy equipment. However, as if by a stroke of pen, suddenly all the important security and defence political and professional structures reached consensus that conscript service is no more needed and thus preventing Croatia of the possibility to rely on the pool of trained people in some future possible conflict, however unlikely it may seem.

However, the story does not end there, because just these days we are faced with the attempt of the HDZ political elite to reintroduce conscript service as a part of training of the military personnel for the future. While it was relatively easy to abolish it 15 years ago, it is not clear how and at what costs to the society it would be feasible to reintroduce it today, and especially what could be the effects and benefits of such a decision. Having in mind with a grain of salt that there was a marked conceptual change and departure from pursuing national security, accepting instead the concept of homeland security, one could only conclude that as the first decision had nothing to do with the eventual effectiveness of the armed forces, today's attempt to reintroduce conscript service and embrace the notion of homeland security, as some of our senior strategic partners from the international security also did, marked only the political agenda both in appeasing our partners while at the same time pushing the nation back towards a serious attempt of complete militarisation of all spheres of the societal and individual life.

The second decision fraught with problems and inconsistencies is the long protracted but relatively recently resolved (we will see how durable it is) issue of re-equipping the Air Force with new fighters. The Croatian Air Force is very small and the fighting element of this force relies heavily on the small fleet – at the best of times of double digits – of ageing MiG-21s. While usually there were 10–15 on paper, not more than half of this number was ever operationally capable. For instance, when Franjo Tudjman died while being the President of the country, during his burial ceremony three MiG-21s presented an honorary flypast, and these three were to the best of our knowledge half of the operationally capable fighters at that specific day.

There were occasional discussions during the last 10–15 years, within the armed forces and also in the public sphere about the need to buy one squadron of new fighters to retain the operational capability of protecting Croatian skies. In all the cases so far, these discussions would dwindle because no government so far had the courage, or better call it impertinence, to seriously think about purchasing new aircraft and spending intolerable amounts of money in such a grave economic situation.

Suddenly, the HDZ-led government started negotiation with a number of foreign companies requiring their official offers. At the end, the list was cut to two possible contenders, the Swedish Gripen and the Israeli modified American F-16. The Swedish company offered brand new aircraft while the Israelis offered second hand, highly modified and very extensively used aircraft. In defiance of common sense, the Government passed a decision recently and accepted the Israeli offer. Politicians pushed forward the point that the Israeli offer was cheaper. Nevertheless, it was only half of the truth because the cost of the aircraft alone was truly cheaper, but the lifetime cost of the Israeli offer was slightly larger. This fact gains even more importance having in mind that the life expectancy of the Israeli aircraft is just half of the life expectancy of the Swedish offer at best.

However, the Government also made a strong propaganda claiming that offset programs offered by Israel were better and more extensive. But, since no one was really able to see the content of those offers, because of its secretive nature, it is very hard to confirm or reject this claim. All of this reinvigorated fears among the public that we are again faced with an attempt of hiding information because at the root of the whole affair is again some kind of corruption. While this may or may not be true, it is hard to supress such an opinion as long as contracts like this are hidden from the public and a less then satisfying level of transparency is obtained.

So, the needs of the society are being completely dismissed and today we witness the reversion of all the processes we believed we successfully implemented during the times we were fighting to pass the scrutiny of the international community when we were in the midst of pre-accession talks with NATO and the EU.

Both decisions, conscript service and acquiring new fighter aircraft, were taken away from the influence of public and both could be only regarded as a way to appease our international partners while at the same time pushing forward the militarisation of the society as a whole. As such, both decisions fit nicely within the general and very visible pattern of changing the concept of security from National to Homeland… whatever that may mean.

Conclusion

The history of building security policy and its institutions in Croatia is mostly a history of lost opportunities and failures linked with occasional hopes in a better future before us. Unfortunately, instead of democracy, the build-up of the economy and overarching societal development, the result of this process for now is ideological backwardness, the strengthening of the discriminative tendencies in society, corruption, and a political elite that is only looking after its own interests, be they at home, in the short run, or in getting lucrative positions in the EU and NATO institutions sometime in the future. It has to be said that the HDZ is the main and most important, although not the only culprit setting the

tone for such a development. There are strong signs they are not, and do not want to be just one of the political parties – instead they behave and run politics using semi-authoritarian methods, while at the same time using and abusing each and every initiative within the wider societal network of independent institutions and organisations, from church to the very strong veteran groups. As a result Croatia, including its security policy, became a part of backward, conservative trends, not realistically sharing European democratic and civil values, running instead politics in accordance with what a few politicians think might best suit their needs. Buying Israeli planes, reintroducing the conscript service, tightening the grip around the citizens' rights and liberties by introducing the concept of homeland security, discriminating minorities, fighting immigrants, preventing the media from having regular and correct information, destroying the NGO community financially, setting the tone and environment for corruption and pursuing clientelism serve the short term interest of the most rigid and most powerful societal groups, and consequently serve the best interest of the most prominent part of the political elite to remain in the chair for as long as possible.

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Developments in the Hungarian Security Policy: Key Actors, Institutions and Decision-making

Péter Rada[1]

Abstract

After almost fifty years, the change of system gave an opportunity to Hungary to join the West again and to begin the long and exhausting transition from a socialist style decision-making structure to a modern institutional system that is compatible with NATO and the EU, which organisations Hungary intended to join. Even though the success of the Euro-Atlantic integration is beyond question, during the transition Hungary met several obstacles and problems that needed to be solved. Hungary has needed to balance between remaining a reliable and worthy ally and the low defence budget. The chapter describes and evaluates the evolution of the Hungarian security policy since 1989 and also assesses the decision-making process, the changing legal environment in the security sector. Finally, the chapter analyses the Hungarian participation in Kosovo and in the counter-ISIL mission.

Introduction

2019 marks a multi-anniversary in Hungarian foreign and security policy. This is when Hungary celebrates the 30th anniversary of leaving the socialist block and the beginning of democratic reforms; in 2019 Hungary – together with Poland and the Czech Republic – have joined the NATO 20 years ago; 2019 was also the 15th anniversary of the EU's "big bang" enlargement; furthermore, 2019 is the 70th anniversary of the signing of the Washington Treaty. These anniversaries mark the commemoration of the symbolically as well as practically most important milestones in the development of the Hungarian foreign and security policy. The regime change gave an opportunity to re-join the West after almost five decades. The doors were practically closed by the great power agreement in Yalta on the post-war reconstruction of Europe. Joining the transatlantic institutions gave back Hungary what was taken during and after the Second World War and the opportunity opened up for the country to (again) become a full and now hopefully permanent member of the Western value and interest com-

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munity. The interests of the other countries in the region were similar, and the Euro-Atlantic integration had no real alternative. When realising this, Hungary initiated closer Central European cooperation and luckily, the political leaders in Poland and Czechoslovakia came to similar conclusions that provided a solid basis for (re)initiating the Visegrád Cooperation.

The newly democratising countries had many headaches when trying to designate their respective countries' future and find the best ways of restructuring their polities, economies and societies. Hungary also had several options to evaluate before stepping on the road of Euro-Atlantic integration. There were and still are some open questions whether NATO, the American alliance, or the EU indeed serve the real Hungarian self-interests. Despite some diverging voices, in 2018, the majority of the Central European countries – and this is especially true in Hungary – are pro-NATO (and pro-EU) and have generally better views of the United States than the Western Europeans. Their populations are in favour of strengthening the Euro-Atlantic alliance. It is often mentioned that Atlanticism is failing but actual opinion polls cannot back the fears of a waning feeling towards the Western security institutions (Nézőpont Intézet 2017).

The success of Central and Eastern Europe's Euro-Atlantic integration is beyond question even though there are many challenges beyond the surface. NATO regained some momentum after the Russian invasion of Crimea but the Alliance still lacks a clear mission and struggles to provide an unmistakable point of reference for the "new members". During the Cold War, NATO's clear mission was to defend the territory of the European allies against the Soviet aggression and enhance their integration. Since 1989, many changes have happened and the lines between the different tasks became blurred. Maintaining stability in Europe, spreading Western values, managing crises and combatting terrorism even "out of area" all emerged as priorities for the renewed and extended alliance. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War met European reluctance to keep up pre-1991 levels of defence spending. The European use of "peace dividends" created a permanent source of friction between the two coasts of the Atlantic and heavy debates on burden sharing. The new NATO members – including Hungary – needed to balance between the low defence budget and proving their importance for the Americans geopolitically, or as a reliable ally in Iraq, or Afghanistan (BUGAJSKI–TELEKI 2007). Nevertheless, the changing role of the United States in Europe and the rebalancing, or pivot, to Asia since the beginning of the early years of the Obama Administration were all cautionary signals.

The growing feeling of being "left behind" became a general phenomenon in CEE. The parallel process of the American disengagement and the EU's internal crisis created space for at times unfounded criticism towards the Central European allies, especially regarding domestic affairs.[2] Honest and equal dialogue is also in the vital interest of the "old members" of the Euro-Atlantic institutions because the original organising paradigms of Western Europe are in crisis (due to illegal migration crisis, Russian aggression and radicalisation and terrorism). The Central and Eastern European countries have behaved as canaries in the coalmine for the West and have reacted to the changes in the international

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[2]   See for instance Victoria Nuland Assistant Secretary of State's harsh criticism in 2014 (Hungarian Spectrum 2014). It is also interesting and not a nice move in diplomacy that the U.S. Embassy in Budapest – led then by Andre Goodfriend chargé d'affaires – translated the whole speech and published it immediately.

security environment quickly; however, these countries have had the least time to integrate to the Western values and institutions (Kron et al. 2013, 9).

The evolution of the Hungarian security policy since 1989

Between 1945 and 1989, Hungary spent more than four decades "experimenting" with the Soviet style defence and political structures. The consequence of the inorganic development was the unquestionable desire of the new political elite in 1990 to develop new defence structures, even designing a new basic approach to security policy. Even though the Hungarian Republic was officially declared in October 1989 and the first democratic elections were held in April 1990, the Soviet Union still existed and there were no expectations among the Hungarian political elite that the "big brother" will collapse any time soon. Consequently, the military-defence planning option of staying close to the Soviet Union was not out of question. Also before 1991, Hungary could not neglect the option of self-defence, either (Csiki et al. 2014, 107).[3] Nevertheless, Hungary's main goal from 1989 was to leave the Warsaw Pact and make the Soviet troops leave the country. Due to Hungary's initiative and efforts, the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991 and the Soviet/Russian orientation was dropped from the agenda (Csiki et al. 2014, 43–45). The option of neutrality – which idea was routed in the 1956 revolution and freedom fight and the Austrian example – was also rather short lived and it became clear that the great power security guarantees have no alternative in the Central European geopolitical realities. The NATO and EU membership became an absolute priority and no political power questioned it in Hungary after the war in Yugoslavia broke out (Csiki et al. 2014, 14, 83–84).

The 1990s was the period for rebuilding the genuine Hungarian identity in the constantly changing international environment after the end of the Soviet influence and before joining the West. The socialist period artificially kept the lid on the national, ethnic, or religious differences and conflicts that also came to the surface in Central Europe. Consequently, parallel to the Euro-Atlantic integration, the need for increased regional security and political cooperation appeared on the agenda. The status of the Hungarian minorities abroad, their protection and the functioning relations with Slovakia and Romania were prerequisites of Western integration. The Central European post-socialist countries needed to change, transform and reform comprehensively their defence and security sectors in the last three decades: firstly, at the end of the Cold War; secondly, after the successful Euro-Atlantic integration; and thirdly, after the new financial realities of the global financial crisis (Csiki et al. 2014, 12; Ušiak 2013, 8).

The first Hungarian Prime Minister József Antall initiated the Visegrád Cooperation in 1991, which became a platform for a joint approach to the EU and NATO. The simultaneous

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[3] By 1991, the Antall Government faced at least two major security challenges that transformed the security policy decision-making, or at least influenced the Hungarian elite's thinking on security: the war in Hungary's southern neighbourhood broke out; and an attempted coup failed in Moscow. As a reaction, the Minister of Defence Lajos Für introduced the concept of "concentric defence". It was based on the recognition that Hungary is weaker militarily than most of its neighbours and the geographical position of the army needs to reflect the new realities. The defence forces need to be ready to defend the country from any attack from any direction.

development of the pan-European security infrastructure was also a subsidiary option that was supported by the Hungarian political elite – both the government and the opposition. The regional collective security – at least on paper – was guaranteed by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe after the Helsinki Final Act. Although the Helsinki Process basically involved all of the security actors in the Euro-Atlantic region, the cooperation was not real and was not institutionalised until 1994, when, in Budapest, the Process became the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The idea of "collective security from Vancouver to Vladivostok" was indeed attractive but its real implementation and maintenance has had several problems since the beginning, therefore it could not become an alternative for NATO or the EU (CSIKI 2013; SZÁLKAI 2016). Consequently, the Euro-Atlantic integration became one of the main priorities of the Hungarian foreign and security policy. The Antall Government formulated the frames of the Hungarian priorities, which have enjoyed broad support in the political elite and with some alteration are still valid today. The main pillars of the Hungarian foreign and security policy were: 1. joining NATO and the EU as soon as possible; 2. good neighbourly relations; 3. protection of the Hungarian minorities living abroad (CSIKI et al. 2014, 100–101).

Hungary spearheaded the regional efforts of changing the regional security architecture (ASMUS 2004). As it was mentioned above, Hungary initiated the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, letting the next steps of integration become reality sooner: Hungary stated in 1991 that the country abandons its obligations and rather considers the 1991 NATO Strategic Concept the leading example and framework. In the Euro-Atlantic integration process – even though the EU membership seemed to be a closer reality – NATO accession became the first step after the Balkan wars broke out. The war in the former Yugoslavia held direct consequences for Hungary because of the large number of Hungarians in Vojvodina, the refugees arriving to Hungary and several instances of provocations by rump-Yugoslavia. The Visegrád countries actively participated in the newly established North Atlantic Cooperation Council from 1991 and in the Partnership for Peace from 1994.[4]

Simultaneously with the integration process, Hungary sought to form a (new) security/ strategic culture and abandon the reflexes of the Hungarian People's Army which had no real historic roots and was artificially created as a subordinate of the Soviet Red Army. In order to have clear directions, Hungary adopted several policy and security documents at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1993, the Hungarian Parliament adopted two basic documents: 1. Basic Principles of Security Policy of Hungary (11/1993); 2. Basic Principles of Defence (27/1993). Based on these documents, the Parliament also adopted Act CX of 1993 on National Defence (1993. évi CX.). All these documents reflected the new realities and calculated with the new strategic alliances and the new security architecture after the Cold War, with the perspective of seeking full Euro-Atlantic integration. It included the efforts to reform the defence sector and the Hungarian Defence forces to be able to deal with the "new security threats" and effectively participate in international crisis management mis-

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[4] Hungary actively participated in the IFOR and later SFOR missions in Bosnia. Earlier the Hungarian Parliament authorised for AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft to use the Hungarian air space and a logistical airfield. Similar AWACS aircraft patrolled over Hungary to deter Serbian aggression earlier during the war (CSIKI et al. 2014, 120–122; ASMUS 2004).

sions especially in the close neighbourhood, the Western Balkans. The documents stressed the importance of the full adaptation of international law, the regulations of international organisations in which Hungary was member (or intended to join): the United Nations, the OSCE, or the Council of Europe. The documents clearly reflected the Hungarian political intention that Hungary prefers political solutions in crisis situations to military ones. The documents also needed to take into account Hungary's special geostrategic situation and the very important fact that a large part of the Hungarian nation lived in the neighbouring countries, thus specific security risks have emerged which were not completely under the control of the Hungarian Government (Csiki et al. 2014, 108–110).

Developing military capabilities and reforming the Hungarian Defence Forces had several limits. Beyond the financial and economic burdens, Hungary has been a party to international agreements, most importantly the *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,* which was adopted in 1990. The full transformation of the armed forces supported the quick integration process, but on the other hand – because Hungary did not expect large-scale military conflict in Europe – self-defence by own military capabilities was also very important. During the Balkan wars, in 1992 NATO already gave security guarantees (1993. évi CX; Szenes 2017, 31).

Before the NATO accession, not surprisingly, there was a need for fine-tuning the above mentioned documents that led to the formation of a comprehensive security policy framework in 1998: *The Basic Principles of Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary* (94/1998). The new document emphasised that Hungary's security policy goal is to be an equal member in NATO and that Hungary intends to participate in solving international problems as not simply a consumer of security. This of course needed to continue with and enhance the reform of the Hungarian military (Csiki et al. 2014, 148; Szenes 2017, 31).

For Hungary, NATO meant that the country would become a close ally of the United States for the first time in its history. Not surprisingly, Hungary's orientation, similarly to the other new Central European members, Poland and the Czech Republic, was more pro-American than that of the other Western allies within NATO, and Hungary has supported the American out of area military missions at times in spite of the harsh criticism by Western European nations. On the other hand, Washington also needed the new reliable allies due to several factors, most importantly the geopolitical reality in the Western Balkans in the 1990s. Even though the Visegrád countries expected quicker accession, finally – 12 days before Yugoslavia's bombing due to atrocities and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo – the three countries could join NATO on 12 March 1999. After joining NATO, the strategic goals of Hungary were diversified. Hungary focused on fulfilling the NATO obligations and trying to share the burdens (e.g. Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq), but the pursuit for the EU membership gained political priority. Hungary's strategic geopolitical position provided room for manoeuvre to increase the protection for instance for the Hungarian minorities abroad and to focus on aspects of internal security as well. Hungary has supported the development of a strong European Security and Defence Policy by utilising NATO capabilities (Szenes 2017, 32–37). Nevertheless, similarly to the other countries in the region and in Europe, the Hungarian defence spending relatively declined in the 2000s. This trend continued until 2012. In 2012 the government decided that the defence spending per GDP will grow 0.1% each year after 2016, and that by 2022 Hungary must reach defence spending equivalent to 1.39% of GDP (1046/2012).

As a consequence of the EU accession in 2004, many laws and regulations changed. One of the most visible changes was the abolition of general conscription and the establishment of a full

professional army. The Hungarian Parliament adopted three security/strategic basic documents reflecting NATO membership and the EU accession: 1. in 2002 the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary* (2144/2002); 2. in 2004 again the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary* (2073/2004); 3. in 2009 the *National Military Strategy* (1009/2009; NKS 2009). The second document followed quickly the first one, and according to the government, it was needed because of the EU membership and the very quickly changing security environment. We should also note the domestic party political interests behind it. The first document was adopted under the FIDESZ government and the Socialist-led government wanted to have an own document from the first day after their electoral victory in 2002. The adoption of Act CV 2004 on National Defence and the Hungarian Defence Forces (2004. évi CV) followed the second document. These documents reflected the realities of the 2000s, the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept and the international security environment after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, as well as the 2003 European Security Strategy. The documents clearly state that the primary guarantor of security is NATO (and the United States) and Hungary gradually intends to reform the armed forces to become a capable expeditionary force, and Hungary continues the transition to collective defence. The documents listed many new security challenges but did not count with major traditional military conflict in Europe. However, it is worth mentioning that these documents already noted that Hungary's security may be challenged by unstable regions and illegal migration, and also mentioned Ukraine as a potential source of future conflict. After joining the Schengen Zone in 2007, a new security task emerged as a priority: the protection of the EU's external Schengen border. Also, these documents were the first that explicitly mentioned Hungary's energy security as a top priority and mentioned Russia as a threat with a view to it. The 2009 military strategy further added that one of Hungary's main goals is to support further Euro-Atlantic enlargement, especially in the Western Balkans.

During the Balkan wars, Hungary enjoyed a strategic position within NATO. In this period, the U.S. security policy focused on Europe. This changed in the 2000s, after 9/11 – U.S. attention turned away from Europe. The criticism towards the slow Hungarian military reforms and the slow restructuring of the security infrastructure was compensated for by the geostrategic position of the country and the Hungarian participation in NATO's missions in Bosnia and Kosovo.

At the time of the 9/11 attacks, Hungary needed to react quickly and the government declared that Hungary fully supports NATO and the United States. Hungary did not provide combat troops to Operation Enduring Freedom but supported all NATO activities in Afghanistan and has been present there since 2003 when the alliance took over the responsibility for the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force, the UN-mandated stabilisation force in the country. Hungary stuck to NATO's Afghanistan principle: "in together, out together"; and Hungary – although sometimes reluctantly – remained in Afghanistan as part of the new Resolute Support Mission after the International Security Assistance Force completed its mission in December 2014. The Hungarian military has performed beyond strength in the U.S.-led NATO missions, not only in Afghanistan, but also in Kosovo (KFOR) and in the NATO mission in Iraq. It was necessary as Hungary wanted to prove that even with a low (and shrinking) defence budget, the country was still an important ally and could accomplish difficult out of area missions. The Hungarian risk-taking, the loyalty and the full support of NATO was very much appreciated in Washington and helped to settle many debates and weaken criticism in the coming years (CSIKI et al. 2014, 164–168).

After the 2010 elections, FIDESZ gained a two-thirds majority and the new government initiated significant changes in Hungary's security and defence policy. The government decided to increase defence spending and the Parliament also adopted two new strategic documents. The Hungarian Government committed to a yearly 0.1%/GDP increase of the defence budget from 2016, after adopting the most recent National Security Strategy (2012) (NBS 2012) and the National Military Strategy (2012) (NKS 2012). Furthermore, the new foreign policy strategy was also adopted (KS 2011). These strategic documents emphasised again, similarly to the earlier documents, that a conventional military attack against Hungary is not probable as Hungary does not have any military adversaries, but unconventional security threats are serious. Hungary needs to pay special attention to the minority rights and the status of Hungarians living abroad. The documents stress again the importance of proper preparation for managing migration because Hungary has special responsibilities related to the external border of the Schengen area. The strategies also set the ambition level for the Hungarian Defence Forces in the frames of global burden sharing in NATO and the EU, and set the number of deployable troops to 1,000 at any time upon request of these organisations and the allies. The National Security Strategy also urged the formulation of sectoral security strategies regarding the different dimensions of security threats (Tálas 2014, 13–16; Csiki 2014, 59–61). The 2013 *National Cyber Security Strategy of Hungary* is a good example for this (1139/2013).

As mentioned above, all of the Hungarian governments paid special attention that Hungary participates in military missions, mostly in NATO frames (Marton–Wagner 2017, 148–159). The goal was to deploy around 1,000 troops in the different missions. Hungary has participated in all of NATO's missions that included land forces and peacekeepers since the accession to the alliance in 1999. The Hungarian troops have been present in Bosnia (in IFOR, SFOR and also in the EUFOR mission of the European Union), in Kosovo (KFOR), in Albania (AFOR) and in Macedonia; in Afghanistan and in the Iraq Training Mission (Csiki et al. 2014, 164–181). The latest new mission for the Hungarian soldiers is the active participation in the global coalition countering ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant). According to the mandate set out by the Hungarian Parliament, Hungary has participated in the coalition's mission with 150 troops on the ground in Iraq near Erbil, whose main task is to support the work of the Iraqi Training Support Contingent. In 2017, the Hungarian Government (approved by the Parliament) decided to extend the mission's mandate beyond 2017 and to send an additional 50 troops to Iraq to help fight ISIL.[5]

Beyond the troops on the ground, Hungary has hosted the main operating base of the Strategic Airlift Capacity (three C-17 aircraft) in Pápa since 2007, the NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine in Budapest since 2009, and the NATO Force Integration Unit in Székesfehérvár since 2016 (Szálkai 2016). Furthermore, Hungary has participated in the Baltic air-policing mission since 2015 and agreed to fulfil similar tasks in Slovenia. Despite the Hungarian efforts, criticism of Hungary remained common due to the falling defence spending. The burden sharing has been a general debate within NATO in the last decades and it became even stronger after Donald Trump was elected President of the United States. Trump made many comments already during the campaign that he would not tolerate any free-riders within NATO, and that all of the members needed to achieve the 2%/GDP level of defence spending soon (Bremmer 2017). For Hungary it is a worrying signal,

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[5] For more details see the next chapter.

because it is an open question how long Hungary can balance the low defence budget with future promises and a heavy presence (in per capita terms) in the international missions.

Legal regulations and decision-making in the Hungarian security policy

Even though Hungary began the reforms as soon as it was possible, almost 20 years after the NATO accession the modernisation of the Hungarian Defence Forces and the security planning and decision-making structure still need further development, especially in the field of compatibility and interoperability. This is most visible in the quality and amount of military equipment, which is clearly a financial question, about which nobody should be surprised when the defence budget has constantly decreased in real terms. This is the only area in defence cooperation where the United States expresses heavy criticism (MAGYARICS 2014).

The last almost three decades have brought many dilemmas and contradictions to the surface, which have created ambiguous environment for the decision-makers. It has been very complicated for the politicians even with the best intentions to vote for clear options while the interests of the great powers have been in constant change, the international security environment and architecture have changed significantly and those Euro-Atlantic institutions have also undergone serious evolution to which Hungary intended to integrate. For Hungary (similarly to the other countries in the region) the most difficult dilemma has been how to maintain good neighbourly relations and a functioning V4, while remaining a trusted ally for the United States, while not forgetting the German (economic) interests; and while also not alienating Russia which still has mutual interests and important stakes in our region. This complexity has seemed to be not particularly well understood by Western allies, and this has led to misunderstandings, ill-founded criticism and, on the other hand, it has given Russia opportunity to exploit the friction, for instance by using energy ties as a policy tool. In 2018, even after many years of full membership in the Euro-Atlantic community, the full picture is no less unpredictable. The relations among the great powers and our regions and Hungary's relations to these powers still make the security situation complicated and bring many debates to the surface (KALAN 2016).

The legal regulations and the decision-making processes in Hungary were intended to follow the above mentioned changes but the adaptation has usually been slow. The eventual legal basis of the security policy decision-making was the Constitution. Consequently, the first task of the legislation was to amend the 1949 Communist constitution that eventually happened in 1989, with the adaptation of Law XXXI (1989. évi XXXI). The goal was to build democratic structures, stability within the armed forces, and to strengthen the civilian control. The amended constitution fundamentally changed the security and defence architecture and regulated the decision-making until the adoption and ratification of the Fundamental Law of Hungary in 2011 (Alaptörvény 2011).

The classic hierarchy of the strategic/decision-making documents – the Fundamental Law; the law on national defence; the law on military service; government decrees; ministerial decrees; doctrines – appeared only after the fundamental changes in the Hungarian legal system made this possible (SZENES 2017, 39). The security policy principles stem from Hungary's special geopolitical situation and from the fact that the Hungarian foreign

policy cannot be interpreted without understanding the international environment and the international institutions in which Hungary became a member (UN Charter, the Washington Treaty, EU treaties). Today, the most important document of Hungary's principles-based foreign and security policy is the Fundamental Law of Hungary which itself underlines the most important basic principles: peace, security, democracy, protection of human rights and minorities, including the Hungarian minorities abroad. The foreign policy goals are formulated in line with these principles, and consequently, Hungary's national interests to achieve these goals (Csiki et al. 2014, 16–17).

After joining NATO, Hungary became part of NATO's defence planning and decision-making processes and aimed at actively participating in all NATO missions. Thus the security policy decision-making process, especially regarding the deployment of Hungarian troops abroad, and the everyday coordination required related to it, made it too complicated to include the Parliament in each decision (Tálas 2014, 8). The Constitution needed to be changed accordingly. The Parliament amended the decision-making process and adopted this change in 2003. According to Article 40/C of the Constitution, the government decides on the participation in NATO-led missions. Several other related regulations and laws were also amended. For instance, the government also has the right to deploy Hungarian troops up to six months without prior consent of the Parliament when requested by NATO invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, or in the case of the United Nations calling for help with reference to collective self-defence. In 2006, the Parliament adopted a similar amendment in case of EU missions, and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 also added the EU's missions in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Szenes 2017, 39–42).

Today, the Fundamental Law of Hungary is the legal basis of utmost importance. According to Article 45 of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, the role of the Hungarian Defence Forces is to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Hungary. The Hungarian Defence Forces are obliged to fulfil the duties deriving from international agreements regarding collective self-defence and peacekeeping. The functioning of the Hungarian Defence Forces is the responsibility of the government and it is governed by the Parliament, the President of the Republic, the Government, and the Defence Minister. According to Article 47, the Hungarian Parliament decides by a two-thirds majority on foreign military deployments – the only exception is when it is derived from Hungary's membership in NATO or the EU. The system of balance in the economic and financial resources, the political and societal support behind national security is the main objective and task of the Hungarian political elite. The allocation of these resources is the main responsibility of the Hungarian Parliament, while the implementation of the laws and the strategic documents adopted by the Parliament lies with the government (Szenes 2017, 33).[6]

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[6] The Hungarian Defence Forces influence the security policy decision-making process through the flag officers who are integral and important parts of the highest decision-making circles and behave as a strong lobby group during the political decisions. However, due to the strong civilian control, the final responsibility lies with the civilian leaders. In this sense, it was a very important step that the National University of Public Service (or, more precisely, its predecessor, the Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University) decided in 1997 that civilian defence and security policy education needs to be accredited as an independent university degree program and discipline (Szenes 2017, 33).

The decision-making is significantly influenced by the country's strategic culture. After 1989, the Hungarian strategic culture has changed fundamentally due to the fact that Hungary left the Warsaw Pact and strived for quick integration in NATO and the EU. Despite this fact, feeling small has remained part of this culture that has imposed serious limits on decisions on the use of the Hungarian Defence Forces. About security-military questions, usually there is no real and broad debate and the political elites are influenced by domestic political preferences more than by long-term foreign policy and strategic thinking. Consequently, with few exceptions, the Hungarian Government followed geostrategic realities reactively rather than aiming at changing them. Stemming from this, the Hungarian security and defence policy's main focus has remained within the frames of NATO and EU obligations and within the Central European region and the neighbouring countries (Tálas 2014, 3–6).

The consequence of the relatively uninterested Hungarian public and of the belief that security and defence policy is the exclusive domain of the experts, a very narrow circle of advisors and the members of the government have been able to actively shape the Hungarian security and defence policy (Tálas 2014, 7–8). The job of the decision-makers is complex and there are no ready-made answers and blue prints that can be used in every situation because external and internal security are overlapping.[7] The broad definition of security appears in the Fundamental Law of Hungary and the security-strategic documents mentioned earlier. The broad understanding of security gives the opportunity to decision-makers, mainly the government, to deal with challenges and situations as security threats. Securitisation of different problems – such as illegal migration – gives the government space for manoeuvre and flexibility in quickly using all means necessary to manage a given situation.[8]

Despite the fact that the public is not interested in the security and defence policy questions in details, there has been broad consensus in Hungary since the regime change that Hungary's place is in the Euro-Atlantic alliance. The governments and the opposition, the parties in the parliament and the political decision-makers agreed that Hungary can best protect its interests and its citizens (including, and extending to Hungarians abroad) if it joins Western institutions.

The regime change and the transformation of the security policy and the decision-making process and the institutions also demanded the modernisation of the terminology used in the security field. The old Soviet terminology slowly gave place to the modern Western concepts and security theories. Since 1989, national defence ("honvédelem") became the synonym of comprehensive national security and it includes not only the traditional territorial defence, and the related defence capacities, but also the capabilities and readiness to protect the country from new security threats such as the type of threat represented by ISIL, or in disaster management, or when dealing with the consequences of a financial crisis or

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[7]   See the decision about the fence at the Southern border and the protection of it that is not simply a military task but the Ministry of the Interior is also very deeply involved through the Hungarian Immigration Office for instance.

[8]   In case of border protection, the Hungarian Parliament amended the Fundamental Law of Hungary and the Law of National Defence after 2015 and authorised the Hungarian Defence Forces to protect the Hungarian borders and engage in border patrol. In 2016, the Hungarian Defence Forces Military Police Centre was established to strengthen the internal security (MTI 2016).

the negative spillover effects of, for instance, the Ukrainian crisis (e.g. for the situation of the Hungarian minority there, or energy security) (Szenes 2017, 7).

The Hungarian participation in KFOR and in the counter-ISIL coalition as examples of decision-making in the foreign and security policy sector

Among many possible examples during the last decades, this chapter will briefly analyse two different decisions: 1. the Hungarian contribution in Kosovo; 2. the Hungarian participation in the counter-ISIL coalition.

The two situations are different: the mission in Kosovo was decided by the government, because – as mentioned above due to NATO accession – the Constitution was amended, and in the case of NATO missions there was no need for the two-thirds majority approval of the Hungarian Parliament; in case of the Iraq/Kurdistan mission, the coalition has been led by the United States and it is not a NATO mission, thus only the Parliament can approve it by a two-thirds majority.

The Balkan crisis and the wars in the Western Balkans put Hungary in a very difficult situation. A large number of Hungarians live in Serbia, and the first Hungarian government had better relations and could share common values with the anti-Milosevic forces, Slovenia and Croatia. Consequently, for Hungary, it was most important not to be involved actively in the conflict and the government tried to emphasise neutrality, while supporting the international organisations' efforts to find a political solution.[9] After the long accession period, Hungary finally joined NATO on 12 March 1999. Only 12 days later, NATO – without the authorisation of the United Nations – launched Operation Allied Force to make Milosevic order the Yugoslav Army back from the province's territory. For Hungary, the decision was difficult and complex due to the lack of UN authorisation, and the presence of the large Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. Even though the operation was launched by NATO, the Hungarian Parliament voted on the Hungarian participation and finally supported it with a large majority. Hungary insisted on not participating in the bombing campaign and asked the allies not to bomb Vojvodina (Csíki et al. 2014, 148–151). After the end of the operation, the UN Security Council finally adopted Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1244 1999), which authorised NATO to establish KFOR. The Hungarian Parliament quickly decided on the Hungarian participation (with a cap of 350 troops) according to Article 40/B § (1) of the Constitution, and gave the responsibility of implementation and decision-making to the government (55/1999). The original mission for the Hungarian troops was to protect the KFOR Headquarters in Pristina.

On 17 February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence and the EU accepted the decision without recognising itself its independence and also without issuing a recommendation for the member states. The Hungarian Government preferred to extend

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9   Between 1992 and 1994, Hungary was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council where it was represented by Ambassador André Erdős who in 1992 also held the Security Council's rotating presidency (Gömbös 2008).

quick recognition but some other EU members, including two of Hungary's neighbours, Slovakia and Romania, were reluctant and the Hungarian minority in Serbia asked for patience on the issue. Nonetheless, the Government announced the recognition on 19 March 2008 (MTI 2008).

Later on, the government decided to restructure the Hungarian mission and increased the number of troops to 500. For this, it did not need the authorisation of the Parliament in line with Article 40/C § (1) of the Constitution (2076/2008). During the last ten years, the number of deployed troops gradually decreased, but later, in 2015, after the withdrawal of most of the Hungarian military units from Afghanistan, the Government decided to once again increase the deployment level in Kosovo back to around 370. This number means that Hungary has been among the top five leading contributors in KFOR lately. In the second half of 2017, Hungary took over responsibility for the Tactical Reserve Battalion that is now a fully Hungarian unit – furthermore, it is the second time that a Hungarian officer is the Deputy Commander of KFOR.[10]

The participation in KFOR, similarly to other missions in the Western Balkans has been a priority for the Hungarian foreign and security policy. Due to its geographic proximity, the region has always been part of the Hungarian history, and connected to this, the Hungarian foreign policy often made reference to a certain "expertise" in regional matters. On the other hand, Hungary has been keen on proving to the United States and NATO that it is a reliable ally, not a free rider, as proved by the burdens carried in the Western Balkans.

Due to similar reasons, Hungary has been active in the missions led by the United States outside of Europe, too. As it was mentioned earlier, Hungary has been a significant contributor in Afghanistan, was a partner in the NATO-led Iraq mission, and most recently Hungary provides strong support in the mission countering ISIL in Northern Iraq. This operation and the Hungarian participation therein is different as it is not led by NATO, and the authorisation of the Parliament is necessary during the entire mission, such as for modifying any of the details of the deployment.

After the United States initiated the global coalition against ISIL in August 2014 and began air strikes first in Iraq, and later in Syria, Hungary joined the coalition and participated at the high-level and regular counter-ISIL meetings in Washington, and in Europe, and has actively participated in the military working group and the working group on foreign fighters. Furthermore, Hungary offered humanitarian aid – around 70,000 EUR – and military materiel to the Iraqi Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government in 2014 (Marton 2015, 3).

The important UN Resolutions in 2014 (UNSCR 2170; UNSCR 2178) created the international legal basis for a more significant military intervention and eventually the Hungarian Parliament adopted the resolution on 14 April 2014 by a two-thirds majority (17/2015), which authorised the Government to deploy 150 troops in Northern Iraq. A total of 27 countries joined the U.S.-led operation's military segment. Hungary was the biggest contributor from Central Europe and among the overall top 10 as such (McInnis 2016). Originally, the Hungarian troops mainly had force protection tasks in and around the coa-

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[10] Colonel János Csombók became the DCOM of KFOR on 30 July 2017, earlier Brigadier General Ferenc Korom served in this position between 2015 and 2016 (Sárkány 2017).

lition's headquarters near Erbil. The mission's mandated deadline was 31 December 2017. The coalition has 75 allied members at the time of writing this, including many Middle Eastern, African and Asian countries. Furthermore, NATO is also an institutional partner since the 2017 Summit (The Global Coalition s. a.). Hungary increased its contribution and the Hungarian Parliament adopted a new resolution on 14 June 2017 (12/2017), which authorised the deployment of 200 (i.e. 50 additional) troops and extended the mission's mandate until 31 December 2019. Similarly to the earlier decision, the Parliament needed to pass the resolution by a two-thirds majority.

Conclusion

The last decades have brought several significant changes in international relations and it became clear that the security architecture that was designed after the Second World War according to the realities of the early Cold War is outdated. All security organisations needed to adapt to the changes especially after those of the former Soviet bloc ceased to exist. Consequently, the history of the post-socialist countries like Hungary has been characterised by a constant need for change. After the end of the bipolar world, new security challenges emerged and old tensions came to the surface that all threatened stability and peace in Central and Eastern Europe. The dissolution of the multinational entities in case of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union forced the West to realise that history in reality has not ended.

Hungary has faced several parallel challenges and security threats that needed to be managed simultaneously while the political institutions, the economy and society have also undergone significant transformation. Hungary, similarly to the other countries in the region, inherited a massive and relatively large, outdated and ineffective army, which was prepared to stop NATO's advance on the Western border, or, as plans at the time called for this, to participate in offensive manoeuvres against it. From the 1990s, Hungary intended to join this very organisation and Hungarian politicians saw Hungary's security best guaranteed by anchoring the country to the Western institutions. According to this, Hungary needed to build better cooperation in Central Europe, and for the protection of Hungarians abroad, it had to work closely with its neighbours.

These serious challenges had to be met in the context of economic difficulties. The Hungarian defence sector has suffered from very low resources and financial support. The necessary transformation and the planned modernisation of the security sector has been slower than the expectations derived from the level of ambitions designated by the several security and strategic documents adopted during the 1990s and 2000s. NATO's anticipation that all members share the financial burdens and spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence became a distant reality in Hungary as the defence spending decreased in the 2000s.

Beyond the serious economic and financial problems, Hungary has struggled with many conflicts in the political sphere, too. Hungary's main political aim in the last decades has been to join NATO, the EU, and to become an equal member in the Euro-Atlantic organisations. However, the global challenges have changed these institutions, too, and have created friction among the members. After the Cold War, NATO sought a new identity and the U.S. influence has become even stronger. In the last years, the United States criticised even the closest allies for not spending enough on defence. Hungary has also been heav-

ily criticised about being too close to Russia. Washington has not been open to listen to Hungarian arguments in this regard, while in the meantime history has proved that East–West conflict brings only bad consequences for the region.

The modernisation of the Hungarian Defence Forces, the security sector and the security policy decision-making processes have been slow due to the permanent financial problems, the shrinking defence spending, the outdated equipment. The situation is grave if we look at the volatility of the political elite's interests, or the uninterested Hungarian public. Despite many unfortunate trends and the above mentioned challenges in the last years, the Hungarian government's new programs intended to initiate change, and there are some positive signs: the Hungarian government's goal to reach the desired 2% of GDP with its defence spending is signed into law. The government also introduced the "Zrínyi 2026 defence and military development program"[11] to further modernise the defence forces, and the education and training of military personnel. The "Irinyi program",[12] in the meantime, intends to develop the military technology aiming at revitalising the Hungarian military industry and, along with it, independent arms production (Szenes 2017, 25–28).

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[11] The program is a confident document, and the details are not published.

[12] The Irinyi program is also confident. The first models of the Hungarian handguns were presented at a V4 joint military exercise in March 2018.

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Key Actors, Institutions and Decision-making in Poland's Security Policy

Michał Piekarski[1]

Abstract

The article describes constitutional changes influencing key actors and relationships – post-1989 changes in the Polish political system, especially the changing role of the President and civilian control and oversight over the military, intelligence and law enforcement apparatus. Other reforms are also discussed, related to NATO and EU accession, along with major activities such as participation in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Regarding stakeholders, the chapter shows the role of key actors: the President (and the National Security Bureau as well as the National Security Council), the Prime Minister, and the following ministers: defence, international relations and internal affairs as well as Parliament (with special regard to four parliamentary committees (national defence, justice and internal affairs, international affairs and intelligence services oversight) of the lower chamber of Parliament (Sejm). The role of other stakeholders with special regard to special interest groups (in security policy in Poland there are two important kinds of actors in this respect: industry and their lobbyists, and, to a lesser extent, NGOs) is also considered.

Introduction

This chapter describes the role of key actors – especially executive bodies, legislative and other stakeholders in the decision-making process in the Polish foreign and security policy. The first part shows the evolution of the contemporary political system, the second is devoted to the description of major stakeholders and formal and informal rules governing their actions. Finally, the third one shows how this system works using two selected cases as examples.

Historical overview

Contemporary Polish foreign relations and security policy is a result of the evolution of the said policy after the fall of communism. That evolution was twofold. On the one hand,

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there was the process of creating a new internal political system, which generated new institutions. On the other hand, there was also the process of changing orientation in terms of foreign policy and military alliances.

Poland in January 1989 was a typical authoritarian country, where actual political decisions were not made by formal bodies like Parliament or government, but by high-ranking members of the ruling party – the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP).[2] The *de facto* head of the state[3] was the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP and the main collective body – a kind of "super government" – was the Political Bureau of the PUWP. Members of this body usually held other offices or were members of parliament, but those functions were less important than their position in the party.

In 1989, due to the Round Table Agreements, several changes were introduced. The Parliament, which until then had one chamber was extended and the Senate was created. The executive was reformed, too, and the office of the President, elected by the joint chambers of Parliament, was created.

In the 1989 parliamentary elections, 65% of the seats in the Sejm were reserved for PUWP and its allies, while the rest was subject to free election and were ultimately won by the united list of the anti-communist opposition. The Senate was to be elected in fully free elections and the opposition won this election by a landslide, no candidate from PUWP was elected there. To balance the situation, the First Secretary of the PUWP, General Wojciech Jaruzelski was elected to the office of President. As such, he was given wide prerogative powers, including those related to military and foreign policy (DUDEK 2018, 26–67). This situation lasted only a year. After that, two satellite parties of the PUWP, the United People's Party and the Alliance of Democrats changed alliances and supported the candidate of the opposition, Tadeusz Mazowiecki for Prime Minister. As a result, the new cabinet dominated by this new coalition was formed, however, with the participation of PUWP members, including ministers of defence and internal affairs. With the fast collapse of Communism in Poland and Europe, Jaruzelski resigned and free presidential elections in 1990 were held. Lech Wałęsa won these elections.

A year later fully free parliamentary elections were held. The former opposition was no longer forming a united coalition. This resulted in a highly fragmented Parliament, with frequent no-confidence votes towards ministers and the entire cabinet. This made the position of the president even stronger.

In 1992, provisional constitutional rules called the "Small Constitution" were adopted implementing basic rules of parliamentary control over the cabinet, but the President remained a strong actor. For example, he was granted powers to dissolve Parliament. In foreign and security policy, the President had a unique privilege, because in the process of forming the cabinet, candidates for three positions, i.e. the Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Internal Affairs, were to be "consulted" with the President. That rule, combined with the personality and leadership style of Lech Wałęsa who interpreted this rule as a permission to appoint his own candidates, led to the emergence of "Presidential

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[2] Smaller and less important satellite parties existed, but until 1989, they were not politically relevant.
[3] Until 1989, Poland had a collective head of state, in the form of the so-called Council of State of the Republic of Poland.

Ministers". However, the relationship between the President and cabinets were stormy. One of the problems was that in the early 1990s, the cabinet was the weakest and most vulnerable political actor, due to frequent elections (1989, 1991, 1993) and unstable coalitions, composed, especially in the years 1991–1993 of small parties. After 1993, when parliament was starting to be dominated by more stable coalitions and parties became more consolidated, the position of the cabinet was further improved. 1993 is also notable, because those elections brought to power the post-communist Alliance of the Democratic Left, who entered into a government coalition with the agrarian Polish People's Party.

Another problem was the evolution of the civilian oversight over the armed forces. Before 1989, there was no such thing as a minister of national defence; this position was held by an active-duty general and military officers in active duty were members of parliament. In Mazowiecki's cabinet, that rule was kept until 1991, but there were conflicts between military elites (notably the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the then highest-ranking military officer), the Ministry of Defence and the President. That led finally to the scandal called "Drawsko dinner" in 1994.

During his visit at the Drawsko military training area, Lech Wałęsa, who already had conflicts with the Minister of Defence, asked a group of high-ranking generals – including commanders of military districts[4] and the different branches of the armed forces – to take a vote of confidence against Minister of Defence Piotr Kołodziejczyk (who was then a retired admiral, appointed by Wałęsa, but later conflicted with him and with the Chief of the General Staff). During this (informal) vote, only two generals supported the minister, and based on this, Wałęsa dismissed him formally. That led to major political outrage, because it was seen as the use of the military to achieve political goals (DUDEK 2018, 304–305). Another scandal happened in 1995, after the Presidential elections were lost by Wałęsa to the candidate of the post-communist left, Aleksander Kwaśniewski. Just before Wałęsa stepped out of office, he accused Prime Minister Józef Oleksy (Alliance of Democratic Left) of being a Soviet and later a Russian intelligence agent, codenamed "Olin". The information about "Olin" was gathered by high-ranking Polish intelligence officers, supporting Wałęsa. Oleksy resigned, even though there was no evidence published supporting the claims made against him, other than inconclusive intelligence reports, so this case never made it to a criminal court. The fact that Wałęsa made this accusation in public just before new President took oath is itself evidence that the security (intelligence) service was used again as a tool in political conflicts.

From a historical perspective: those events had one long-lasting effect on decision-making processes. The Armed Forces since 1995 have become a silent actor in politics. Any attempt to use the military in political conflicts, even in the softest form, and any attempt to influence political processes, became taboo. That was consistent with the process of joining NATO and later the European Union, which required the implementation of strict civilian oversight. Generals who were accustomed to participate in political activities or hoped for some stronger role of the military in society were quickly replaced by new officers, who often graduated from Western military academies.

In 1997, the new constitution was adopted; since this moment it can be said that at last Poland has finally fully reformed into a democratic system. Especially notable is the

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[4]   At that time, Poland had four military districts, which were the elements of the command structure of land forces.

position of the Prime Minister that can be described as dominant over the legislative body. This is due to the abolishment of the ordinary no-confidence vote – only a constructive one was from here on allowed.

The first new cabinet, led by Jerzy Buzek, formed after the elections in 1997, managed to last four years – its entire parliamentary term, which was earlier unheard of. New rules limited the power of the President, but as it shall be explained in the next section, the role of the head of the state in shaping security policy is still important.

This created a new environment for decision-making, with limits typical for a democratic state (ANTOSZEWSKI 2012, 51–57). Also in 1999, the process of joining NATO was finalised, and Poland chose to widely deploy troops as part of multinational forces in various missions. Main examples were in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo, as part of NATO-led forces) and in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism. Those operations had a highly positive impact on the armed forces, especially in training and the professional education opportunities for the military personnel.

In the context of decision-making, the main vector of change was Westernisation in terms of technical modernisation as well as personnel training. Poland adopted a military doctrine fashioned after a Western model, which puts emphasis on the quality of forces instead of quantity. The military was reformed to include light units (special operations forces, airmobile units) useful in military operations other than war, such as crisis response, peacekeeping and stability operations.

Stakeholders in decision-making

From a legal standpoint, key actors in security policy and decision-making processes are defined by the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of the 2nd of April 1997. According to the constitutional rules, the head of the state is the President of the Republic of Poland. Article 126 of the Constitution declares the President to be the "supreme representative of the Republic of Poland and the guarantor of the continuity of State authority" and his most fundamental duties being to "ensure observance of the Constitution, safeguard the sovereignty and security of the State as well as the inviolability and integrity of its territory" (Constitution of Poland 1997).

Those words are not only a declaration, and the President is also, according to Article 134 of the Constitution, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, who in peacetime exercises his power through the Minister of National Defence. The President's powers in peacetime are therefore limited and detailed in statutes of parliament. The most important laws in this area are: *Act of 21 November 1967 on the common duty of defence of the Republic of Poland* (Dz.U. 1967 nr 44 poz. 220)*, Act of 29 August 2002 on martial law and competences of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and rules of his subordination of constitutional organs of the Republic of Poland* (Dz.U. 2002 nr 156 poz. 1301) and *Act of 17 December 1998 on rules governing the use or presence of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland outside of state borders* (Dz.U. 1998 nr 162 poz. 1117) (usually termed "foreign missions" in the Polish military jargon). According to these laws, the President is required to make the most important decisions regarding the military security of Poland, including approval of the National Security Strategy which is the funda-

mental legal document for all security-related planning processes, including the classified Political–Strategical Defence Directive, which is also issued by the President. The head of state declares the state of war (martial law), and is tasked with directing the defence of the state and issuing decisions about the use of the military outside of state borders[5] – albeit the law requires making those acts by request, or in cooperation with the Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers.

There are also advisory bodies to the President: the National Security Council, usually composed of the Prime Minister, ministers of defence, foreign affairs, internal affairs, the speakers of both chambers of parliament, and the leaders of the major parliamentary parties. The other is the National Security Bureau that serves as a kind of Presidential "think tank" in areas of security, especially military security.

Another prerogative of the President is related to personnel matters. The Presidents appoints the Chief of the General Staff and commanders of the branches of the Armed Forces, and, in a state of war, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (by request of the Prime Minister).

The Minister of Defence is tasked with daily oversight of the Armed Forces, such as personnel policy, military education, managing of the budget, purchasing military equipment, oversight of defence-related activities (mostly defence preparedness), according to the *Act of 14 December 1996 on the Ministry of National Defence Office* (Dz.U. 1996 nr 10 poz. 56). Also, the General Staff of the Armed Forces is by law part of the MoD and is responsible especially for long-term military planning.

This division of tasks between the President and the Minister of Defence assumes mutual cooperation, regardless of political divisions and differences which is the reason why there are no solid rules governing cooperation between the two actors. In fact, various scenarios are possible. In case the President is not willing to participate in defence policy, the leading actor would be the MoD, with the President acting only as a kind of "notary" signing earlier-prepared documents. This scenario never occurred in real life. In case of a President who is an active actor in security policy and if there is positive cooperation with the MoD, the security policy at strategic level is formulated in active dialogue. However, when there is conflict, effective cooperation may be impossible.

In case of conflict, the MoD as a part of the Council of Ministers is usually the stronger side. First of all, it is the MoD's responsibility to plan the annual military budget and spend allocated funds. The majority of the administrative matters do not require formal participation of the President, so unless it is a very formal and strategic decision, the President may even be circumvented entirely. For example, in 2017, in the context of the conflict between Minister Macierewicz and President Duda, a doctrinal document, describing the security environment, including perceived threats and future trends in the development of the Polish Armed Forces – usually this would be outlined in the National Security Strategy – was published as *The Concept of Defence of the Republic of Poland* by the Ministry of Defence. *De facto* it was a strategic document and treated by the national security community as such (Defence Concept 2017).

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[5] In Polish law any use of military force as a part of coalition peacekeeping, stability, counterterrorism, military assistance operation, even when it involves the use of large military formations is not considered war.

Because there are always exceptions to the general rule, there was at one time a different situation, during Bronislaw Komorowski's term, when the National Security Bureau became an active participant in shaping the national security policy by conducting a large-scale review of the national security. As a result, among other decisions, a reform of the command structure of the armed forces was implemented – but mostly because the Ministers of Defence during this time chose to focus on daily management and administrative affairs, leaving long-term planning to the NSB in this case. Another factor in this was personal, as the then chief of the NSB was an ambitious retired general, who wanted to leave his mark, while the Ministers of Defence at the time (Bogdan Klich and Tomasz Siemoniak) were career politicians. In addition, they had to deal with the consequences of the Smolensk air disaster.

Regarding security policy, the role of the legislative is different. There are in both chambers standing committees (in the Polish nomenclature the word "commission" is used) on national defence affairs, as well as separate ones on internal affairs and intelligence oversight.

Despite the fact that the parliament has broad formal rights in the legislation process (including, of course, the right to make proposals for new acts of parliament), in the security policy domain, it plays only a supporting role. Because of the features of the political system described earlier, and the dominant position of the Council of Ministers, members of parliament of the governing coalition do not seek to alter the government's policy in the security domain.

Because representatives of government inform members of parliament about their intentions and decisions, the scope of information presented during the meetings of the standing committees (notably the Sejm commission on national defence) is itself an important source of public data on national defence, especially about the intentions of the Ministry of Defence regarding various aspects of defence policy. The role of the Senate commission is almost unnoticeable, which is consistent with the general role of this chamber of parliament, which plays hardly any noticeable role in Polish politics overall.

Poland's security forces, services and agencies can be divided into three main groups. The first one is the military, the second is the law enforcement apparatus, the third group is that of intelligence-gathering services.

The military is at present an all-volunteer force (the Polish nomenclature uses the word "professional"), although there are legal provisions permitting the reintroduction of the draft and also the retention of reservists (former draftees) who may be called in for active duty (in case of a crisis or for training).

The Polish Armed Forces are composed of five main services.[6] Most numerous are the Land Forces with two mechanised divisions and one armoured division (each has several mechanised or armoured brigades), an artillery regiment, an air defence regiment, airmobile forces in the strength of an airborne brigade, an air assault brigade and two bases (battalions) of assault and utility helicopters as well as three reconnaissance regiments and other units – including sappers, chemical defence and engineer regiments. Most of the weapon systems – such

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[6] More detailed information – actually the entire *order of battalions* of the Polish Armed Forces is available at https://jednostki-wojskowe.pl/ webpage (Polish only).

as tanks, artillery and air defence systems and helicopters – are inherited from the Warsaw Pact period, or to some extent are direct modifications/upgrades of them. That includes almost all air defence systems and helicopters. To a lesser extent, new equipment was purchased, but only few types (including armoured personnel carriers and anti-tank missiles) are brand new, while others – e.g. German-manufactured Leopard 2 tanks – were purchased second-hand.

The Navy is composed of two flotillas. The 3rd Flotilla of Ships is considered an offensive force, with frigates (class Olivier Hazard Perry), a single corvette, three fast attack missile ships, submarines, reconnaissance (SIGINT) ships and a Coastal Missile Unit, equipped with mobile launching batteries for NSM cruise missiles. The 8th Coastal Defence Flotilla consists of two squadrons of mine-countermeasure vessels and one squadron of landing crafts. This unit is considered "defensive", however, this distinction is blurred. Poland contributes ships on a regular basis to NATO standing naval groups, especially minehunters from the 13th Minesweepers Squadron of the 8th Coastal Defence Flotilla. An important part of naval forces is the Naval Aviation Brigade, who performs patrol, search and rescue and ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) functions in support of military forces and civilian authorities (especially search and rescue missions).

The Air Forces are responsible for control of the air space and providing support to other branches of the armed forces. Their main elements are four air wings: two tactical air wings, an air transport wing (which includes a special operations helicopter squadron) and one training wing. Also, there are two brigades: one operating the radar network, and a second composed of surface-to-air missile squadrons. There are also intelligence-gathering and support elements.

The Special Forces were created as a separate branch in 2006, and they are responsible for conducting full-spectrum special operations, including counter-terrorism roles. They are a small element of the Polish military, with five battalion-sized units of various specialisation areas (counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, maritime operations, etc). They are the most modern and best-equipped branch of the military in comparison to others, and almost all of their equipment and weapons have been purchased after 2005. As they are the smallest of all branches, this makes modernisation and the purchasing processes very easy for them in comparison with the Air Forces or the Navy (Special Ops 2013).

Territorial Defence Forces, created in 2016, are the youngest element of the Polish military and still in the process of formation. Their role is described as support and defence of local communities in case of war as well as non-military crisis situations (e.g. floods).

There are yet other elements of the Polish military, including the Military Police, responsible for law enforcement in military structures, or the Support Inspectorate, responsible for logistical support.

The Polish military at present has no single central command for the entire armed forces, and there are no such commands for either the Land Forces, the Air Forces or the Navy. All divisions, brigades, wings and flotillas are in peacetime subordinated to the Armed Forces General Command, responsible for training and preparing military forces to be used ("force provider"). In case of a crisis, or a foreign deployment, the units that are to be used are transferred to the Operational Commander of the Armed Forces. Only the Special Forces and Territorial Defence Forces have their own commanders, who are "force providers" and "force users" at the same time. The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces has no superior role over any of these commands – they are all equal in their formal position and subordinated to the MoD.

The main law enforcement agencies are: *Policja* (Police) – responsible for protection of the general public order, having wide jurisdiction over various crimes and misdemeanours. It is a nationwide, centralised and organised in the fashion of a paramilitary agency, with a number of specialised units, including helicopter units, a criminal intelligence-gathering unit, counterterrorism (SWAT) units and a Central Bureau of Investigations, the latter investigating organised crime groups. The Border Guard, responsible for protection of the state borders and international airports has powers to investigate border-related crimes.[7] The Border Guard has its own aviation elements and specialised maritime branch. Those agencies have full police powers (to apprehend persons, conduct searches and seizures, interrogate persons, use confidential informants, wiretaps, etc.). Similar powers are also granted to two intelligence-gathering services: the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Internal Security Agency (ISA, *Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*). ISA is the leading counterintelligence and counterterrorism agency in Poland. Other intelligence-gathering services include the Intelligence Agency, the Military Intelligence Service and the Military Counterintelligence Service. These have lesser roles. In addition, intelligence agencies are restricted from gathering domestic intelligence.

Those branches, services and agencies are themselves important stakeholders and interest groups in the decision-making process. Due to budget limitations, all are competitors for funding and formal as well as informal status, i.e. prestige and reputation that translates into access to financial resources.

Another powerful interest group are suppliers of military equipment. This group includes domestic manufacturers (including state-owned companies), arms traders and foreign manufacturers offering their products. Because many weapon systems are obsolete and require replacements, competition is high and lobbying is aggressive, involving the use of various methods, including media campaigns that also include paid activity in the social media.

Close to lobbyists in this arena are NGOs and the media. There are a number of security-oriented media outlets in Poland as well as NGOs and think tanks. Their influence on the decision-making processes is most visible in the context of decisions about purchasing military equipment. Their activity on other issues – such as military-related social problems, e.g. veteran affairs or personnel policy – is much less visible. Last but not least, there is always an important international context to the above-mentioned decisions, which will be discussed in next section.

Selected cases

The first case discussed here is Poland's involvement in the Iraq War from 2003 onwards. This decision was made in the context of a strongly U.S.-oriented foreign and security policy, formulated after 1990, which became only stronger in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. A decision was made in October 2001 to deploy troops to support the U.S.-led Operation "Enduring Freedom"; however, it turned out to be at the beginning difficult to accomplish. The Polish Armed Forces managed to deploy in March 2002 to Afghanistan

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[7]   There is also a separate customs and tax service, which also has limited law enforcement roles.

only a small element – a mixed company, tasked mostly with engineering support and the demining of the Bagram Air Force Base. Another element was deployed to the Persian Gulf in the form of the Navy logistical support ship ORP "Xawery Czernicki", supporting Allied naval activities there, including special operations. It was not frontline activity and their propaganda dimension was far larger than the actual military effort, especially given that for a country with a large military (with about 150,000 personnel in 2001), it took six months to send one company to help its allies in maintaining an airfield. That created an obvious prestige problem for military leaders and politicians (Piekarski 2014, 79–100).

The political decision regarding the Polish participation in the operation against Saddam Hussein's regime was made public in January 2003. During his visit to the United States on 12–14 January, President Aleksander Kwaśniewski declared to George W. Bush strong support for military action against the Iraqi regime (Lasoń 2010, 115–137). This support was later confirmed at home when Minister of Foreign Affairs, Włodzimierz Ciemoszewicz (from the post-communist Alliance of the Democratic Left) declared in an official statement to the Sejm that Poland is ready to support a "steadfast response" to violations of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, regarding the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program (Informacja Rządu 2003). The majority of the members of parliament supported this, including not only the Alliance of the Democratic Left and its coalition partner, the agrarian Polish People's Party, but also the major opposition parties: the liberal Civic Platform and the conservative Law and Justice. Only two parties – the conservative League of Polish Families and populist agrarian Self-Defence – opposed. Those voices had no actual influence on the decision, because according to the above-mentioned legal regulations, the decision was made by the executive powers, and the legislative was only to be informed.

Also in January, Prime Minister Leszek Miller signed the letter by eight leaders of European countries (the U.K., Spain, Portugal, Italy, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Denmark), supporting American plans regarding Iraq (Aznar et al. 2003). The support from countries of Central Europe that were not yet members of the European Union was criticised by politicians from those EU countries, who opposed the military option. Most notably, Jacques Chirac reacted with strong words saying that "they missed a good opportunity to keep quiet", and he went on to question the loyalty of these countries to the EU, accusing them that they "acted frivolously because entry into the European Union implies a minimum of understanding for the others" (CNN 2003).

The formal decision was signed by Aleksander Kwaśniewski on 17 March 2003, but it was only the final step in the process. Only after Operation Iraqi Freedom had started on 26 March was a debate in parliament held. Again, the majority of the members of the Sejm supported this decision by voting on accepting the government's communication of the decision to the parliament, which again was only a symbolic gesture, without legal consequences.

From a military perspective, executive decisions were made before the formal decision. Forces committed were composed of elements already present in the Persian Gulf – such as the ORP "Xawery Czernicki", and also the 56-strong special forces company (from the GROM special unit). The only element that was really deployed after the formal decision had been signed was the small chemical defence platoon, deployed to Jordan, which was to be used with a U.S. chemical defence company in case Saddam Hussein's regime chose to use chemical weapons. That element was never used in its role, and later deployed to Iraq to prepare bases for the incoming large stabilisation force. Other elements – naval and

special forces – were used in the opening days of the invasion phase in the coastal area around Basra. The GROM company was also used in direct action deep in Iraqi territory, cooperating with U.S. special forces.

In the post-invasion phase, Poland was offered control of one of the occupation zones, and this offer was accepted. The Polish-led Multinational Division Central–South controlled five provinces (Babil, Wasit, An-Nadżaf, Al-Kadisijja and Karbala) and was initially composed of Polish, Spanish and Ukrainian brigades, as well as smaller elements from other countries. Albeit the size of the Polish contingent was gradually reduced, Polish troops remained in Iraq as stabilisation forces until 2008, and until today there is a limited military presence there (advisors from special forces and four F-16 fighter planes, used only for imagery/intelligence data-gathering).

Major actors in making that decision, with long lasting effects, were elements of the executive branch – the President and members of government. The fact that support for the military option was first declared abroad, to the President of the United States, and only later to the parliament, which had no possibility to vote in any form other than giving a symbolic opinion, illustrates the deep imbalance in security policy decision-making. Parliamentary control on major political decisions, like sending troops in "foreign missions" – *de facto* war operations – was non-existent. The same principle applied to other strategic decisions.

The case of Operation "Iraqi Freedom" illustrates another factor in the decision-making process. All major actors, who controlled the executive in 2003 and onwards, agreed to the fundamental directions of the national security policy. No matter if the governing party was post-communist, conservative or liberal – all of them supported this decision, so Polish involvement in the Iraqi war was different than, for example, Spain, where it could end after a change of the governing party.

Another important factor was the international context, related to strong support for the United States, perceived then by Polish politicians as the most important foreign partner in the security area. There were hopes for the permanent basing of U.S. forces in Poland (to be moved there from Germany), a recurring theme was having Poland accepted to be part of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, allowing Poland to access to Iraqi oil fields and hopes for contracts for supplying military equipment to the new Iraqi armed forces. These ambitions never materialised, and this had influence on later, more pro-European decisions in foreign policy.

The second case is one of those made later, already in the context of EU membership, and it is a case reflecting the failure to modernise the Polish armed forces – known locally as the "Caracal case".

On 29 March 2012, the Ministry of Defence formally announced its intention to purchase twenty-six medium-size helicopters, including sixteen cargo ones, three of the land SAR (Search and Rescue) variant, three of the maritime SAR variant and four of the ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) variant in order to replace old Soviet-era Mi-8 and Mi-14 helicopters. All helicopters were to be based on a common platform – i.e. one manufacturer was to be selected. A year later it was announced that forty-eight helicopters were to be of the tactical transport variant for the Land Forces, ten of the Combat SAR variant for the Air Forces and twelve for the Navy, including six in a C/SAR (Combat and Search and Rescue) and six in an ASW role (Raport 2015). The fact that the purchasing intent was changed from a small "stop-gap" measure to a large modernisation program is seemingly

coincident with the results of the earlier mentioned review of national security conducted by the National Security Bureau.

This was, at the time, one of the biggest such purchases in Europe, and the winner would be given an extremely strong position on the local market, looking ahead to prospective decades of delivering support (spare parts, major maintenance works, mid-life upgrades, etc.) and in case the Polish Armed Forces were to make a decision to purchase more helicopters, the winner would be already in an advantageous position. As one could expect, lobbying was very strong, even in the early phases. In October 2014, one of the would-be competitors, the consortium of Sikorsky Helicopters and the Polish-based PZL-Mielec (owned by Sikorsky) demanded a change of the requirements, claiming that they are impossible to fulfil, which was interpreted in a Polish media outlet as an attempt to win a better position for the consortium's helicopter, the S-70 Black Hawk (Altair 2014a). Sikorsky's demands were countered by another company, Airbus Helicopters, in a letter protesting any attempts to change the rules or the deadlines (Altair 2014b).

On 30 December 2014, three offers were submitted to the Ministry of Defence, from Sikorsky Helicopters (the S-70 helicopter), Airbus Helicopters (offering the EC-725 "Caracal") and AgustaWestland (with the AW-149). All of the companies offered final assembly and maintenance in Poland. In the case of Sikorsky and AgustaWestland, their respective factories in Mielec and Swidnik (former state-owned Polish aircraft factories) were to be the bases for these operations, while Airbus offered assembly and aircraft maintenance in a plant in Łódź (Altair 2014c). In 2015, Airbus Helicopters was selected. It is notable that the decision was announced by President Komorowski, not the Minister of Defence. Subsequent military trials were conducted with positive results (Altair 2015). An important factor here was the fact that the Caracal was best fit for the Polish needs, due to its size being similar to the helicopters that were to be replaced, and because the other competitors offered smaller and less capable types.

The contract was not signed before the parliamentary elections, and politicians of the main opposition party – Law and Justice – heavily criticised the decision of the Ministry of Defence. Antoni Macierewicz, the Law and Justice leader in defence-related affairs even declared that if Law and Justice wins elections, the contract will be cancelled and divided orders will be placed favouring Mielec and Swidnik (Miłosz 2015). Noticeable is the fact that after 2015, when Komorowski was replaced by Andrzej Duda (supported by Law and Justice), the role of the President changed, and the main decisions were made from thereon by members of the cabinet.

After the elections, the new government did not sign the contract and finally cancelled the deal in October 2016. Since then, despite multiple assurances from government officials, no new helicopters have been delivered to the Polish Armed Forces from any other supplier.

The decision-making process in this case was, as illustrated by the facts, complicated, and finally the result was actually no decision at all. It seems that there were two main reasons for this, linked to different stakeholders. One was the different vision of foreign and security policy: Civic Platform took a more pro-EU stance and favoured the choice of a helicopter manufactured by a company based in the "hard core" of the EU (France and Germany). The choice of a U.S.-based company, on the other hand, or even a company based in Italy and the United Kingdom, may have been seen from a political perspective an act of Euroscepticism, especially in the eyes of officials of the Law and Justice party who hoped for better and deeper relations with the U.S. and the U.K.

Another factor was internal politics and lobbying. Airbus offered placing the assembly and maintenance facility in Łódź, in a city in central Poland where support (counted in terms of votes) for the Civic Platform was high. Mielec and Swidnik are located in eastern Poland, where support for the conservatives is so strong that this area is sometimes called the "conservative belt". Labour union Solidarity also opposed the choice of the Airbus offer, citing a possible reduction of jobs in the Swidnik and Mielec plants (WPolityce.pl 2015), and these factors were also visible in the media, including the social media, newspapers, and other news outlets. Contrary to 2003, when public opinion had no role, this time winning the support of a part of the public opinion (PiS electorate) was visible. It can be safely said, that the decision-making process was disturbed by an active political and media campaign, and the formal decision-makers on the political level were not able to conduct similar activities in order to shape the political arena to win support for the contract with Airbus and secure its fulfilment despite the change of government. Or, perhaps, it was assumed that the Civic Platform would win the elections and with this, there would have been no obstacle to signing the contract. Yet another, slightly different explanation could be that in that term, the Ministry of Defence was the more passive actor in creating security policy, but the more active side – the President and the NSB – was not able to make things happen because of limited resources and political capital. The only fully committed and engaged actor was the Armed Forces who needed the helicopters, but they cannot shape or alter politics; it is practically beyond them.

All in all, the lesson from the case is that a key decision was made with a view to factors other than considerations of national security. The Armed Forces with their needs were only one among a number of stakeholders with varying interests – and seemingly the weakest actor among all. The other actors – political parties, labour unions, the helicopter manufacturers and their lobbyists – all had more effective leverage over the process.

Conclusion

The evolution of the Polish political system and decision-making process shows peculiar traits regarding the role of the key stakeholders. The role of parliament is limited, while the key decision-making is conducted in the executive branch, usually in the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Defence. Notable is also the role of the President, which is different than in other European countries, where the majority of decisions are made on the level of the cabinet, and not by the head of state. However, the role of the President here is "pivotal", and outcomes depend on the state of the relationship with the cabinet's members.

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Landmarks of Euro-Atlantic Integration: Key Actors, Institutions and Decision-making in Romania's Foreign and Security Policy

Cristina Bogzeanu[1]

Abstract

Romania's foreign and security policy has to be analysed in the wider regional and international security context. Its political, economic, juridical and political-military aspects have been highly influenced by NATO and EU membership criteria. Ever since the fall of the communist regime in 1989, Romania's foreign and security policy has passed through a serious set of reforms including the downsizing of the armed forces, establishing democratic control over the military, implying a reform of the institutions as well as a change in its strategic thinking. The hypothesis is that Romania's foreign and security policy was reshaped in the conditions of a consensus, largely, among decision-makers and stakeholders, due to the importance and influence of foreign factors – NATO and the EU – perceived as the main security guarantors in an unstable security environment.

Introduction

In almost 30 years since the fall of the communist regime, the country has passed through a long transition from isolationism to Euro-Atlantic integration, to becoming connected with the major trends.

The fact that Romania's top priority in its post-1989 foreign and security policy consisted of NATO and EU integration deeply influenced both its internal and external evolution. Internally, the need to implement the required reforms to gain NATO and EU integration has been the main force that formed and developed the political, economic, juridical, administrative and military dimensions. Externally, Romania carried out actions proving its adhesion to NATO and EU values, standards and interests. It achieved NATO membership in 2004 and EU membership in 2007.

Actually, NATO and EU integration and, subsequently, the engagement to become a reliable member within these organisations constituted the major axes of the Romanian foreign and security policy. Strongly interconnected with this trend, but also with Romania's geographical position at the border of NATO and the EU, in the proximity of relatively

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unstable regions, is its interest in promoting and maintaining security and stability in its Eastern and Southeastern neighbourhood.

Setting itself as a regional stability and security promoter has been not only a legitimate interest, based on the need for being surrounded by stable and secure actors, but also constituted a way of emphasising Romania's added value within the organisation. Thus, Romania's foreign and security policy builds on the following main pillars: NATO and EU membership, a strategic partnership with the U.S., and stability and security in the Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA) and in the Western Balkans.

Nowadays, Romania is deeply involved in international efforts to manage global and regional security challenges, and foreign and security policy decisions have stood as proof of the state's responsible engagement as an EU member and as a NATO ally. Just to name a few current and relatively recent efforts in this regard, we could consider the active involvement in NATO's reassurance measures in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, the participation in the Missile Defence System, the support of EU economic sanctions in the same context, or the efforts of developing cooperation in Southeastern Europe (SEE), participation in the Bucharest 9 Format being just one of the most recent such initiatives. Additionally, Romania initiated together with Austria the EU Strategy for the Danube Region; it is also involved in energy security related projects.

Its involvement in promoting stability and security in the neighbourhood can be traced back to the early 1990s. In the East, Bucharest has shown constant support for the Republic of Moldova, as the two states have a common cultural, historical and linguistic background. Also, the violent breakup of Yugoslavia created a situation in which Romania had to prove its commitment to democratic values and an allied position, when NATO needed support in Western Balkans stabilisation missions and in the 1999 campaign against Serbia. Romanian participation in various missions under the NATO and EU aegis needs to be seen as a contribution to the stability and security of the region. Nevertheless, Bucharest was not among the capitals recognising Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008.

Beyond all the progress in terms of foreign and security policy lies a constant effort to reform foreign policy and security institutions in accordance with democratic principles and standards, ever since the fall of communism, as well as a widely shared belief that Euro-Atlantic integration would bring and represents the strongest security guarantee Romania could possibly get, given its geopolitical circumstances.

All of this was achieved by means of the decision-making stakeholders sharing a strong consensus in the matter of the fundamental security and defence decisions. The *hypothesis* of the present study is that Romania's foreign and security policy was advanced in the conditions of the key decision-makers and stakeholders' consensus, due to the importance and influence of external factors – NATO and the EU – perceived as the main security guarantees in an unstable security environment.

From isolationism to integration and interdependence

After the overthrow of Ceaușescu's regime, Romania's political leadership was assumed by the Front of National Salvation (FNS). During the December 1989 Revolution, FNS released a Communiqué to the Country, framing Romania's future foreign and security policy within

the European context, referring to it as a means for promoting good neighbourly relations, friendship and international peace (Historia s. a.).

Soon after the Revolution, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was reorganised and its mandate was extended beyond mere representation and foreign affairs management, to planning and implementing strategic action in the international arena. The Supreme National Defence Council of the Country (SNDC) was established to coordinate national security issues. Also, there were established a series of departments of European integration within executive structures, regarded as serving the new, professional and democratic approach of Romanian foreign policy after 1989.

European integration was coordinated through the Ministry of European Integration, established in 2000 and disbanded in 2007. Subsequently, its attributions were assigned by the Department of European Affairs, firstly subordinated to the prime minister and the secretary of state and, subsequently, transformed into the Ministry of European Affairs. Ever since 2012, Romania has a Ministry of European Funds, including structures and activities for the coordination of structural and cohesion funds and the grant funds pertaining to the European Economic Area. Within the MFA, the Department for the European Union manages the activity and structures in the area of European Affairs.


Figure 1.
The evolution of the MFA budget, 2009–2018

Source: MFA Budget 2018.

The MFA's budget remained fairly constant throughout this period, mirroring the evolution of the national economy. However, as Romania is to assume the Presidency of the European Council in 2019, the MFA's budget has been notably supplemented for preparing for this stage (Figure 1).

The reform of the national security system was one of the greatest challenges after 1989. The urgency was to reform the system of internal security, as one of the instruments of the communist regime for maintaining power was the Department of State Security or DSS (widely referred to as "Securitate"), which restricted to a great extent the fundamental rights and liberties of citizens. On December 30 1989, FNS disbanded all the DSS structures and, in March 1990, issued Decree no. 181, establishing the Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS), the state institution specialised in gathering national security information and providing intelligence. Subsequently, Law no. 51/1991 regarding Romania's national security established structures with a mandate in the area of national security: RIS, Foreign Intelligence Service, the Service of Protection and Guard, together with other specialised institutions within the MoD, the MoI and the Ministry of Justice. The entire activity related to national security was placed under the coordination of the SNDC. RIS's responsibilities were set by Law no. 14/1992. In 2001, the legal framework for RIS was reset, and in 2008, the SNDC issued a decision regarding the approval of the RIS structure and functions.

Even though, ever since 1990, it was clear that Romania needed a regulation act regarding access to the files of the former Department of State Security "Securitate", only in 1997 did the Government issue a law granting the public access, as well as calling for the content of the respective files to be published in official positions. Law no. 187/1999 allows access to these files and the exposing of Securitate as political police. In 1999, the National Council for the Study of Securitate's Archives (NCSSA) was established as an autonomous administrative authority, under the Parliament's control. Nevertheless, in 2008, the Constitutional Court decided that Law no. 187/1999 was unconstitutional, as NCSSA might act as a parallel juridical power. Subsequently, NCSSA has continued its activity based on Law no. 293/2008, abrogating the unconstitutional provisions.

In 2006, the Senate approved the lustration law bill, which has not been adopted within the Deputy Chamber until 2010. In the same year, the Constitutional court decided that the respective law was unconstitutional, as it impinged on the fundamental right of voting and being elected and that there was no justification for such a legal regulation within a democratic society. However, the lustration law was approved in 2012, allowing the lustration of all the individuals with political leadership functions paid by the former Romanian Communist Party or the ones having worked within the former Securitate (Legea Lustratiei 2012).[2]

The application of democratic principles in national security institutions had to rest on the development of democratic civil-military relations, and a consensus on the norms guiding national security related actions. One of the first moves in this direction was the establishment of the SNDC, including both civilian and military officials, functioning as an institutionalised framework for the coordination of civilian and military visions on security. In 1990, five of the ten members were military officers: the Chief of the General Staff, the Presidential Counsellor, the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS), the defence and the interior ministers. In 1997, only 3 of the 10 members were active officers of the

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[2]   The law of lustration regarding the temporary limitation of the access to certain public positions and dignities for the individuals who were part of the power structures and the represive apparatus of the communist regime during 6 March 1945 – 22 December 1989.

military: the Chief of the General Staff, the Presidential Counsellor and the Director of FIS (Watts 2001, 603). This ratio between civilians and military officials is still in force.

As the security-related topics were taboo until 1990, the training of civilians to be able to act and work effectively within national security institutions was a key issue for developing proper civil-military relations. In this context, under the MoD aegis the National Defence College (NDC) was created in 1992, adopting a model of similar institutions from NATO member states. NDC courses were opened to both civilian and military individuals who had experience in decision-making positions in national security and defence policy (Decision 438/1992).

Similar institutions were established within the intelligence area. In 1992, the Superior Institute of Intelligence was created that would subsequently become the National Intelligence Academy (NIA) and, later on, the National Intelligence College (NIC) was also established. The latter is set as a structure within the NIA, and, since early 2018 its activity is suspended. NIC was defined as a structure by which RIS contributes to the increase of the level of expertise and know-how within the civil society, public administration and the private environment regarding current security challenges (NIC s. a.).

Research institutes in the foreign, security and defence policy areas have contributed to the increase of knowledge and understanding regarding national and international security and defence issues. Among such institutes there are the Centre for Security and Defence Strategic Studies (ROU NDU "Carol I"), the Institute for Defence Political Studies and Military History (of the MoD), the National Institute of Intelligence Studies (NIA) and the Romanian Diplomatic Institute (MFA).

The military reform began soon after the Revolution as a consequence of the change of system as well as in accordance with the provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), mainly by the process of downsizing. Another major landmark in the reform of the military was SNDC's establishment as *Law no. 39/1990 on the establishment, organization and functioning of the Supreme Council for National Defence.* It was one of the first laws helping the organisation and coordination of defence policy. The initial phase of the reform lasted until 1992, and is considered a period of "de-communisation" (Zulean 2004, 16).

After 1993, the MoD passed through a series of reforms, changing its structure by the reduction by 727 positions of the ministry and the introduction of over 100 civilian positions. Also, the General Staff (GS) was established, together with three separate component staffs – Land, Air and Naval Staffs. Patriotic Guards were dissolved and a system of territorial reserve was established (Zulean 2007, 11). Another important moment was the assignment of the first civilian as defence minister – Gheorghe Tinca (1994), a former diplomat. Also, the position of Secretary of State for Defence Policy and International Relations has been assigned to another civilian personality, Mr. Ioan Mircea Pascu. The Deputy Chief of the National Defence College was also a civilian. Reform was made in stages, but at a rapid pace, as the number of Romanian troops dropped from 320,000 in 1990 to 207,000 in 1999 and to 140,000 in 2003 (Zulean 2005, 16). Presently, Romania has 69,300 active military personnel and 50,000 reserves (Military Balance 2018, 140). This also triggered an exponential decrease of the defence budget since the fall of communism, until the stage in which Bucharest came to invest less than the 2% of its GDP. However, the degradation of the security environment in the WBSA, together with the increasing pressure from the U.S. in this respect (with a view to spending dropping below 2% of GDP) entailed the increase of the defence budget, which translated in capabilities development and acquisition.

Figure 2.

Romania's defence budget evolution in terms of % of GDP during 1989–2017[3]

Source: SIPRI 2018.

In 1997, both the MoD and the GS were fully reorganised, with effects on the central structures and the combat forces. After becoming a NATO Member State, *Law no. 346/2006 regarding the organization and functioning of the Ministry of Defence* established the organisation of the ministry, its structures and responsibilities, force structure, leadership and personnel related aspects. Law no. 346/2006 was modified and completed through Law no. 167/2017, which also includes a change of name of the GS from Major General Staff to General Staff of Defence.

The Romanian vision on security risks and threats fundamentally transformed after December 1989, in tune with the dynamics of the internal and external security environment and with the progress made towards Euro-Atlantic integration. The first post-communist document referring to security risks and threats was Law no. 51/1991, mirroring the characteristics of the historical experience Romania was passing through at that moment, marked by the violent fall of the communist regime as well as by the violent riots in the early 1990s. The document reveals concern for military threats such as actions and plans affecting national sovereignty, integrity, unity and the independence of Romania. There was a strong focus on internal security risks and threats and the blurred line between internal and external risks and threats (Law no. 51/1991). In September 1991, SNDC approved the Military doctrine for Romania's defence, after Romania's participation in a series of CSCE events on military doctrines, and this included aspects of the democratic control of the armed forces, conditions regarding the transit of foreign troops on national territory, as well as concepts of "total war for the country's defence" (Anuța 2017, 257). In 1994, the Integrated Conception on Romania's security was approved by the SNDC. In fact, all the strategic documents until 1999 approached security strictly from a military perspective.

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[3] SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Source: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (Accessed: 31.01.2018.).

Table 1.

List of Romania's strategic papers 1990–2015 in internal and external context

Year	Title of the document	Coordination	Context	Observations
1991	Military doctrine for Romania's defence	Presidency, Parliament, MoD	Regional conflicts with a strong ethnic and religious dimension; first steps to Euro-Atlantic integration	
1994	Integrated conception on Romania's National Security (1994 ICRNS)	Launched by SNDC, coordinated by MoD State Secretary, Ioan Mircea Pascu	Regional conflicts with a strong ethnic and religious dimension; first steps to Euro-Atlantic integration; highly violent internal social revolts; building stronger relations with the U.S. and NATO (PfP)	• Simultaneously, the 1991 military doctrine is revised according to the principles of the Romanian state's national security principles, included in the ICRNS, within a separate task group, coordinated by the Chief of the General Staff, Dumitru Cioflină • ICRNS and the Military Doctrine Revisited would not be included in the Agenda of the Commission for Defence, National Safety and Public Order in the Parliament, due to vices of procedure, as they should not be remitted to the Parliament by the SNDC

1999	National Security Strategy of Romania – democratic stability, sustainable development and Euro-Atlantic Integration (1999 NSSR)	President Counsellor	Regional conflicts with a strong ethnic and religious dimension; enhancement of the relations with the U.S.; progresses on NATO and EU integration (PfP)	• Presented by the President to the Parliament. According to the procedure established in Edict no. 52/1998, also establishing responsibilities and deadlines for security and defence strategic documents:
				  ◦ The president – national security strategy – 4 months since investiture
				  ◦ The Government – White Paper in 4 months since the vote of confidence
				• Law no. 63/2000 approving Edict no. 52/1998 – the Parliament shall approve the Strategy; deadlines are restricted to 3 months
				• 2000: the Government issues the White Paper

2001	National Security Strategy of Romania – Guaranteeing democracy and fundamental liberties, sustainable economic and social development, NATO adhesion and EU integration (2001 NSSR)	President Counsellor	NATO and EU integration speeding up	• Analysed and approved by the SNDC; presented to the Parliament and approved

Year	Title of the document	Coordination	Context	Observations
2006	National Security Strategy of Romania – European Romania, Euro-Atlantic Romania: for a better life in a democratic, safer and more prosperous country (2006 NSSR)	Presidency Administration (LTG Constantin Degeratu), with the participation of the same ministries	9/11 attacks – shift in decision-makers' perception on security issues; progresses in the reform of Armed Forces; NATO integration	• Law no. 473/2004 on defence planning changes the process deeply • Subjected to public debate with civil society • Approved by the SNDC • As the Constitution and Law no. 476/2004 stipulate that the President shall present a National Defence Strategy; the advance of national security strategy by the President was provided only by Law no. 415/2002 on the organisation and functioning of the SNDC; this state of facts triggers the elaboration of a National Defence Strategy (2008)
2010	National Defence Strategy of Romania – for a Romania guaranteeing the security and prosperity of future generations (2010 NDSR)	Representatives of institutions with responsibilities in the area of security, coordinated by President Counsellor, Iulian Fota	Full NATO and EU membership; the world economic and financial crisis	• Approved by the SNDC, and advanced to the Parliament • The two subsequent White Papers (2011, 2013) are not approved in the Parliament • There are issued sectorial strategies: the National Strategy of Public Order (2010)
2015	National Defence Strategy of Romania for 2015–2019 – a strong Romania in Europe and in the World (2015 NDSR)	Department of National Security, led by President Counsellor, George Scutaru	Full NATO and EU membership, return of regional conflicts spectre	• Advised by foreign policy and defence, national safety and public order commissions in the Parliament, representatives of the civil society, academic environment and security related institutions • Approved by the SNDC, presented to and approved by the Parliament • Followed by a an Implementation plan of the National Defence Strategy and a Guide on National Defence Strategy, meant to contribute to the understanding and implementation of extended national security and security culture • 2017: White Paper on Defence

Source: ANUȚA 2017, 257–258.

In 1999, the NSSR was the first strategic document in which national security was presented as more than defence, as a multidimensional concept. It was also the first time when a strategic document on national security was not focused on territorial defence, but on the citizens, with their interests and rights.

Ever since, Romania's perception of risks and threats has been focused on issues of global concern such as regional conflicts, WMD proliferation, international terrorism, etc. (see Table 2). The main differences come from the historical context (the most recent crises experimented) and from the stage of Romania's integration in NATO and the EU, which can be also traced through the subtitles of the documents. At the same time, in the internal domain, the main risks and threats seemed to be relatively constant – economic and financial issues reflected in social challenges and the poor or insufficient performance of national institutions. For instance, the 2001 NSSR reflects Romania's synchronisation with the Western perceptions on security and defence, but it reflects, at the same time, the extent of the challenges faced internally, especially in the economic and social areas. In this line of thought, the document mentions security challenges such as international terrorism and organised crime, but also the fact that Romania's main challenges are of an economic nature. The 2006 NSSR refers to vulnerabilities of an economic and social nature: negative demographic trends, social insecurity, frail civic spirit, high dependence on resources of difficult accessibility, low development and protection of infrastructure, low resources for crisis management. The 2010 and 2015 NDSRs maintain this vision on vulnerabilities, strongly anchored in the economic and social areas.

The titles of the main Romanian strategic programmatic documents vary between "national security strategy" and "national defence strategy". The reason for these shifts resides in the provisions of the Constitution of Romania and in the laws on defence planning. The Romanian constitutional law refers only to the defence strategy, when listing the topics requiring common meetings in the Parliament Chambers. Law no. 141/2008 amends Law no. 415/2002 on the organisation and functioning of the SNDC, by prescribing that this forum approves Romania's national security strategy and Romania's national defence strategy. This is the reason for which there is a National Security Strategy issued in 2006, and a national defence strategy issued in 2008 (which is mainly a military strategic paper). However, the 2010 and 2015 NDSR's contents suggest that they are better seen as security strategies.

The way security risks and threats are approached reflects Romania's attachment to the Euro-Atlantic community, also implying responsibilities in their management. By this token, Romania was part of major international and regional actions and measures towards promoting and maintaining peace and stability not only in Europe, but also in the Middle East and Africa. In the same line of thought could be considered Romania's participation in the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence System, contributing to the enhancement of both the U.S.–Romanian strategic partnership and Romania's role as a reliable ally within NATO and as a regional security provider.

Table 2.

Security risks and threats according to strategic documents, 1990–2015

Risks and threats/Strategic Papers	1991	1994	1999	2001	2006	2008	2010	2015
Economic and social issues		✔	✔	✔	✔		✔	✔
The state's institution inefficiency				✔	✔		✔	
Possible internal conflict	✔			✔				
Extremist internal movements	✔	✔					✔	✔
Foreign instigation to extremism, separatism, xenophobia	✔	✔		✔				
Regional conflict		✔	✔	✔	✔	✔		✔
Unstable neighbourhood		✔					✔	✔
WMD proliferation			✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
Easy access to conventional weapons						✔		✔
International terrorism			✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
Organised crime		✔			✔		✔	✔
Negative demographic trends				✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
Illegal migration				✔	✔			✔
International financial system frailty							✔	
Poor governance in the neighbourhood				✔	✔			
Dependence on limited resources				✔	✔			✔
Cyber threats								✔
Actions impinging on ROU's image				✔				
Hostile actions for influencing decision-making, mass-media and public opinion	✔						✔	✔
Directed press campaigns								✔
Energy								✔
Environment			✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔

Source: NSSR 2001; NSSR 2007; NDSR 2010; NDSR 2015.

Departing from this vision on security risks and threats and directed by the main objectives of post-communist foreign and security policy, beyond the regional cooperation processes initiated or supported by Bucharest, it was also decided, in 1999, to support the NATO campaign in Serbia and Montenegro, and further on, in 2003, to support the U.S.-led coalition operations in Iraq. However, in 2008, Romania was one of the few European countries that did not recognise Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, considering it a breach in the international law (MFA 2010). In supporting this position, Romania relied only on international law provisions, emphasising its attachment to its norms and principles as guarantors of a predictable and cooperation-prone regional and international environment (AURESCU 2010, 63). In other words, Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence is

considered an act of secession, with the potential of fostering instability in a region where Romania has a legitimate interest in preserving peace and security. When regional crises re-emerged in the WBSA, together with the annexation of Crimea, Romania adopted a similar position, strongly condemning the breach of international law and being one of the main supporters of enhancing the NATO deterrence posture in the region, and rallying to economic sanctions decided within the EU. Also, Romania is lead nation for the NATO Trust Fund established to develop Ukraine's cyber defence.

Even before having become a donor, a national strategy for the international cooperation policy for development was elaborated by the MFA (Decision no. 703/2006). According to this strategy, East Europe, the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus are the priority areas, while good governance, enhancement of democracy and rule of law, along with economic development, education, health, infrastructure and environment are the sectoral priorities.


Figure 3.
Evolution of Romania's AOD budget (Million RON)

*Source:* Raportul RoAid 2007–2016.

Figure 4.

Balance between bilateral and multilateral ODA in the case of Romania

*Source:* Raportul RoAid 2011–2018.

Figure 5.

Main receiver countries of ROU Bilateral assistance (% of the Bilateral Assistance Budget)

Source: Raportul RoAid 2007–2012; Raportul RoAid 2013; Raportul RoAid 2014; Raportul RoAid 2015–2017.

Figure 6.
Main domains of bilateral AOD 2012–2016

Source: Raportul RoAid 2011–2018.

Ever since it became a formal international donor (2007), Romania's development policy contribution was made either multilaterally (on regional or international fora), or bilaterally. Most of Romania's ODA (Official Development Assistance) funds have been distributed through multilateral cooperation mechanisms. Bilateral assistance reflects the major trends in Romanian Foreign and Security policy and is directed towards the countries in Romania's area of interest.

Stakeholders in decision-making: Coordinates of a centralised decision-making model

Romania is defined as a semi-presidential republic, the executive power resting with the President and the Government. Foreign and security policy decision-making in Romania can be considered centralised, the main stakeholders being the holders of the executive power – the President and the Government. The constant mainstream in Romanian foreign and security policy – NATO and EU integration, U.S. strategic partnership, and security and stability in the Black Sea Area and Southeastern Europe – are visible the most in foreign and security policy, where decision-makers are keen on showing a strong consensus. The centralised nature of foreign and security policy decision-making is paralleled by a high trust of Romanian citizens in regional security and defence organisations, such as NATO and the EU (Figures 7–8).

Since December 2014, Romania's Presidency is assured by Klaus Werner Johannis. According to the Romanian Constitution, the President has a five-year mandate, represents the Romanian state and guarantees its national independence, unity and territorial integrity. As far as foreign policy is concerned, the President's attribution includes signing international treaties on behalf of Romania, negotiated by the Government and submitted to Parliament's ratification within a reasonable period of time. He is also the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the President of the SNDC. Nevertheless, within this forum his vote is equal in terms of importance with the votes of the other members.

The President can declare, after getting the Parliament's approval, the partial or full mobilisation of the armed forces and, in case of armed aggression against the country, he can undertake measures for rejecting the aggression, which he must communicate immediately to the Parliament.

According to Romania's Constitution, as amended in 2003, the Armed Forces are exclusively subordinated to the people's will, for guaranteeing the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, territorial integrity of the country and constitutional democracy.

The Prime Minister is the head of the Government and is seconded by 4 deputy prime ministers, in charge of the coordination of Romania's strategic partnerships, regional development, public administration and the ministry of the environment. The Government is organised in the following ministries: a) regional development and public administration; b) environment; c) national defence; d) internal affairs; e) foreign affairs; f) public finance; g) justice; h) agriculture and rural development; i) national education; j) economy; k) energy; l) transport; m) European funds; n) business, trade and entrepreneurship; o) health; p) culture and national identity; q) waters and forests; r) research and innovation; s) communication and information society; t) the young and sports; u) tourism; v) Romanians abroad; w) the relation with the Parliament; z) public finance. The composition of each Government may change from one cycle of governance to another, depending on the programs of governance.

The cabinet includes a Minister Delegate for European Affairs, subordinated to the MFA. Also, within the MFA, since 2016, Romania's International Development Cooperation Agency (RoAid) is the main coordinator of development cooperation and humanitarian aid (Law no. 213/2016).

Romania's fundamental law stipulates that the SNDC is the body organising and coordinating the activities with regards to national security and defence, the participation in maintaining international security and in collective defence within military alliances or coalitions, as well as in peace operations. The activity of the SNDC is subjected to the annual examination and approval of the Parliament. The members of the SNDC are: the President of Romania (President of the SNDC), the Prime Minister (Vice President of the SNDC), Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Economy, Public Finance, the Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Chief of the GS, Presidential Counsellor for National Security, and State Counsellor (the Secretary of the SNDC).

The national defence policy is conducted by the MoD, in accordance with the legal provisions and the national security strategy. MoD is accountable to the Parliament, Government and the SNDC for the ways in which the provisions of the Constitution, national legislation, Government and SNDC decisions, and international treaties to which Romania is part are implemented in the area of activity.

The structure of the Romanian armed forces is adapted to the needs of territorial defence and support to NATO, having contributed to missions carried out under this aegis for over 17 years, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. By service branches, the Romanian Armed Forces are organised into Land Forces (36,000 personnel), Naval Forces (6,000 personnel) and Air Forces (10,300 personnel). To these, there shall also be added MoI paramilitaries: the Border Guards (22,900) and the Gendarmerie (57,000). In addition, Romania developed cyber security strategies (Decision nr. 271/2013), defining the conceptual framework, aim, objectives, priorities and courses of action for providing cyber security at the national level. The MoD already has established a centre for response to cyber security incidents – CERTMIL – and a Cyber Defence Command is expected to be set up within the military command structure in 2018.

Ever since the beginning of the 1990s, Romanian military institutions have gained the trust of the public. This is because the military had not had a special status during the communist regime and had not been used for the population's control. In this context, the armed forces were considered almost unanimously a "defender of the state" (Watts 2001, 599), becoming one of the most reputable domestic institutions, being outperformed only by the religious institutions in this respect. However, the efficiency of the security sector reform can be also seen in the light of the high scores by intelligence services in the statistics on public trust, which is significantly higher than the one given to the Government or Parliament (Figures 7–8).


Figure 7.

Trust in foreign and security policy institutions – public opinion trends 2004–2009

Source: Eurobarometer 2004–2009.

Another significant trend is the high amount of population trust invested in international or regional security organisations, which is usually higher than the one in national security related institutions. For instance, the analysis of the Eurobarometer's National Reports for Romania in the period 2004–2016 reveals that Romanians' trust in the EU has been high even in times of crisis, when the general view on the EU had a general tendency of decreasing. For instance, 50% of Romanians turned out to have a positive image of the EU, while the EU28 average was 35% (Eurobarometru Standard 86 2016). The poor level of trust invested in domestic political institutions has, therefore, a counterbalance in the trust given to EU institutions. The same seems to be valid for NATO as at least one of every two Romanians asserted they have trust to a large extent in both NATO and the EU.


	Govern-ment	Parliament	Armed Forces	Foreign Intelligence Service	Romanian Intelligence Service	EU	NATO	Presidency
2013	40%	31%	64%	46%	47%	46%	52%	28%
2014	28%	16%	68%	45%	50%	46%	51%	18%
2015	23%	18%	75%	46%	52%	52%	55%	51%
2016	23%	13%	76%	53%	50%	47%	55%	45%

Figure 8.

Trust in foreign and security policy institutions – public opinion trends 2013–2016

Source: INSCOP 2016.

Figure 9.

Positive view on the EU – Romania and the EU average

Source: Eurobarometer 2004–2009.

Several NGOs are also active in security and defence policy research, such as the European Institute for Risk, Security and Community Management (EURISC) or the Centre for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning. EURISC was established in 1995, having as its objective to study and inform the public about issues related to risk, security and communication.

As far as official development assistance is concerned, the MFA, through RoAid is the main coordinator. Also, in development assistance, the civil society seems to have a greater role. Ever since 2006, organisations acting in this area were reunited within the Federation of Non-Governmental Organizations in Romania (FOND), to contribute to the development of cooperation policy, when Romania changed its status from recipient to donor. FOND was involved in the development of the development assistance legal framework and includes nowadays 39 organisations according to the FOND website (FOND s. a.).

FOND also laid the basis for the Black Sea NGO Forum, with the support of the MFA and the European Commission, as part of the Black Sea Synergy. The Black Sea NGO Forum is meant to facilitate dialogue and cooperation among NGOs in the Wider Black Sea Area, strengthening the NGOs' capacity to influence regional and national policies and to increase the number and quality of regional partnerships and projects (Black Sea NGO Forum s. a.). It is also presented as an opportunity for the non-governmental organisations within the Black Sea region, but also for the state actors to develop sustainable partnerships in this area.

Briefly, the major stakeholders in Romania's foreign and security policy are the state institutions – Presidency, Government and Parliament. However, the importance of mass media and the public at large shall not be underestimated. There is strong public support

for regional security organisations, stronger than that invested in national institutions. This may be one of the reasons for the large consensus shown by these institutions when it comes to carrying out foreign and security policy within NATO and the EU.

Case studies: Accession to NATO (2004) and supporting NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999)

The highly centralised decision-making process in Romania's foreign and security policy can be clearly illustrated by two major cases of foreign and security policy decisions – the one on becoming a NATO Member State and the one about support for the NATO military campaign in Kosovo in 1999.

Both NATO and EU membership were the results of foreign and security policy stakeholders' efforts concentrated in this direction. The timeframe 1996–2000 is widely considered the beginning of focused political and military efforts towards meeting the membership criteria. Achieving full membership in these organisations supposed the involvement of all decision-making stakeholders, as meeting the criteria for joining NATO supposed changes within a large spectrum of national institutions.

Ever since the early 1990s, there was an intense diplomatic activity, directed towards gaining the support of NATO and EU member states, and to getting closer to these organisations. The Romanian President made a visit to Paris, where he got France's support for Romania's adhesion to the Alliance. During the Political-Military Steering Committee Session on Parliamentary Oversight of the Defence Establishment, the Parliament interceded for gaining the support of the Alliance Member States for Romania's membership (1997). In the same trend, the MFA negotiated bilateral good neighbourhood treaties with Romania's neighbours (with Bulgaria in 1992 and Hungary in 1996). The SNDC approved the establishment of an Inter-Agency Commission for Romania's NATO integration within the Government, meant to coordinate and support the external actions regarding Romania's NATO integration, to evaluate the efficiency of the actions carried out in this respect, and to present reports to the SNDC and propose further actions. In 1994, Romania was the first post-communist country signing PfP (Partnership for Peace).

In 1999, a PfP International Conference was held in Bucharest, and an Inter-parliamentary Commission for Romania's NATO Integration was convened. It subsequently issued a National Adhesion Plan. Soon after, a National Security Strategy, focused on Euro-Atlantic integration, was presented to the Parliament.

After supporting NATO's operation in Kosovo (1999), Romania was offered a Membership Action Plan. President Emil Constantinescu insisted that Romania's deadline for membership be not later than 2002. Subsequently, Bucharest cooperated with NATO in the former Yugoslavia, participating with troops and civilian expertise in the Alliance's missions.

With the change of the presidency, Ion Iliescu (President 2000–2004) and Adrian Năstase (Prime Minister and former Minister of Foreign Affairs) focused on the implementation of Romania's Euro-Atlantic Roadmaps. A special governmental meeting was held for the preparation of Romania's integration in NATO, with the participation of members of the Inter-Agency Commission for Romania's NATO Integration.

The major Romanian political parties issued the Declaration for Romania's adhesion to NATO, defining NATO membership as the fundamental foreign and security policy objective. Soon after, a National Plan for preparing Romania's adhesion to NATO was issued, comprising not only measures for meeting membership criteria, but also for promoting Romania's membership in NATO (through the coordination of the activities of embassies) and for promoting a common language between the Government and the civil society (Ziarul de Iași 2001). Involvement of the civil society in this decision could be tracked back to the Committee for NATO of the so-called social dialogue partners in Romania – NGOs aiming at promoting Romania's candidacy to become a member of the Alliance. They did so primarily by organising a cooperation framework with MFA and by being involved in a dialogue with NATO's Information and Press Office.

In February 2002, a report of the Romanian Government emphasised the importance of internal political support for Romania's NATO integration that could be achieved only on the basis of a multi-dimensional strategy, applied in almost all of the state institutions, together with mass media, society, and political parties (Zodian 2007, 117). Furthermore, after identifying vulnerabilities, the causes of the previous failures and the possible solutions, a schedule was set with clear actual responsibilities and measures for civilian and military authorities. NATO and EU integration went hand in hand, being two complementary processes. By consequence, it was asserted that there was a need for NATO-trained experts to help with Romania's performance in non-military areas, which would have gained security valences in the perspective of NATO and EU adhesion. Also, experts from other member states were involved in the training process not only of the MoD and MFA personnel, but other institutions as well (Zodian 2007, 118).

Various timelines of Romania's adhesion to NATO (Mostoflei 2002, 144–163; Zodian 2007, 114–129), emphasise the importance of a series of conferences, stressing Romania's role as a regional stability actor. Among them, there is the Donors Conference within SEESP (2001, with the participation of the NATO Deputy SG for Political Affairs), the "Rose-Roth" Workshop on NATO's role in Black Sea security" organised by the Romanian Parliament and NATO Parliamentary Assembly (in Bucharest, 2001, with the participation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defence), and the "Public security issues in peacekeeping operations" NATO/EAPC international workshop (Bucharest, 2001).

Furthermore, in the context of the 9/11 events, Bucharest rallied to the international community's position and supported the U.S. response to the attacks. Parliament itself lent its support to participate in the counter-terrorist fight, together with the other NATO Member States, and to increase Romania's contribution to the SFOR and KFOR missions.

The Commissions for foreign policy and the commissions for defence, public order and national security of both the deputy and the senate chambers published a common report on NATO integration on 18 February 2004 regarding the draft of the Law of Romania's adhesion to the North Atlantic Treaty. The report showed the consented belief that Romania's adhesion to the Alliance is a historical moment, marking the materialisation of one of the fundamental foreign and security policy goals Romania followed constantly through all governments since 1990, supported by the large majority of the population (Raport comun 2004).

In the context of the Kosovo crisis (1998–1999), NATO asked military facilities from Romania and Bulgaria in its campaign against Milosevic's forces in Kosovo. Internally, Romania was getting through serious turbulences due to difficulties of the economy result-

ing in a decrease of the population's living standards, as well as a loss of the Government's popularity in the aftermath of the social revolt of January–February 1999. On this background, a nationalist political trend began to gain ground in the Romanian political arena. In foreign policy, Romania had reached a stalemate at the time in its process of getting closer to NATO and EU integration, despite receiving a U.S. promise of support towards accession to NATO (1997).

In 1999, Romania made one of the most controversial foreign and security policy decisions in its post-communist history – supporting the U.S.-led intervention in Kosovo, although it had traditionally good relations with Serbia. U.S. expression of support towards Romania's NATO integration may have functioned as an incentive for the government to offer the required support to NATO in the Kosovo campaign, despite the fact that NATO was beginning to lose trust in the public opinion, highly influenced by the rise of nationalist mass media (ZIELONKA–PRAVDA 2001, 403–404).

Ever since the beginning of the crisis, Romania supported finding a political solution, but was constantly connected and involved in Western debates on this topic. There was an intense diplomatic activity as Bucharest was accepted as an interlocutor by all of the parties involved. For instance, Albania requested Bucharest's good offices in May 1998. Also, the President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence made and received various visits of Western officials and participated in various fora of cooperation debating solutions for the Kosovo crisis and presenting Romania as a factor of stability in the Balkans (ZODIAN–ZODIAN 2007, 245–261): the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Pleşu, met Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott (U.S. Secretaries of State) and Richard Schifter in Washington, all of them key coordinators of U.S. Policy in the Balkans (MOSTOFLEI 2002, 144–163; ZODIAN 2007, 114–129); the Romanian President made a visit to the U.S. and discussed implications for the U.S.–Romanian Strategic Partnership, NATO and EU integration, and security in the Balkans. In October 1998, the Romanian Head of the Government, Radu Vasile, asserted in Brussels Romania's approval of the use of its air space by NATO in case of a military intervention in Kosovo. In the same month, Romania was represented at the Summit of South-East European Heads of State and Government (in Antalya), which searched for a political solution to the Kosovo conflict, but did not take a stance against a possible NATO military intervention.

At the same time, the crises in the former Yugoslavia only added to the already developing political-military crises in Romania's Eastern vicinity. The prospects of NATO integration seemed to get farther away due to strong internal economic, social and political turmoil. In the meantime, Russian officials expressed their position that NATO enlargement had reached its final point and that any other enlargement wave would challenge European stability (1997).

Romania was offered security guarantees and economic incentives from Moscow in return for giving up its NATO membership plan (ZIELONKA–PRAVDA 2001, 403–404), but the formal pro-Western position of the Romanian Government for NATO's military operation was expressed after 13 April, when the Russian Duma voted for establishing an Alliance between Russia, Belarus and Serbia (New York Times 1999), leaving Romania exposed to risks in the event of a Russian military intervention in the Balkans on the side of Serbia.

At the beginning of NATO operation, the Romanian President declared that NATO's intervention was both necessary and legitimate, and, after NATO began the bombardment

of the former Yugoslavia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his hope that NATO's military action would convince Belgrade to return to negotiations (Constantinescu 2002, 183–184). Of high relevance for the context in which the key stakeholders' consensus emerged is also the Romanian president's declaration, emphasising the efforts for finding a political solution of the conflict: "Presently, Romania is engaged in finding an international political solution for solving the conflict in Yugoslavia" (Constantinescu 1999). At the same time he also reiterated Romania's basic policy orientation: "Romania's security is also the result of its firm commitment to NATO and EU accession. For our country there is and there could be no other strategic options, third ways, nor void neutralities" (Constantinescu 1999). Soon afterwards, Romania's President submitted to the Parliament's approval a proposal to ban Russian air forces from flying over Romanian territory. The proposal was approved with 90% of the votes in favour (Constantinescu 2017). The decision was made after a Russian aircraft breached a Protocol previously agreed between the Romanian and the Russian Chiefs of Staff. The Romanian MoD notified the Russian MoD on this decision and the Romanian air forces accompanied the Russian aircraft until exiting Romanian air space. This decision is believed to have contributed to the prevention of one of the gravest confrontations between the U.S. and Russia after WWII on the field, in Kosovo (Constantinescu 2012).

Subsequently, the SNDC and the Government approved NATO's request and the decision was sent for Parliament's approval. The archive of the debates within the Parliament on this issue reveals the decrease of NATO's popularity among Romanian politicians (especially nationalist ones) in the context of launching the military campaign in Kosovo. The positions taken by the members of Parliament during the debates revealed the main arguments against granting support to the Alliance, but also the main fears building up with reference to security risks and threats. The main arguments against the decision were built on the low support of NATO's operation in Kosovo both internationally and on the part of the public. For instance, the Members of Parliament brought up topics such as: the lack of a UN mandate for NATO's operation; the good relations between Romania and Serbia; the common cultural and religious background with Serbs; Romania's vulnerability in case of the NATO campaign's failure; the lack of economic compensation for the economic losses after NATO's bombing of Danube bridges which not only stopped trade relations between Romania and Serbia, but also isolated Romania from the Western Europe market (Romanian Parliament Debates 1996–2000).

The public support for NATO's campaign in Kosovo was extremely low. According to an opinion survey published on 2 April 1999, only 1% of Romanians supported NATO's campaign in order to push back Serb troops from Kosovo. The public sentiment against the intervention was amplified by the coverage of the crisis in mass media institutions with anti-Western positions (Gallagher 2004, 248). However, there were national newspapers going in line with the idea that, by supporting NATO's campaign, the government quitted a duplicity-based foreign policy, showing engagement and loyalty to Western democracies and the North Atlantic Alliance (Gallagher 2004, 248). A similar vision was expressed by the Romanian president in the message addressed to Romanian citizens after the intervention of NATO's air forces in Kosovo.

In spite of the large public dissent regarding NATO's campaign, the Parliament debated and approved the decision to grant the Alliance unrestricted access to Romanian air space.

The Social Democratic Party, which represented the opposition at that time, preferred to abstain from this decision. The Minister of National Defence declared that Romania's and Serbia's interests became divergent and the sole possible solution and answer is supporting NATO. The same firm engagement was showed by the Chief of the General Staff when he expressed the need to support NATO until the solution of the Kosovo crisis.

In the course of the same month, during the NATO Summit in Washington (23–25 April 1999), the Alliance presented the MAP for Romania. In May, the Romanian Government and NATO representatives agreed the conditions under which NATO could use the Romanian air space and, subsequently, the MoD confirmed the fact that NATO is granted the right to use Romanian airports for the Czech and Polish troops which were part of the international peacekeeping troops (KFOR) to transit to Yugoslavia.

Given the background of the decrease of public trust in NATO, the decision to support NATO's Kosovo campaign eroded even more the popularity of the governing political party. The unanimity showed by a Government otherwise strongly divided in public was therefore remarkable.

Conclusions

In the regional security context of the early 1990s, marked by regional conflicts both in the eastern and in the southwestern neighbourhood of the country, Romania, which had been a member of the Warsaw Pact, widely known for its noncompliant attitude within this forum, showed a decisive orientation towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Until the accession, NATO and EU integration has been the benchmark of Romanian foreign and security policy, fundamentally shaping the decisions made by Bucharest.

Responsibly assuming all the implications of NATO and EU membership still guides the Romanian foreign and security policy, as they are still seen as the main and the highest security guarantees the country has ever benefitted of. At the same time, a large significance has been constantly attributed to maintaining and promoting peace and security in the country's immediate neighbourhood. The increase of the defence budget in the context of the growing instability in the WBSA and the similar increase of the MFA budget as the Romanian Presidency of the European Council is getting closer also stand as proof of Romania's commitment in this respect.

The perception of security risks and threats gradually evolved from a strong military focus in the early 1990s to developing a multidimensional approach on security. Regional conflicts, international terrorism and organised crime have been constant preoccupations in this respect. The shared vision on security challenges is not just the result of Romania's adhesion to Euro-Atlantic values, as the flow of history has proven that most of these phenomena do actually impact on both Romania's national security and that of the Euro-Atlantic community.

Meeting the accession criteria has functioned as an incentive for post-communist reforms in the security policy area, and Romania progressed at a relatively rapid pace in restructuring and reforming its foreign and security policy, the relevant institutions and its laws. The reforming of civil-military relations, according to Western standards, along with the reform of the Armed Forces and the intelligence services were among the firsts

steps taken with the view to reaching Euro-Atlantic standards. The fact that the population invests a large amount of trust in security-related institutions could be considered a relevant token in this respect. In fact, both NATO and the EU could be considered stakeholders in Romanian foreign and security policy decisions.

In terms of the internal stakeholders in decision-making, Romania could be defined as a centralised state. Stakeholders are mainly the national institutions, as strategies are designed, promoted and implemented at this level. Each one of these institutions constantly follows the same objective in accordance with its competencies. Nevertheless, the procedures of civil control create a favourable context for the decisions to be legitimate and to have the support of the population. NGOs with interests and activity in the area of foreign and security policy have developed mostly next to national institutions, cooperating with them and supporting them in reaching their objectives. In fact, one could conclude that the civil society has not strongly participated in these decisions. Arguments in this respect can be found in the text of national security strategies, when referring to the frailty of the civic spirit, or in the fact that national security strategies have been subjected to public debate only since 2006. The scarcity of the data regarding public debates on major foreign and security policy decisions also comes in the same line of thought. Debates among stakeholders are in fact very rarely public. Therefore, following the actual negotiation of the decisions is surely incomplete.

Foreign and security policy decisions seem to attract a solid consensus among the stakeholders as long as they are made with the view to NATO and EU membership. The Romanian public's trust invested in these organisations is far greater than what is given to national institutions. This comparison stands even in those periods when the EU or NATO themselves see decreasing trust from members of the Romanian public.

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Slovakia: A Small Country with Potential

István Hangácsi[1]

Abstract

As a small country and a young democracy, the Slovak Republic has a lot to learn in shaping its own foreign, security and military policy in the international arena. Slovakia has experienced and changed a lot in a short period. First, the fall of communism (1989) with its long-term and painful socio-economic outcomes; a few years later the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia; thirdly the road of integration in NATO and the European Union followed. Not all of the governments were committed fully to meet certain democratic, economic and military standards set by NATO or the European Union. The story of Slovakia is thus a story of hard-earned reputation. The current study highlights the key historical moments, policies and strategies, the institutions, the various stakeholders and some practical cases of the Slovak foreign policy that significantly influenced Slovakia's international position.

Introduction

As a small country and a young democracy, the Slovak Republic has a lot to learn in its own foreign, security and military policy in the international arena. Slovakia has experienced and changed a lot in a short period. First, the fall of communism (1989) with its long-term and painful socio-economic outcomes; a few years later the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia; thirdly the road of integration in NATO and the European Union followed.

Not all of the governments were committed fully to meet certain democratic, economic and military standards set by NATO or the European Union. The story of Slovakia is thus a story of hard-earned reputation. The current study highlights the key historical moments, policies and strategies, institutions, the various stakeholders and some practical cases of the Slovak foreign policy that significantly influenced Slovakia's international position.

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Historical overview

Evolution of threat perceptions in the Slovak defence and security policies

Since the birth of Slovakia in 1993, all elected governments of the country have proclaimed their main aim by joining different international and European co-operations, which support peace, security and collaboration (political, economic and cultural) between nations. Even when the domestic political landscape was full of contradictions. The first five years (1993–1998, the so-called Mečiar era) were determined mostly by internal developments,[2] which had taken a toll on foreign, security and military policies by postponing the possibility of joining the EU and NATO. After the groundbreaking elections in 1998, the integration to transatlantic and European institutions picked up pace, peaking in 2004, when Slovakia caught up with other aspirant countries and joined both the European Union and NATO. Other international developments (terrorism, migration crisis, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea) also left their mark on the country's institutions and policies. The following official documents[3] highlight these shifts and the development of threat perception in the Slovak defence, security and military policies, as found in the Reference at the end: Defence Strategy (2005), Security Strategy (2005), Military Strategy (2005), the White Book on Defence (2013 and 2016).

The Security Strategy[4] highlighted the changing global security environment. The document emphasises the importance of failed states, as the roots of various terrorist groups and uncontrolled activities locally and internationally. Further important items include:

- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by different hostile state or non-state actors
- Regional armed conflicts
- Organised crime through corruption and illegal economy that are enhancing the threat of illegal and uncontrolled migration
- Vulnerability information and communication systems
- Activities of foreign intelligence services
- Outcomes of globalisation as economic imbalances, which can fuel radical nationalism
- Natural disasters and unbalanced demographics (SSSR 2005, 4–7)

The Security Strategy also highlights key international organisations,[5] which play an important part in the Slovak security, defence, military and foreign policies. The documents highlight the following geographical areas of special interest:

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[2] After the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the establishment of the Slovak sovereignty was the priority, followed by reforming of institutions, a wave of privatisations and development of a market economy.

[3] Unfortunately the Defence Doctrine (1994) and the Fundamental Aims and Principles of the National Security of the Slovak Republic (1996) documents are not available online and in public versions, and their content was thus not analysed here.

[4] The Slovak Parliament accepted the first version in 2001, which was followed by an enhanced version in 2005 due to the achieved NATO and EU membership.

[5] UN, NATO, EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, OECD, Visegrád Group and Central European Initiation.

- Ukraine and Western Balkans – the active supports of integration into NATO and the EU structures
- Commonwealth of Independent States – strengthening democracy, the rule of law, security and stability in case of raw materials and for the fights against terrorism, illegal migration and drugs
- Russia – importance of natural resources and global potential, with a focus on mutual beneficial economic cooperation and political partnership
- Rest of the world – supporting the peaceful resolution of local conflicts, increasing focus on developing democracy, stability and security (SSSR 2005, 15–16)

The Defence Strategy[6] is based on a similar evaluation of the international environment as the Security Strategy enhanced by NATO and the EU members. The document concludes that the "Slovak Republic is not threatened by an imminent extensive conventional military conflict" directly; however, the danger of international terrorist attacks shows an increasing global and European trend. The Strategy acknowledges the aims of the Slovak defence policy in alignment with internationally accepted basic principles, NATO and EU members. It also emphasises the "mission of defence" as a basic goal, to be able to defend the state sovereignty, territorial integrity and its citizens against external threats (terrorism or WMD). Slovakia relies on its own forces and as NATO member can count on the collective defence, as well as on the EU wide defence cooperation, too.

The most recent documents are the White Paper(s) on Defence of the Slovak Republic (2013 and 2016 editions), which draw a clear picture about the threat perception of the country. Although there are some differences between the two documents, both of them acknowledge that the global environment is characterised by dynamic geopolitical and geo-economical changes, which causes instability (White Paper 2013; White Paper 2016). The version published in 2013 presents the following findings and assumptions:

- Does not count with a conventional armed conflict in the Euro-Atlantic area, but views the growing military capabilities of some countries with concern
- Countries that do not respect the international law and carry out an aggressive foreign policy, developing weapons of mass destruction and missiles, are a major threat
- Threat of new local military conflicts, mostly in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, North Africa, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia
- Terrorist groups that may use the territory of Slovakia as a transit or logistical base to support their own activities
- Deepening inequalities, as well as the problems of the EU monetary and economic development
- Populist and extremist groups that decrease the confidence in democratic institutions
- Activities of foreign intelligence services, organised crime, also exploiting various information and communications channels (White Paper 2013, 46–49)

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[6] In case of the Defence Strategy, the same history applies: the Slovak Parliament accepted it in 2001, later on an enhanced version followed it in 2005 after achieving NATO and EU membership.

The updated document published three years later made further acknowledgements, reflecting on more current issues such as: the annexation of Crimea by Russia, NATO positions towards Ukraine and Russia, the use of propaganda for polarising societies, cyberattacks and the rise of terrorism globally. The study also highlights that the security perception of Slovakia will be influenced increasingly by asymmetric threats and non-state actors (White Paper 2016, 32–36). Both papers made a step forward viewing and understanding the global trends in security and threats compared to strategies adopted in 2005. The military related content of these White Papers will be discussed further in the upcoming chapters.

Achieving sovereignty and Euro-Atlantic integration

Through the course of history, the Slovaks lived within larger states such as the Hungarian Kingdom, the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy and Czechoslovakia, which meant that they had little influence in shaping foreign policy. However, it did not mean that the Slovak elite had not had any concepts related to this. The foreign policy of the Slovak Republic, more precisely the Slovak society and political elite, is historically divided into three major orientations: the Slavic bloc idea, looking towards Russia; national liberation based on a nation state and international and European cooperation (Bútora 2017, 13). These historical concepts changed during the different political systems or were overridden by greater powers, especially during the Cold War period.

The peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1992 and the establishment of the Slovak Republic in 1993 were the biggest political decisions made by the Slovak political elite. Although the process was fuelled by nationalism and the desire for independence, it did not lack the idea of long-term goals: joining the European integration and various international structures. Martin Bútora[7] divides the development of the Slovak foreign policy since 1993 into ten phases:

- Establishment of the Slovak Republic (1993)
- Long-term commitment towards the Euro-Atlantic integration (1993–1994)
- Foreign policy trapped by the sidetracked domestic political development (1994–1997)
- International isolation and missed chances with NATO (1997–1998)
- Political changes – back to the original direction (1998–2002)
- "Tiger of the Tatras"[8] (2002–2004)
- Integrating into the various Euro-Atlantic structures (2004–2007)
- Eurozone crisis (2008–2012)
- Growing influence of think tanks, civic sector and experts (2013–2015)
- Liberal democracy in danger (2016–present) (Bútora 2017, 15–16)

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[7] Martin Bútora is one of the first politicians and influencers, who took the responsibility shaping the foreign policy of Slovakia through consultation and representation after 1993. Source: https://osobnost.aktuality.sk/martin-butora/ (Accessed: 17.03.2018.)

[8] Slovakia received this label since it was one of the fastest growing economy in the early 2000s in Central Europe: "Tatra from the mountain range here and tiger after the Irish Tiger, the term used to describe Ireland's economic transformation in the 1990's" (Reynolds 2004).

As a young democracy and society, the Slovaks quickly fell into the trap of populism under Vladimír Mečiar, which sidetracked the country and its citizens between 1994 and 1998. These four years nearly excluded Slovakia from the Euro-Atlantic integration process. However, in 1998 the pro-European and democratic parties won the parliamentary elections that had a long-term and decisive effect: the ensuing governments were all committed to strengthening the efforts for achieving NATO and European Union memberships. This gave the country international visibility and led to the adoption of the European single currency (EUR) in 2009. Although the Eurozone crisis left its mark both on economics and society, it did not change the Slovak foreign policy fundamentally.

Parallel to this, the number of actors shaping foreign policy multiplied in addition to the President, the PM, the cabinet and the National Council, several think tanks, civil society and experts raise their voices or work together with the government and the ministries, contributing to the overall strategy.

However, it does not mean that all the political parties or the whole of the Slovak society are clearly committed to seeing the future of the country in the European Union. The Eurosceptic politicians and opinion leaders question the direction towards closer integration, while they call for further reforms and strengthening of the member state level against the federation. Moreover, the current international trends also affect the domestic political scene, the increasing focus on international migration and other contemporary developments.

MFA reorganisation since 1989

The story of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic started in 1989, with the establishment of the Division of International Relations within the Government Office structure. This section was neither independent nor autonomous, since it was overseen and reporting to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its status, however, quickly changed after the elections in June 1990, when the Slovak Ministry of International Relations was established (1990–1992). Until the dissolution of Czechoslovakia both the Slovak and Czech Republic had the rights and autonomy within the federal structure to build international relations and close agreements with states and international organisations, and to send and receive diplomats or representatives (Teraz 2014). In 1990, the Ministry was operating approximately with 40 employees and most of them lacked any professional experience in diplomacy. By 1993, the staff increased to 400 members and additional 350 employees were working in representative offices abroad (Bátora 2003, 340).

After Slovakia became an independent country, many institutions changed their name, so did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1993–2012). During the Mečiar era, the Ministry was affected by the domestic political developments that resulted in frequent leadership changes: six ministers led the institution between 1993 and 1998, changes based on personal and competence conflicts with PM Vladimír Mečiar. The Ministry was at this time clearly affected by clientelism, most visibly the representative offices abroad, when PM Vladimír Mečiar decided to call back 28 ambassadors in 1998, to replace them with HZDS party members, despite their lack of experience in international diplomacy (Marušiak 1999, 279). Mečiar's defeat in the general elections in 1998 also affected the MFA rather positively; under the leadership of Eduard Kukan, the Ministry underwent a huge restructuring process (creating

new departments and groups) and a wave of professionalisation. Kukan also strengthened the domestic and international reputation of the MFA by the active participation in searching for solutions for the Kosovo crisis (Marušiak 1999, 285).

In 2006, the MFA under the leadership of Ján Kubiš conducted an audit about itself to understand the key weak points and untapped potentials, which resulted in the first big restructuring project called TREFA (permanent effective management) between 2007 and 2008. The project was inspired by the Danish MFA and focused on achieving the following goals:

- Create tools for strategic planning and management
- Streamline processes, so the employees can focus more on the MFAs overall strategic goals
- Increase the quality of human resources, implement competitive remuneration and promotion
- Streamline the budgetary and financial processes
- Optimise IT and communication technologies and access of information (Výročná správa 2008, 44)

In 2008, the MFA conducted another major round of restructuring: the leadership reduced the number of management levels from four to three, and several sections were cancelled (Výročná správa 2008, 67). Since then, no similarly new major reforms were implemented in spite of several changes of government, the Slovak EU Presidency in 2016 and new trends in international affairs.

Defence reform since 1989

During the communist era, the Czechoslovak army was a key point of the regime and the ruling party. It was a segregated group from the society, with little transparency about its budget and operation. Following the change of system and democratisation, civic control became an important aim for the Slovak Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence. Its achievement may be validated by the high trust ratio in society towards defence institutions, according to polls since 1993. The Army was also among the key interested parties, which supported the ever-closer integration of the Slovak Republic in international community (OECD, UN, OSCE) and Western institutions (NATO, WEU, EU, EC). The Armed Forces regularly provide open-source information to the public since 1993 through annual reports and quarterly published magazines (Wlachovský 1997, 101).

The first reorganisation of the Armed Forces (1993–2000)

The dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 was followed by the establishment of the Armed Forces of the SR and the separation of the Federal system. Before 1989, the Federal Army was primary focused on a direct confrontation with Western (NATO) forces, which in practice meant that most of the units were placed (air force, ground forces and anti-aircraft system) on Czech territory. Meanwhile the Slovak side was a hinterland providing for the site of defence industry production and training. According to the dissolution agreement

between the Czech and Slovak Republics, the Federal Army was divided in a 2:1 ratio in favour of Prague. In details, it meant:

- The number of soldiers per kilometre on the borders were 404 in the Czech Republic, and only 273 in Slovakia
- The number and quality of airfields were superior on the Czech side
- Most of the anti-aircraft system (missiles, radio network and aircraft) remained on the Czech side (Wlachovský 1997, 102)

Thus, the established Armed Forces of Slovakia (Vida 2007, 92) had 58,346 soldiers, 995 tanks, 1,370 armoured vehicles, 1,058 artillery pieces, 146 fighter aircraft and 19 support helicopters in 1993. Due to the ratified Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces, the Mečiar Government had to reduce the number of forces in every category, except helicopters by 1995. Moreover, the Army required a full-scope transformation on all levels, also on a conceptual basis due to the extensive political and military changes worldwide. The need for restructuring of the Armed Forces to become efficient and to join NATO was declared regularly since the time of the very first security and defence related documents, as well as in government programs. The first concept published in 1994 aimed to complete the whole process until 2000 (Görner 2018, 121–123). The plan was divided into three periods, from which only one was fully closed, the second had partial achievements, while the third failed to reach the main goals (Wlachovský 1997, 101–104; Purdek 2012, 60–70):

1. First phase 1994–1995 (achieved)
- Reorganisation of the General Staff, redevelopment of the mechanised, tank and artillery units
- Unification of the command system for tactical and operational levels
- Establishment of military education and preparation of commanding corps
- Slovakia joined to Partnership for Peace NATO program (1995)
- Slovakia started to participate in missions in the Balkans (UNPROFOR)

2. Second phase 1996–1997
- Stabilisation after general reorganisation, focus on military training, preparation, rearmament and modernisation of the army
- Increase the readiness of military units within new structures
- Creating conditions for starting the overall professionalisation of the Armed Forces
- Accomplish the tasks set by the Partnership for Peace program
- Reasons of (partial) failure: Although the second phase met some goals in case of the completion of military units, it was unsuccessful due to budgetary issues and domestic political developments, which negatively affected the whole process as well as the integration dialogue with NATO
- As a result, Slovakia did not receive a NATO invitation to begin the accession period

3. Third phase 1998–2000
- This period aimed on the development of a modern command system that can easily cooperate with NATO
- Finish the overall military modernisation and rearmament

- Creating conditions for joining the security structures of NATO
- Reasons of failure: After the parliamentary elections and changes in the domestic political landscape, the new Dzurinda Government reviewed the reforms timeline and structure, which was followed by new documents, goals and strategy. This phase never really started since the new government re-shaped the entire process.

The concepts of 2002 and "Models" 2010 and 2015

After the failure of the previous reform and the domestic political changes, the MoD decided to review the reform plans and create a new concept in 1999, to be implemented until 2010. This plan counted on Slovakia's NATO membership as well as the involvement in international missions. The concept goal was to reduce the Armed Forced to 30,000 soldiers (a reduction of 13,500), to continuously dismantle the old T-55 type tanks, OT-90 armoured vehicles, D30 and 2S1 artillery; and also prepare for a bid on new aircraft models. The plan aimed to create quick reaction forces until 2002. The concept was successfully implemented and the goals were achieved (Vida 2007, 107–110).

After the domestic political changes with the Dzurinda Government, the reform and transformation of the Armed Forces were again on the main agenda with NATO accession. In 2001, three important documents (Defence Strategy, Security Strategy and Military Strategy of the SR) as well as a series of new laws were adopted by the Slovak Parliament.

Based on these strategies, Model 2010, Model 2015 and White Papers of Defence of the SR (2013 and 2016), the Ministry of Defence decided to start a new restructuring, transformation and modernisation process.

Model 2010 (Reform Concept of the Armed Forces of the SR – Model 2010) was accepted in 2001 by the Parliament. The document provides an overall picture about the complex transformation of the Armed Forces, restructuring the Ministry of Defence, aspects of defence planning and financial budgetary responsibilities (this was later followed by Model 2015). Model 2010 criticised the previous transformation attempts. Because of this, the "Army of the Slovak Republic is still largely a product of past inherited structure, which is not effective and financially sustainable" (Model 2010 2001, 6). Model 2010 also acknowledged the attempts of several reports (many of them are unfortunately not available for the public[9]) and emphasised that the most critical situation is in case of resources and planned size of the Armed Forces with a focus on equipment and armament, which require modernisation. It also targeted to reduce the number of employees at the Ministry of Defence in order to be more effective, financially sustainable and to avoid any duplication (Model 2010 2001, 15). The document advised further actions in the case of human resource management:

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[9]   These are the following reports and documents: *Hodnotenie bojaschopnosti Armády Slovenskej republiky za rok 1999,* Štúdia reformy obrany Slovenskej republiky z roku 2000 (Garrettova štúdia/Garrett case study), *Správa o stave obrany Slovenskej republiky z januára 2001* (Cubic application), *Prehľad štruktúry manažmentu a administratívy Ministerstva obrany Slovenskej republiy a Generálného štábu Armády Slovenskej Republiky – 2000* (Clarkova štúdia/Clark case study), *Hodnostenie PZM a PARP Slovenskej republiky Január 2001.*

- Suspending the compulsory army training and introducing a professional army
- Increasing the overall number of women within the AF SR
- Developing the wellbeing of soldiers in terms of accommodation and various benefits
- Introducing leadership and training programs
- Implementing a large-scale redundancy program (regarding military and non-military staff): through requalification courses, earlier retirement, supporting career changes and increasing pensions

Model 2010 also covered the various categories of army supply materials and logistical bases through reducing the number of warehouses (from 10 to 4 centres), moreover to create from the current one-dimensional bases multifunctional centres (foodstuff, weapon equipment, construction materials) (Model 2010 2001, 28). The document also reviewed all types of available mechanised and air force units in terms of ageing, which clearly showed that by 2010:

- From 7,567 mechanised units 77% will be over 21 years old and 42% will be over 30 years old
- In case of air force, the numbers were even worse – from 231 units 82% will reach more than 21 years and 37% is over 30 years old (Model 2010 2001, 35–36)

While Model 2010 was a concept that highlighted all the desired changes based on the demands for NATO membership, Model 2015 was created several years later (in 2006) by what was already then a NATO member country, reflecting on the current and potential military or security trends. The new document summarised achievements and set key goals for general readiness for self or collective defence; Slovakia should have to prepare two ground brigades with full fighting potential and support, different air wing groups (helicopters, air fighters, transports, anti-air and reconnaissance).

The document set further short and long-term goals for ground and air units focusing on extensive modernisation and acquisition of new armaments and technologies with the following timeline: Phase I (2007–2010) focusing on modernisation of logistical units, Phase II (2011–2015) development of field capabilities.

In 2015, Róbert Ondrejcsák (security expert and current State Secretary of the MoD) published a short paper about the dire situation of the Armed Forces, whose key points included:

- The level of troop's interoperability is around 54%
- Mechanised units meet 62% of NATO requirements
- Engineering units meet 39% of NATO requirements
- In case of aircraft and the NATO Integrated Air Defense System a level of 66% is fulfilled
- Ammunitions were nearly at the end of their service time
- Most of the technology and weapons are still Soviet–Russian, which is a source of dependency (Ondrejcsák 2015, 1)

The analysis clearly highlights that the Armed Forces are lagging behind in every type of unit and technology.

Future plans and the White Papers of Defence of the SR (2013–2016)

While these Models highlighted the necessary steps and goals for extensive restructuring and modernisation of the AF SR until 2012, the concepts were mostly not followed by necessary actions and large-scale acquisitions of new technologies, especially not for ground and air units. They also lacked the relevant funding and financial planning.

The MoD published two further documents, which determined overall threat perception as the future framework of defence, security and military plans of Slovakia. The reasons were obvious: "The current conceptual framework of the national defence system fails to fully meet the requirements" (White Paper 2013, 30). The first White Paper (2013) contained recommendations and calls to action, since "the Armed Forces of Slovak Republic have only a limited range of capabilities" (White Paper 2013, 38), and Slovakia "is lagging behind in implementing its own plans as well as commitments within the framework of collective defence" (White Paper 2013, 42). Accordingly, several new acquisitions are planned or already in the works:
- JAS 39 Gripen or F-16 Block 70/72 (approximately 7 to 14 units)
- Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk (9 units – awaiting delivery)
- C-27 J Spartan (2 units – delivered)
- Sojka III drones, Radar units (around 3–4 of them, planned since 2015)
- BVP M2 Šakal (485 units until 2029) (Kováč 2017)

Intelligence and secret services reforms

The Slovak intelligence and secret service structure consist of the following institutions: Slovak Information Service (SIS), Military Intelligence (MI) and National Security Authority (NBÚ). The following section will provide a brief summary of these organisations.

Slovak Information Service (Slovenská informačná služba – SIS)

The relatively short but fascinating story of the SIS started in 1993, as the Slovak Republic declared its independence and the new institutions became functional in the country. During the Mečiar era, when the most important judiciary, executive and political institutions were occupied by the governing coalition and in many cases exploited by them, unfortunately, the SIS was no exception. The leadership of the authority gladly circumvented the lustration act that allowed them to employ former agents of the old communist secret service. They were given room to actively influence the domestic and international political development of Slovakia. They also had access to top-secret documents about important political and social figures as the SIS observed many opposition politicians and journalists, and often threatened them (Lesná s. a. 791–796). The biggest scandal was the abduction of the President's son and the death of a police agent (Robert Remiáš, who tried to investigate the case), where SIS played key roles to complete the operations (Lesná s. a. 791–796).

In reaction, an alternative network came alive by those, who openly criticised and opposed the incumbent coalition, and it provided help and cover for those, who were threatened and exploited by the state authorities. The fact of this "parallel Secret Service" (1995–1998)

was first time mentioned at an annual conference of the ABSD[10] in 2011. A few years later Peter Tóth[11] explained and presented his findings about these whistleblowers. The informal service was based on the network of former secret intelligence agents and employees, who worked to reveal the illegal operations of the SIS, which threatened the young and weak democracy of Slovakia. They informed the public about the regular illegal surveillance of opposition politicians, journalists and civic activists by the SIS. According to Peter Tóth, this network played a key role and provided valuable help to the democratic opposition in defeating the Mečiar Administration during the parliamentary elections in 1998 (Tóth 2013, 29–32).

Then, in 2011 a huge political scandal broke out, which heavily involved the SIS, too. A transcript document (called Gorilla) was leaked by an employee of the SIS. Its content was about bribes paid to high profile politicians from all the parliamentary parties by the businessmen of PENTA financial services (Euractiv 2012). The leaked document caused massive outrage and protests. It also revealed the deficiency of the SIS in many aspects; their processes received public attention and criticism, too (Sme 2012b).

Since 2011, SIS publishes annual reports about its activities and its analysis of current domestic and international trends, which affect Slovakia. In case of foreign politics, the reports focus much on the current situation in Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, the Western Balkans, China, hybrid threats, crisis and conflict regions (Middle East and North Africa). SIS mostly monitors the general political, social and economic developments in these countries and regions (SIS Annual Reports 2011–2018).

Military Intelligence

While the SIS was since 1990 an autonomous and separated entity in the information service structure, the Ministry of Defence oversaw between 1993 and 2012 the Military Defence Intelligence (prevention and counterintelligence) and the Military Intelligence Service (collecting information abroad) (Legal Status of Military Intelligence s. a.). There are few open source documents available from this period, but one thing is sure: the directors of the MI were always from a military background and they were members of the Slovak Army. Since 2013, (Legal Status of Military Intelligence s. a.) the two services were joined and are since functioning as one. According to the law in force, the joint MI focuses on the collecting and the analysis of security and defence related information of Slovakia (internal and external), targeting specifically:

- Threat to the country's sovereignty, constitutional system, territorial integrity
- Activities of foreign intelligence services, terrorism, cyberattacks, sabotage, treason
- Extremism (political or religious), harmful groups endangering the defence of the country
- Organised criminal activities, illegal trade, weapons of mass destruction
- Illegal international human trafficking, exposing or leak of classified information (Legal Status of Military Intelligence s. a.)

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[10] ABSD is the Association of Former Intelligence Officers of Slovakia established in 2006. Source: www.absd. sk/o_asociacii (Accessed: 20.03.2018.)

[11] Peter Tóth worked as a journalist and political analyst between 1993 and 2003 and focused mostly on the activities and problems of information service authorities. Between 1995 and 1998, he provided information for the SME newspaper about the abduction of the President's son by the SIS.

International trends, such as the growing threat of terrorism, EU and NATO integration, clearly affected the organisational development, as well as certain changes in the domestic political landscape (GOFJÁR 2013, 51–57). The MI had to adapt especially to the NATO and EU related military intelligence structure. It released so far only two public reports about its activities, in 2015 and 2016, which provides a detailed glance how the MI SR sees and ranks the domestic and international threats. Here are some key findings worth mentioning:

- Currently the most important security threats are the ongoing crises in Ukraine and Syria, which intensify illegal migration and cross border criminal activities
- The reports expect the growth of negative propaganda, activities of foreign services and potential jihadist groups in Slovakia
- It also highlights the regular observation of informal, paramilitary organisations and other subjects, by monitoring their potential of destabilising society or exploiting the Slovak Armed Forces (SIS Annual Reports 2015–2017)

National Security Authority of the Slovak Republic (NSA SR)

NSA SR was established to meet the need for an independent institution for various information and cyber security tasks in 2001, during the EU and NATO integration processes. The NSA SR is currently responsible for protecting classified information, cryptographic protection and management of electronic signatures (since 2002), vetting processes for judicial eligibility (since 2015), cyber security (since 2016) and trust services (since 2018) (NBU SR s. a.). These activities affect the public and private sectors (natural persons and legal entities). Since its establishment, the NSA SR was involved in 36 bilateral agreements for mutual exchange of classified information and security clearance (15 rokov NBÚ 2016, 3). Another notable achievement was the creation of a government communication network for classified national and foreign information in 2004. The NSA SR has currently more than 200 employees. The director of the Authority is named and recalled by the National Council, who serves a 7-year term. All of the directors were independent experts; however, it is always the reigning government that nominates them. Since 2001, all of the directors (except the incumbent one) resigned before the end of their mandate or were recalled after scandals. NSA SR has both English and Slovak websites with general information about its activities, responsibilities and annual reports from the last 5 years.

The NSA recently published two important documents in the field of cyber security: the Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic for 2015–2020 (Concept) and the related Action Plan. These papers outline the importance and threats of contemporary cyber security trends highlighted by NATO, EU, UN and OECD (CSC SR 2016; API CSC SR 2016). Both are among the very first documents of Slovakia focusing on cyber security, with the aim to set up a specific legal, organisational, action orientated and terminological (theoretical) framework. The Concept identifies several strategic goals (protection of national cyber space, security awareness of the society, strengthening the cooperation between the public-academic-private sectors) and solutions (creating of legal, institutional and methodical frameworks; developing of internal cyber security products; enhancing national and international partnerships).

The first big step to implement theoretical plans in practice was made by the creation and adoption of the Cyber Security Act, which came to power on 1 April 2018. The Act defines key terminology, the structure of institutions and their responsibilities, incident management and countermeasures. While the NSA SR highlighted the adoption of this Act as a great success, there were some critical voices several months before the final voting, namely coming from the Comenius University of Bratislava (Stanovisko UK 2017) and the world famous Slovak IT company, ESET (Stanovisko ESET 2017). Both criticised the process of the creation of the draft namely: the exclusion of relevant academic experts and the private sector; imprecise or incorrect terminologies; conflicts of interest (NBU is a controlling and executive institution at the same time); technical solutions (due to the single point of failure), and several controversies of the draft's overall content. While the adoption of the Cyber Security Act is clearly a huge step forward in Slovakia, it also raises questions and further fields of improvements for the future.

Trends in spending/budgetary trends: MFA, defence, intelligence

Unfortunately, not all the budgetary spending is available starting from 1993 in the case of foreign policy, defence and intelligence. However, there are some identical trends, which influenced the financial aspects: long-lasting effects of system change (overall restructuring and cost savings), the dissolution of Czechoslovakia (establishing the independent institutions), integration into EU and NATO structures (meeting the requirements and implementing the necessary changes) and adapting to the new European or international trends of the foreign, defence and intelligence fields.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomacy

- The public data shows, that between 1992 and 2016 the overall expenditure was between roughly 0.8% and 1.2% of the state budget.
- During the dissolution (1992–1993) and the following year (1994) the expenditure grew from 0.8% up to 1.1%, meeting the demands of launching Slovakia's independent diplomacy worldwide, but later on it decreased around 1.0% (until 1997) (Výročná správa 2008, 46).
- Another increase came in 1998 up to 1.2%, which was the peak period and was followed by a long-term decrease until the Slovak EU presidency in 2016, when the spending reached again 1.2% (Výročná správa 2008, 46).
- A significant decrease happened between 2000–2002 from 1.1% to 0.98% that was later even lower presumably due to the global and European financial crisis, which resulted in the lowest of budget spending 0.7% in 2010, at around 110 million EUR (Ovádek 2017).

Figure 1.
Annual Budget of the MFA SR (2009–2018)

Source: Výročné správy MZV SR, www.mzv.sk

- The most interesting period was the Slovak EU presidency in 2016, when the expenditure exceeded prior estimates significantly: instead of 100 million EUR, the Ministry spent 180 million EUR. At the end of the Slovak EU presidency, a financial scandal broke out, which showed that the Agency EVKA won marketing and event organisation bids with overpriced expenses (Šípoš–Hlaváková 2017).

Defence expenses

- There are plenty data available about the recent military and defence spending via NATO and the World Bank. Despite these sources, not all these statistics are accurate; therefore, the study uses the latest statistics published on the SME website (Kováč 2017).
- Figure 2 clearly shows the declining trend of military and defence expenses of Slovakia since achieving its independence (blue line) compared to NATO requirements (orange line).
- The first big decreases happened between 1997 and 1999, when the domestic political landscape shifted, resulting in huge state budget cuts. It was also the period of the failed first military and defence transformation attempt.
- Another major budget cut can be see between 2009 and 2014. This was again a hectic period: the end of the first Fico Government, the Global Financial Crisis, the short-lived Radičová Administration and the return of the second Fico Government. One of the main reasons for declining expenditure is the direction set by PM Robert Fico in 2008 (Kern 2008), who openly refused to increase the military and defence spending despite the NATO requirements (HNonline 2017).
- Since 2014, there is a trend of slow increase of expenditure that can be sustainable due to the ongoing modernisation activities and plans.

Figure 2.

Percentage of Slovakia's military expenditure in GDP compared to the NATO target (1993–2018)

|	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
■ Other	26.46	23.58	22.38	23.55	22.19	19.16	23.49	22.31	21.08	21.29
■ Infrastructure	4.49	4.22	1.01	0.37	0.29	0.57	1.99	3.75	2.97	4.96
■ Personnel	55.82	62.39	69.47	66.53	40.14	69.14	56.24	58.65	58.21	52.7
■ Equipment	13.23	9.81	7.15	9.56	7.39	11.12	18.28	15.3	17.74	21.05

Figure 3.

Distribution of Slovakia's total defence expenditure

- Other interesting aspects are the distribution of expenses (Figure 3) by different categories (infrastructure, personnel, equipment and other – operation, maintenance, R&D, etc.). Slovakia is no different from most of the NATO member countries that have similar spending trends (NATO Com PR/CP 2017, 12–13).

Intelligence (Military, National Security and the Information Service)

- Unfortunately, only the Slovak Intelligence Service and the National Security Authority published their budgets publicly (since 2009), while the Military Intelligence did not provide any data before 2016.

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
NSA SR	8.7	8.5	7.8	7.8	8.1	7.6	8.2	12.0	8.8	9.1
SIS	48.1	46.6	41.8	41.6	46.2	43.4	47.7	47	51.5	53
MI SR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	37.9	53.7

Figure 4.
Annual budgets of NSA SR, SIS and MI SR (million EUR 2009–2018)

Source: cenastatu.sk

- As the above figure shows, in the case of the NSA SR, the expenses were quite stable and sustainable between 7.6 and 8.7 million EUR (Figure 4). A significant change happened in 2016 when the Authority received more than 4.6 million EUR from the state budget. Unfortunately, there is no clear explanation available for this major financial boost, but potentially it was connected to the increased responsibilities of the NSA SR during the Slovak EU presidency.
- The SIS highlights in every annual report that they struggle to: cope with ongoing trends in technological development (SIS 2012); manage cost saving, while the in-

formation and communication systems are in a critical status (SIS 2013); upgrade cyber and encrypting services that can affect the Slovak EU Presidency (SIS 2015); and implement new IT, intelligence and communication technologies, to catch up with current international trends (SIS 2017).

- Unfortunately, the publicly available annual reports (from 2015 and 2016) of MI SR provide only brief information about the costs of general functioning and some development categories (infrastructure, communication and information systems, technologies) (VSS 2016; VSS 2017).

Stakeholders in decision-making

The key actors in the field of executive power and the legislative framework

As in every constitutional and democratic country, only specific state representatives and officials are allowed to shape the foreign, security, defence and military developments. This is the same in case of Slovakia, where the most influential are: the President, the National Council (Parliament), the Prime Minister (PM), the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs (MoFaEA), the Minister of Defence (MoD) and the cabinet (to some extent).

The President

The incumbent president, Andrej Kiska, is the 5th head of Slovakia since 1993 and the second non-party member, who holds this role. According to the Constitution of Slovakia, the President in case of foreign policy making, defence and military decisions has the following rights:

- Represents the country internationally and ratifies international agreements (with the consent of the Government and Parliament)
- Handles diplomatic missions (receiving, accrediting and recalling)
- Is the Supreme Commander of the Slovak Armed Forces
- Declares war based on the Parliament's decision
- Can order the mobilisation of the Armed Forces and declare a state of war or martial law
- Can call for referenda
- Appoints and recalls the Prime Minister and other ministers of government (Constitution 1992, Article 103–107)

In Slovakia's history, Michal Kováč was the most active president in the field of foreign policy. As the first president of the independent country, Kováč tried to shape the overall decision-making, influencing the government and the parliament as well, which resulted in frequent clashes of interests between the President, the PM and the governing coalition in case of NATO and EU accession. PM Vladimír Mečiar attempted several times to weaken the President's position through shrinking its responsibilities; however, his plans did not bear fruit. Compared to his predecessors, Andrej Kiska is also a critical thinker, who is

not afraid to criticise the Fico Administration, mostly its governing style and the results of domestic political developments. Having said that since becoming a member of NATO and the EU, the President of Slovakia takes generally only a representative position, while the cabinet and the MoFaEA manage day-to-day tasks of foreign policy.

The National Council

The National Council is the most important legislative body of the country, which has legislative power, power of scrutiny, power to create state bodies, domestic and foreign policy powers (NR SR s. a.). According to the constitution, in case of foreign, defence, security and military policies, the Parliament is responsible for:

- Legislation
- Overseeing different state bodies – mainly the government, but also creating new state bodies (institutions, commissions, committees, etc.)
- Approving various international treaties
- Passing resolutions about declaring war
- Giving consent for sending military troops outside of Slovakia
- Approving the presence of foreign troops in Slovakia
- Debate and decide about referendum calls (NR SR s. a.)

The National Council in most cases follows the direction set by the governing coalition, which has the majority in the parliament, in every policy field, including the foreign, defence, military and security.

The Prime Minister and the cabinet

The Prime Minister and the cabinet (with various ministries):

- International treaties which were passed by the President and requires additional consultation with the Constitutional Court
- Overall foreign policy
- Approving drafts for a state of war, the mobilisation of the Slovak Armed Forces, approving the draft for state of emergency and its termination
- Sending troops abroad for humanitarian help, military trainings or monitoring missions – as well as giving consent for foreign troops to be present in Slovakia for the same reasons as above
- Sending troops abroad up to 60 days in case of fulfilling responsibilities based on international treaties about collective defence (Ústava 1992)

The PM is perhaps the most influential in the field of foreign, security, military and defence policy, even as there is no clear legal framework about the PM's position and responsibilities in this field. However, as head of the government, the PM has access to all necessary information and has, of course, a key position in setting conceptual elements of policy.

The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MoFaEA)

The MoFaEA also plays an important role in shaping the foreign policy, representation abroad (individual and governmental) and building the international relations of Slovakia. The Minister, who stands on the top of the MoFaEU leadership, has a dual role: managing the Ministry and representing Slovakia abroad. The Ministry is responsible for:

- Protecting the interests and rights of Slovakia and its citizens
- Managing the representative offices of the country
- Keeping contact with representatives of foreign countries abroad
- Managing state owned properties abroad
- Handling the overall process related aspects of international treaties (negotiation, conclusion, announcement and implementation)
- Cultural representation of Slovakia (MZVEZ SR 2015)

Both Act 575/2001 (Zákon č. 575/2001) and the Ministry's own statute set further tasks, including:

- Coordinating the activities of other Ministries in international organisations
- Setting Slovakia's agenda in NATO and the UN
- Diplomatic and consular services
- Securing independent communication networks as well as cryptographic information services (Štatút MZVEZ SR 2016)

Ministry of Defence (MoD)

MoD has no direct responsibilities in the field of foreign policy making set by legislation. However, in case of policy implementation and foreign military missions, evidently, the MoD makes important contributions.

Key domestic interest groups

There are several active think tanks in the foreign and security policy field – most prominently: the Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA), the Slovak Security Policy Institute (SSPI), GLOBSEC and Stratpol.

CENAA

CENAA (Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs) is an independent think tank, established in 2003 (Sme 2003). CENAA facilitates discussions and conferences on different levels between the Euro-Atlantic community, NATO members and Slovakia (Vicenova 2014). The organisation promotes democratic institutionalisation, provides consultancy services in case of foreign policy making, development armed forces (Šnídl 2014)

(in Ukraine) and study programs abroad (for University of Kabul in Afghanistan) (Sme 2012a). The organisation provided one of the current state secretaries of the Ministry of Defence, Róbert Ondrejcsák, who led CENAA for more than 7 years (2007–2010 and 2012–2016). Members of CENAA represent the organisation quite often in domestic as well as Central European media.

SFPA

The SFPA (Slovak Foreign Policy Association) is an independent think tank specialised in foreign policy making since 1993. The organisation was established by the first generation of Slovak politicians, who held important and influential positions in the past as ministers, ambassadors, the PM's or the President's advisors, or MPs of Parliament. In the first years, SFPA mostly focused on organising discussion forums about foreign policy. Later on an analytical centre was created as a research department of the organisation (in 1995), which plays also a key role in publishing the magazine *Foreign Policy* since 2005 (SFPA 1 s. a.). SFPA built long-lasting cooperation and partnership with numerous European and U.S. based institutions (academic sector, universities, think tanks and councils) (SFPA 2 s. a.). The organisation divided its activity into two categories: research and project based works, which are further divided into geographical and sectorial categories (Eastern Europe, Central and Southeastern Europe, European Union, International Security, Economy and Development Policy, Security and Cooperation in Europe). Since 2004, SFPA has been publishing annual reports about the organisations research, publications, media coverage and various projects.

SSPI

The SSPI (Slovak Security Policy Institute) is a non-governmental and non-partisan organisation established in 2014. The Institute focuses on Slovak and international security and defence policy research, as well as on cyber security and myth-busting (SSPI s. a.). Most of the SSPI members were former employees of different ministries (Foreign Affairs or Defence) or came from other similar Slovak NGO-s. The Institute has a wide range of projects: summer schools, cyber security forum, debunking myths (an anti-propaganda programme), security and defence – these are targeting both Slovak, Visegrád and international scales. As all the previously mentioned organisations, the SSPI also built strong cooperation with numerous international institutions and the Slovak public sector and governmental bodies or relevant ministries funded some of its publications.

GLOBSEC

GLOBSEC (Bratislava Summit) is the most famous foreign and security policy focused international forum in Slovakia. It has been set up in 2005 by three institutions: the Slovak Atlantic Commission (still active), the Central European Policy Institute (CEPI) and the

Centre for European Affairs (CESC s. a.). From 2016, all the above-mentioned organisations joined and formed one legal entity, GLOBSEC (GLOBSEC 2016). Following this union, a new structure was created within the organisation: GLOBSEC Policy Institute (based on former CEPI), GLOBSEC World and GLOBSEC Academy Centre. Since 2013, the organisation expanded its events by organising the Tatra Summit, which has a political, financial and economic agenda (GLOBSEC 2018). Also from 2013, another forum was launched and is called the "Château Béla Central European Strategic Forum" focusing on Central European security, political and economic issues. GLOBSEC is currently the most established organisation, with the largest staff (GLOBSEC s. a.) and international network among the Slovak think tanks.

Stratpol

Stratpol is a relative newcomer as a security policy think tank, founded in 2016 by the former CENAA director and current State Secretary Róbert Ondrejcsák (Teraz 2016). As most of the security and defence focused institutions in Slovakia, Stratpol also aims to cover the European (East, West and Central), Transatlantic (NATO) and Caucasus regions. The Institution built its presence in the Black Sea and Caucasus, primarily with officials of Georgia through the annually co-organised South Caucasus Security Forum (SCSF 2019). Stratpol also pays great attention to educating young people through a summer university and in high schools in Slovakia (about critical thinking, EU and NATO, fighting against disinformation, etc.). Stratpol's newest initiation in cooperation with the Institute of Asian Studies monitors the most important security developments in Asia from Slovak and Visegrád perspectives (Stratpol s. a.).

Public opinion: Major characteristics and trends

It is quite challenging to characterise the long-term public opinion in Slovakia in case of different foreign, security, defence and military policy related topics, due to the lack of relevant data. While the support of NATO and EU membership was regularly monitored since 1993, the experts and researchers paid less attention to other aspects of policy-making. Time to time there were several public surveys, but those cannot be considered influential data. Mostly the Focus Research and the Institute of Public Opinion monitored the public attitudes, while GLOBSEC recently started regular surveying, in a more broader way than has hitherto been the practice in Slovakia.

The study collected all of the available and verified data that were related to the NATO or EU membership support in case of Slovakia. There is still a huge difference between the support of these two organisations on the part of the public: while support for NATO membership has recently even deteriorated, EU membership is viewed more positively (see Figure 5).

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2008	2016	2017	2018
NATO	52	58	42	47	52	60	49	52	55	53	58	54	56	37
EU	74	79	66	72	74	74	92	75	80	85	85	68	59	66

Figure 5.

Changes in EU and NATO support in Slovakia

Source: IVO (1997–2008); GLOBSEC (2016–2018).

Several factors make an important difference between the EU and NATO. First of all, the member states: NATO involves the U.S., a global power, and there is thus more identification with the EU. There are also several partly conspiracy theories and concepts connected in the minds of the public to the U.S., which influence negatively the Slovak public:

- That the U.S. played an important role ending the Eastern bloc and thus also in the change of system in Czechoslovakia
- The U.S. fuels globalism that in turn supposedly fuels terrorism, and so on and so forth
- This is partly the legacy of the 4 to 5 years of Mečiarism that were full of anti-American messages (Marušiak 1999, 280–282), which clearly strengthened the anti-American attitude in the Slovak society or at least spread a negative image about the USA

In contrast, the Slovak society viewed the European Union in a much more positive way, to some extent as a saviour. The expectations were really high after joining the EU in every field, since the society and politics viewed the EU integration as the only possible direction for the country to take, providing comprehensive security, political, economic, cultural, etc. protection in the long run for Slovakia.

The recent GLOBSEC surveys show, for example, that Russian influence, conspiracy theories and fake news are quite influential and their impact is measurable even against the backdrop of the generally strong NATO and EU membership support. GLOBSEC's findings include, among others that:

- NATO and EU support remained above 50%
- More than 50% of the respondents believe in some kind of conspiracy theories and fake news, for example ones involving secret groups seeking world dominance or that the U.S. planned the 9/11 attacks
- While there are still many people who think nostalgically about the Socialist era, it is mostly the older generation (MILO et al. 2018, 30–34)

Case study: From last to first – Slovakia's road to NATO

After the peaceful divorce from the Czech Republic, Slovakia had to compete with the other Central and Eastern European post-socialist countries in a situation, where every state was trying to build a closer relationship with Western countries for achieving various political and economic benefits. The young Slovak Republic received some credit for the bloodless dissolution, for the commitment towards Western values and its institutional reforms. However, the democratic development was not linear. It had certain phases and trends, even setbacks, which made a huge impact on Slovakia's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. The following case study highlights the key moments of the Slovak foreign policy on the road to NATO accession.

It may be convenient to divide the NATO integration of Slovakia into three periods:
- 1993–1995 (first, early period): gaining independence, establishing and building new institutions and international relations
- 1995–1998 (second, sidetracking): the period under the Mečiar Government that proved to be unsuitable for moving closer to NATO integration due to various controversial decisions and policies
- 1998–2004 (third, catching up): Dzurinda Government that turned Slovakia back in the right direction and built the reputation of the country for NATO membership

During the first period, Slovakia became a member in several key NATO programs and projects, which were the anterooms of full membership. These projects also tested the orientation of the country's institutions and politics towards democratic values. During this the early period:
- Slovakia reached membership in the NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council – 1993)
- Joined to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and a Security Agreement was signed between Slovakia and NATO in 1994
- Approved the Status of Forces Agreement in 1995 (Slovakia–NATO 2004)

It seemed to be a successful period, since the Slovak Government and Parliament accepted several security related documents, working towards closer cooperation with NATO. However, internally this period was full of political tensions and fight for power between the governing coalition, the opposition and the President in many areas (economic transition, the transformation of the army, ethnic and societal issues and political stability). NATO was mostly following the defence and military related restructuring processes in Slovakia. The

Mečiar Government (1994–1998) officially declared its foreign and security policy aim of achieving NATO membership, since the government considered it a way to gain security guarantees (Program 1994–1998 1994). During these four years, four Ministers of Foreign Affairs were responsible to shape NATO–Slovakia talks. However, it was not very successful due to the frequent changes in the ministry leadership and the lack of a professional approach, mostly PM Mečiar influenced the foreign policy of Slovakia.

The beginning of the second phase was highlighted by the climax of the long-term conflict between the PM and the President, with the kidnapping of the President's son, Michal Kováč Jr, with the direct involvement of the Slovak Intelligence Service. This scandal followed EU and U.S. demarches, emphasising strong concerns about institutional tensions and the future of democracy in Slovakia (Spectator 1995). Meanwhile the members of the governing coalition tried to play down the importance of these demarches, while the President and oppositional parties emphasised the documents as objective criticism of Slovakia's political direction (MESEŽNIKOV 1997, 25–26). The governing coalition played a two-faced game:

- On the one hand, they communicated towards the international community their interest of achieving NATO membership
- On the other hand, they used a populist language in the domestic field criticising NATO and the international community due to what they called an interference in Slovak politics; and what they claimed was an irresponsible way of handling NATO's Central European enlargement without Russia's consent, which – they opined – could lead to an alliance between Russia, China and the Arabic countries; and they also accused the U.S. of "double standards" against applicant countries (MESEŽNIKOV 1997, 25–26)

The problems grew further, when the National Council approved the State Language Law in 1996, which caused an outcry both in the local Hungarian community, in Hungary and internationally (in the framework of the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE) as well, since it terminated the possibility to use minority languages in offices (SIMON 1996, 275). The Mečiar Government thus slowly led the country into international isolation (MARUŠIAK 1999, 275). Moreover, several members of the coalition used an anti-American and populist approach criticising anyone deemed a local representative of the U.S., critics who commented on domestic political developments in Slovakia (MARUŠIAK 1999, 280–282).

Although the country became a founding member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), this did not have any influence on the upcoming referendum about the country's NATO membership in May 1997. The referendum was about two topics: about changing the way the President was elected (to direct election) and Slovakia's NATO membership (MESEŽNIKOV 1997, 19). The governing coalition under Mečiar's leadership was against joining NATO, while the parliamentary opposition, the President and the civic sector was in favour of it at the referendum. Due to some printing and formatting errors, not all the voting sheets contained four questions, which clearly violated the voting, and this procedural error was acknowledged by the Central Referendum Committee. The Committee accused the Minister of the Interior of manipulating the referendum by not securing the voting sheets with the right format (MESEŽNIKOV 1998, 44). The failed

referendum followed many negative reactions from NATO member countries (particularly from the U.S.), from international organisations as well and resulted in exclusion from the invitation to membership during the NATO Madrid Summit in July 1997. While in the political dimension it was clear that Slovakia was far from being an ideal candidate country, at the same time, the Armed Forces met the military requirements through participation in military missions within the NATO framework, according to Joseph Ralston (Wlachovský–Marušiak 1998, 237–238).

The mark of the third period began with the parliamentary elections in 1998. The opposition parties desperately tried to change the course of the country, both domestic developments and foreign policy, with the support of various international organisations and the civic sector. Although Mečiar won the parliamentary elections in 1998, he could not form a government while the opposition parties managed to unite and create a coalition. The new Dzurinda Government promised to break the international isolation of the country by *"pursuing a persuasive and trustworthy foreign policy"* and joining NATO (Program 1998–2002 1998, 40). One of the first actions of the new government was to send a letter to the President of the European Commission (Jacques Santer) and to the NATO Secretary General (Javier Solana), about the clear aim and commitment to enhance Slovakia's integration to Euro-Atlantic structures (Mesežnikov 1999, 38). Eduard Kukan (MoFA) and Mikuláš Dzurinda (PM) lobbied actively various NATO countries' governments and expected a recognition from NATO during the Washington Summit in 1999, which they achieved (Slovakia–NATO 2004). The decision showed that NATO member states welcomed the efforts of Dzurinda's government and considered Slovakia as a strong candidate country for the next accession wave (Marušiak 1999, 283–286).

Meanwhile, the Kosovo War broke out, which also affected Slovakia's progress in NATO, as the Dzurinda Government supported NATO operations and allowed NATO overflights of Slovak air space (Marušiak 1999, 277). The following period saw many official meetings between NATO and representatives (PM, MoFA and President) of Slovakia (Slovakia–NATO 2004). The Dzurinda Government established some new parliamentary committees; one of them was focusing on NATO integration (1999) (Bruncko–Lukáč 2000, 333). In 1999, a pro-NATO President was elected in Slovakia, Rudolf Schuster who defeated Mečiar's comeback attempt, and fully supported the NATO accession of Slovakia.

In 2001, the Slovak National Council (parliament) accepted three important documents (the Security Strategy, Defence Strategy and Military Strategy), which emphasised the political elite's commitment towards NATO accession. These aspirations slowly started to bear fruit, as more and more positive acknowledgements and statements came from NATO and member states officials regarding developments in Slovakia (Mesežnikov 2001, 51–54). One of the key documents was the Annual National Programme of Preparation of the Slovak Republic for NATO Membership, which made the following recommendations:
- The Slovak Government needs to keep up the pace and trend of reforms (economic, social, etc.)
- Increase public support for Slovakia's NATO membership
- Fight against corruption, keeping up political and economic stability, improving the situation of national minorities and the Roma
- Implementing plans for defence and military reforms
- Increase participation in NATO's missions (Rokovania 2001)

The year 2002 was one of the key periods due to the upcoming parliamentary elections. These resulted in the victory of the coalition led by Mikuláš Dzurinda, who formed a new government, which remained pro-NATO. The discussions about the integration processes continued with several high-profile visits, reviews and further legal amendments in Slovakia. The latter included: the Constitutional Law on the Security of the State during War, Warfare and Emergency State; Law on Military Service; Law on Defence and Law on Armed Forces (Slovakia–NATO 2004). NATO and the Western countries closely monitored the parliamentary elections in Slovakia. However, only the U.S. took preemptive countermeasures stating: if Vladimír Mečiar's party becomes a part of the governing coalition, they will not support Slovakia's further integration (Mesežnikov 2002, 54–56). Although Mečiar tried to ease tensions, both NATO and the U.S. leadership remembered well his approach to politics. They fully supported Dzurinda Government won the general elections in 2002 and during the NATO Prague Summit, they invited Slovakia to join NATO.

During the course of 2003, the high-profile visits continued between NATO and Slovak officials, as well as the monitoring of progress (Mesežnikov 2003, 28). It seemed that the Dzurinda Government would reach its main goal; however, some interest groups raised their voices in order to organise a referendum about the country's NATO membership. Among the initiators were the Slovak National Party, the Slovak Communist Party, a well-known dissenter in the person of Ján Čarnogursky, the Confederation of Trade Unions of the Slovak Republic, the local Greenpeace group and more. Many supporters just wanted the set a referendum about Slovakia's NATO membership, while others used the initiative to spread anti-NATO views and propaganda (Mesežnikov 2003, 28). However, the organisers failed to collect more than 350 thousand signatures and thus to gain the necessary public support. Eventually, the Slovak Government could thus approve the Letter of Intent, while the National Council approved NATO membership on the 10th of April. Rudolf Schuster as President of Slovakia finally signed the accession protocol, which was followed by the approval of other member states. The process lasted until 2004 and on the 29th of March 2004, Slovakia joined with several other countries NATO along with the Baltic countries, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.

Case study: How not to obtain armoured vehicles – Scandal of the 8 x 8 vehicles

Obtaining new and modern armoured vehicles is a key and long-term goal of the Slovak security and military strategy. The following brief case study focuses on the ongoing procurement scandal related to armoured vehicles (4 x 4 and 8 x 8), in which different interested parties are involved. The case involves several relevant parties, including:

- The Ministry of Defence (MoD), especially the Minister of Defence (Peter Gajdoš from the Slovak National Party – SNS)
- State Secretary of the MoD (Róbert Ondrejcsák, security expert, nominated by Most–Híd)
- Some parliamentary opposition parties (Freedom and Solidarity/Sloboda a Solidarita – SaS and Ordinary People and Independent Personalities/Obyčajní Ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti – OĽaNO)

- A non-parliamentary political party (Progressive Slovakia/Progresívne Slovensko – PS)
- The Security and Defence Industry Association of the Slovak Republic (ZBOP)
- The Finnish military manufacturing company, Patria AMV

The procurement saga started back to 2015, when PM Robert Fico (Sme 2015a) and the Ministry of Defence were building a cooperation between Polish and Slovak manufacturers of armoured vehicles and howitzers (Sme 2015b). However, after 2 years the plan fell apart due to financial difficulties (Kováč 2016). Later on, the third Fico Government presented and accepted a detailed document about a procurement tender on the 17th of May 2017 (Rokovania 2017). The paper highlighted the following points:
- Slovakia plans to buy vehicles that can be used for both defensive and offensive purposes
- The vehicles must be able to carry 4 to 6 crew
- The units should be equipped with a machine gun (up to 12.7 mm), an automated grenade launcher and anti-tank weaponry
- The document recommends 81 units of 8 x 8 and 404 units of 4 x 4
- Obtaining the units through public procurement processes
- The process is open to regional, international and government-to-government co-operation, also plans to channel in Slovak suppliers (Rokovania 2017)

The document set a timeframe between 2018 and 2029, for evaluating bids and producing the first models with logistical support. The draft focused more on the 8 x 8 vehicles (obtaining and arming them until 2024), while it count ends on most of the 4 x 4 units after 2023. The whole procurement framework is estimated to value around 1.2 billion EUR. Based on this document the Ministry of Defence announced a public bidding process (Aktuality 2017).

Table 1.
Procurement of combat armoured vehicles

Unit type	Costs (per unit)	Cost (with logistic support)
8 x 8	Up to 4 million EUR	417 million EUR
4 x 4	Between 1.2 and 3.5 million EUR	782 million EUR

Source: Rokovania 2017.

In August 2017, *Denník N* published an article, which highlighted the possibility of a pre-arranged winner of the bid, even though there were still several companies in competition (Šnídl 2017a). The whole bid was in the hands of the SNS, which had great influence on the MoD through Peter Gajdoš. In October 2017, *Denník N* revealed that the MoD chose the Finnish Patria AMV as a supplier for the 8 x 8 units, and that the procurement will be managed in a government-to-government framework (Šnídl 2017b). The Slovak Government approved the acquisition, which followed critical reactions from experts and the Security and Defence Industry Association of the Slovak Republic (ZBOP 2017).

The scandal grew, when in November the State Secretary of the MoD, Róbert Ondrejcsák revealed his concerns about the procurement process, as he did not have any

access to the contract (Šnídl 2017c). This caused long-term tensions within the MoD, and also between the SNS and Most–Híd coalition parties. It was becoming clearer week by week that the process lacked transparency (Šnídl 2017b); but the public did not get any hard evidence of this until the 24th of November 2017 when a politician, Martin Dubéci,[12] a specialist of foreign policy matters, revealed documents about a contract between Finland and Slovakia, signed by Minister Gajdoš in Brussels on the 18th of May 2017 (Šnídl 2017d). This caused an outcry both among the opposition parties and within the governing coalition, former ministers (Glváč, Fedor and Galko) (Sme 2017) raised their voices and asked for the details to be revealed and the bid to be halted, which the MoD rejected citing state security as main argument. The MoD highlighted that the contract will provide opportunities for Slovak suppliers to develop the mission module (the turret), while Patria AMV will manage the drive module of the armoured vehicles (Šnídl 2017e). However, some military experts doubted the whole concept, as the Finnish supplier had similar concepts in the past with Bulgaria, Croatia and Poland, which means that at the end Slovakia, would have several competitors in the same category, supported by Patria AMV.

As currently planned, the program signed in May 2017 between the Slovak MoD and the Finnish MoD will involve three suppliers: Konštrukta Defence a. s., Patria Land Systems Oy, and EVPÚ a. s. The research and development phase is to last until 2024, with plans to manufacture and put into service 81 armoured vehicle units upon successful tests (Šnídl 2017e).

Conclusion

This study aimed to provide a comprehensive assessment of the major trends and institutional developments in foreign, security and military concepts of Slovakia. The political leadership of the country achieved its primary goal: Slovakia became a member of the Euro-Atlantic community, NATO and the European Union. From a foreign policy perspective, Slovakia continuously developed its stable relations with key EU and NATO member states, as well as in regional cooperation (primarily with the Visegrád Countries). In case of security, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, along with various other state agencies as well as civil/think tank professional organisations shape Slovakia's security perceptions, largely following the international and European trends. Compared to 1993, the international community now recognises the Slovakian foreign and security policy sector through various events (e.g. the GLOBSEC Summit). In the military field, the Slovak Armed Forces underwent several reforms and restructuring since 1993. All previous governments struggled to find the necessary budget for large-scale modernisation; however, Slovakia has constantly under-spent on defence compared to NATO requirements, especially on modernisation. The current armoured vehicle procurement process may represent some positive change in this respect. However, major change would require a consistent commitment to military modernisation and restructuring. At the same time,

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[12] Martin Dubéci is a foreign and security policy analyst, who is a member of Progressive Slovakia, a newly formed non-parliament party.

there is some success in how Slovakia is actively participating in various NATO and UN military missions around the globe.

Overall, Slovakia has become a recognised member of the Euro-Atlantic community since 1993, even as there remains much to be done in the fields of foreign and security policy.

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Key Actors, Institutions and Decision-making in Security Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: Ukraine

Maksym Bugriy[1]

Abstract

My aim in this chapter is to achieve a better understanding of the decision-making process in Ukraine's security policy. Ukraine's situation as a post-communist state has left this country with the legacy burden of Soviet and imperial Russian political processes and institutions, which was far from the practices in NATO and EU member states. Its own traditions were very latent. As Ukraine became independent with the USSR breakup, it created all institutions anew, but it was replicating quasi-Soviet security architecture, yet lacking the imperial resources. While Ukraine's politics was until recently the bargaining of oligarchic elites, they were virtually sharing the neglect of the importance of the security sector development, leading to its degradation. At the same time, the society and the establishment were drifting away from Russia and integrating with NATO. The degradation of security institutions led to tremendous difficulties in resisting the Russian aggression. Yet, the societal resilience amidst a seemingly "chaotic" formal institutional environment has supported the resistance to the aggressor and is fuelling the Security Sector Reform in Ukraine.

Introduction

In reforming the security sector, Ukraine followed the pattern of several other Central European countries, who were former members of the Moscow-led Warsaw Pact and shared the legacy of the Soviet centralised security and defence system. Even more, Ukraine was one of the key pillars in the Soviet security and defence architecture, possessing a significant share of the former USSR's defence forces, security forces and the military-industrial complex.

This origin makes Ukraine's case of decision-making in the security sector exemplary. What explains certain critical foreign and security policy moves? The seminal book *Essence of Decision* by Graham Allison presented three foreign policy decision-making models for a national government: the "rational actor" model, where the "individual chess player was moving the pieces with reference to plans and tactics toward the goal of winning the

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game", the "organizational process" model, according to which "the chess player might not be a single individual, but rather a loose alliance of semi-independent organizations, each of which moved its set of pieces according to standard operation procedures" and the "governmental politics" model, "…a number of distinct players, with distinct objectives but shared power over the pieces, could be determining the moves as the resultant of collective bargaining" (Allison 1971, 7). This useful framework of analysis makes even more relevant Ukraine's case historically as its post-Soviet legacy was, in fact even making questionable the Western "rationality" realist way of thinking. Soviet government institutions inherited by Ukraine did have standard operating procedures, but they hardly had the power that was necessary for policy-making. In the Soviet and modern Russian strategic culture, collective bargaining over foreign and security policy becomes possible only when irritated crowds rush to the streets as the casualties become too many – such was the case of the Soviet Afghanistan campaign.

The security sector legacy was characterised in Ukraine by a highly centralised decision-making, with a certain degree of civilian control over the "military organisation" by the Communist Party's Central Committee. The impact of the Russian imperial legacy and over 70 years of Soviet rule left Ukraine with substantial burdens, which is quite hard to break free from. At the time of writing this article, the term "military organisation of the state" still existed in Ukraine's law, alongside the "security and defence sector" which has been more substantialised in the recently adopted Law on the National Security of Ukraine. The meaning of this term, deeply embedded in Soviet thinking, as defined by Russia's Ministry of Defence, is "the aggregate of the military and security structures of the state and its governing bodies, as well as military-political, military-scientific and other institutions involved in military affairs, and all military personnel, ensuring the interests of the country" (Voyennaya organizatsiya gosudarstva s. a.).

Decision-making in Ukraine's security policy was until recently highly centralised and skewed in favour of the top management level. The President had the highest authority in the sector. Such governance was sometimes effective in Ukraine, with resolute leaders who had a high-level Soviet management background, such as Leonid Kuchma, but it could lead to power abuses and poor performance as in the case of Viktor Yanukovych. Scholar and consultant in defence reform Thomas-Durell Young wrote, ringing very true regarding Ukraine's Soviet legacy, that:

> "There was no hint of a policy framework. Soviet thinking did not distinguish between national-level defense policy and its subordinated and hierarchical levels of policy implementation […]. 'Military doctrine' (Vayennaya daktrina) was considered to be at the highest level of policy formation—a use of nomenclature which immediately confuses the Western military mind, as the latter defines "doctrine" as a corpus of concepts and procedures, vice national-level policy. In the Soviet mind, these concepts were, in effect, conflated."

Nevertheless, Ukraine has implemented some reforms in its military even before the Euromaidan. Young has acknowledged this himself: "Any country that can deploy to a war zone (i.e. Iraq), and largely sustain a brigade-size force for three brigade rotations and re-

cover the force (despite its inability to perform to Coalition expectations), notwithstanding logistics failures, is an achievement very few other countries in the world could succeed in executing" (Young 2017, 17).

In addition to the Soviet governance legacy, Ukraine's security sector system was ill with corruption that served as an informal economic mechanism of the security sector. A traffic police officer, a judiciary employee and a law enforcement official might be in the trap of making advance payments to superiors for their positions, with subsequent obligations to earn a corruption rent. Even the defence forces did not escape this practice. This system corrupted the military, which was thus inadequate to provide the capabilities to effectively resist the Russian aggression in 2014.

At the same time, Ukraine has a richness of talent, which is reflected in the pool of resilient lower to mid-level officers and public servants available that were able to compensate for the gaps in governance and management and steer the state security institutions in hard times.

A historical overview

Ukraine has considerably streamlined decision-making in the security sector since 2014, compared to the very slow pace of reform before the Euromaidan of 2013–2014. This watershed may lead even experts, especially ones novice to the field of national security to thinking that there were no reforms before Euromaidan, especially given the dismal state of the military and security services. While there has been indeed such a decay, it would be incorrect to believe that there was no progress in developing decision-making in the security sector – some of its segments, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (uniformed defence forces) and the cadre of government officials and civil society experts had some successes even before the 2014 "Revolution of Dignity".

In the 1990s, the nation formed security and defence institutions, some of which were created anew. The July 1990 Declaration of Ukrainian State Sovereignty stipulated that the Ukrainian SSR had the right to possess own Armed Forces and retain internal state military and security institutions to be regulated by the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament). Ukraine had a vision of becoming a "neutral state", which was, however, soon removed from strategic documents. Ukraine also pledged to be a nuclear-free state, a pledge kept upon having entered the Budapest Memorandum.

Basic security provisions, especially the responsibilities of government bodies in the Constitution of 1996, were amended with the 2004 Constitutional Reform, currently in force, which defines Ukraine as a parliamentary-presidential republic, raising the parliament's role, yet not to the extent of a parliamentary republic. The Constitution also instituted the National Security and Defence Council as the President's advisory and coordinating body, in Article 107.

In the early 1990s, Ukraine began to establish an expert cadre and think tanks in the security and defence sector. The first National Security Concept was drafted in Ukraine in October 1990. The Law on Defence of 1991 has defined the concept of military (aggression) against Ukraine. The definition included not only full-scale and limited war, but also proxy war, blockade, violation of terms by foreign troops stationed in Ukraine, etc. Ukraine

was the first post-Soviet country to establish a National Institute for Strategic Studies in December 1991. In 1994, NISS became affiliated with the National Security and Defence Council, and currently it works under the President of Ukraine (NISS s. a.).

While security challenges and threats emanating were not reflected in the language of Ukraine, early strategic documents, the "meta-developments" were nevertheless shaping Ukraine's security policy. The Military Doctrine of 1993 has dropped the reference to Ukraine's neutrality and in 1994, Ukraine became NATO's "Partner for Peace". Ukraine was in fact leaning Westward as its actual policy that was chosen by the leadership at that time, but not without an interest in balance. To the latter end, President Kravchuk came up with the idea of an alternative security system of CEE states, with Poland as a key partner, but this was not supported by Poland, already seeking NATO membership at the time.

The Concept of National Security document that was adopted in January 1997 defined both national security threats and national interests. The Concept brought to the forefront the "traditional national mental split" resulting from ideological, religious, ethnic, and also economic conditions, as a pressing problem. It raised concerns over government weakness that state institutions are often in controversy and there is a lack of sufficient coordination among them.

The Concept defined national security as "the protection of vitally important national interests". The basic definition of security as the absence of threats remains in some way in all official documents. Distinguished were "internal" and "external" national security threats. The entire definition of threats in the 1997 Concept was quite broad as it mentioned as possible sources of threats not just military matters, but the environment, domestic politics, etc. Importantly, the Concept also set the criteria that the most important measure of the national security effectiveness is the security of the individual. This differentiates the Ukrainian understanding from the Russian concept. The Concept also had a reference to the issue of democratic control (Postanova 2003).

Declarative "multivectorialism" (i.e. the lack of unidirectional orientation in foreign policy) continued to remain in the security doctrine, but President Kuchma for both external and internal political reasons was increasingly leaning towards NATO. In May 2002, Kuchma adopted a new strategy for co-operation with NATO. Its objective was to join the Alliance. From that moment on, Ukraine was working with NATO on the reform of the security sector. In 2003, the Rada adopted quite a modern law "On Democratic Civilian Control of State Military Organization and Law Enforcement Bodies".

Such cooperation with NATO laid the foundation of institutional reform and resulted in knowledge transfer, which had both positive and negative results for Ukraine's security sector: it created a corpus of mid-level personnel and experts that were "initiated", but that also instituted the frictions with the Soviet institutional legacy and the oligarchic governance structures in politics and the economy, competing as the latter were for Russian economic rents, and interested as they were neglecting the security sector in general in terms of proper investment.

A comprehensive "Law on Fundamentals of the National Security of Ukraine of 2003" attempted to list "fully" known threats in the meantime. The law stated that: "Threats to National Security are clear and present factors that represent a danger to vital national interests of Ukraine" (Law of Ukraine "On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine" 2013, 47–59).

The Law introduced formally the strategic documents to be drafted, such as the *National Security Strategy* and the *Military Doctrine,* and "concrete programs covering all elements of state policy relating to national security". Remarkably, the law had a special emphasis on internal state security concerns: were there subversive activities to be carried out by foreign intelligence services operating in Ukraine; domestically originating subversion, or threats against the "economic, scientific, technical and defence potential of Ukraine as well as the rights and freedoms of its citizens", and "the spread of state corruption and bribery including the overlap of business, politics and organised crime". Related to this, experts emphasised economic and societal security, e.g. with issues connected to ethnicity, religion, etc. in mind (BBK 2005).

The Law on Defence Planning of 2005 (Law of Ukraine "On Defence Planning" 2013, 59–64) attempted to further promote the strategic planning process. Having confirmed the two-level strategic planning process, the law instituted the Strategic Defence Bulletin as a document resulting from the comprehensive defence review as a long-term planning document for the Armed Forces and other military and security establishments.

Even though there were certain attempts to reform Ukraine's intelligence and internal security institutions from 2003, some experts believed that the reform has not spread beyond the Armed Forces. "Beyond the armed forces, there was a failure to confront seriously issues of security governance in the country before the Orange Revolution. The SBU, Ukraine's intelligence agency, has owed *de facto* loyalty to the president and no effective oversight mechanism exists through which its activities and resources can be monitored, an unsatisfactory arrangement that has contributed historically to numerous scandals and ensured disconnect between the SBU and the general population. The system of law enforcement agencies remains inefficient and corrupt" (DOWLING–FLURI 2007, 62).

Under President Viktor Yushchenko, the national security apparatus attempted to reform both civil-military relations – including raising the role of civilians in both the MoD and the Armed Forces, and also gradually increasing the share of contract soldiers versus conscripts. The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) Reform Concept was adopted by a Presidential Decree in 2008 and several bills appeared that year addressing SSU needs, some of which attempted to deprive the service of law enforcement functions (SENCHIKHIN 2009).

The military has increased interoperability with NATO. Yet, strategic documents of that time were already accounting for Ukraine's economic problems. As the crisis of 2008–2010 was about to hit the growing economy, the National Security Strategy of 2007 had a significant part dedicated to the analysis of economic security threats. Generally, the years of Yushchenko's administration were those of forward-looking expert thinking that went far beyond the grounds of Ukrainian "oligarchic capitalism". Even so, one of the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis was the sharp underfunding of the defence sector.

The poor state of Ukraine's military and law enforcement was well noted by NSDCU experts that drafted the 2007 National Security Strategy. It stated: "Ukraine's security sector is inadequate given society's needs: the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine in their current state are unable to provide adequate protection of human and civil rights and freedoms, to effectively prevent crime, in particular organized crime, criminalization of the economy and corruption; activities of Ukraine's intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies are not entirely adequate in light of the challenges and threats to its national security" (NSSU 2008, 18).

The alarm was raised about the "critical state of armaments and military equipment, low level of logistical support and personnel training in the Armed Forces of Ukraine which threaten their ability to perform the tasks of defending the state". The Strategy addressed the issues in the judiciary, including corruption. Among the external threats, it mentioned "the struggle for natural resources, first of all for control over energy sources and energy supply routes", and "the growth of tensions associated with the formation of new energy transportation corridors from the Caspian region, which are strategically important for Ukraine" (NSSU 2008, 18).

Viktor Yanukovych's presidency (2010–2014) was characterised by a sharp rift in strategic thinking among government and civil society national security experts on the one hand, and the ruling regime that was bargaining with the Kremlin on the other hand. Relations with Russia were personalised – Yanukovych and Putin entered the Kharkiv accords in 2010, despite strong opposition by experts as well as parliamentarians. "The regime of President Yanukovych, 2010–14, was a nightmare for Ukrainians. It was a predatory regime despite the fact that Yanukovych was democratically elected. To begin with, he appeared to reestablish the oligarchy, but within a year he started concentrating power and wealth to his own family circle, upsetting not only the populace but also the big businessmen" (Åslund 2015, 4).

Even against this backdrop, the NSDCU staff produced an amendment of the National Security Strategy in 2012 that pointed to that lack of effectiveness in the government. In addition, the strategy addressed the issue of delimitation and demarcation of the state border, which could lead to territorial claims against Ukraine "by some political forces of adjacent countries", which could in turn increase mutual tensions. In private, there was a consensus that Russia and Romania were such sources of threat – indeed, the relations with Romania were improved only after the 2014 Euromaidan. When drafting the strategy, the expert discussion was organised by the National Institute for Strategic Studies in 2011 – it presented the concept of the strategy, which included the need to agree with Russia on the basing of the Black Sea Fleet and the Kerch Strait border demarcation, while it also called for the continuation of partnership with NATO, even as it suggested that Ukraine could participate in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (Lytvynenko 2011, 14). Expert speakers at the DCAF (the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, international organisation that provided advisory in Ukraine's Security Sector Reform since the mid-1990s) international conference in 2012 sharply criticised Yanukovych's malicious policies and referred to the reforms as declarative (Fluri et al. 2013).

The times post-Maidan led to an increased focus on the reform of the defence forces, which became part of the strategic doctrine. Drafting the new security strategy in 2015 and making decisions on the security sector reform was preceded by a comprehensive RAND Corporation study of the entire security sector, "undertaken in response to a request by the presidential administration of Ukraine and in participation with the National Security and Defense Council and sponsored by the Ukraine Investment Alliance" (Oliker et al. 2016). Russia was named as the single most important source of a security threat for Ukraine. Meanwhile, President Poroshenko's strategy was to have a clear security orientation towards NATO–EU as the ultimate benchmark, declared also in the new National Security Strategy (Decree of the President of Ukraine 2017a, 131–133).

The 2015 National Security Strategy confirmed the goal of NATO membership and mentioned Russia several times as the source of security threats, but it also listed among

such threats the lack of international security guarantees for Ukraine, acknowledging also the issue of global threats facing Ukraine (Decree of the President of Ukraine 2017b, 137–149). NSS designated NATO and the U.S. as key strategic partners, while Poland was distinguished as one of the most important allies. Ukraine amended its military doctrine accordingly. The new doctrine, even though still bearing the "Soviet" name, resembles more of a defence strategy document (Decree of the President of Ukraine 2017c, 149–166).

Ukraine is increasingly viewing revisionist Russia as the main security threat, questioning the future viability of the Russian state. Volodymyr Horbulin, current Director of the NISS, wrote: "Russia, as it is today, poses a huge threat not only to its neighboring countries but to itself as well. This threat will persist into the future" (Horbulin 2017, 9).

While the "transition to the NATO standards" has become a buzzword with the Ukrainian military, the new political goal since 2015 became to join the alliance. The MoD leadership is attempting to send this as a strong message: Minister Poltorak recently said that Ukraine was beginning the process of drafting a Defence Review for defence goals past 2020, according to a strategic assumption of (Ukraine's) membership in the alliance (Poltorak 2018a).

However, Poltorak recently also commented on the difficulties of reform, concluding that the lack of strategic governance in the security and defence sector, and strategy and defence forces management supported Russian aggression. He also said the new threats require in-depth planning and modelling in the security and defence sector, which is confronted with the lack of expertise and adequate background legislation (Poltorak 2018b, 5–11).

The new Draft Law on National Security in the version adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 21 June 2018 (Proekt Zakonu 2018), which was drafted in cooperation with international and Ukrainian experts for approximately 1.5 years, introduced several innovative framework provisions in the security sector governance. One was the rejection of the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign threats as the conflict with Russia has blurred this dividing line. Additionally, the law strongly facilitated civilian democratic control and the reforming of the institutions. It defined various areas of security, such as "national security", "military security", "state security" (the latter concept is somewhat akin to the Euro-Atlantic concept of internal security), the "security police" domain and "public security and order" as the domains of the National Police, "information security" and "cyber security". As to strategic documents, the law calls for a Military (defence) Security Strategy (and no longer a "Military Doctrine"), a Cybersecurity Strategy, a Strategic Defence Bulletin drafted based on the results of the Strategic Defence Review, a defence industry strategy, and a public order and civil protection strategy.

Earlier defence reform efforts led to the partial introduction of interoperability with NATO in the Armed Forces and partial improvements in defence management. This was especially true in 2005–2006, i.e. after the Orange Revolution. The State Program for the Reform and Development of the Armed Forces of 2000 already had in mind Euro-Atlantic integration and provided for the creation of inter-branch commands of the armed forces.

The military reform was facilitated by the NATO–Ukraine Action Plan signed at the Prague NATO Summit in 2002 and included various SSR objectives, of which the military element was partially implemented. Ukraine and NATO established the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR). As of 2004, the Armed Forces, which were 780,000-strong when Ukraine inherited them from the USSR, were cut to 300,000.

Remarkably, when discussing the defence reform, high-level government experts emphasised in May 2004 that Ukraine's goal was to join NATO – this was even before the Orange Revolution, which began in late November 2004 (Horbulin 2004, 15–21).

The goals of the defence reform included increasing effectiveness and the establishment of a "core force", as a Rapid Reaction Force. Another aim was to gradually phase out conscription and reduce the overall number of the military – by 2013, the total number was to be not more than 100,000 persons and was by then lower in reality. Ukraine was trying to introduce civilian positions in the MoD and the Armed Forces, but after some initial progress in 2005–2007, the process was reversed.

Yet, Ukraine was able to create several well-functioning units used in partnership with NATO and U.S.-led coalitions, such as POLUKRBAT that has successfully accomplished missions in Kosovo and Iraq (while at the same time it often trained alongside the Russian military). Defence management, however, was at a low level and underfunding drew talent away from the military.

Young noted that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence introduced planning and budget reforms in 2000 to initiate program-based budgeting, while the general staff developed its own planning management software *(Resource)* in 2005, even though "…there is no evidence that this data has ever been systematically used to inform decision-making nor for national-level defense planning." Furthermore, there was "the repetitive failure to produce a viable five-year State Program on the Development of the Armed Forces […]. For example, for the 2006–2010 version of this plan, the financial shortfall between what was anticipated, as opposed to what was allocated by the Ukrainian Parliament, was a startling 25 percent" (Young 2017, 69–70). Nearly throughout Ukraine's entire history, the lion's share of the defence budget was allocated to personnel costs.

Likewise, there were some steps taken to reform intelligence and security services. In the early 1990s, these services hired new personnel, while also retaining some former KGB officers, but "de-KGB-isation" was one of the objectives of the new Ukrainian special services. Technically, special services reform started with President Leonid Kuchma's Interinstitutional Commission on law enforcement reform under the auspices of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine created by the 2001 Decree of the President of Ukraine (Ukaz Prezydenta 17/2001), but more realistic moves were in 2004, when the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine was separated from the SSU in 2004. President Kuchma and then SSU Chairman General Ihor Smeshko were behind this move. Smeshko proposed also to transfer the military counter-intelligence to the Armed Forces, and to transfer anti-corruption responsibilities to the National Bureau of Investigation (Smeshko 2004). In order to effectively fight corruption within state institutions, a National Bureau of Investigations was long-planned to be created – but this never materialised until 2017, when Ukraine formed the State Bureau of Investigations.

In November 2005, President Yushchenko signed the Law 'On the Overall Structure and Strength of the Security Service of Ukraine', followed by the Presidential Decree of December 2005 on 'Issues Pertaining to the Security Service'. This first reform phase regulated internal divisions of the SBU, removed intermediary links and cut the staff, adding more civilians. However, the experts acknowledged "the legacy of Soviet notions and practices, which remain pervasive in security structures" (Fluri–Radetskiy 2010, 28). After the 2004 Orange Revolution, Ukrainian governmental experts proposed some ideas

to achieve improvements in the quality of strategic and operational-level analysis. Liubomyr Tokar with the National Institute for International Security Issues had stated that intelligence consumers, i.e. the State's leadership, were in need of operational intelligence that was able to better capture changing dynamics. Tokar proposed to develop the cooperation among analysts and customers. He called on the special services analysis centres to improve their work based on customers' need and the state's strategic interests (TOKAR 2005, 41–44).

Among the internal security bodies, the State Border Guard Service has relatively successfully transformed from a defence-type border force to a law enforcement institution in line with the 2005–2015 Reform Concept. One of the main reform frameworks was the Ukraine–NATO Working Group on Defence Reform, but the service also worked within EU frameworks. The State Border Guard Service is distinguished by its interoperability with Ukraine's neighbours, EU member states, especially Poland.

The reform of the State Border Guard Service was assessed by experts at the Razumkov–DCAF Conference Nine as done "hastily", "due to international pressure to adopt Euro-Atlantic principles". The Border Guard was substantially demilitarised, which reduced its readiness and the ability to provide an effective response during the Russian aggression (DCAF–Razumkov 2016b, 16). The State Border Guard Service has increased recently its military capacity and it will be compatible with the Armed Forces of the Ministry of Defence – at the same time, it continues to reform its civilian police track. The Border Service has its own intelligence function in the area of border and migration security. Its extensive cooperation with the EU neighbours and Frontex allows it to keep up with its status of being the most reformed agency.

Currently, institutional weakness remains a characteristic of Ukraine's law enforcement system. The institutions often have overlapping functions, which leads to unhealthy competition among the different agencies involved in this area. The SSU remains in essence unreformed. Among the reasons are the constitutional idiosyncrasies, whereby the president has currently limited political influence over the police force, but directly controls the SSU that has quite broad law enforcement functions. Publicly, President Poroshenko called for the passage of a National Security Law (adopted on 21 June 2018) – this law set the process to gradually deprive the SSU of its law enforcement functions that are not related to national security threats. It remains to be seen, how these changes are implemented.

Ukraine has embarked on the most ambitious defence and security spending since its independence. Combined budgeted defence and security expenditure is 5% of GDP in 2018, including almost 3% of GDP on national defence. Remarkably, Ukraine began to fund the investment part of the defence budget better. At the same time, the funding pressure on the military and security institutions is quite high – notwithstanding the fact that the increased labour migration to the EU, inflation and alternative domestic opportunities in the wake of the country's economic recovery makes the defence and security sector uncompetitive.

Young finds that Ukraine is a showcase example of the absence of financial management in the security sector. "In essence, money as a concept is not perceived by the military, or even by many civilian defense officials, as constituting a key management tool. Money, rather, is just "there": to pay salaries and more is always needed in order to *create* military forces. As a result of this misunderstanding, spending never changes to adapt to new policy or priorities, and so plans are never developed with the view to create options. They are all based on the assumption that more money will be provided to realize the plan.

In consequence, plans are never realized because they are not linked to money and because there is never enough money, no one is responsible for planning failures" (YOUNG 2017, 76). A new development is the societal crowdfunding of the military through volunteer fund-raisers – this was a lifesaver in 2014–2015, but is slowly waning in significance since then. On a positive note, Ukraine has recently improved its defence procurement system. Unlike in previous years, private companies are gaining more access to the defence market. Most bids and purchases are currently transparently made through the PROZORRO electronic procurement system. Procurement problems that remain to be addressed are excessive secrecy in defence procurement and budgeting, and the reform of the Ukroboronprom defence monopoly.

Stakeholders in decision-making

The roles of all key players in the security sector were recently specified in more details in the new Law on National Security. Ukraine distinguishes between "security" and "defence" areas. The law defined the security and defence sector as "unified under one leadership and the coordinated aggregate of government and military and security institutions, citizens and civic associations that participate in the provision of national security". The law proposed to differentiate between the "security forces" and "defence forces", with some overlaps, most notably the National Guard, which is a combination of militarised police and, in some units, mechanised infantry. The National Guard is under the Ministry of the Interior as a "security force" in peacetime and under the MoD in wartime. Currently, some of its tactical units are on the frontline in Donbas, just like a regular military.

The President has the key governance role over defence and security according to the Constitution. With the Constitutional reform of 2004, currently in force, the Parliament has some counterbalancing oversight and control powers. Furthermore, the Head of the State and President is the Commander in Chief. The Prime Minister is Head of the Government and has more control levers over the police, the Border Guard Service and the National Guard.

According to the Constitution's Article 106, the President is Ukraine's Commander in Chief and is responsible for the appointment of the chief commanders of the Armed Forces, the Security Service of Ukraine – domestic security special service and intelligence institutions. The approval of the appointment of the heads of these bodies by the Rada (Parliament) is required. Even so, the President directly approves a number of Chairman's Deputies and even Heads of Departments in the Security Service of Ukraine and the intelligence bodies. It is again the President that has key oversight functions over the special services – the new Law on National Security gave more controlling authority to the Verkhovna Rada. The Head of the SSU is obliged to report once a year before the Parliament under the new Law.

For advice and coordination of national security issues, Ukraine has the National Security and Defence Council. After 2014, the trend was to streamline the NSDCU – one of the recommendations by RAND researchers was to assign the NSDCU more day-to-day management authority. In 2014–2017, this was accomplished by way of amendments to existing laws that added more crisis management and national security coordination and control responsibilities. This was accompanied by the increase in the NSDCU staff units, for example adding the section responsible for strategic analysis, and also adding more

personnel. The NSDCU established the War Cabinet, a quasi-crisis management authority for the so-called "special period" on 18 February 2015. Situation Centres were created at NSDCU and other executive bodies. The National Security Law emphasised NSDCU responsibilities as being delegated some presidential management tasks. It remains to be seen whether the NSDCU staff is capable in improving its work in the direction of management.

The Cabinet of Ministers has some quite vulnerable authority in the sector: with limited policy-making, and yet real responsibilities for adopting the Armed Forces Development Program, "security economics" and budgeting, defence procurement, and strategic planning programs. The audit is performed by the Accounting Chamber. The ministries submit their plans and financing requests to the Cabinet of Ministers. This is likely one of the sources of the slow pace of reforms. The new National Security Law declaratively assigned the Cabinet this special democratic control authority. The imbalances related to this could only be resolved through constitutional change, which is not on the political agenda.

Specific ministers and executive agencies have certain roles and influences in the security sector decision-making. At times, this is independent from institutional authority. Some current ministers, such as the Minister of Internal Affairs, Arsen Avakov, are powerful political figures with a business background, representing the People's Front, a post-Maidan coalition partner, while Defence Minister Poltorak and heads of politically less influential agencies, such as the SSU and the intelligence services, are career professionals, or in some cases political appointees.

Even though the Parliament has achieved some basic democratic control functions in the security sector, such as over appointments, budget appropriations and ministers, the Rada committees according to the current law do not have proper control and oversight functions. As an example, the new draft Law on National Security was criticised by the Rada's staff legal experts, who noted that the Constitutional Court had two rulings stating that Rada Committees shall have only auxiliary, but not control functions.

The Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine has the ultimate authority to declare the states of war and peace, upon Presidential initiative, to authorise overseas deployments and missions of Ukrainian troops and the deployment of international troops in Ukraine. The appointment functions of the Rada are limited to the approval of Ministers of Defence and Chair of the SSU and the intelligence services. While the Parliament has the budgeting function, in reality, it is a rather limited authority compared to the role of the Cabinet of Ministers.

The Rada has open hearings in the house and the Committees have their own hearings. Yet, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff, or Chairman of the SSU were almost never attending the committee hearings. Also, even though the Rada has the power to establish investigating and ad hoc review commissions, in practice, this is rarely used.

The Committee for National Security and Defence Issues (CNSD) is the Rada's main body responsible for parliamentary control over defence, defence industry and procurement and special services, that is, intelligence and counterintelligence. The committee is responsible for the authorisation and oversight of defence and special services budget allocations. However, several other committees in the Rada also have to do with the defence and security sector, including the Committee of Law Enforcement Activities and the Committee for the Budget. Political issues may take priority in the National Security and Defence Committees. Traditionally, the Committee might revert to taking an approval, rather than

an oversight function. Thus, the new Law on National Security and Intelligence, as drafted in the Presidential version, plans to increase the level of parliamentary control over the special services stating that they shall be controlled by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

During the State Budget appropriations process, the Budget Committee has the power to review proposed defence and special services and expenditure and to influence decisions regarding final defence and special services intelligence appropriations. Both committees are allowed to oversee budget expenditure. At the same time, the Accounting Chamber according to the law "On the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine", also monitors the utilisation of the budget.

Experts on defence reform noted that the leadership of Ukraine's power ministries does not always appreciate the necessity of parliamentary control. They often complain about the lack of funding, not realising that this also depends on communicating their needs effectively to the legislature and the Cabinet of Ministers (DCAF–Razumkov 2016a, 10).

Ukraine's pressing problem is corruption and the country is still creating new special government bodies, such as the NABU (National Anti-Corruption Bureau) authorised to investigate higher officials in corruption cases (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine s. a.), and the SBI (State Bureau of Investigation) that would handle the investigation of the cases of the highest public officials. After a long dragging period, the SBI was established in 2016, and is at the time of writing this, still hiring staff (SBI 2018). The NABU became quite pro-active: "As of the end of April 2018, Detectives of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) under the procedural guidance of the prosecutors of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) have exposed and prosecuted more than 380 corrupt officials. In 135 cases, the pre-trial investigation was completed and indictments against 207 persons were passed to courts. At the moment, NABU Detectives investigate over 600 criminal proceedings, in which 174 persons are suspected of committing corruption crimes" (NABU 2018).

There was some scandalous infighting between NABU and the Prosecutor's General Office. One pressing issue is the absence of finished cases thus far. At the same time, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) also has some responsibilities over corruption and organised crime as well as some pre-trial investigation functions. The SSU handing over those functions according to the new National Security Law is a cause of uncertainty – as to whether or not this would result in weakening the service or create a "policing vacuum". The SSU's militarised and elitist corporate culture faces a challenge to fit in with the new civilian-designed security institutions. The Concept for SSU Reform, which was drafted in May 2016 has not yet been signed by President Poroshenko and is undergoing editing, "going in circles".

The reform of intelligence services was announced repeatedly as to be in line with "NATO standards". Yet, the public expert discussions on this topic have subsided – the reform is not yet on the political agenda.

The new Law on National Security called for the creation of a special committee to oversee the SSU and the intelligence bodies. The function of the SSU was changed from that of a "law enforcement body of special designation" with a fairly broad mandate, to that of an organisation primarily responsible for counterintelligence, counterterrorism, protection against internal national security threats and cybersecurity.

Several non-governmental think tanks, such as the Razumkov Centre, or the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, are known for their expertise in security

and defence. There are frequent discussions in the social media, including via Facebook as a platform, where civil society activists and experts, but often government officials as well, exchange their views, or advocate for certain issues, especially on the Armed Forces and national defence reform.

A network of some 20 to 30 prominent Ukrainian experts is working with both government and non-governmental think tanks. Yet, even so, there has not been any success in systematically fostering working partnerships between government, academia and think tanks insofar. Volunteer organisations have been playing a significant role in the security sector after the Euromaidan. This even includes fund-raising to supply the troops in need, for example buying commercially available night vision goggles, helping with air reconnaissance, tactical medicine and other special areas such as open source intelligence and cybersecurity. Additionally, many Ukrainian institutions have "civic councils". The RUKH 100 association is supporting the development of territorial defence. A reform-focused organisation is the Project Office of Reforms affiliated with the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine but financed by donors. POR developed several pilot projects, including the reform of combat medicine, raising the stature of sergeants in the Armed Forces, reaching compatibility in procurement procedures with NATO, and the introduction of the PROZORRO transparent e-procurement platform.

Notably, several initiatives to strengthen the parliament have not materialised. Following the DCAF–Razumkov Centre Conference One, the International Expert Group on Defence Sector Reform was established under the Verkhovna Rada. The group's primary task was to work on the legislation part of the reform, and it was supposed to have a permanent secretariat. This has stalled at some point. There was an improvement in the independent oversight as the Ombuds institution established a department to deal with the military in March 2016.

Excessive secrecy is often used to obstruct reform. The current Law on Democratic Civilian Control of State Military and Law Enforcement Organisations does not clearly refer to access to "sensitive", or "classified" information. By law, every MP has access to all types of information, but in reality, there is virtually no access to crucial information for oversight since the security agencies do not trust MPs with their information (DCAF–Razumkov 2017, 18).

Cases

In choosing the cases, the objective was to compare Ukraine's decision-making during the acute Crimean crisis management periods in 1996 and 2014. The first phase of the Crimea crisis unfolded beginning almost immediately after the breakup of the USSR in 1991.

In the 1990s, the Russian Supreme Soviet escalated its revisionist demands regarding the Crimea and Sevastopol. The Russian Federation's Supreme Council's Foreign Affairs Committee Chair, Vladimir Lukin, argued that Ukraine should be faced with a tough choice, relinquishing either the BSF (Black Sea Fleet) or the Crimea, and suggested that the Russian Supreme Soviet look into the legality of the 1954 transfer of the Crimea from Russia to Ukraine. The Russian Supreme Soviet and Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the 1954 transfer in a resolution adopted on 23 January 1992. This elicited a strong protest

from Ukraine, claiming that the resolution violated the previously signed Ukrainian–Russian treaties and CIS agreements from 1990 to 1991.

RF Vice President Alexander Rutskoi visited Crimea in April 1992 and called for its secession from Ukraine. A month later the Russian Supreme Soviet passed a resolution declaring the 1954 transfer of Crimea "illegal", leading again to Ukrainian protests.

In the Russian Supreme Soviet, "the status of Sevastopol was debated in December 1992 and the overwhelming opinion was that Sevastopol should be the main base for the BSF, be accorded a special status, and not be placed under Ukrainian sovereignty. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and parliament issued a number of critical statements, while parliamentary speaker Ivan Pluishch condemned Russia's move as an attempt to 'reanimate the old empire and old imperial policies'" (Kuzio 2010, 18–19).

In 1991, Crimea was given the status of Autonomous Republic. The Black Sea Fleet remained for some time as Russia and Ukraine's common navy. However, politics escalated. In January 1994, pro-Russian President Vladimir Meshkov was installed as the President of Crimea.

The Black Sea Fleet Intelligence sharply activated its work on collecting intelligence on the operation of the Naval Staff of Ukraine and of units and subunits of Security Forces in the Crimea, and, especially, in Sevastopol (Borysfen Intel 2013).

From March 1995, the BSF went on high combat readiness, as in its perception there was "a threat of their being captured by Security Forces of Ukraine". The Russian BSF remained on high combat readiness all the way into the crisis. The situation was complex as Deputy Commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet O. Frolov was also Vice Speaker of the Parliament of Crimea and he publicly stated that the BSF would not interfere in the crisis. Nevertheless, Russia deployed more military from the BSF 98th coastal defence regiment, and an anti-aircraft rocket regiment that was part of the BSF 126th coastal defence division.

Russian media, including ITAR-TASS and other media aired the news that administrative buildings were blockaded by Ukrainian special forces and Meshkov asked the Russian Cossacks to provide military assistance. While Russia's Prime Minister Chernomyrdin declined the request to speak before the State Duma, the Duma Speaker Rybkin was publicly calling Crimea an area of Russia's strategic interests and exclusive influence.

Pro-Ukrainian political forces were active in Crimea at the time and assisted the government in Kyiv in managing the crisis. The Crimea Civic Council was acting as an "opposition parliament" in Crimea since 1993 and organisations such as Prosvita ("Enlightenment"), Ukraine's Officers Union, the Ukrainian Republican Party, Crimean branches of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and other civic groups supported the Ukrainian cause. Interestingly, Crimean Communists led by Leonid Grach supported Kyiv, as Kuzio noted, as they "had more in common with national communist President Kravchuk than with then reformer Russian President Borys Yeltsin" (Kuzio 2007, 31). Kyiv used very harsh language, and the Parliament Speaker Leonid Pluishch strongly condemned Russia's activities (Kuzio 2007, 136). Pro-Russian Crimean President Meshkov at first attempted to stage the referendum, but eventually resorted to non-binding polls in 1994.

An effective move on the part of the central government was the strong degree of control over security, the establishment of a counterintelligence unit directly subordinated to Kyiv and connected neither to the Russian military, nor to local authorities (Kuzio 2007, 146).

In the escalation of the crisis, in October–December 1996, the Russian State Duma and the Council of the Federation both voted for the resolutions calling Sevastopol "a Russian

city". This move was supported even by figures such as Boris Nemtsov. Yeltsin's office was giving mixed signals – while his office stated that Crimea was Ukraine's, his party voted for anti-Ukraine resolutions (Kuzio 2007, 111–112).

Remarkably, according to Kuzio, the use of the military instruments was ruled out by Russia, as Ukraine was still in possession of nuclear weapons, even though it lacked operational control over them. However, the Ministry of Defence also "sent reinforcements to Crimea" (Kuzio 2007, 232).

The wording of the comments of Ukrainian officials was often harsh. Secretary of NSDCU Volodymyr Horbulin called the Russian actions "simply aggressive" (Kuzio 2007, 115). On the diplomatic front, Ukraine appealed to the UN Security Council, which had confirmed Ukraine's territorial integrity in its resolution (Kuzio 2007, 118).

Notably, the referendum was the Russian technique about to be used in Crimea. Crimean president Meshkov found no support of the Supreme Council of the Autonomy, which was afraid of further increase of the popularity of the "President". Against the background of the "pre-election battles", this led to an aggravation of the contradictions between the executive and legislative branches of power in Crimea. Eventually, on the 16th of March 1994, the Central Election Commission of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea in its decision blocked the poll. Meshkov attempted to dissolve the Council of Ministers of the Crimea by decree – consequently, the Head of the Supreme Council of the Crimea, N. Bagrov, criticised the move (Borysfen Intel 2013).

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine then abolished the Crimean Presidency. The Prosecutor General's Office initiated criminal proceedings against Yuriy Meshkov. The government facilitated the opinion poll, which showed that most Crimean residents supported the decision to oust Meshkov.

Ukraine's image was quite positive in that crisis in the eyes of leading Western media. Smart, resolute and at the same time not keen on using the military, Ukraine's actions were compared favourably against Russia's Chechen operations. Moreover, Ukraine was acting in a united manner, with unity across the power branches. Russia's options were limited as it was busy with the war in Chechnya at the time.

The Kyiv Government response included "economic weapons". At the end of the crisis, Kyiv used economic assistance, having allocated $500 million to provide water for Crimea, finance crop farming, tourism, and as assistance to Crimean Tatars and other formerly deported people's ongoing resettlement there.

In the meantime, Ukraine effectively forced Russia's Consulate team that was issuing Russian passports for Crimea's residents out of the area – the group left Crimea on 31 March 1995.

One result of the crisis was the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the formation of Ukraine's Navy, which began on 1 April 1995 in Izmail. The follow-up was the signing by the Ukrainian and Russian prime ministers of three intergovernmental agreements on the division, basing, and costs of the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine leased the port facilities in Sevastopol to Russia for 20 years (until 2017) for $98 million a year. The lease could be extended for five more years by mutual consent, allowing Sevastopol to remain the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Taras Kuzio wrote on 31 May 1997 that Russia finally recognised Ukraine's borders by signing the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership with Ukraine. It clarified the two countries' mutual respect for each other's

territorial integrity and the inviolability of their borders. Russia also abolished the many trade barriers it had raised against Ukraine. These Russian–Ukrainian agreements were Kuchma's great achievements and the high point of the relationship with Moscow. By and large, Russia had accepted Ukraine's demands and reconfirmed its recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty over Crimea and Sevastopol (Kuzio 2007, 118).

The resolution of the Crimean crisis involved special operations by security and military units as well. According to Yevhen Marchuk, then SSU Chairman, when the situation was critical in spring 1995, the security forces were preparing for possible armed assaults in Sevastopol (Podrobnosti 2011). When seizing the control over the local security force, an SSU special counterterrorist unit used Border Guards helicopters to deploy in Crimea. In yet another instance, according to expert Kost Bondarenko (author's interview), the marine special forces commander confronted Meshkov in a demonstration of force.

Crimea's annexation in 2014 is the second case discussed here. It occurred in a very different context and with a different outcome.

In this well-documented operation, Russia effectively managed to illegally grab Crimea, while the Ukrainian Government initiated certain decisions: strategically not to respond to the Russians, attempting to stage only unarmed resistance to the capturing of military units, raising the Army to defend mainland Ukraine, and using the scarce diplomatic instruments available, including the UN Security Council and the consultations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Even though the outcome was the actual annexation, Ukraine's decisions were made differently this time. Instead of presidential "executive decisions", the centre stage was a collegial decision and discussion in the National Security and Defence Council.

Remarkably, the Russian tactics were in some respects similar to those of the 1994–1995 crisis, but this time, the operation was more elaborate and used the moment of Ukraine's extreme state weakness after the Maidan. Thus, a clear difference between the two Crimean cases was the different strategic and operational environment. Russia probably employed some kind of pre-existing contingency scenario to execute the annexation. A cover-up of the annexation was a 150,000-strong snap Russian exercise, which allowed relocating additional forces closer to Crimea. The exercise gave Russia "plausible deniability" for the redeployment of its military.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's military command was in a disarray – the chief of the General Staff, who was appointed to this post by Yanukovych, departed from Kyiv to Crimea on February 22. Defence Minister Lebedev did the same. Both commanders remained formally in their roles, but in fact, they were unreachable when the annexation was unfolding. Furthermore, the only available legitimate authority in Ukraine in the early days was the Verkhovna Rada. President Yanukovych fled Kyiv and was exfiltrated in a covert operation to Russia. Prime Minister Mykola Azarov was lucky enough to leave Kyiv well before the February 20 Maidan massacre. Yanukovych's departure left the Rada in confusion – the deputies were busy building a new parliamentary coalition and managed to consider the crisis in Crimea, but the Russian military was already doing their job. Only on February 26, after the Supreme Council of Crimea and the Council of Ministers buildings were seized by Russian special forces in Simferopol, did Rada Speaker/acting President Oleksandr Turchynov hold a meeting, the public readout of which mentioned "separatism", but was more reserved and unclear.

On 27 February 2014, The Rada appointed Arseniy Yatseniuk as Prime Minister, Andrii Deshchytsia as acting Foreign Minister and Admiral Ihor Teniukh as acting Defence Minister. Their "acting" status was explained by the absence of a legitimate president – under these circumstances, Turchynov was, in fact, the lawfully acting President. On the diplomatic front, Turchynov had several conversations with the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns, Dalia Gribauskaite and Linas Linkiavichus of Lithuania, Polish President Bronislaw Komorowsky and a number of other officials.

The Rada took some foreign policy steps, addressing the Signatories of the Budapest Memorandum, and calling for Russia to cease "the moves that have the signs of claims against Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity". Ukraine also called a UN Security Council meeting. Chairman of the Rada's National Security and Defence Committee Volodymyr Lytvyn proposed to send a delegation of MPs to Crimea to negotiate, and hoped that the newly appointed security and defence executives would be able to resolve the situation – apparently underestimating the Kremlin's resolve. Similar "moderate" proposals were made by some Party of Regions MPs (Plenarne zasidannya 2014).

Meanwhile, Oleksandr Turchynov addressed the public at the end of the day on 28 February. He was in the role of acting president, naming Russia's actions as the start of open aggression against Ukraine. Turchynov said that according to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia is hoping to achieve "the Abkhaz Scenario" (Povidomlennya 2014b).

On 1 March 2018, Turchynov chaired an NSDC meeting and warned against the Russian aggression. The public message after the NSDC meeting was also that Russia was trying to provoke Ukraine into war. At the same time, Turchynov and the newly appointed Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk had a press briefing, where Turchynov said he ordered the armed forces to go on full alert (Povidomlennya 2014c).

In reality, scarce military were assembled to protect mainland Ukraine and many volunteers joined the Army and the National Guard that was re-established to replace "Internal Troops" that stood against the people at Maidan. Later on, there were speculations that the crisis could have been resolved using special operations forces in this early stage.

In the 2014 crisis, Ukraine did not have the time to apply any economic or financial tools. Turning to a blockade would have been risky as that would alienate more local residents. On top of that, Russia arranged effective control of access to the peninsula by road and air. Ukraine was overall considerably weakened relative to Russia. Only later on in the course of the crisis did Kyiv use some of its leverage related to electricity and water supply.

The Kremlin spread the narrative that after the Yanukovych "exfiltration" to Crimea and Russia on 22 February 2014, Putin made a unilateral decision to annex Crimea launching the contingency operation that included an array of special measures later often referred to as "hybrid": the demonstration of military readiness, the blockade of Ukrainian military units, media messaging, the use of local pro-Russian activists, etc. Certain actions were unfolding in adaptable response to Ukraine's moves: as Crimean Tatars held a pro-Ukraine rally in Simferopol on 26 February, the next day Russia organised the covert seizure of the Supreme Council and other buildings. Russia controlled effectively several local – known but self-imposed – leaders in Simferopol and Sevastopol. It has employed Cossack auxiliaries and eventually staged a referendum. Furthermore, the Russian Duma gave Putin the formal right to employ troops in Ukraine. Crimea was thus declared part of the Russian Federation on 18 March 2014.

The decision-making in Ukraine involved the traditional institutional pathways of intelligence and analysis stages, the development of military recommendations by the Ministry of Defence, and some first response measures by certain politicians and security sector institutions. However, the "essential decision" was taken collectively at the meeting of the National Security and Defence Council. The Ukrainian Government, in an unprecedented move, eventually declassified the minutes from the meeting.

The readout dramatically reveals the dismal state of failed Ukrainian security institutions: according to Defence Minister Yezhel, the military to be raised was 5,000, after the defection of a substantial number of local law enforcement and security personnel to Russia. At the same time there seemed to be prepared recommendations for military response, which were approved at the meeting and coming from the MoD. Yet, the Minster's proposal for resistance operations was voted down, as was the proposal to impose martial law – only Speaker Oleksandr Turchynov was in favour of it. Remarkably, a highlight of the meeting was a very strong move by Julia Tymoshenko, who urged not to provoke Russia. Speaker Turchynov referred to similar advice by Ukraine's Western partners.

The representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also spoke at the meeting, but his recommendations were of a routine nature. More foreign policy response measures were proposed by Arseniy Yatseniuk, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In the case of the 2014 crisis, the only effective local civic resistance force was the Crimean Tatars. Pro-Ukrainian activists from Kyiv that were to arrive in Crimea were effectively blocked from getting there by Russian proxies. A considerable part of the local population was supporting Russia reacting to its massive information operations campaign.

However, Ukraine was able to withdraw a certain number of its military and security forces from Crimea, which had a very strong patriotic mobilising effect. Eventually, the hastily assembled military units and volunteer forces together managed to provide the necessary resistance and thwart the "Novorossiya" project, allowing Kyiv to liberate significant areas in the east of the country, leaving the combined Russian and separatist forces with only a tiny share of the country's territory.

Conclusions

Ukraine's reform has, at the time of writing this, reached a chokepoint. It may just be the case that the desire to see the reforms continue altogether exceeds what can realistically be achieved.

Ukraine is still struggling with post-Soviet and Russian imperial tradition of decision-making. Currently, its strategic decision-making process is quite democratic – Russia's practice, where President Putin could suddenly make some critical strategic decisions entrusted only by a narrow circle of security and military advisors is simply unimaginable in Ukraine. Key security decisions are made collectively as the Crimea case demonstrated. In the given case, collective decision suffered as Ukraine virtually lacked a President as chief executive at the time of the annexation, nevertheless, Ukraine resisted a notably stronger adversary with dignity. In the aftermath, Poroshenko's election gave the Ukrainian Government key legitimacy.

Ukraine is experimenting with creating new institutions in the security and defence sector as we speak. It has changed the format of the ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation) to a Joint Forces Operation in the Donbas.

Problems remain. Some agencies are without reforms, and the latter are apparently blocked, or delayed by interested political stakeholders. There have been minor cases of friction among the President, Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior, affecting the coherence of the government's actions occasionally. This is not posing a security threat as there is still a broad support of the government's security policy by the Ukrainian people.

Ukraine is also currently distinguished among other neighbouring countries by a significantly high degree of national resilience. It is being criticised by international organisations for neglecting the challenge of far-right extremism – Kremlin's propaganda often exploits this criticism to its advantage. In reality, the radicals have only marginal support, but the government in a democratic way allows them to be visible avoiding the use of force even when it seems weak – but this tactic allows avoiding social conflict. Despite causing occasional crises, these radicals and their organisations do not pose a threat to overall stability.

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Central and Eastern Europe and the Changes in Foreign and Security Decision-making: Obvious Successes but Many Failed Expectations

Péter Rada[1]

Abstract

The chapters of the book provide material for further discussion and food for thoughts for further research. They intended to examine similarities and differences between the countries – not all – of Central and Eastern Europe, especially how the security (and foreign) policy decision-making processes have evolved since 1989. The chapters also analysed how the security threats perceptions have changed and the authors chose two case studies to better introduce the decision-making processes, the key actors and institutions in the respective countries. There are obviously challenges and threats that are shared and similar in the countries covered in this book, but we need to take into account that these countries have significant differences at the same time, even though all of them experienced a socialist and post-socialist past and history and of course a heavy legacy. Let us think about Ukraine, which is the only post-Soviet state among the countries included in the book, and the only one not being member of the EU and NATO. The other countries' main priority was to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions as soon as it was possible, and after the accession to prove that they are reliable allies whilst they struggled with many problems of the parallel challenges of democratic transitions and transformations of their polity, economy and societies.

There are times when it is worth to sit back and to analyse the achievements, failures and the steps forward in a region's history. For Central Europe, the most important achievement in the last decades was the Euro-Atlantic integration. In this sense, 2019 is a special year as it marks the multi-anniversary for many countries in the region.

However, as Péter Marton argued in his introductory chapter, it is very difficult to analyse the countries in the region applying the same standards. This is similar with Euro-Atlantic integration. All the countries can celebrate the 30th anniversary of the end of the Cold War, but not all of them were independent – such as Croatia, or Ukraine, or in a sense the Czech Republic and Slovakia – at this time. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic

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can celebrate being members of NATO for 20 years. In 2019 Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia had been members of the European Union for 15 years. Romania and Slovakia had been in NATO for 15 years and Croatia had been a member for 10 years.

These anniversaries mark important symbolic and at the same time practical milestones in each country's foreign and security policy and also in the evolution of security policy decision-making – Ukraine is an exception in this sense. However, the change of system and the democratic transitions – even though it happened a little bit differently – gave opportunity to all the countries to come closer to the West in a "whole and free Europe". Of course, the newly democratising countries met several obstacles and caused many headaches to the West and sometimes (many) to each other when they tried to find the institutional way of their respective countries' future when restructuring the polities, economies and societies. It is not surprising – and all the authors highlighted it in their chapters – that the countries of Central Europe still struggle with some open questions after the long and exhausting decades of democratic transitions: whether NATO, or EU membership, the U.S. alliance really serves the countries' self interest in all dimensions.

There are also challenges that have been the consequence of the simultaneous crises facing Europe and the Transatlantic Alliance in at least the last decade: a resurgent Russia, international terrorism, failing states in Europe's neighbourhood, illegal migration crisis and not least the long lasting effects of the global financial crisis.

As it is argued in the chapter about Hungary, despite the above-mentioned challenges and headaches, in 2018, the majority of the Central European societies are pro-NATO, pro-EU and have better views on the United States than many Western Europeans. The people in Central Europe are in favour of strengthening the Euro-Atlantic alliance.[2]

The success of Euro-Atlantic integration and even the democratic transitions in general is beyond question though there are many challenges as argued above beyond the surface. Nevertheless, NATO regained some momentum after the Russian invasion of Crimea but the Alliance still lacks a clear mission similar to the one during the Cold War, when NATO's obvious task was to defend the territory of the European allies against the Soviet aggression and enhance their integration. Since 1989, maintaining stability in Europe, spreading Western values, managing crises and combatting terrorism all emerged as priorities for the renewed and extended alliance.

Mentioning the anniversaries, we also need to take note that the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Balkan Wars created a new situation in which the Central European countries, similarly to the Western allies became reluctant to keep up pre-1989–1991 levels of defence spending. All the authors mentioned in their respective chapter that restructuring the socialist security sector meant a sharp decline also in the defence spending and caused heavy debates on burden sharing. Those countries who became members of NATO needed somehow to find a way to prove they are reliable allies even if they cannot spend enough on defence. An obvious choice was to participate in the NATO and the U.S.-led missions.

As Péter Marton argues in his chapter, the selected set of countries for the different chapters is wide and there are significant differences as we can see with regards to the

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[2] For more details see Péter Rada's essay in this volume.

historic backgrounds and the developments in the last decades. Marton highlights that: "Ukraine is the only post-socialist as well as post-Soviet country in the sample. Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are former constituent members of larger entities."[3] Ukraine is also the only one not being member of NATO, or the EU. It also must not be forgotten – as Marton underlines – that "the change of system proceeded differently across the cases in the volume: e.g. in Poland and Hungary, negotiated transitions occurred, leading at first to an only partially free arrangement of elections in Poland, but leading directly to free elections in Hungary; Romania, in contrast, saw violent upheaval and the execution of the head of the party state".[4] These processes were longer in Slovakia and also happened differently due to obvious reasons in Croatia and Ukraine. Marton also adds that: "The new political elites (where they were truly new elites) had to rely on the competences of these former bureaucratic elements. In many cases, the politics of the commemoration of, and even political parties' actual personal connections to the past have impeded"[5] the processes of transformations and transitions.

Despite the differences in the countries covered in the volume, the chapters followed a similar structure to try to compare the different cases and countries, which is almost impossible to achieve as argued by Marton and also mentioned above in this chapter. The contributions of this book provided first an overview of how the dominant security/threat perceptions evolved since 1989, with reference to how official documents reflected these changes. These sections of the chapters also provided an introduction to the major foreign policy decisions, to the reorganisations of the most relevant ministries and state agencies, reforms in the field of defence and the military, and to the fundamental trends relating to budgetary conditions – the latter having key relevance for any drive for the modernisation of militaries in each of the countries. The second sections of the chapters discussed the developments of the decision-making processes, the key actors, institutions and agencies of the government and the military. The final sections focused on practical examples and strengthened the argument of the authors by introducing two case studies for major foreign and security decision and the decision-making process in the respective countries.

The evolution of security perceptions since 1989

Zvonimir Mahečić underlines in his chapter that the case of Croatia was different from the other countries because the security sector reform and building new institutions during the parallel democratic transition was very difficult and not entirely successful because Croatia was engaged in a war right after gaining independence. However, there are also some similarities to the other cases covered in this book, because the NATO and EU integration processes due to the conditionality and the obligations brought some beneficial effects and improvements. According to Mahečić the process of the security sector reform in Croatia can "be broadly divided into sections covering five major periods. The key events and

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[3]   See Péter Marton's essay in this volume.
[4]   See Péter Marton's essay in this volume.
[5]   See Péter Marton's essay in this volume.

activities undertaken during these periods mark more or less significant milestones that have determined the way Croatia – its society and political and security institutions developed".[6]

Péter Rada argues that the "change of system gave an opportunity to Hungary to join the West again and to begin the long and exhausting transition from a socialist style decision-making structure to a modern institutional system which is compatible with NATO and the EU".[7] Before 1989, "Hungary spent more than four decades "experimenting" with the Soviet style defence and political structures. The consequence of the inorganic development was the unquestionable desire of the new political elite in 1990 to develop new defence structures, even designing a new basic approach to security policy".[8] "The 1990s was the period for rebuilding the genuine Hungarian identity in the constantly changing international environment after the end of the Soviet influence and before joining the West. The socialist period artificially kept the lid on the national, ethnic, or religious differences and conflicts that also came to the surface in Central Europe. Consequently, parallel to the Euro-Atlantic integration, the need for increased regional security and political cooperation appeared on the agenda. The status of the Hungarian minorities abroad, their protection and the functioning relations with Slovakia and Romania were prerequisites of Western integration."[9] The new values, articulated interests – which are in some ways still influential today – were formulated at the beginning of the 1990s by the Antall Government. During the 1990s, "the criticism towards the slow Hungarian military reforms and the slow restructuring of the security infrastructure was compensated for by the geostrategic position of the country and the Hungarian participation in NATO's missions in Bosnia and Kosovo".[10] However, later criticism grew whilst the defence spending decreased in Hungary. This could not be compensated by the relatively strong Hungarian participation in NATO, or U.S.-led missions.

According to Michał Piekarski's argument, contemporary Polish foreign relations and the evolution of security were two-fold. "On the one hand, there was the process of creating a new internal political system, which created new institutions. On the other hand, there was also the process of changing orientation in terms of foreign policy and military alliances."[11] During the process, Poland intended to be a reliable ally; lately Poland is one of those few that spends more than 2% of GDP on defence. Poland similarly to other countries in the region paid special attention to the participation in foreign missions, most notably in Iraq.

Cristina Bogzeanu argues that "since the fall of the communist regime in 1989, Romania's foreign and security policy has passed through a serious set of reforms including the downsizing of the armed forces, establishing democratic control over the military, implying a reform of the institutions as well as a change in its strategic thinking".[12] Not differently to the other NATO members covered in the different chapters, Romania's top priority after 1989 was the successful NATO and EU integration. This process was influenced by internal and external factors. "Internally, the need to implement the required reforms to gain NATO

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[6]   See Zvonimir Mahečić's essay in this volume.
[7]   See Péter Rada's essay in this volume.
[8]   See Péter Rada's essay in this volume.
[9]   See Péter Rada's essay in this volume.
[10]   See Péter Rada's essay in this volume.
[11]   See Michał Piekarski's essay in this volume.
[12]   See Cristina Bogzeanu's essay in this volume.

and EU integration has been the main force that formed and developed the political, economic, juridical, administrative and military dimensions. Externally, Romania carried out actions proving its adhesion to NATO and EU values, standards and interests."[13] Following a similar path than its neighbours, today "Romania is deeply involved in international efforts to manage global and regional security challenges, and foreign and security policy decisions have stood as proof of the state's responsible engagement as an EU member and as a NATO ally".[14]

In his chapter on Slovakia, István Hangácsi mentioned that Slovakia has experienced a lot of fundamental changes in the last decades: "First, the fall of communism (1989), with its long-term and painful socio-economic outcomes; a few years later the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia; thirdly the road of integration into NATO and European Union followed."[15] He also argues that the transformation has not been easy as "not all of the governments were committed fully to meet certain democratic, economic and military standards set by NATO or the European Union".[16] This is true despite the fact that since independence "all elected governments of the country have proclaimed their main aim by joining different international and European co-operations, which support peace, security and collaboration (political, economic and cultural) between nations. […] After the groundbreaking elections in 1998, the integration to transatlantic and European institutions picked up pace, peaking in 2004, when Slovakia caught up with other aspirant countries and joined both the European Union and NATO".[17] Similarly to the other countries in the region, the major international challenges such as "terrorism, migration crisis, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea"[18] significantly influenced the evolution of the foreign and security decision-making process and also the related institutions in Slovakia.

As mentioned above several times, Ukraine's development is significantly different from the other countries. Even though the Euro-Atlantic integration has not been completely out of the question during the last decades, the real accession to the EU, or even more so to NATO is far away. We could also see that even the mere intention of the Ukrainian Government, or the public to maintain a close(r) relationship with the Euro-Atlantic institutions triggered harsh responses from Russia. In his chapter Maksym Bugriy highlights that the different past "left this country with the legacy burden of Soviet and imperial Russian political processes and institutions, which was far from the practices in NATO and EU member states. […] As Ukraine became independent with the USSR breakup, it created all institutions anew, but it was replicating quasi-Soviet security architecture […]. While Ukraine's politics was until recently the bargaining of oligarchic elites, they were virtually sharing the neglect of the importance of the security sector development, leading to its degradation".[19] The antagonistic differences being present within the society and the political elite led to several "revolutions" and upheavals, most recently in 2013. These events brought some changes and further challenges. "The times post-Maidan led to an increased focus

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13   See Cristina Bogzeanu's essay in this volume.
14   See Cristina Bogzeanu's essay in this volume.
15   See István Hangácsi's essay in this volume.
16   See István Hangácsi's essay in this volume.
17   See István Hangácsi's essay in this volume.
18   See István Hangácsi's essay in this volume.
19   See Maksym Bugriy's essay in this volume.

on the reform of the defence forces, which became part of strategic doctrine."[20] The new security strategy in 2015 decided on the security sector reform and not surprisingly named Russia as the single most important source of a security threat for Ukraine. "Meanwhile, President Poroshenko's strategy was to have a clear security orientation towards NATO–EU as the ultimate benchmark, declared also in the new National Security Strategy."[21]

Key actors of the foreign and security decision-making

The process of rebuilding, or building for the first time of the security institutions in Croatia was a bumpy road with lost opportunities, failures as Zvonimir Mahečić criticises the country's development in the last decades. "The majority of the security sector institutions have been established in the years following independence, but obviously, the beginning of the process took place during the time of war. Clearly, a wartime environment does not represent the most favourable framework for such an endeavour. After the year 2000, however, finally some steps have been taken in the process of accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures."[22] Croatia fell behind other countries in the region and needed "to catch up with the other transitional states on their way to accession to NATO and the EU. Because of the blindness of the leadership during the first ten years of independence, being also, partially, the result of the protracted war, all attempts to join these two organisations were stalled to the point that external observers had to wonder if the Croatian leadership was actually expecting to be begged to join".[23]

Péter Rada emphasised that the "Hungarian governments paid special attention that Hungary participates in military missions, mostly in NATO frames"[24] with the clear goal to deploy around 1,000 troops in the different missions. The Euro-Atlantic integration and the NATO and later the EU membership significantly influenced the development of the security institutions. The legal regulations and the decision-making processes intended to adapt to the new realities that came with the memberships. "After 1989, the Hungarian strategic culture has changed fundamentally due to the fact that Hungary left the Warsaw Pact and strived for quick integration in NATO and the EU. Despite this fact, feeling small has remained part of this culture that has imposed serious limits on decisions on the use of the Hungarian Defence Forces."[25] Since 2010, Hungary has experienced further changes and developments, but taking off the post-socialist historic burden needs more time.

Similarly to the other countries in the region, the development of the regulations of the security sector has been defined in the Constitution. As Michal Piekarski argues in the second section of his article, the fundamental legal document has defined the key actors in the security policy decision-making process and also the process itself. The Constitution of Poland was adopted at the end of the first decade of independence on 2 April 1997.

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[20] See Maksym Bugriy's essay in this volume.
[21] See Maksym Bugriy's essay in this volume.
[22] See Zvonimir Mahečić's essay in this volume.
[23] See Zvonimir Mahečić's essay in this volume.
[24] See Péter Rada's essay in this volume.
[25] See Péter Rada's essay in this volume.

Cristina Bogzeanu argues in her chapter that in Romania the application of the democratic principles in the security policy decision-making process and the development of the institutions were based on the democratic civil-military relations and the achieved consensus on the norms guiding the transformation process. Bogzeanu highlights that "Romania is defined as a semi-presidential republic, the executive power resting with the President and the Government. Foreign and security policy decision-making in Romania can be considered centralised, the main stakeholders being the holders of the executive power – the President and the Government. The constant mainstream in Romanian foreign and security policy – NATO and EU integration, U.S. strategic partnership, and security and stability in the Black Sea Area and Southeastern Europe – are visible the most in foreign and security policy, where decision-makers are keen on showing a strong consensus".[26]

István Hangácsi also underlines that in Slovakia "as in every constitutional and democratic country, only specific state representatives and officials are allowed to shape the foreign, security, defence and military developments".[27] Besides the most important actors – "the President, the National Council (Parliament), the Prime Minister (PM), the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs (MoFaEA), the Minister of Defence (MoD) and the cabinet",[28] there are prominent think tanks that have some influence over the security policy decision-making process: "the Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA), Slovak Security Policy Institute (SSPI), GLOBSEC and Stratpol."[29]

As was mentioned above, Ukraine is an exemption in many senses. Maksym Bugriy also highlights that: "The roles of all key players in the security sector were recently specified in more details in the new Law on National Security. Ukraine distinguishes between "security" and "defence" areas. The law defined the security and defence sector as "unified under one leadership and the coordinated aggregate of government and military and security institutions, citizens and civic associations that participate in the provision of national security". The law proposed to differentiate between the "security forces" and "defence forces", with some overlaps, most notably the National Guard, which is a combination of militarised police and, in some units, mechanised infantry. The National Guard is under the Ministry of the Interior as a "security force" in peacetime and under the MoD in wartime. Currently, some of its tactical units are on the frontline in Donbas, just like a regular military."[30]

The case studies

It seems to be obvious that Zvonimir Mahečić chose first the case when Croatia got involved in the Bosnian War. It happened at the same time when Croatia struggled for international recognition and also needed to build up its security institutions. The second case is less known. The government's decision "fraught with problems and inconsistencies is the long

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[26] See Cristina Bogzeanu's essay in this volume.
[27] See István Hangácsi's essay in this volume.
[28] See István Hangácsi's essay in this volume.
[29] See István Hangácsi's essay in this volume.
[30] See Maksym Bugriy's essay in this volume.

protracted but relatively recently resolved (we will see how durable it is) issue of re-equipping the Air Force with new fighters".[31] The modernisation of the military and buying new equipment has brought problems to the surface. However, this development is not unknown to other countries in the region that needed to take difficult decisions when choosing either American or European equipment, or military materiel.

Péter Rada argued in the last section of his chapter that there are many obvious choices in the last decades in Hungary to analyse through case studies concerning the security decision-making process but two are especially interesting: the Hungarian contribution in Kosovo and the Hungarian participation in the counter-ISIL coalition. "The Balkan crisis and the wars in the Western Balkans put Hungary in a very difficult situation. A large number of Hungarians live in Serbia […]. Consequently, for Hungary, it was most important not to be involved actively in the conflict and the government tried to emphasise neutrality, while supporting the international organisations' efforts to find a political solution."[32] In case of Kosovo, Hungary was already member of NATO and intended to fulfil the voluntarily accepted obligations brought on board by the membership. "After the United States initiated the global coalition against ISIL in August 2014 and began air strikes first in Iraq, and later in Syria, Hungary joined the coalition and participated at the high-level and regular counter-ISIL meetings. Furthermore, Hungary offered humanitarian aid – around 70,000 EUR – and military materiel to the Iraqi Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government in 2014."[33] The Hungarian Parliament later authorised to deploy Hungarian troops helping the coalition efforts in Northern Iraq.

In case of Poland, probably the best example for a classic decision in security policy is Poland's involvement in the Iraq War in 2003. Michał Piekarski argues that the decision "was made in the context of a strongly U.S.-orientated foreign and security policy, formulated after 1990, which became only stronger in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks".[34] The second case study – "the Caracal case" – analyses a decision rather influenced by the EU membership and related to the failed modernisation of the Polish armed forces. In "2012, the Ministry of Defence formally announced its intention to purchase twenty-six medium-size helicopters, including sixteen cargo ones, three of the land SAR (Search and Rescue) variant, three of the maritime SAR variant and four of the ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) variant in order to replace old Soviet-era Mi-8 and Mi-14 helicopters".[35]

Cristina Bogzeanu argued that "the highly centralised decision-making process in Romania's foreign and security policy can be clearly illustrated by two major cases of foreign and security policy decisions – the one on becoming a NATO Member State and the one about support for the NATO military campaign in Kosovo in 1999".[36] "In the context of the 9/11 events, Bucharest rallied to the international community's position and supported the U.S. response to the attacks. Parliament itself lent its support to participate in the coun-

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[31]   See Zvonimir Mahečić's essay in this volume.
[32]   See Péter Rada's essay in this volume.
[33]   See Péter Rada's essay in this volume.
[34]   See Michał Piekarski's essay in this volume.
[35]   See Michał Piekarski's essay in this volume.
[36]   See Cristina Bogzeanu's essay in this volume.

ter-terrorist fight, together with the other NATO Member States, and to increase Romania's contribution to the SFOR and KFOR missions."[37]

István Hangácsi also highlighted that Slovakia needed to compete for more Western attention. Thus the first case analysed the decision about NATO integration. The process "had certain phases and trends, even setbacks, which made a huge impact on Slovakia's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures".[38] The second case study is similar to the one of the Croatian chapter's case. "Obtaining new and modern armoured vehicles is a key and long-term goal of the Slovak security and military strategy."[39] Among the many available examples Hangácsi focused on "the ongoing procurement scandal related to armoured vehicles (4 x 4 and 8 x 8), in which different interested parties are involved".[40]

Maksym Bugriy chose two interrelated cases from Ukraine's recent history. First, he analysed the Ukrainian government's decision to defy the Russian demands and threats and to maintain Ukraine's territorial sovereignty also in Crimea and use the tools of international law and agreements. The second case mainly stems from the first one. Bugriy argued that Crimea's annexation in 2014 occurred in a very different context and obviously with a different outcome. "The Ukrainian Government initiated certain decisions: strategically not to respond to the Russians, attempting to stage only unarmed resistance to the capturing of military units, raising the Army to defend mainland Ukraine, and using the scarce diplomatic instruments available, including the UN Security Council and the consultations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum".[41]

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[37] See Cristina Bogzeanu's essay in this volume.
[38] See István Hangácsi's essay in this volume.
[39] See István Hangácsi's essay in this volume.
[40] See István Hangácsi's essay in this volume.
[41] See Maksym Bugriy's essay in this volume.

The studies of this book follow a three-fold structure. First, a historical overview of how the dominant security/threat perceptions have evolved since 1989 is provided, with reference to how official documents reflected these changes. This is then followed by a consideration of the key stakeholders in foreign policy decision-making, also introducing readers to the major foreign policy decisions taken and institutional transformations carried out during the period in question, with special regard to the ministries of foreign affairs and defence, reforms in the field of defence and the military, and in the field of intelligence. The third and final parts of the studies then offer the readers two illustrative case studies each. The authors were requested to present one case of a major foreign policy decision and another, lesser known case, to thus illustrate the role of key actors and factors examined in the first two sections of their studies.

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