

International Security Organisations

Edited by
Anna Molnár – Dóra Molnár –
Mónika Szente-Varga



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Preface

In many ways, the post-bipolar period is radically different from the preceding eras. Just consider the changed nature and ever-widening range of challenges, risks and threats, or the world order that, after a brief unipolar period, has taken on a multipolar character, with power centres in all parts of the world. An equally important change in the post-Cold War era is the widening circle of actors shaping security, which strongly underpins the need for this volume. Nowadays, states, as the traditional actors in international relations, are far from being the only ones shaping world political events. The range of actors shaping security has been extended to include a number of sub-state and supranational actors, and international organisations are among the key players in the latter.

Today, there is hardly a researcher, security policy expert or politician who would question the role of international organisations in international politics, although the extent of their influence, their positive or negative impact, their independence and bias varies from organisation to organisation. The aim of this volume is to present and evaluate the structure, functioning and areas of activity of the most important organisations from a security policy perspective, namely the world organisation, and the organisations of the Euro-Atlantic area and the other continents. It does so in a coherent structure that first introduces the reader to the organisation itself and its operational characteristics, and then, in a chapter immediately following, to the crisis management activities of the organisation. The United Nations is the first of these organisations to be introduced as the only universal international organisation. The reader gets an insight into what the theoretical construct of collective security means and how it works in practice, both within the framework of the organisation and in the UN's peace operations. The authors then introduce four organisations that are key to the Euro-Atlantic area: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and then examine the mission activities of each organisation. The authors have devoted the three concluding chapters of the volume to an introduction to the security organisations of the three continents, Africa, Asia and the Americas.

The activities of international organisations are important not only for global policy-making, but also for the security of our country. Hungary is now a member of all the major international organisations in our region, which has brought about changes in our daily lives that would have been unimaginable before. This change has clearly improved the security situation of our country and has also positively shaped our bilateral and multilateral relations.

The world of international organisations is gradually taking shape, as are other forums for intergovernmental cooperation. The nearly 80 years, since the end of the Second World War have shown that, while organisations cannot always respond quickly and adequately to all challenges, they can contribute to maintaining or, where necessary,

restoring international peace and security by providing a forum for interstate interaction and by channelling disputes. In today's turbulent world, international security organisations are the safe haven to which we can turn in the most difficult times and which may be capable of solving the most serious problems.

Editors

Péter Stepper

International Organisations and Security: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives

Introduction

Hungary has been a member of the United Nations since 1955, joined the NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004. Budapest works with partners in different multinational institutions such as the OSCE and supports regional cooperation primarily through the V4 (RADA–STEPPER 2019: 172–194; BARTHA–RADA 2014: 14–21). These memberships affect our security, and international organisations became part of our life. This book chapter introduces some fundamental features of multilateral organisations, which are connected to international security. To analyse this topic, the chapter uses the tenets of various international relations theories, not exclusively realism, liberalism and constructivism, but also some forms of critical security theories.

In academic debates, there is a tendency to formulate distinctive sub-fields of research connected to (EU) integration studies, regional security and international organisations. There are several well-written books available both in English (KARNS–MINGST 2010) and Hungarian (SZÁLKAI et al. 2019; BALOGH et al. 2015; MOLNÁR et al. 2019), which deal with this topic. However, focusing on security institutions requires a special approach. Hence, this textbook serves the purpose of explaining the realm of institutions and regimes by prioritising the language of security over the legal and the political.

This volume does not seek to duplicate works on international organisations, rather to analyse the security perception of certain institutions, the structure and the *modus operandi* as well as organisational features. It is almost unavoidable to have a certain level of overlapping agenda with the previously existing literature, but the main goal is to distinguish ourselves from the wide range of studies on international organisations.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2022) identified more than a few hundred regional security cooperations, which might be shaped differently but all of them contribute to peace and security studies. Alas, in the shadow of great power competition, we tend to forget how paramount institutions can be and how they facilitate cooperation and build trust among parties. The idea of collective security and the United Nations helped to change the mindset about international armed conflicts and led humanity to a new era of peace. However, regional cooperation has its utmost importance to build functioning security communities all around the world and prevent conflicts between neighbours.




Figure 1: Map of intergovernmental organisations

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_intergovernmental_organizations#/media/File:Alliances_expansive_Map.png

Concepts of international security

One of the most essential theoretical questions about international relations is whether humanity can overcome international violence, and the history of mankind could be different from the last couple of hundred years. Fukuyama wrote his famous essay about the end of history, which argued that with the end of communism, the battle of ideologies is over, hence the history – as we know it – came to its end. However, it reflected upon a unique moment of U.S. hegemony in the aftermath of Soviet dissolution and his original arguments are not necessarily valid anymore (RADA 2019: 1–10). There are two radical viewpoints on this subject matter. The first group of scholars argue that international politics is still full of violence by nature, while the other group puts more emphasis on the fact how rarely wars and armed conflicts occur in the 21st century. The big question is that globalisation and the increasing interdependency, which is an inevitable feature of our era, helped to decrease the number of violent acts significantly, or not. Liberal interdependency theories claim that the more globalisation mankind witnesses, the safer place the world will become.

Another important methodological problem has been also highlighted by the traditionalist-behaviourist (scientist) debate in political science (BAYLIS et al. 2021: 357). The question is if the causes of war(s) are unique or can be described by general features. Unlike historians, political science analysts often argue that there is an overarching pattern which explains international politics with clearly identified constant variables (like power, resources, anarchical system, etc.).

Neorealists like quantitative, data-based methodology, and they argue that systemic causes are fundamental. Hence, the behaviour of any state can be explained by analys-

ing the international system, which is basically determined by the relative distribution of power (WALTZ 1959). The international system can be described as an anarchical place, where units (primarily states and non-state actors to a limited extent) fight for their survival via self-help and *ad hoc* cooperation.

Historians tend to deny this approach, highlighting that every single armed conflict has unique reason(s) to start, and resource wars as a concept is the product of neorealist oversimplification.

Armed conflicts start by decisions of men, decision-makers being responsible for the consequences. Scientifically, the expert could only understand these decisions after a certain amount of time, by analysing the personalities, and the historical context of the given era. The decolonialisation process of the 1960s helped a lot to neorealism to surpass this viewpoint and use mathematics, and data analysis as their primary tool to understand international politics.

Decision-makers, at first liked their methods, but it does not mean they were right in everything. Structural realism could not explain numerous post-Cold War armed conflicts, or the absence of them. Changes in power distribution happens all the time, but it is not necessarily followed by armed conflicts. After the transition in the 1990s, there were no wars in Central Asia over water resources, and Central Europe could experience velvet revolutions instead of bloody fights over political power. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh region is a place of constant violence, and Ukraine has been illegally attacked by the Russian Federation in 2014 and 2022. Structural realism is fashionable, because it explains most of the problems related to armed conflicts, but not all of them.

Idealist scholars after World War I firmly believed in the capacity of mankind to overcome violence (IKENBERRY et al. 2009). The eruption of World War II, the constant fear from nuclear apocalypse during the Cold War led to the birth of human nature realism, structural and strategic realism, which pushed back idealism for a long time. Even if the *détente* period in the 1970s and the unipolar moments of the 1990s restored the credibility of neoliberal arguments, the current international environment helped again realist scholars to win this debate. Alas, the failure of U.S. long-wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the re-emerging great power competition, and the Russian aggression against Ukraine reminds us that violence is still part of international politics. Our question is therefore, how to define international security. Without analysing the concept of security, it is hard to understand the functions of international organisations related to international security.

Most of the scholars (see BUZAN–HANSEN 2009; PEOPLES–VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS 2021) agree upon the contested nature of the definition of security. One of the first trials to define the problems by Arnold Wolfers (1952) served as the basis of a lot of other concepts. According to him, security is the absence from threats against (any) values. There is a debate, however, about the type of threats and values (global, international, national) we are talking about here. During the Cold War, research was focusing on military capabilities necessary to counter any threat from the enemy. This was a narrow field of research, having ethno-centrist features, revolving around the interests of the

Western world. Barry Buzan struggled to transform this approach by his book *People, States and Fear* published in 1983 and incorporated new dimensions, such as political, economic, societal and environmental sectors.

Another interesting problem is the connection between national and international security. Some might argue that there is a tension between the two and maximising security on national level might cause its own problems for international peace. Others argue that international security after all represents the national interests of the current hegemon of the system, which does not cause any problem, if its position is unquestionably strong as the U.S.'s was in the 1990s. The decline of the hegemon, however, may lead to future problems, as the world is more and more multipolar with the rise of China.

But not every scholar accepts the significance of this connection between national and international security. The functionalist school of regional integration theories denies this (MITRANY 1971: 532–543), and one part of the constructivist academic community thinks that societal security is more important than the above-mentioned structural features like the balance of power or hegemony. The first group of scholars focus on the EU integration, which showed us that regional cooperation and national sovereignty are not exclusionary terms. States (like post-Nazi Germany) could gain more sovereignty on international level by sacrificing some sovereignty on national level. Also, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were in the forefront of constructivist research as the primary examples of artificial political communities, disintegrated states, where the ethno-national groups proved to be better referent objects (ROE 2005), and units of analysis than the larger political community.

These oft-criticised viewpoints were most of the times seen as mere exceptions in the matters of world politics. Realists were afraid of broadening the concept of security to such an extent, which could eventually lead to irrelevant conclusions, not so useful for decision-makers (WALT 1991). According to another counterargument, states are basically the political communities, which are the echoes of ethno-national groups. The will of the people (at least in democracies) is expressed by them; therefore, it is unnecessary to examine the behaviour of any sub-national unit.

The examination of sub-state level and ethno-national groups have also been criticised by the globalist movement. It is a quite radical viewpoint, which believes that the global community will eventually enforce the building of international security to tackle planetary threats like nuclear catastrophes, ecological degradation, or collapse of the international financial system. The last few years, however, did not show us solidarity on global scale at all. Political communities during the Covid crisis expected solutions from their own political leaders, but also the Russian aggression against Ukraine has not been unanimously condemned by all UN member states (not to mention the sanction regime, which is supported only by the West).

Definitions of security

A nation is secure until it is not threatened by any risk to give up its fundamental values to avoid a war; and even if war happens, the nation is still capable of preserving those values by winning this war. (Walter Lippmann)

Objective security is the level of risks against acquired values, subjective security is the lack of fear from a future attack against those values. (Arnold Wolfers)

In case of security, dialogue is due to maintain the absence of any threats. When this happens in the framework of international system security is about how states and societies are able to preserve their identity and functional integrity. (Barry Buzan)

Individuals and groups can only build stable security if they do not prevent others from having it; it can happen only if security is seen as an emancipatory process. (Booth-Wheeler)

Source: BAYLIS et al. 2021: 359.

Collective security

The concept is the product of the 20th century, even if certain scholars like Pierre Dubois, or Immanuel Kant could be used as reference points for peace studies. According to this concept, the answer for the reoccurring problem of interstate violence is neither self-help/self-defence, nor the balance of power. According to Woodrow Wilson, one of the founding fathers of collective security, the long-term solution to prevent conflicts is a creation of a rules-based international order. It creates obligations for community members and deters aggressive powers from taking reckless actions (MARSAL et al. 2019: 9–17). This concept focuses on the internal problems of a universal community, thus the prevention of potential conflicts among members is key. It works only if the organisation (and any member) is able and willing to impose sanctions if one broke the basic rule of non-interference and the prohibition of aggression. If any member(s) of the community were threatened by an aggressor, the UN (members) would be ready to help, even considering all available options including the use of force, if necessary. Collective security thus prepares for an attack within, and the potential “enemy” is not predefined precisely. It depends on the actions of a potential aggressor, who is ready to break the peace and legal regulations underlined by the UN Charter (GÄRTNER 2005).

Common values are established in a statutory document, which contains the largest common denominator of the 193 member states. Classic examples for collective security are the League of Nations and the United Nations. The latter was created by 51 founding members with the signature of the UN Charter in 1945. Two of its main bodies, the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly are entitled to order the use of force in specific cases. The framework of cooperation as most of the liberal institutionalist IR scholars might argue, is very useful for small states, which would not be able to defend themselves from the aggression of great powers otherwise.

According to Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919): “The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.”

According to Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

Treaties, as it can be seen above, explicitly authorised the organisation to the use of force, but the implementation is in the hand of member states every single time. Therefore, there is always a deterrence element or sanction related to the concept. The whole idea is based on the concept of international cooperation collectively. The strength and significance of the UN has always been dependent on the willingness of member states. If they are ready to serve its purpose, because of, or despite their specific national interests, the UN is considered to be a strong toolbox. However, most of the times, the organisation looks more like as a dispersed toolbox, and the members are looking for other approaches to defend their sovereignty and power from any form of aggression. The League of Nations proved to be unsuccessful in its effort to preserve peace, considering the aggression in Manchuria (1931), Ethiopia (1935), the Rhein district (1936), the Anschluss in Austria (1938) and Czechoslovakia (1939). These failures underlined the problem of political willingness, and the divergence of security and defence policy perception in the world, which contributed to World War II.

Despite the tragic failure of the League of Nations, the Allied Powers decided to give another chance for collective security by establishing the UN right after World War II. The most fundamental difference can be seen in the procedures of the UN Security Council, which earned the responsibility to decide on the question of peace and security.

Most of the conflicts which required UN peacekeepers since then were of internal nature (civil wars and non-international armed conflicts). Many scholars criticised the concept of collective security either from the realist or liberal side of IR theories. All these perspectives will be introduced comprehensively in the next sections. It is enough to say that because of the shortcomings in the collective security concept, a lot of unwanted violence remained present, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, in the 1990s, a new set of institutions was established to tackle those challenges, some rooted in the idea of *détente* and peaceful co-existence. These initiatives like the nuclear non-proliferation regimes, MBFR, CFE, or the OSCE themselves are signs of the increasing importance of cooperative security.

Cooperative security

Cooperative security (ZAGORSKI 2010) is different from collective security. It is a toolbox of a group of states against threats, perceived as threats by all states in the organisation. This definition might look a bit simple but catches the essence of political cooperation. This works based on common political will to define certain problems as threats and reassure each other to tackle them together. It has an institutional character if the states create a political and legal network of connection, which helps them to increase their own security. This is the *sine qua non* of a common institutional system. This is the most general form of cooperation among nation states, and it was created to offer an alternative to the traditional forms of cooperation. It is not necessarily established by allies, rather by political rivals, or even potential enemies. Its primary focus is mutual arms reduction, but the whole range of activities might differ from that. If we define collective security and use of force as a measure of last resort, cooperative security is more like a preventive method to ensure that conflict will not be necessary. It is less than collective security, because it excludes military measures from the agenda, and covers less fields.

The concept of cooperative security is in connection with the non-alignment movement of the 1980s and was supported by a significant number of small states, who had agency in the question of nuclear non-proliferation, but did not have the toolbox to influence the debate between the two superpowers. A common European security area was the only option for them if they wanted their voice to be heard. The idea of a European security architecture is fundamentally liberal, and realists did not forget to criticise this concept, highlighting the importance of balance of power, hegemony, great power competition, which are all important factors of credibility.

OSCE and ASEAN are good examples, worth to mention, when it comes to cooperative security. OSCE aims to maintain peace, help democratic development, avoid new political divides, and resolve security problems. ASEAN has been created under different circumstances in Southeast Asia, where liberal democracy does not exist, and there were no other common identities/common institutions. Just as in the case of the OSCE, the primary goal was mutual trust building to prevent future armed conflicts. Institution building, however, required a certain level of common identity, and now we can argue that there is an 'ASEAN path' to development (norms, processes, institutions) and peaceful negotiations are the way to manage conflicts.

Cooperative security demands a lot of factors to work together. Primarily, a common perception about future expectations is key, and members must see each other as partners and not rivals in the first place. Interdependency in the 21st century helped a lot to create a framework in Europe, where global, regional and local problems (terrorism, organised crime, natural disasters) need common solutions.

However, it is hard to miss the global and regional developments of great power competition, which transforms cooperative security institutions. Some organisations (OSCE) are in decline, while others (like SCO, ASEAN) show unexpected potential. On the global scale, the Sino–American rivalry creates a new Cold War, where European countries, including Russia and Turkey, but all the others must choose sides. This

choice will be based on their security perception, and there will be differences among the 57 participating states of the OSCE. On regional level, the Russian aggression against Ukraine (in 2014 and 2022) was the turning point, which led to the dissolution of previously functioning regimes, like the INF Treaty, Open Sky Treaty, and other core elements of European security architecture. Of course, the OSCE is still the (only) most improvement platform of the West to negotiate with Russia if any other channels fail to exist, which is especially true after the suspension of the NATO–Russia Council. But this is a step-back from the historic achievements of the OSCE.

Origins of international (security) organisations

The demand for any regional security cooperation is significantly higher if there is some economic or political interdependence (BÖRZEL–RISSE 2019: 1231–1252). The best example for such connection has been the transatlantic relations in the aftermath of World War II: the land-lease system and the Marshall plan, which changed the relations between Europe and the U.S. fundamentally. There are other less obvious connections either if we examine intra-European trade and industrial relations most notably between France and Germany. But also, the Asia-Pacific region offers several platforms from the China-led SCO to the U.S.-led QUAD, which reflects the effects of economic dependency leading to political cooperation.

Demand for more regional cooperation increases if participants suffer from some negative external effects (BÖRZEL–RISSE 2019: 1231–1252), so they might try to minimise their losses together. History of European integration started with the deep recession of the 1950s, which required cooperation in the field of coal and steel, which eventually led to the creation of the free market and finally the European single market. It is also beneficial for regime security if certain political actors, most probably small states present themselves as members of a wider political and defence cooperation, which gives them more credibility and leverage, what anyone might expect from their actual defence capabilities (BÖRZEL–RISSE 2019: 1231–1252). The presumptions that small states benefit more from membership in international cooperations are true in case of East Central European and Baltic countries, protected by NATO collective defence principles.

Regional security cooperations build a sense of belonging to a community, exceptionalism, identity and sometime even elitism. Any power transfer of the sovereign to an international organisation presumes a relatively high level of trust and community. It is however debatable that a collective identity is the reason, or the consequence of this.¹ Mutual trust is one of the most important elements, which helps to avoid creating a security dilemma (HERZ 1950: 157–180), and lead us to build a security community (DEUTSCH 1957). One of the most frequent references is the transformation of Franco–

¹ NATO embraces the idea of building a collective identity, see e.g. the media campaign of ‘We are NATO’ at the official website of the organisation (www.nato.int/wearenato/).

German relations after 1945 into the most stable and reliable partnership in the realm of economy and defence.

A good and functional regional (security) cooperation can be known by its best practices and attractivity. While NATO enlargement and partnership projects are considered to be a huge success story of the last 30 years, other Asian alternatives like the CSTO or the SCO struggled to attract new members into their club until now. A significant number of African and South American regional cooperations use the EU Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights as role models for their own tribunals. On a much smaller but still significant scale, the Western Balkan countries keep learning from the Visegrád group when it comes to knowledge transfer related to EU and NATO accession talks.

Therefore, it is easy to argue that international organisations, and especially security organisations (like NATO, SCO, CSTO, OSCE, etc.) are important actors in the field of international relations. They shape world politics fundamentally, but theoretical explanations of their behaviour might differ through time. In the following section, some different approaches of IR will be examined with the special focus on the presumptions toward international conflict and cooperation, and of course international organisations.

Theoretical perspectives on international (security) organisations

The nature of different types of regional (security) cooperations are a topic of discussion in IR theories regularly. Neorealism and neoliberalism consider the structure of the international system and its interaction an independent variable, which influences international actions. Political relations are defined by functional differences, distribution of capacities, ultimately the share of power, the latter is deeply influenced by world order. Theories could compare the bipolar and multipolar structures and test their assumptions before and after the 1990s.

While the neoliberal institutionalism imagined a rule-based order, neorealism prefers the term of hegemon stability to describe global politics. Others like Henry Kissinger perceive the return of global power competition, thus the good old balance of power (KISSINGER 2014). All the approaches, even if they differ significantly, argue that our world can be analysed by understanding the structural effects and elements.

Neorealists do not consider international cooperation a primary solution for their problem, in other words, they do not prefer cooperating just for the sake of cooperation but are always making a cost–benefit calculus when it comes to the issue of choosing between peace and conflict. They believe in the utmost importance of nation states, sovereignty, and self-interest. They find cooperation difficult to maintain because states usually calculate with relative (individual) and not absolute (collective) gains. Win–win scenarios do exist, but the bigger player always wins a bit more than the smaller. Of course, they do not deny the importance of alliances, but prefer to explain them as the toolboxes of great powers. Most of the realist scholars argue that international organisations were established to serve the interest of certain state(s), and not the community of humankind.

Neoliberalism, however, believes in the rationale of collective security. They argue that states are capable of cooperating for absolute gains and reward of international peace and security. Harmonisation of interests is not a dream, or a utopia, but a real possibility if the political willingness is there.

Neorealists argue that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (1952) was the product of the Cold War, a classic example for confidence- and security-building measures among European allies. Mainstream realism perceives the ECSC as a toolbox to balance the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization (1955) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) (1949) (KELSTRUP–WILLIAMS 2000). Of course, they cannot deny the results of the ECSC and the European Communities in the field of customs, free trade, internal market, but they want to remind us of the fact that it was originally created to control German military industry through the cooperation in the field of coal and steel production. So, the whole idea was connected to the military and defence dimension. Other realist scholars predicted the downfall of the cooperation in the European Union (MEARSHEIMER 1990: 5–56), because in the post-Cold War world, relative gains, again, will be much more important and state rivalry will eventually return (GRIECO et al. 1993: 727–743).

Neoliberal scholars presume that non-state actors influence the international system, thus its conflictual nature can be regulated. Non-state actors are not interested in conflicts, but in profit, and they have enough power to push state actors into the direction of a rule-based order. International regimes, institutions help to maintain this order. Furthermore, by the increase of the number of linkages, and interdependence, they help to create a more and more stable system, where the chance of armed conflicts and violence remain lower by each year. The point of any regional (security) cooperation is to create diplomatic channels which help regular communication, increase trust and decrease the chance of any misunderstanding, which are the primary cause of any conflict.

Common rules are followed, because every actor is afraid of losing the benefits related to the system, and it is much less expensive, than having rounds of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic talks with each relevant partner year by year separately. Cost–benefit calculus, expectations and relative gains are in the focus of this approach. Realising the importance of these factors eventually leads to creating political communities. Karl Deutsch described political communities as institutions and practices, strong and widespread enough to meet the expectations of the society for peaceful changes and non-violent negotiations (DEUTSCH 1957).

Realism

The history of the UN can be described in several distinguishable phases. At first, great powers imagined an organisation through which the four policemen can guard international peace and security. Later, the Cold War realities revealed the dysfunctionalities deriving from the UNSC veto system, and the lack of political willingness to rely on this format when it comes to peacekeeping operations. The post-Cold War era, however,

opened new possibilities for the UN to fulfil its original role in the field of maintaining peace in the 21st century. IR theories have different explanations for the different phases; here I focus on the realist arguments.

The fundamentals of realism have been built upon the thesis of unavoidable conflict, the critique of liberal utopia and idealism, especially in the field of international cooperation, most notably the idea of collective security manifested in the organisation of the League of Nations. Edward H. Carr argued in his book, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* that the problem was mixing utopia and reality, and underlined that most of the time the main cause of international violence was based on wishful thinking (CARR 1939). According to him, some idealist politicians believe that harmony of interest can exist. This wrong presumption was one of the main reasons, which led to the eruption of World War II. It is easy to see why scholars under the tenet of realism remain sceptical towards the successor of this institution, the United Nations. Especially the Russia-experts in the U.S. were extremely cautious to support the UN, like George F. Kennan, who believed that maintaining peace is primarily the responsibility of the sovereigns, and to transfer this power to a supranational level is nothing more than a dream.

Even if universal international cooperation (the UN) is regularly criticised by realist scholars, there are other formats of cooperation, which they find useful. Especially defensive (neo)realism supports the idea of regional international cooperations and alliances to maintain hegemony and world order. Already during the Cold War, Stephan Walt did his well-known research about the origins of alliances (WALT 1987), which is still a reference point for many 21st century realist scholars. Fellow realists in the Trump era emphasised that it is still in the interest of the U.S. to support his allies even if it comes with expenses. Grygiel and Mitchell argue that financing the defence of the 'Unquiet frontier' in the Eastern flank of NATO is much less expensive for the U.S. than to wait for its global rivals rising. 'Using' local allies to fight for U.S. hegemony is much more beneficial from the defensive realist perspective (GRYGIEL–MITCHELL 2017). One of the main realist reasons to support international security cooperation is the action radius problem, which is the burden of every 'empire'.

Global power projection is a costly business, especially if you do it on your own. Furthermore, the strategic overstretch can cause unexpected or unwanted consequences for peace and security. As Németh highlights, strategically important locations can attract all kinds of great powers to build military bases. One of the best examples is Djibouti with the presence of five foreign military powers (the U.S., France, Italy, China and Japan) (NÉMETH 2019: 27–46). It serves the original goal to secure the chocking point of Bab el-Mandeb Strait, but can also raise tensions between the U.S. and China. Triggering the rivals with the expansion of an international alliance is something what great powers should avoid, argued by many realist scholars like John J. Mearsheimer. He was one of the few scholars who warned against NATO Eastern expansion in the 1990s (MEARSHEIMER 1990). Other realists like Mandelbaum raised the attention to the cost–benefit calculus of maintaining an international security cooperation. Expenses of the hegemon will become eventually a huge burden if its economy starts to decrease, but the costs of preserving supremacy remain the same or even begin to increase (MANDELBAUM 2005).




Figure 2: Foreign military powers in Djibouti

Source: www.dw.com/en/tiny-but-mighty-djiboutis-role-in-geopolitics/a-57136069

Security environments in the 21st century transformed, hence realism adapted to new realities. Neoclassical realism focuses more on the processes of domestic politics, and the interdependency of defence and wider politico-economic dynamics. This way, these scholars can explain the new, so-called transactionalist foreign policy of the U.S. administration since the election of Donald Trump. The Trump Administration cut the U.S. budget contribution to the UN and oftentimes criticised multilateral diplomacy, but the U.S. remained the most important supporter of UN institutions proportionally (ALMQVIST 2017). Despite his critical rhetoric about NATO being obsolete, Trump preserved the foundation of the alliance, for it helps U.S. capability of global power projection.

Liberalism

(Neo)liberal scholars often argue that various kinds of non-state actors have a significant effect on the international system, thus the conflictual nature of the interstate arena can be restrained. Primarily international regimes, institutions can help to achieve this goal, and the number of these will increase because of increasing interdependence. The effects of global interdependence became visible right after the oil crisis of 1973 and several publications emphasised its long-term effects on the nature of conflict and cooperation (KEOHANE–NYE 1973: 158–165).

The point of any international cooperation is to create channels through which the parties can communicate, thus they decrease the level of mutual distrust. Trust-building is the first step to conflict prevention. Common rules are respected, because members might be afraid of losing future gains, and using a system is cost-effective for them. There is no need to maintain several bilateral channels if multilateral channels also work. The realisation of these profits can lead to the establishment of political (and security) com-

munities. Karl Deutsch defined political communities as institutional practices, strong enough to make a long-term impact on societal expectations to peaceful changes and non-violent negotiations (DEUTSCH 1957).

Moravcsikian intergovernmentalism theory is also based on presumptions of liberalism, but unlike the functionalist approaches, which believe in bottom-up development, it focuses on interdependence of governments. It perceives international cooperation as a top-down process, where governments have a key role in the negotiations. Unlike liberal institutionalist scholars, Moravcsik does not think that nation states cooperate just because of creating global common goods. They cooperate because they know that even if the international system is defined by competition, it is not exclusively a zero-sum game. Governments try to achieve mutual gains, even if they compete with each other at the same time. In a nutshell, any type of regional (and global) integration is the product of cooperation and competition (MORAVCSIK 1993: 473–524).

Neofunctionalist theories explain regional integration by the success of practical day-to-day routines, standard procedures, which basically make those developments irreversible. Intergovernmental theory, however, focuses on the process of big intergovernmental conferences, *travaux préparatoires* of international treaties, where the political willingness and national interest can finally be revealed. They both agree on the significance of economic profitability and the fact that it is in the interest of transnational and national lobby groups to facilitate the deepening of existing cooperations (HOOGHE–MARKS 2009: 1–23).

Constructivism

Constructivism is only a 30-year-old theory, which became popular because mainstream theories failed to explain the velvet revolutions in the post-Soviet space and the rare moments of American unilateralism in the 1990s. Neither the tenets of realism (anarchy, self-help, survival) nor the ideas of liberalism (interdependence, regimes, democratic peace) could give adequate response to post-Cold War changes. Realism (especially Malthusianism) expected different types of military confrontations over natural resources, while liberalism forecasted the global victory of liberal democracy (FUKUYAMA 1992), yet to be seen (RADA 2007: 23–41).

The most well-known stream of constructivist literature, led by the Copenhagen School, created a ‘new framework for analysis’ in the field of security studies (BUZAN et al. 1998). They incorporated the realist/English school traditions (security sectors and regionalism) and a dynamic approach offering new methods like discourse analysis (securitisation).

A little less popular are the constructivist works focusing on the functioning of international institutions. Three core elements of all constructivist approaches are norms, values and (cultural/collective) identities. The international system, according to constructivist theories is not shaped by military power or economic interdependence, but by the norms and rules, which are products of intersubjective interactions (WENDT 1992: 391–425). States

and the international structure affect each other. Unlike the realist or intergovernmental approach, constructivism believes that this connection is mutual. International organisations can be either dependent or independent variables, or simply being norm-makers or norm-takers.

Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argued that organisations have their own realm. They “are bureaucracies that have authority to make rules and so exercise power [...] such bureaucracies can become obsessed with their own rules, producing unresponsive, inefficient, and self-defeating outcomes. Authority thus gives international organizations autonomy and allows them to evolve and expand in ways unintended by their creators”.

Both the concept of Wendt and Barnett and Finnemore serves as a bridge between the realist and liberal understanding of international organisations. What is different from mainstream theories and post-structural constructivism is the question of responsibility. Constructivism criticises structural approaches because of their blindness to ethical problems. The decision on war and peace has always been in the hands of men. Even if we accept the effects of security organisations on the international system, political responsibility is always a burden of decision-makers. And they are always free to choose international cooperation over conflict.

Conclusions

International (security) organisations can be either the cause or the consequence of peace in international relations depending on the theoretical viewpoint. Realists believe in the supremacy of power and the primary role of states, when it comes to international politics. Thus, they see organisations as the derivatives of state behaviour, nonetheless important actors to maintain the *status quo*, which favours the current hegemon. The liberal approach on the other hand argues that international organisations create norms, and behavioural patterns on their own, adopt rules, which are costly to break, hence they contribute to international peace significantly. Constructivism highlighted the flaw in the logic of structural theories, both realism and liberalism. They argued that ‘anarchy [in international systems] is what states make of it’, so cooperation and conflict is everything but inevitable consequence of the feature of international system (WENDT 1999). Following this logic, it is quite clear that neither the international (security) organisations nor the nation states are responsible for peace or violence alone. Inter-subjective processes (agent/structure model), slowly changing (cultural/political) identities, and of course the actual people (politicians) are responsible for certain decisions in international politics.

International organisations have formed part of our lives since 1945, and regardless of our theoretical viewpoint, they must be considered important variables of analysis. Naturally, the UN is the most important organisation related to international security by providing guidance on international law, facilitating peaceful negotiations between nation states, and as a last resort it is entitled to enforce peace by any means if necessary. Intergovernmental regional institutions cover all our world from the Pacific (ASEAN, SCO, Pacific Alliance), the Euro-Atlantic area (NATO) to the Middle East and Africa

(Arab League, African Union, SADC). Some of them are primarily defence alliances like NATO and SCO or contributing to international security by providing peacekeeping forces like the AU, or the EU.

For small and middle-sized states like Hungary, with an economy very open to world markets, membership in different international organisations is one of the most important tools for survival. Either from the realist, liberal or constructivist perspectives it is quite logical for Hungarian leaders to enhance partnerships and connectedness as much as possible. The first step to achieve this goal is to understand the nature and functioning of those institutions, and hopefully this book will contribute to this process as much as possible.

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United Nations – The Conceptual Issue of Collective Security and the Practical Problems of Its Implementation

Introduction

Collective security is a conceptual framework for maintaining international peace and security through concerted action and agreement of all nations. The concept, even in defiance of Wilsonian principles, institutionalises a state of balance of power, with the entire international community's agreeing to act against military aggression by any member. At the heart of the concept is the idea that no single state alone dares to stand up against all the other members of the system, which will permanently deter aggression by any member of the system. (It should be added that this assumption immediately becomes problematic if the system includes nuclear powers since the operational logic of nuclear weapons is completely different from that of conventional weapons.) In short, collective security is security for individual nations by collective means.

The theoretical model of collective security is based on the avoidance of war and the peaceful resolution of conflicts between states. The failure of the balance of power policy to prevent aggression in general and the outbreak of the First World War in particular, contributed greatly to its creation. The model strongly emphasises consensus-building between states and the role of international law, but any attempt to establish a collective security system is doomed to failure if the following six conditions, set out by Schloming (1990), are not met:

1. There must be broad consensus among states to maintain the status quo.
2. The system must be able to create an overwhelming force that will divert any potential aggressor from its intention to change the status quo.
3. War must be considered a realistic option, but its purpose is to deter the potential aggressor.
4. The concept of aggression and the identity of the aggressor must be clearly defined.
5. States should be guided by the principle of preserving peace as opposed to particular national interests.
6. All major actors in the international system should participate in the collective security system.

The first attempt in history to build such a collective security system was the creation of the League of Nations, which failed because it could not meet these conditions. Having learnt from its mistakes, the United Nations (UN) and its Security Council can now function as a collective security mechanism that is already able to act successfully to maintain international peace and security when necessary (as demonstrated by its

response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991), although the system still faces a number of challenges. The chapter aims to illustrate the functioning of the collective security concept and system through the UN Security Council and to highlight the vulnerabilities, fragility and difficulties of the reform process.

The historical evolution of the concept and the League of Nations

Although the terminology is a product of the 20th century, the idea dates back to antiquity, as elements of the concept can be found in some conglomerations of ancient Greek states.¹ Later, with the founding of the Holy League, we find a similar idea by the introduction of the congress system with the participation of great powers, and afterwards in the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham dreamed of building a similar system with the idea of “eternal peace” through the construction of confederations.

In Europe, in the nineteenth century, the classic era of nationalism, there was no place for collective security, the “peace movement” looked in other directions such as arbitration, disarmament and the development of international law based on voluntary agreement. The long period of peace in Europe (which covered most of the period 1815–1914 and especially the years between 1871 and 1914) did not favour the development of collective security and other similar concepts, as the Western world believed that it had embarked on a path to the end of war.² And although the alliance of force was rejected by the leading powers, it is worth referring to Jean Jaurès's proposal, who, as early as 1900, proposed a peace alliance as a counter-pole to the alliance of force, with a commitment to non-aggression and the peaceful settlement of disputes (JAURÈS 1931: 238–241, 242–244). He did so also because the “European concert” as a pan-European congress, which had been convened several times so far, was no more than an extension of traditional diplomatic methods and only a very faint foretaste of a permanent, systematic and institutionalised international cooperation.

Following such a precedent, August 1914 clearly showed that the old methods of diplomacy had failed and that other solutions were needed to avoid the devastating wars of the future. Among the many ideas that came to light, the most striking was the draft drawn up in March 1915 by a group led by James Bercy. The document entitled “Proposals for Avoiding War” was a very detailed constitution for the League of Nations, and stated, among other things, that the League undertook to defend any of its members who were attacked by a state that refused to arbitrate or conciliate (DUBIN 1970: 288–318). The big novelty, then, was the idea of a league to enforce peace, but there was still some uncertainty about it, even among theorists. Some felt that the collective security proposals were not strong enough, as states still had the option of using armed force as a tool, while others thought the opposite: that states would not want to tie their own hands and

¹ I hereby mention the Association of Delos as an example, founded in 478 BC, which served as a league of 173 Greek city states.

² The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 reflected this approach.

commit themselves so heavily. Nor was there agreement on which states could join such an alliance (thinking in particular of powers that had behaved aggressively before and during the war), nor what joint action would take place in the event of aggression. However, the need to create such an organisation was clearly growing. And while the details of many of the plans that came to light differed, what they all shared was a desire to unite the world's states in a permanent organisation with the power to settle disputes and prevent war.

Following this precedent, the world's first collective security organisation, the League of Nations, was set up, based mainly on American and British ideas. However, the organisation was already facing fatal problems from the moment it was founded. On the one hand, the Covenant that created the organisation was part of the Treaty of Versailles, drawn up in Paris in 1919 and imposed on the defeated states (and Germany in particular), and its content was an uncoordinated combination of the ideas that had been emerging. On the other hand, powers have not become or could not become members of the organisation, without which it would be inconceivable to build a viable collective security system. Thus, the United States never became a member of the League,³ nor did the Russian socialist state initially, and states defeated in World War I were initially excluded. Thirdly, one of the most important but also most controversial provision of the Covenant highlighted from its very beginning the problems of solving the most difficult issue facing collective security. By the wording of Article 10, this seemed to require member states to "preserve the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League against external aggression". However, because of inadequate provisions, the League, through the Council, could only ask, but could not force any of the member states to act. So the central question of collective security arose at that time: is it possible to get binding commitments from member states to prevent future violent changes to the status quo? On the other hand, is it desirable at all, as the status quo may not be fair or reasonable, at least not for everyone?

It was after such antecedents that the international community found itself in the 1930s, facing systemic challenges such as Japanese, Italian and then German aggression. It became obvious that the efforts of the Western European states and the Soviet Union – the latter had joined the League in 1934 – to turn the League of Nations into an effective instrument for preventing war through collective action against aggression had failed. The League could only provide a meeting place, but what really mattered was the will to resist, which was conspicuously absent in democracies in those years. All this was compounded by the fact that direct negotiations between the great European powers had bypassed the machinery of the League, and by the growing criticism in America of both the country's withdrawal from the League and its isolationism (i.e. its abdication of American responsibility for protecting the world from aggression).

³ Although the United States was at the forefront of the creation of the organisation, the Senate, frightened by the idea of American soldiers being called up to fight on foreign soil at the behest of a foreign organisation, refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.

The theoretical background of the concept

It is worth analysing the two components of the expression “collective security”. The term “collective” expresses the way in which security is to be defended in the event of war or aggression. In other words, all participating states must act collectively to ensure that the preponderance of power thus created will deter and force a state that threatens or violates international peace and security to retreat. And “security” is nothing less than the ultimate goal of every state. It is inextricably linked to the security of all other nations, because national security is part of international security. Thus, any attack on the security of one nation is in fact an attack on the security of all nations, and it is therefore the responsibility of all nations to protect the security of the nation under attack. On this basis, collective security is a crisis management tool, a mechanism by which war or aggression can and should be countered by building global power among all nations. As George Schwarzenberger says: collective security is a “machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order” (EBEGBULEM 2011: 23). Another approach emphasises the systemic nature of the concept, stating that collective security is a “system by which states have attempted to prevent or stop wars”, and stresses the global nature of the system: “Collective security arrangements have always been conceived as being global in scope; this is in fact a defining characteristic, distinguishing them from regional alliances” (Britannica s. a.).

The initial theoretical model of collective security has undergone a number of changes over time. According to Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, the concept of ideal collective security should be combined with the given power relations of the international system, which would increase the reality of the concept. After the end of the bipolar world order, a combination of collective security and a power concert was seen as the most effective mechanism. The European Concert is cited as a historical example, which was effective in ensuring the stability of the continent between 1815 and 1853, the outbreak of the Crimean War. The following three basic conditions need to be met:

1. All States in the international system must suffer when collective action is taken against them.
2. The leading powers of the international system must hold compatible views on a stable international order.
3. Political solidarity and a minimum sense of community must prevail in relations between the great powers (KUPCHAN–KUPCHAN 1995: 52–61).

Although these conditions were indeed fulfilled in the international system in the 1990s, in the quarter of a century since then the international balance of power has changed significantly, new poles of power have emerged, and these processes often work against the effective enforcement of collective security.

In many ways, this modified collective security model is more beneficial than balancing nation states in anarchic conditions. On the one hand, it can prevent war more effectively than the balance of power policy by reducing the uncertainty of coalition-building against the aggressor, because the members of the system are committed to joint action and at the

same time states are able to generate more power than in the balance of power system. On the other hand, a system of collective security increases the willingness of states to cooperate, thereby reducing rivalry between them. Finally, it should be noted that collective security also contributes to reducing the security dilemma, as having more and more information within an institutional framework increases trust between states, reduces the sense of insecurity, which in turn reduces the temptation to demonstrate their strength, and the number of misunderstandings also decreases.

These are the principles on which the UN operates as a collective security organisation. On the one hand, states must renounce the use of force as a means of settling disputes between themselves, but at the same time they must be prepared to use force against members of the collective security system who violate the rules of the system, in accordance with the rules laid down.

The UN's role as a collective security system is to maintain peace within the system, not to protect its members from threats coming from outside. In this way, it can be said that by regulating the relations between the members, the system is directed inwards. The aim is to bring as many states as possible into the system, and the formal and informal relations that are thus established between them in the various areas of security are the appropriate basis for guaranteeing and increasing security.

The conditions necessary for a functioning collective security system can therefore be summarised as follows:

- functioning impartially: for which flexibility of policy and sentiments is needed by both the people and the governments
- the ability of deterrence: it must be able to muster overwhelming strength against the potential aggressor at all time
- same security perception of participating states
- supporting collective action against the aggressor at all costs (also by subordinating their political differences)
- unanimity among states in determining the aggressor in case of any aggression
- must be directed against aggression in general and not against any specific state or group of states
- incompatible with the traditional doctrine of neutrality in war
- necessitates the willingness of the nations to fight for the status quo, not accepting a forcible change in the international order

If any one of these conditions is not met, the system becomes fragile (in extreme cases, inoperable), but I stress the importance of the second and third conditions above all. Because if the system is not able to provide sufficient deterrence and demonstrate its effectiveness in crisis situations, it will give way to further aggressive actions. And if the actors of the system have different views on security, not only does united action become impossible, but in extreme cases the dissenting state may itself become the aggressor. Enough to think of the Russian–Ukrainian war, which broke out in 2022. It is due, among other things, to the failure to meet the basic conditions of the collective security system.

The United Nations

After the outbreak of the Second World War, the great powers began to negotiate the creation of a new international organisation that would eliminate the defects of the League of Nations system and thus be able to guarantee international peace and security. In this new world order, the absence of the United States was inconceivable, as was the need for the participation of the Soviet Union, which was previously expelled from the League of Nations. Thus, the United Nations was formed in 1945, with the strong support of the American public, after earlier conferences and discussions, reflecting the basic philosophy of collective security developed during the first half of the century.

Hans Kelsen describes the Charter that created the world organisation as a strange combination of the U.S. Constitution, an old-fashioned treaty, a utopian manifesto and a set of rules for a private club (KELSEN 1946: 134–159). It is a sign of Kelsen's greatness that in this statement we can also discover the weaknesses, controversies and doubts about the functioning of the collective security system, which the practice of the UN has indeed confirmed decades later.

When we mention the role of the UN as a source of legitimacy, we talk about the UN as a near-universal collectivity of legally equal member states bound together, at least in theory, by common principles, norms and rules of conduct (BERDAL 2003: 13). However, the world organisation is not only an “actor” but also an “arena”. The United Nations is both a corporate body and a service agency for its members, consisting of five main bodies based in New York (the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council), and another main body, the International Court of Justice, headquartered in the Hague; 72 regional offices around the world; 15 specialised agencies and an international staff headed by a Secretary General dedicated to maintaining international peace and security.

Collective security is embodied in the Security Council from among the main body of the UN. Unique in the international system is the way in which member states have delegated some of their sovereignty to the Council. As stated: they assign the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to the Security Council and recognise that the Security Council acts on their behalf in fulfilling the obligations arising from this responsibility.

Composition of the Security Council

In this chapter, we review the basic issues of the functioning of the Security Council, covering the composition of the main body, the specificities of its decision-making process, and the statutory provisions of the UN Charter that operate the collective security system.

The composition of the Council is a perfect reflection of the political structure of the world organisation, which privileged the special status states when the UN was created, and 78 years on, this has not changed. The Council is composed of permanent and non-permanent members. The five great powers that emerged victorious from the

Second World War, who at the time claimed additional powers in accordance with their considerable political, economic and military power, became permanent members. These five great powers are the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. These five great powers retain their privileged status to this day, with some ‘turnover’ over time. First, in 1971, it was decided that the People’s Republic of China would replace the Taiwanese delegation as the successor to the Republic of China, and then, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation would take part in the Council as the successor state.

The five permanent members are joined by ten non-permanent members.⁴ They are elected by the Assembly by a two-thirds majority for a two-year term, with half of them being replaced each year. Voting is always secret, although if there are several rounds of voting, breaks in between give states the opportunity to consult. The ten seats are distributed on a geographical basis as follows:

- 3 countries from the African Group
- 2 countries from the Asia-Pacific Group
- 2 countries from the Western European and Others Group
- 2 countries from the Latin American and Caribbean Group
- 1 country from the Eastern Europe Group

Non-permanent member status is a very valuable political position for the members-elect, so it is no coincidence that states are keen to obtain it. To this end, the candidate countries are preparing a comprehensive campaign and strategies to ensure that they can take the lead within their group. Hungary has twice been a non-permanent member of the Security Council, in 1968–1969 and 1992–1993, and was a candidate for the 2012–2013 term, but finally Azerbaijan was chosen.⁵

We can sense that almost 80 years later the power poles have shifted and it would be timely to reform the composition of the Security Council, but the diverging state interests and legal obstacles make it seem impossible to find a compromise solution. (This issue is discussed in more detail in chapter on European Union – Defence Community.)

Responsibilities of the Security Council

The responsibilities of the Security Council can be divided according to whether it carries out its tasks in order to achieve its own internal goals or to conduct international relations. Accordingly, we distinguish between inward and outward powers (LATTMANN 2019: 46).

⁴ The number of non-permanent members was initially 6 and was increased to 10 in 1965.

⁵ The 2011 election was more than interesting. After Hungary withdrew in favour of Slovenia, which received more votes, the Assembly voted in 15 rounds to decide whether Azerbaijan or Slovenia should be elected as a non-permanent member. As neither country managed to achieve the two-thirds majority required for election, Slovenia decided to withdraw and Azerbaijan was elected as the sole candidate in the 17th round. It is thought-provoking that after their withdrawal, Hungary and Slovenia still received votes, as did Estonia, which did not even stand as a candidate.

Inward powers are mainly related to the election of members of the main bodies. Firstly, the non-permanent members of the Security Council, who are proposed by the Council itself to the General Assembly, which only then takes up its position. This preliminary screening role is very important, as it means that the Council is essentially taking a position on policy issues in advance, and with the agreement of the five major powers. The Security Council also has a role in the election of the UN Secretary General, as it also has the right to make proposals and the General Assembly then decides. Finally, the 10 judges of the International Court of Justice are elected in a special way, involving voting both by the Security Council and by the General Assembly. We must not forget about yet another important power of the Council: an emergency or emergency special session of the General Assembly can be convened at the request of the Security Council.⁶ This is a very important initiating role, as an extraordinary meeting always attracts strong political attention, regardless of its effectiveness.

From a collective security perspective, the Council's *outward powers* are the most significant ones. The Security Council's declared primary objective is the maintenance of international peace and security, to which end member states are obliged to consider Council requests or, in more serious cases, comply with its obligations, and not to regard them as interventions in internal affairs.

Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter summarise the Council's outward powers. Chapter VI lays down a framework for the possibility of peaceful settlement of disputes in cases where the prolongation of an international conflict has the potential to threaten peace. The instruments used by the Council do not go beyond mediation and conciliation, and Council decisions adopted under Chapter VI are always recommendatory documents and therefore not legally binding.⁷ Chapter VII stands on a completely different basis, in which the instruments contained therein may only be used if there is an undoubted threat to international peace and security or if the peace must be restored. In such cases, following the declaration of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, it is already possible to adopt binding decisions and impose coercive measures. Given that these are the cases where the collective security system actually comes into operation, the mechanism of collective security will be described below.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter

Chapter VII, entitled *Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression*, consists of 13 articles, the first of which, Article 39, gives the Council a general mandate:

⁶ Under Article 20 of the UN Charter, an emergency session may be convened upon the request of the Security Council or a majority of its member states, while the Uniting for Peace resolution provides for the convening of an emergency special session upon the request of any of the 7 Security Council members or a majority of its member states. In both cases, sessions are convoked by the Secretary General.

⁷ It is important to underline that in a Chapter VI vote, the state concerned is always obliged to abstain (no such obligation exists for Chapter VII).

“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

The Security Council has very broad discretion under this Article 39 to determine what it considers to be a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. Since these concepts are not defined in the Charter, it is up to the Council to decide in each case how to classify the acts of the State. It is not a legal decision at all, but rather a political and factual one, constrained only by rules such as the Council’s own rules of procedure and international legal principles.

Of the three categories, threat to the peace is the broadest and therefore covers the most possible acts. First, the Arab attack on the state of Israel, which had declared its creation, was classified as an international conflict posing a threat to peace, and later this category was often used for humanitarian crises and terrorist acts.

According to UN practice, a breach of the peace can only be the consequence of an act of state that results in armed hostilities. The first case of a breach of the peace was the Korean War in 1950. Later examples include the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 and the Iraq–Iran war in the 1980s.

Only regarding the third category, aggression, is there a guiding document available: the General Assembly Resolution 3314,⁸ which summarises the essence of aggression and gives an illustrative list of what can be considered acts of aggression, but, being a General Assembly resolution, it is not binding on the Security Council. (The very nature of the recommendation is stated in the document itself.)

Once the Security Council has established the fact that one of these three situations exists, it has three options: it can make a recommendation to remedy the situation, adopt provisional measures (Articles 40–41) or take coercive measures in the form of a decision to maintain or restore international peace and security by the use of armed force (Article 42). The latter offers the Security Council a concrete instrument, which in the most serious cases could involve the use of armed force. This is set out in the Charter as follows:

“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” (Article 42)

In order to be able to take a coercive measure involving the use of armed force lawfully ordered under Articles 39 and 42, Member States must conclude an agreement (Article 43).⁹ If no such agreement is reached, the Council will not be able to oblige Member States to make their armed forces available, and thus will not be able to take coercive measures

⁸ A/RES/3314 (XXIX). *Definition of Aggression*.

⁹ (1) All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

involving the use of armed force. Therefore, in practice, the Security Council only gives a prior and explicit authorisation in the adopted resolution to take such measures, which may be addressed to a UN Member State or an international organisation, but the recipients of the authorisation are responsible for the implementation of the resolution.

The other provisions of the chapter deal with the command and deployment of military forces (Articles 43–47), the obligation of Member States to adopt binding decisions of the Council and to provide mutual assistance in their implementation (Articles 48–49), the effects of preventive or enforcement measures of the Council against third States (Article 50) and the right of individual or collective self-defence (Article 51).

Functioning of the Security Council

The voting system established in 1945 is crucial to the functioning and viability of the Security Council. As stated in Article 27(1) and (2) of the Statute, each of the 15 States has one vote in the Council, and a minimum of 9 votes in favour is required for a decision to be adopted. However, there are two main groups of issues that come up for discussion in the Council, and the voting procedure is different for both. On so-called procedural matters, the Council shall take a valid decision if any 9 of the permanent and non-permanent members support the proposal. Contrary to this, for so-called substantive issues, the minimum of 9 votes in favour must include the affirmative votes of the five permanent members. If this is not the case, the great power voting against the proposal will block the decision. This is called the right of veto, although this term is not used in the Charter itself. The power of the veto is further strengthened by the fact that the very question of what constitutes a procedural question and what constitutes a substantive question is itself already subject to veto.

The veto is a privileged instrument granted to the great powers to prevent the adoption of any binding decision under Chapter VII of the Charter if their interests are threatened. This political option has been used unevenly by the major powers over the 77-year history of the world organisation. Initially, until 1955, only the Soviet Union used the veto (57 times), and then a further 33 times during the Cold War. During the bipolar world order, the United States exercised its veto 65 times (from 1970 onwards), the United Kingdom 27 times (from 1963 onwards) and France 14 times (from 1974 onwards), while China only once, in 1972 (on Bangladesh's application for membership). Since the end of the bipolar world order, the Russian Federation has vetoed proposals 32 times, China 26 times and the United States 17 times, while the U.K. and France have not used their veto since 1990. Altogether, taking into account the 77-year-old history of the veto, the list is headed by Russia with 112 vetoes, followed by the United States with 82, China and the United Kingdom with 27–27, and France with 14. What is worth highlighting as a trend is that on the one hand, since 1990 China has been making spectacular use of this great power potential and, on the other hand, that it frequently does so with Russian veto. This is no coincidence, since the new world order is clearly taking shape, and China is clearly one of the most important factors in this (UN Security Council 2022).

The question arises as to what happens if a permanent member abstains or is absent from the meeting. Article 27(3) of the Charter states that “decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members”, i.e. an affirmative vote of all five major powers is required for the adoption of decisions on substantive matters. However, practice has changed this provision and requires that the negative vote be explicit. This means that the abstention or absence of a permanent member does not automatically imply the use of the veto right and the decision so adopted will be valid.¹⁰ In such cases, the non-voting permanent member thus expresses its opinion and makes it known to the world that, although it does not agree with the proposed decision, it does not wish to block its adoption. This is a clear political statement on its part. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the Charter provides for an obligation of abstention for the member of the Security Council concerned in the case under discussion only in cases falling under Chapter VI, not in Chapter VII. This shows that in 1945 great powers clearly wanted to have the decisive voice in the really sensitive political questions.

There is also a difference between Chapters VI and VII as regards the binding force of the decision adopted. While it is not possible to adopt a binding decision in the context of the peaceful settlement of disputes, a binding decision imposing coercive measures is already possible under Chapter VII in cases deemed to be at least a threat to international peace and security. It is problematic in Security Council practice that in many cases the adopted resolution does not contain a clear indication (or at least a reference) as to which chapter the Council based its decision on. In such cases, the terms of the adopted decision can provide guidance. The use of terms such as “situation posing a threat to international peace and security” or “authorization” clearly refers to the application of Chapter VII, while the use of the terms “recommends”, “calls for” or “affirms”, which refer to a broader field of action, clearly indicates the non-legally binding nature of the decision.

The Uniting for Peace resolution

Article 24(1) of the Statute states that “its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. The wording implies that if there is a main responsibility, there must also be a “secondary responsibility”, so the Council’s responsibility in this respect is not exclusive, other bodies may also be involved in dealing with such issues. This thinking led to the adoption of the Uniting for Peace resolution on 3 November 1950 [A/RES/377 (V). Uniting for Peace]. By then, the Soviet Union had exercised its veto power 41 (!) times in just over 5 years, making it clear that the Security Council was unable to take decisions in many

¹⁰ This practice was also recognised by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion in the Namibia case.

cases because of the veto of the great powers, and therefore could not fulfil its main task of maintaining international peace and security.

Resolution 377 identifies the General Assembly, the most democratic principal body of the United Nations, as the body with underlying responsibility for the exercise of the Council's powers. As the resolution states: the General Assembly

“Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to make appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace of act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by the majority of members of the United Nations.”

The resolution therefore authorises the Assembly to discuss the situation in the event of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, and in the latter two cases to decide on collective action, including the use of armed force (by a two-thirds majority). In such crisis situations, the decision enables the Assembly, as a new provision, to convene an emergency special session within 24 hours. It is important to stress, however, that even if the Assembly adopts a resolution, it is not legally binding, it is only a recommendation, but it can nevertheless be of great importance in crisis situations. To date, Member States have used this option only 11 times in history, but the expected political success or outcome has been delayed in most cases.

Critique of the concept

Above all, critics of collective security argue that collective security is nothing more than a war prevention plan that assumes the problem is already solved, when it is far from being that simple and is not always the case. The very premise of the concept is inherently flawed, as it assumes that the vast majority of world powers are peace-loving by nature, and that war is caused only by the occasional misdeeds of a bad nation driven to commit evil acts by some strange and unusual circumstances. Therefore, there are two alternatives: if the great powers were able to remain friendly and cooperate for world peace, all would be under control; if they were not, no collective security system could work. In contrast, we refer to the main point of the realist school, namely that the main actors in the international system, nation states, are by nature struggling for survival and power, and that their basic characteristic is of competition and confrontation, which can easily involve the use of force. And in such a system, the theoretical concept of collective security should have (or should have had) to find a compromise between national and world sovereignty, since sovereignty is by nature indivisible. Yet it is not difficult to see that world politics to this day is shaped by the actions of sovereign nation

states in defence of their own interests, in which the great powers have never been willing to neither subordinate their national interests to those of the world organisation, nor to commit themselves unconditionally to implementing the organisation's orders – the most visible manifestation of which is their veto power in the Security Council. Thus, not only sovereignty is indivisible, but also security, and according to the concept, peace, too, because if the peace and/or security of one nation is threatened, the peace and/or security of all other states is threatened. We can also say that “whoever commits aggression is the enemy of all; whoever resists aggression is the friend of all” (CLAUDE 1965: 233).

Critics describe the collective security system as an *idealistic* and *limited* system. It is idealistic on the one hand as it assumes that there can be full international agreement on the nature of any threat or aggression to international peace and security. On the other hand, the meaning of the collective in the system is that everyone acts for themselves and for the collective as a whole, which ignores the fact that not all nations are equally active in international relations and not all nations want to participate in a collective security action.

The limited nature of the system is underpinned by several features. Criticisms of the system often focus on the problem of how to judge and eliminate aggression. Indeed, the theory misleadingly assumes that in case of aggression against any nation, the aggressor and the nature of the aggression can be truly and easily identified. In practice, this is very difficult, and the aggressor often acts in the name of self-defence and justifies its aggression as defensive (as was the case with the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022). In addition, the concept makes it an international obligation for all nations to take collective action in the event of aggression, thus excluding neutrality. In contrast, practice has shown the opposite to be true, with the majority of states preferring to stay away from war.

There is a consensus among critics that the lack of a permanent peacekeeping force is a major shortcoming of the concept. This leads to a situation where, once a decision has been taken (assuming that there is no great power veto exercised) to take military action against an aggressor, it takes a very long time to send the blue helmet team to the scene, which can create a very favourable situation for the aggressor. Moreover, the UN Charter does not even contain a provision on how collective action is to be terminated when it is no longer necessary to take further collective action.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that one of the basic principles of collective security is that all states have an equal voice in collective security decisions. However, the functioning of the UN system has proven the opposite: the Security Council, which has the power to take collective security measures, only involves 15 of the 193 member states of the world organisation, and only the five major powers have a real influence on the decisions on the most important issues.

Collective security – indivisible security – human security

Criticisms of the collective security system are not groundless, as collective security alone cannot make the international system work. However, in combination with another theoretical concept, indivisible security, it could be viable.

The principle of indivisible security was first articulated in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and has since been included in a number of international treaties and national strategy documents, but has nevertheless received much less attention and been much less researched. The concept provides equal security for all nations, regardless of their political, economic or ideological affiliations, as opposed to the more exclusionary nature of collective security. However, neither of these two concepts can be the sole basis for a smoothly functioning world order, because collective security leads to exclusion and inequality, while indivisible security lacks effective problem-solving mechanisms (KVARTALNOV 2021: 5). The concept of indivisible security is also perfectly complementary in the sense that the UN also relies on the indivisibility of security and aims to maintain peaceful conditions in all sectors of security. It does this through the General Assembly and the Security Council in the areas of political and military security, but has chosen to “outsource” these tasks to the so-called specialised agencies, with which it interacts through the Economic and Social Council.

At the same time, new areas of security are emerging where the presence of the world organisation is also essential. One example is cybersecurity, where the UN has been a global forum for almost twenty years, or human security, the concept of which was laid down by the Human Development Report issued by the United Nations Development Programme in 1994.

The concept has thus innovated in several areas. Firstly, unlike the previous sectors of security, human security no longer considers the existence of security at the level of nation states, but in the context of individuals, so the concept focuses on individuals. On the other hand, the concept already seeks to protect individuals against widespread threats such as global pollution or epidemics, and is not limited to the classical notion of security designed to protect the state against external aggression. The range of actors involved in guaranteeing the security of the individual is also expanding, with international organisations, local communities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) joining the state in not only reacting to events but also in preventing and averting threats to the individual (MOLNÁR 2019: 22). These features point to new directions that raise the question of the adaptability and readiness of the world organisation, which is also on the agenda in the context of collective security.

The future of the concept of collective security

The global organisation was founded 78 years ago and reflected the power relations of the time. This was the reason why the United States, China and the Soviet Union joined by the United Kingdom and France were among the great powers, the most striking man-

ifestation of which was the veto power of these five states. During the last 8 decades, however, the world has changed a lot, and there have been three major power shifts. First, the era of the bipolar world order emerged, which was succeeded by a brief period of unipolarism led by the United States, and now, under the banner of multipolarity, a number of power poles are emerging. These emerging powers are also seeking greater influence in the management of international relations, based on their economic and demographic potential, as well as their excellence in a number of other areas. In parallel to the rise of these new powers, France and the United Kingdom, once great powers, have lost much of their influence and are now only regional powers on the great chessboard (even if they are as active geopolitical players as before). It is not surprising, therefore, that they continue to stress the indispensability of the UN and the Security Council in international affairs, in an attempt to demonstrate their coveted great power status.

The narrowing of power differentials at the global level is a real and lasting phenomenon, even if the more fragile international system has not yet consolidated into a fixed new multipolar order (CUNLIFFE–KENKEL 2016: 809). Alongside the old–new poles such as the BRICS, the rise of the MINT states¹¹ is also clearly visible, but alongside them the ‘old’ powers continue to retain their dominant status. At the same time, while Russia’s permanent membership of the Security Council became an essential element of its claim to great power status (like France and the U.K.), it also allowed it to extract concessions from other great powers, especially the United States. China, on the other hand, has always been much more relaxed about its status as a great power, something it has never doubted (BERDAL 2003: 13). And it has always seen its Security Council membership as a key means of making clear what it opposes: essentially anything that could be interpreted as undermining the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, and anything that could be interpreted as support for Taiwan’s full independence.¹² And finally, the fifth permanent member is the United States, whose leading political, economic and military power is unquestionable, and therefore domestic politics often raises the question of whether the U.S. needs the world organisation. The answer is yes, because we have seen over the decades that the Security Council has also been used effectively by the U.S. To address, contain or simply marginalise difficult issues and challenges that its military power is limited to but which it cannot ignore as a truly global power (BERDAL 2003: 14).

The UN should find its place in this new world order. The future of the UN and of collective security will depend heavily on the extent to which the world body is able to take truly collective and united action in any sector of security. However, this would require, on the one hand, a renewed effort to involve the new “great powers” in the decision-making processes on the most important issues affecting international peace and security, and also a change in the non-fair rules of the veto is needed (see CARON 1993: 552–588). This, however, is unthinkable without amending the UN Charter, which

¹¹ BRICS countries include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, while MINT countries include Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey.

¹² This objective is perfectly reflected in China’s voting behaviour in the Security Council.

would require the agreement of the five major powers, in addition to a two-thirds majority. Although attempts have been made over the last 20 years, they have unfortunately all failed. On the other hand, the future of collective security also depends crucially on the organisation's ability to provide a viable response to acute challenges. The ongoing Russia–Ukraine war could well be such a watershed test for the organisation, especially since the aggressor state under international law is Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council. But let us not forget that trust is essential for collective security to succeed. If states have full confidence in the system, they will do everything in their power to make it work and operate successfully. Otherwise, they themselves will pursue policies that undermine the success of the system (CLAUDE 1965: 233–234). Perhaps it is not without reason that the German sociologist Karl Mannheim calls collective security a relative utopia that tries to be realistic but retains elements of fantasy (PAUL 2018: 192).

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UN Peace Operations

Introduction

Peace operations are one of the most visible and well-known activities of the United Nations, despite the fact that peace operations do not figure as such in the founding document of the organisation. They evolved during the practical application of the UN Charter. The regulations which stand the closest are in Chapters VI and VII. Chapter VI is on the pacific settlement of disputes (let it be via negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, with the help of regional agencies, etc.), whereas Chapter VII is entitled *Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression*. Article 39 in fact empowers the Security Council to evaluate and decide on the nature and seriousness of a conflict, whether it is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression and make the necessary steps (diplomatic, economic or other non-military sanctions and ultimately, the use of force). Peace operations tend to be between peaceful settlement and the use of force, that is between Chapters VI and VII, and are often referred to as Chapter VI and half, a term attributed to the 2nd Secretary General of the organisation, Dag Hammarskjöld (UN 2008a).

Different generations of peace operations

UN peace operations have been going on since the end of the 1940s. The change in the international environment, in the nature and number of conflicts as well as experience gathered over the decades led to the evolution of these activities. Accordingly, different generations of peace operations are distinguished “on the basis of three main factors: the level of force used by the operations’ military pillar; the type and depth of the tasks conducted by its civilian pillar; and in case of the latest generation, increased UN load-sharing with regional organizations” (KENKEL 2013: 125). Despite these criteria, it is not easy to draw a clear line between generations (KIANI 2004: 177; KENKEL 2013: 124), due to the fact that there is a constant development of these activities. Generations are built upon each other, and even within one mission it is possible to find various generations of peace operations. Hence, there exist various classifications, using 3, 4 or 5 generations (ERDŐS 2013; SZENES et al. 2019: 15–16). Nonetheless, there is a consensus on the important change that has been taking place in peace operations, which tended to shift from a more passive, reactive approach to a more pro-active one, growing both in size and complexity.

First generation peace operations, also called traditional or limited peacekeeping, cover the deployment of a small UN force with a restricted mandate to be positioned between opposing forces to monitor the ceasefire, separate the two sides and prevent

any possible recess to armed conflict. Tasks could also include monitoring demilitarised zones and borders. The goal is to prepare the ground for a political solution (MOLNÁR 2019: 35; SANDLER 2017: 1879; HILLEN 1998: 22). The above-mentioned operations were launched in case of interstate conflicts in the Cold War. UN forces were required to display a neutral stance in the conflict and they were not allowed to use arms unless in self-defence. Requisites for the deployment of the UN mission included the agreement of all involved parties, in particular the host states. Most of these operations were created by the Security Council, for example the United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) established by the Security Council Resolution no. 47 in 1948 to supervise the ceasefire between the two countries; and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was set up by Security Council Resolution no. 50, also in 1948, following the Arab–Israeli War. However, due to reduced cooperation among the veto-wielding powers (P-5) in the Security Council in the Cold War, the body was rendered ineffective on various occasions. Consequently, in 1950 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 377, also called *Uniting for Peace*, which allowed it to circumvent the deadlock in the Security Council by permitting the General Assembly to enter a special emergency session in case of necessity and thus establish peace operations. Resolution 377 has been evoked few times, because, by leaving it aside, it erodes the power of the Security Council, one of the main bodies of the UN; and therefore, it could weaken the organisation as a whole. Yet, for example in 1956, it was resorted to. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was created by the General Assembly to help solving the Suez Crisis.

The end of the bipolar confrontation went on in parallel with the end of various civil wars which resulted in an increased need for UN operations. This was also a time of improved international relations when the P-5 could work together more efficiently in the Security Council, facilitating UN activities. All the above resulted in a spectacular growth in peace operations. Deployed peace missions grew more than threefold (from 5 to 17) between January 1988 and December 1994. During the same period the military personnel sent to these operations increased more than sevenfold (from 9,570 to 73,393) and civilian police sixtyfold (from 35 to 2,130) (UN 1995). This clearly shows a shift in the composition of UN forces, which corresponded to a change in goals.

The missions from the end of the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s are usually called *second generation peace operations*, or multifunctional operations in which military duties were complemented by civilian ones (HILLEN 1998: 140–141), carried out by non-military personnel in order to help political transition and settlement. These tasks could include the organisation of referendums and elections and activities related to refugees, reintegration of ex-combatants into society, disarmament, demobilisation and government capacity building (KENKEL 2013: 129). The spectacular surge in the number of police was due to the need to provide law and order in the post-conflict period and also train local forces.

There tended to be a big gap between the ambitious goals of these missions and the available resources, especially financial ones. Another challenge was that second generation peace operations did not have a wider mandate with respect to the use of force,

compared to first generation ones, which meant that their degree of accomplishment depended heavily on the attitude of the host countries. Peace operations such as United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) or the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) achieved considerable success. The decade of the 1990s, however, also brought about the biggest fiascos in UN peacekeeping: the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Srebrenica massacre in 1995 and also the heavy losses that UN forces suffered in Somalia.

Secretary General Kofi Annan insisted in a 1998 speech that “while impartiality is a vital condition for peacekeeping, it must be impartiality in the execution of the mandate, and not just an unthinking neutrality between the warring parties” (UN 1998). The painful experience of the 1990s and the lessons learnt contributed to the evolvement of *third generation peace operations* or peace enforcement operations. They typically appeared in case of failed states where there was no stable central government to call for UN involvement. As the name peace enforcement suggests these operations moved away from the original idea of self-defence only, to imposing some kind of force. The importance of the security of states started to be overshadowed by a shift in the security paradigm towards what the UN Human Development Report of 1994 introduced as human security, which increasingly linked the concept of security to individuals rather than to territories and states and stressed the importance of development over arms.

Fourth generation peace operations are usually “robust peacebuilding operations that combine elevated permission to use force with enhanced civilian tasks” (KENKEL 2013: 132). They can even result in a UN transitional administration, when the international organisation provisionally assumes the role of the government, for example in the case of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), both formed in 1999 (STROMSETH et al. 2006: 103–105). The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) also included tasks of similar nature. These missions are often carried out together with other organisations, such as NATO, EU or the African Union, and therefore could be considered fifth generation operations.¹

Increasing tasks, limited financial resources, better knowledge of local conditions by regional organisations as well as the reluctance to Western UN members to deploy great numbers of personnel to missions led to a desire for increased burden-sharing. These hybrid operations might be a) integrated (under single or joined command); b) coordinated (UN and other organisations have separate but coordinated command structures); c) parallel (no formal coordination among the participating organisations; and d) sequential (UN precedes or follows in time other organisations). However, their most important feature, underlined by the scholars Bruce Jones and Ferydal Cherif (2004: 17–18), is being highly flexible and *sui generis* in nature.

¹ For example, the African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), established in 2007.

Reform process of UN peace operations

Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali elaborated a report in 1992 entitled *Agenda for Peace*, upon the request of the Security Council, on preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping, adding a new, originally not contemplated field: post-conflict peacebuilding. The Secretary General emphasised that “since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead. The United Nations was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes – 279 of them – cast in the Security Council” (UN 1992), but the end of the Cold War, improved East–West relations could bring new possibilities of cooperation and was therefore an opportunity to seize. In 1995, on the 50th anniversary of the birth of the United Nations, he came up with a position paper: *A Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*. The purpose was not to correct or complement the previous report but “rather, to highlight selectively certain areas where unforeseen, or only partly foreseen, difficulties have arisen and where there is a need for the Member States to take the ‘hard decisions’” (UN 1995). At the turn of the millennium Secretary General Kofi Annan entrusted the ex-Foreign Minister of Algeria, Lakhdar Brahimi to lead a 10-member high-level panel to make a comprehensive review of UN peace and security activities and elaborate proposals (see DURCH et al. 2003; GRAY 2001: 267–288). The resulting 58-page Brahimi Report (2000) contained numerous recommendations, including better coordination among the Security Council, the Secretary General and involved states; the setting up of UN peacekeeping troops only when resources (human and financial) are available; clear and feasible mandates; good balance between mandate and resources; faster deployment of forces, among others. It also suggested a shift in financing, arguing that peacekeeping is a core function of the UN, therefore it should be financed via the biennial regular budget of the organisation (UN 2000: 33–34), a change that has not been carried out (yet).

There has been a constant reviewing of peace operations by the UN in the 21st century to improve them, set certain norms, and provide this crucial activity with more impetus and professionalism. In response to failures of UN peace operations and with the aim of preventing mass atrocities, the responsibility to protect doctrine (R2P), was adopted as an international norm at the UN World Summit in 2005. It declared the responsibility of the international community to act in order to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (UN s. a.). This was followed in 2008 by a document elaborated by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS), entitled *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, “a doctrine that sits on top of the large number of directives, guidelines, standard operating procedures, manuals and training materials issued by DPKO and the new Department of Field Support (DFS) over the years, not unlike the capstone of an arch or other structure that locks it together through the authority of its downward pressure” (DE CONING et al. 2008: 1). A year after, in 2009, the two above-mentioned UN departments disclosed a non-paper, called a *New Partnership Agenda. Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*. In 2010, a report of the Secretary General

called the *Global Field Support Strategy* was released. The document emphasised that “protecting and nurturing a fragile peace is a critical role of the United Nations”. The degree of success depends on the common work of various actors, in particular, “the Security Council, in terms of setting mandates; the Member States, in their commitment of personnel and financial and material resources; the host countries, and their consent and cooperation; and the Secretariat and its own ability to stand up, support and sustain operations” (UN 2010: 1). In 2014 Secretary General Ban Ki-moon set up a committee made up of 16 independent experts under the leadership of Nobel Peace prize winner East Timorese politician, José Ramos-Horta,² to propose reforms on peace operations. The resulting High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations submitted its report *Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People* in summer 2015. The HIPPO report (named after the acronym of the commission) stressed that “a number of peace operations today are deployed in an environment where there is little or no peace to keep. In many settings today, the strain on their operational capabilities and support systems is showing, and political support is often stretched thin. There is a clear sense of a widening gap between what is being asked of United Nations peace operations today and what they are able to deliver. That gap can be, must be, narrowed” (UN 2015: 9). The report contains numerous recommendations, including a “more field-oriented and people-centred” UN, building “stronger global and regional partnership for peace and security”, including “modalities for capacity enhancement and burden-sharing, as well as mechanisms for monitoring and accountability”. In autumn 2015, Ban Ki-moon disclosed his report, *The Future of UN Peace Operations*, to reinforce the recommendations of the HIPPO report and help change. The latest development of the 2010s was the Action for Peace (A4P) program, put forward by Secretary General António Guterres, coupled with institutional changes within the UN Secretariat. Accordingly, since 2019, peace-keeping operations have been supported through the Department of Peace Operations (forerunner: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1992–2019) and the Department of Operational Support (forerunner: Department of Field Support, 2007–2019).

Financing

Most peacekeeping operations are financed through a special budget³ to which UN member states must contribute based on Article 17 of the UN Charter. The rates of contributions are assessed on the capabilities (mainly economic) of the countries and the role they have in maintaining international security. Thus, the P-5 are required to pay more. The top contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations for 2020–2021 were the United States (27.89%), the People’s Republic of China (15.21%), Japan (8.56%), Germany

² (1949–). Minister of Foreign Affairs (2002–2006), Prime Minister (2006–2007), President of East Timor (2007–2012, 2022–).

³ The very first UN missions are exceptions, the UNTSO and the UNMOGIP are financed through the regular budget.

(6.09%), the United Kingdom (5.79%) and France (5.61%).⁴ Unlike the regular biennial budget of the UN, the peacekeeping budget cycle lasts only one year and runs from 1 July to 30 June. The approved peacekeeping budget for 2021 to 2022 was 6.38 billion USD. This has to cover operational costs (transport, logistics) and staff costs. Each country pays its own soldiers, whereas the UN provides them with a standard reimbursement. In July 2019 it was 1,428 USD per month per soldier.⁵

Statistics

From 1948 to date, the UN has established a total of 71 operations. As of 30 June 2022, there are 12 active missions around the world, with a total deployed force of 87,122 peacekeepers participating in these 12 missions. The distribution of actively participating peacekeepers is as follows: Experts on mission: 1,004; Police: 7,624; Staff Officers: 2,040; Troops: 62,936. Civilian personnel currently reaches almost 12 thousand people (11,996), added to the participation of UN Volunteers (1,264) (UN 2022).




Figure 1: Breakdown of United Nations peacekeeping forces by continent, 1990–2018

Source: Compiled by Rodrigo Guajardo based on the International Peace Institute: IPI Peacekeeping database (as of 29 September 2022)

Figure 1 presents a stacked area graph that details the total size of active UN peacekeeping forces between 1990 and 2018. An important initial predominance can be seen in

⁴ Source of data for the whole paragraph UN 2022.

⁵ To compare, the average monthly wage in the USA was 5,911 USD in 2021, whereas in Bangladesh it equalled to approximately 75 USD (World Data s. a.).

the contributions of European and Asian personnel with numbers peaking in the middle of the 1990s. After a nadir at the turn of the millennium, numbers started to increase again, but this time with growing proportions of African and Asian contributions which currently form the bulk of the contingents.

In terms of contributions by country, the Global South dominates the ranking: the current top three countries are Bangladesh (6,692), Nepal (5,790) and India (5,768). Each of the top 10 countries send more than 2,000 peacekeepers, China figuring on place 10 with 2,241. Devoted to UN goals, 176,000 km²-sized Uruguay with a population of only 3.5 million, is on place 18 (!), with a contribution of approximately 1,000 personnel (UN 2022). There is no Global North country in the top 20 contributors (in 2022).

Hungary participated in four missions as of September 2022: UNIFIL in Lebanon, UNFICYP in Cyprus, MINURSO in Western Sahara and UNMIK in Kosovo, with a total of (only) 34 personnel, including experts on mission, staff officers, troops and individual police.⁶




Figure 2: Ranking of contributions by country (as of 31 May 2022)

Source: UN 2022; UN s. a.

⁶ World Data s. a. For more on the course and evolution of Hungarian participation in peacekeeping operations see SZENES 2007: 121–133.

The number of personnel in UN missions shows a gradually decreasing tendency since the middle of the 2010s (Figure 3). However, the ratio among military personnel (over 70%), police, civilians and UN volunteers have not altered in a significant way.




Figure 3: UN peacekeeping total personnel, 2016–2022

Source: Compiled by Rodrigo Guajardo based on UN 2022

“To ensure that the uniformed component of United Nations peacekeeping is diverse and inclusive of women, reflecting the communities the United Nations serves” (UN 2018: 2), female participation is encouraged in missions. The proportion of women in the military component of peacekeeping operations have grown from 1.4% (December 2006) to 6.8% (October 2022) but is still low. In 2022 female uniformed personnel (military and police) made up 8.1% of the grand total (UN 2022). The Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018–2028 set the following ambitious goals: by 2028 the percentage of women serving in troop contingents should reach 15%; 25% in contracted military staff, 20% in Formed Police Units (FPU) and 30% among Individual Police Officers (IPO) (UN 2018: 4–6).

Regarding human losses, the total number of fatalities in all (71) peacekeeping operations since 1948 has been 4,210, a considerably low number compared to the total number of fatalities in (the 12) active operations: 1,553 (UN 2022). Behind this growth in fatalities, the most important reason is “the increases in the number and scale of UN peacekeeping operations” (SEET–BURNHAM 2000: 602). Additional factors include the location of the missions and more complex security environment. The most dangerous missions, according to fatality figures, are UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNAMID (Darfur) and MINUSMA (Mali) (UN 2022).

Table 1: Most important data of current UN missions in 2022

Mission	Location	Established	Total Personnel (2022)	Total Fatalities (as of Aug. 2022)	Top 3 military contributors (May 2022)	Top 3 Police contributors (May 2022)	UN Special Representatives	UN Force Commanders
MINURSO	Western Sahara	April 1991	456 (245)*	20	Egypt, Ghana, Pakistan	Ghana, Kenya	Alexander Ivanko (RU)	Commodore Faustina Boakyewaa Anokye (GH)
MINUSCA	Central African Republic	2014	16,241 (17,420)*	167	Bangladesh, Pakistan, Rwanda	Senegal, Rwanda, Cameroon	Valentine Rugwabiza (RW)	Lieutenant General Daniel Sidiki Traoré (BF)
MINUSMA	Mali	April 2013	17,612 (15,209)*	288	Bangladesh, Egypt, Chad	Senegal, Togo, Bangladesh	El Ghas-sim Wane (MR)	Lieutenant General Cornelis Matthijssen (NL)
MONUSCO	DR of the Congo	July 2010	17,783 (16,316)*	252	Pakistan, India, Bangladesh	Senegal, Egypt, Jordan	Bintou Keita (GN)	General Marcos De Sá Affonso Da Costa (BR)
UNDOF	Golan	May 1974	1,155	56	Nepal, India, Ghana	–	–	Brigadier General Anita Asmah (GH)
UNFICYP	Cyprus	March 1964	1,015	183	Argentina, UK, Hungary	Ireland, BIH, China	Colin Stewart (CA)	Major General Ingrid Gjerde (NO)
UNIFIL	Lebanon	March 1978	10,638 (13,000)*	325	Indonesia, Italy, India	–	–	Major General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz (ES)
UNISFA	Abyei	June 2011	2,433 (4,190)*	50	Ghana, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe	Rwanda, Kenya, Nigeria	–	Major General Benjamin Olufemi Sawyerr (NG)
UNMIK	Kosovo	June 1999	351 (18)*	56	Austria, Czech R., Germany	Germany, Russian F. Austria	Caroline Ziadeh (LB)	Major General Angelo Ristuccia (IT)
ISS	South Sudan	July 2011	17,982 (19,101)*	114	Rwanda, India, Nepal	Rwanda, Ghana, Nepal	Nicholas Haysom (ZA)	Lieutenant General Mohan Subramanian (IN)
UNMOGIP	India and Pakistan	January 1949	111	12	Croatia, R. Korea, Philippines	–	–	Rear Admiral Guillermo Pablo Ríos (AR)
UNTSO	Middle East	May 1948	387	52	Finland, The Netherlands, Switzerland	–	–	Major General Patrick Gauthat (CH)

Source: Compiled by Rodrigo Guajardo based on UN 2022

Note: *Total uniformed personnel.

UN stabilisation mission – Haiti case study

Haiti became independent of France in 1804, being the second independent state in the Americas after the United States. However, the peculiarity of this state is that its foundations lie in the remarkable revolution that began there with a massive uprising of the enslaved in 1791 (DUBOIS et al. 2020: 7), which did not only create Haiti as a sovereign country, but also turned its social structure upside down. This resulted in international isolation by France, supported by other European powers and the U.S. (SERRANO CABALLERO 2007: 183).

20th century Haitian history was marked by the family dictatorship of the Duvalier. François Duvalier came to power in 1957, appointing himself president for life in April 1964, and transferring this title at the end of his life, in 1971, to his son Jean-Claude Duvalier, only 19 years old then (COUPEAU 2008: 94). “Baby Doc” used his father’s dictatorial methods, plunging the country into further repression and hunger, which led almost a million Haitians to leave the country (PIERRE-CHARLES-GRÜNER 1999: 42; MARÍN SANABRIA – PAREJA BLANCO 2018: 96–97).

As a result of disturbances in November 1985, which caused the death of protestors at the hands of the police forces, new demonstrations began that quickly spread nationwide. Duvalier was forced to leave the country in February 1986. His fall was followed by a period of intermittent democratisation, linked to Jean Bertrand Aristide. However, he was overthrown via a coup d’état in September 1991.

The fall of Aristide generated an international response; an international mission of the United Nations was deployed in conjunction with the Organization of American States in 1993; after the Haitian political power agreement, a pact was celebrated to re-establish the lost constitutional regime. In this way, the first peace mission organised by the Security Council began in September of that year. So far, until 2022, six Peacekeeping Missions (PKO) and four Special Political Missions (SPM) have been deployed in Haiti under UN mandate (MARÍN SANABRIA – PAREJA BLANCO 2018: 97).

Until the late 1980s, traditional peacekeeping focused on ensuring security and stability. Since the early 1990s, UN peacekeeping operations have undergone a significant evolution in policies, mandates, functions and tasks, focusing primarily on peacebuilding. In this context, the case of Haiti exemplifies the changes and the lessons learnt by the UN.

As of 2022, there is still an active UN special political mission taking place on the island. Although UN presence did contribute to governmentality and to providing a more stable and secure environment, there is much to be done, as Haiti is still the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, whose growth potentials and stability are seriously endangered by widespread corruption (164 out of 180 countries in the 2021 CPI index) extreme levels of poverty (60% of the population lives under the poverty line), and low education (40% of the population cannot read or write) (CIA 2022).

Table 2: *Peacekeeping Missions (PKO) and Special Political Missions (SPM) in Haiti*

Mission	Type	Established	Total personnel	Military and police contributor countries
UNMIH	PKO	Sept. 1993 – June 1996	Initially it considered 567 United Nations police observers and a military construction unit with approximately 700 members, including 60 military instructors, reaching a maximum contingent (June 1995) of 6,065 troops and military support personnel, and 847 civilian police, supported by international and local civilian staff	Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Canada, Djibouti, France, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Mali, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, the Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and the United States
UNSMIH	PKO	June 1996 – July 1997	Initially it considered 600 military and 300 civilian police personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff (in addition, the UNSMIH military element included approximately 800 additional personnel), reaching a maximum contingent (Nov. 1996) of 1,297 military and 291 civilian police personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff	Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Canada, Djibouti, France, India, Mali, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States
UNTMIH	PKO	July 1997 – Nov. 1997	250 civilian police personnel and 50 military personnel (a number of additional military personnel, provided on the basis of voluntary funding, were also attached to UNTMIH's military component)	Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, the United States
MIPONUH	PKO	Nov. 1997 – March 2000	300 civilian police personnel, including a special police unit, supported by a civilian establishment of some 72 international and 133 local personnel and 17 United Nations Volunteers	Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, the United States
MINUSTAH	PKO	June 2004 – Oct. 2017	It considered an initial military force of 6,700 men, 1,622 civilian police officers, and additional civilian personnel; at the end of the mission (August 2016) the military component consisted of 2,361 troops and 844 civilian police personnel	Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, DR Congo, Equator, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Grenada, India, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Togo, Turkey, the United States, Uruguay, Yemen

Mission	Type	Established	Total personnel	Military and police contributor countries
MINU-JUSTH	PKO	Oct. 2017 – Oct. 2019	351 civilian staff, up to seven Formed Police Units (FPUs) (comprised of 980 FPU personnel) and 295 Individual Police Officers (IPOs)	Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Djibouti, El Salvador, France, Germany, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, the United States, Uruguay
MICAH	SPM	March 2000 – Feb. 2001	150 members, who unlike their MIPONUH predecessors, did not carry weapons	N/A
ONUVEH	SPM	Aug. 1990 – 1991	N/A	N/A
MICIVIH	SPM	Feb. 1993 – April 2000	N/A	N/A
BINUH	SPM	June 2019 – Active	N/A	N/A

Source: Compiled by Rodrigo Guajardo based on UN Security Council 2004; UN 2022

Conclusions

UN peacekeeping operations have existed since the 1940s and formed a crucial part of the activities of the United Nations. They have gone through a significant evolution during the course of time, and based on their principal characteristics, they can be grouped into different generations. Similarly to their past behaviour, peacekeeping operations will keep changing, evolving and adapting. Presently they need to cope with the post-Covid situation, the constraints on financial resources as well as with increasing global tensions and worsening relations among great powers, hindering cooperation and common action within the United Nations. According to Cedric de Coning (2021: 211–224), in the mid-term, peacekeeping operations will need to adjust to “geopolitical power shifts”. These could lead to more uncertainty and tensions, and paradoxically, an increased demand for peacekeeping activities. In the long run de Coning expects a change in the global order, to which UN peacekeeping would be able to adapt in a successful manner, also coping with new security challenges brought about by climate change and the emergence of new technologies, among others.

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NATO Collective Defence

Introduction

Hungary became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 12 March 1999. When Hungary became a member, the political goal was that the country would not only be a “consumer” of security but would also actively contribute to the operations of the Alliance. Membership radically changed the Hungarian security and defence policy, bringing new opportunities and obligations to Hungarian politics. Although Hungary relies on its own strength to maintain and develop national and allied defence capabilities, it also attaches great importance to the cooperation with allied states and their armed forces in the military defence of the country. Accordingly, the country’s armed defence plan and the NATO defence plan for Hungary’s military security (GRP – Graduated Response Plan) were prepared. A NATO battle group has stationed in the country from 2022, with military forces from the United States, Croatia, Hungary, Montenegro, Italy and Turkey. The National Security Strategy of Hungary states that “the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the cornerstone of Hungary’s security. Hungary is committed to acting as a member of NATO, together with the other member states, to promote Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty”. The new National Military Strategy emphasises that “Hungary’s strategic objective is to build by 2030 a Hungarian Defence Force that, as a member of NATO and one of the leading military forces in the region, can guarantee the security of the country, deter possible aggression, support the whole governmental approach to defend the country against military and non-military threats and challenges, furthermore fulfil its responsibilities as a member of the Alliance and the European Union” (Government Resolution 1393/2021).

NATO is a classic collective defence organisation (it defends its members against external attack), although its collective defence tasks were extended after the Cold War to include crisis management and co-operative security (MEDCALF 2005; LINDLEY-FRENCH 2007; SZENES – SIPOSNÉ KECSKEMÉTHY 2019). The purpose, importance and content of collective defence has changed throughout NATO’s history. During the Cold War, collective defence was based on the classical logic of balance of power, as the members of the North Atlantic Alliance had to defend themselves against nuclear and conventional threats from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. After 1990, the Alliance’s purpose changed, and after the “disappearance” of the enemy, NATO had to adapt to a changed world. The tasks of collective defence were relegated to the background, only to reappear in NATO policy with elementary force after the crisis in Ukraine in 2014 and the Russian military invasion of Ukraine in 2022.



New security challenges

By the 2020s, a complex international security situation has emerged in Europe, the wider Middle East, and many regions of Africa. In 2014, the international community had to deal with parallel challenges: the Ukrainian crisis and the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS), followed by the European migration crisis in 2015. Since the mid-2010s, the events have accelerated (lasting migration crisis, protracted war crises, erosion of arms limitation regimes, Covid-19 global pandemic), creating complex hybrid threats that have led to a shift in the balance of power and the perpetuation of insecurity and instability in international politics. The Hungarian National Security Strategy describes this situation as follows: “The new challenges are based on the emerging multipolar world order, the drive to reshape the rules governing the relations of international actors, the changing face of security challenges, and global challenges such as the acceleration of climate and demographic change, the closely related illegal and mass migration, the depletion of natural resources, and the society-shaping effects of the technological revolution.” Russia’s illegal and unprecedented war in Ukraine has created a radically new security situation in Europe. NATO has continuously responded to the changes in foreign and security policy, taking decisions on more important issues at summits (Wales 2014, Warsaw 2016, Brussels 2018, London 2019, Brussels 2021, Brussels 2022, Madrid 2022, Vilnius 2023) and even adopting a new strategic concept in June 2022.

According to NATO’s assessment of the strategic environment (*NATO 2030: United for a New Era*), the third decade of the 21st century will be different from the previous one, and the most important task will be to adapt continuously to the changing environment. Alongside competing powers, the decade will be dominated by the challenges to the current world order, authoritarian regimes (China and Russia) pursuing assertive, revisionist foreign policies, and aiming to strengthen their own power and influence. It will continue to be important to preserve and strengthen the geopolitical perspective (360-degree security perception), to jointly address transnational threats that shape security in the long term, and to use NATO capabilities to shape the global environment.

NATO has developed four strategic concepts over the past three decades, which have served as a compass for the Alliance’s tasks, activities and development. In the past decades, the Alliance’s concept of security has changed considerably, with increasing attention being paid to comprehensive security and new security challenges in addition to military security. After the Russian war that started on 24 February 2022, the focus turned again to military security, deterrence and defence (Table 1). The 1991 strategic concept changed the Cold War thinking and focused on the security of Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, but already indicated the importance of broader security challenges and risks (regional instability, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, transnational crime). The 1999 strategic concept stated that the security of the Alliance must be seen in a global context, defined by the multiplicity of military and non-military risks from multiple directions, which are difficult to foresee. The 2010 strategic concept prioritised addressing new global security challenges (terror-

ism, cybersecurity, energy security, environmental security). The 2022 strategic concept refocused on military security but stressed the importance of the global security context (SZENES 2021: 246–251). The concept provides a picture of a strengthening deterrence and defence of the alliance, capable and ready to fight a high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer competitors. NATO has taken up the gauntlet against Russia's aggressive policy, which it sees as the most significant and immediate threat to the security of its allies and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The new strategy envisages a new evolutionary turn in NATO's life: back to the future! (HERD–KRIENDLER 2013).

Although new security challenges are always identified by consensus, they are reflected in strategic documents, North Atlantic Council resolutions and various political and military decisions. However, addressing them collectively is not easy because 1. they do not necessarily have the same impact on allies; 2. they may not necessarily require a military response; and 3. they require a comprehensive approach (IKLÓDY 2010). All three factors complicate decision-making, as every policy, action plan and implementation requires an independent decision, where nations are already trying to assert their own interests. There are threats (e.g. cyberattacks, hybrid warfare techniques) that do not automatically require federal decisions and actions, but need to be addressed primarily on a national basis. Most non-military security challenges (e.g. non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems) require primarily political, diplomatic, or economic-technological responses, dominated by nations with the necessary capabilities and means. Today, the joint response is further complicated by the fact that challenges, risks and threats may come from abroad and from within the country, and may be simultaneous, complex and hybrid, requiring a comprehensive approach not only within the Alliance but also in coordinated action with international institutions. Therefore, new security challenges will always test NATO, each situation and solution will require “rebuilding” solidarity, the Western international community will have to act as a “team”, which means a constant search for new solutions, more political consultation, greater political cooperation and trust.

NATO's strategic concept of 2022 has grouped security challenges, risks and threats in several dimensions: firstly, geopolitically (Russia, China, South, Space, Cyberspace), secondly, sectorally (energy security, climate security and environmental protection, human security and the role of women in maintaining peace and security, pandemics and natural disasters), and finally, by type of activity (breakthrough technologies, terrorism, hybrid and cyberattacks, strategic communications, publicity and disinformation).

Table 1: Evolution of new security challenges

NATO document	After the Cold War	The first decade of the 21 st century	Today
1991 New Strategic Concept of the Alliance (Rome)	<i>Changes in principle</i> a simultaneous, unexpected, large-scale attack is unlikely multidirectional security risks <i>Sources of danger</i> regional instability in CEE, ethnic rivalry and territorial disputes can lead to military conflicts	<i>Changes in principle</i> threat of a conventional military attack is low new global security challenges <i>Sources of danger</i> military threats (proliferation of ballistic missiles, WMD and delivery systems, terrorism)	<i>Changes in principle</i> complex security perception (sectoral, territorial, global) the return of competition between policy regimes increasing global threats <i>Sources of danger</i> Russia, China Southern threats, migration boom in new disruptive technology
1999 Strategic Concept of the Alliance (Washington, D.C.)	broader risks (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, obstruction of key resources, terrorism, acts of sabotage, international crime)	instability outside the borders of NATO (extremism, illegal trafficking of arms, drugs and human beings)	terrorism energy security climate security and green protection policy
2010 NATO Strategic Concept (Lisbon)	the emergence of state and non-state actors	cybersecurity energy security	human security, women, peace and security epidemiological and natural disasters
2022 NATO Strategic Concept (Madrid)	<i>Conclusions</i> the security of the Alliance must be seen in a global context NATO's security functions remain unchanged a wide range of military and non-military risks that affect security, which are multi-directional and difficult to predict	the impact of new technology on warfare environmental security, health risks, climate change <i>Conclusions</i> three new basic tasks new threats, new capabilities, new partners	hybrid and cyber threats dangers from space strategic communication, strengthening publicity and managing disinformation <i>Conclusions</i> new strategic concept strengthening the core tasks establishing NATO's new Force Model

Source: Compiled by the author

The perception of Russia will not change in the near future (at least not in the Putin era), and it is likely to remain NATO's biggest military for a long term; NATO–Russian relations will continue to be managed according to the current dual-track policy, although political relations have also been severed since the launch of the Russian “special military operation”. Although NATO has not abrogated the NATO–Russia Founding Act and has not abolished the NATO–Russia Council (NRC), it cannot return to business as usual if the Russia–Ukraine war continues. Until political relations are normalised, NATO must maintain the conventional and nuclear military capabilities necessary for defence and deterrence and develop the non-kinetic means necessary for hybrid warfare.

In addition to Russia, NATO now sees China also as a security challenge, which goes well beyond the “opportunity and challenge” stance of the London Declaration. The Alliance increasingly views the powerful East Asian country as a rising power and global power rival, posing a systemic challenge to Western democratic societies. China, with its growing superpower policy, requires much more political attention, strength and resources from the Alliance, a clearer security perception, the development of a political strategy and a coordinated response to hybrid threats.

However, NATO's common security perception is not only weakened by divergent Russian and Chinese policies within its membership. There are also different views on threats from the south, as terrorism, instability in North Africa and the Middle East affect member countries in different ways. Nevertheless, the new strategic concept identifies terrorism as NATO's second biggest threat and has also "included" migration among the global threats. Strengthening the strategic direction of the South in security policy implies closer cooperation with both the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU). However, in other areas, such as new advanced technologies (EDTs), compliance with arms limitations and non-proliferation treaties, and the conclusion of new agreements (e.g. New START III), there is consensus among member states. The allies see the opportunities and tasks similarly, to address non-military security challenges and threats (energy security, climate security, pandemics, cybersecurity, strategic communications, gender issues) (SLOAN 2020, 317–338). Overall, the Alliance's common concept of security has improved considerably compared to the previous period, but there are still differences between member states' policies on key issues (Russia, China).

NATO as a collective defence organisation

NATO was established on 4 April 1949 by the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, D.C., by 12 founding countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Iceland, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States). NATO's legitimacy derives from international law. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations states that it is the natural right of UN members to organise individual or collective self-defence against armed attack. The founding countries also enshrined in the treaty that NATO's members form a single community of values based on the principles of individual freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law (the title on which NATO rejected the Soviet Union's application for membership in 1954). The short document, consisting only of 14 articles, set out the basis on which the Alliance would operate, the substance of which has remained unchanged since its foundation. NATO's activities are centred on maintaining collective defence, complemented by crisis management and partnership tasks after the Cold War. Collective defence is different from collective security, which is a security arrangement, political, regional, or global, in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all and therefore commits to a collective response to threats to, and breaches of peace. It is more ambitious than collective defence in that it seeks to encompass the totality of states within the region or indeed globally, and to address a wide range of possible threats. Today, NATO has 31 members and, as a security community, has institutionalised relations with 39 further countries. NATO as a security community consists of 70 countries.

NATO's organisational structure and functioning is determined by its purpose (collective defence and the maintenance of democratic peace in the North Atlantic region), its nature (political and military alliance) and its evolving mission (the current three main tasks). The institutional setup was made possible by Article 9 of the Washington

Treaty, which states: “The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3¹ and 5.² The functioning of NATO is based on respect for the national sovereignty of its member states and on the mechanism of established cooperation.

The main decision-making bodies of NATO are the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Military Committee (MC), which are composed of senior representatives of the member states. The NAC is the principal political decision-making body which oversees the political and military process relating to security issues affecting the whole Alliance. It brings together representatives of each member country to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions, providing a transatlantic forum for wide-ranging consultation between members on all issues affecting their peace and security. The Committees are composed of representatives of member countries at the appropriate level. A wide range of committees (e.g. political, partnership, defence policy and planning, armaments, standardisation, air and missile defence, logistics, resources, operations and exercises, intelligence and counterintelligence, etc.) support consensus-based decision-making. An important body for defence management is the new Resilience Committee (RC). Decision-makers are supported by national experts and the civilian – International Staff (IS) and military – International Military Staff (IMS) apparatus at NATO Headquarters (Brussels). National and partnership delegations are also based at NATO Headquarters. Four agencies (standardisation, support and procurement, intelligence and information, science and technology) provide the non-military conditions for operations. NATO’s integrated military command structure is under the leadership of two allied military level headquarters. The Allied Command Operations (ACO, Mons, Belgium) is responsible for allied military operations, the command of subordinate commands, integrated air and missile defence, and command of standing and subordinate forces. Allied Command Transformation (ACT, Norfolk, Virginia, USA) plans, coordinates and manages NATO transformation, with planning,

¹ Article 3 states that: “In order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”

² According to the article embodying collective defence, “the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security”.

training and education organisations, a network of excellence (including the Health Centre of Excellence in Budapest).

NATO has no army of its own except for a few standing forces (for example, the Airborne Early Warning and Control Force [AWACS]) subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). The Alliance carries out its tasks with military forces and capabilities offered by its member countries. At the same time, the Alliance has the unique advantage that, although it does not have its own forces, it has built up a permanent command structure (NATO Command Structure [NCS]) to lead its forces, which is always ready to lead subordinate national forces in peace, crisis, or war. NATO is a small organisation compared to other international institutions: 1,200 civilian staff at NATO Headquarters (with a similar number of national delegations), 5,000 at the agencies and 6,500 in the NATO Integrated Military Structure (headquarters, permanent subordinate forces [e.g. airspace control, naval forces]) (NATO SECGEN 2021: 75–100).

NATO operates on consensus (unanimous decision-making), which is perhaps the most important principle of democratic functioning. Unanimity can be traced back to Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which states the requirement for a decision on enlargement to be “by unanimous agreement”. Consultation continues until a decision is reached that is acceptable to all, although there are still cases where a member state vetoes a prepared decision (e.g. Greece’s opposition to Macedonia’s NATO membership at the Bucharest summit in 2009). The principle of unanimity ensures the equality of all member states and embodies the common will.

NATO’s operations are financed by the member countries, which provide adequate resources for the operation (Strategic Concept, point 37), which must be used in the most efficient way possible. NATO therefore determines from time to time the level of defence expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) of its member countries, depending on NATO’s level of operational ambition, Alliance tasks and defence planning requirements. Most recently, in Wales (2014), it was decided that all member states should reach 2% of GDP within 10 years and that 20% of defence spending should be spent on modernising their armed forces. Since 2014, European member states have increased their defence spending by more than 20% (50 billion EUR), with the burden-sharing ratio between the U.S. and other member states improving by 4% (NATO 2021). Defence spending has continued to grow, with a growing number of new military capabilities being developed (such as the NATO RQ-4D Global Hawk surveillance and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles, which have already reached the initial military capability). Already 11 countries have reached the 2% of GDP target set at the Wales Summit and 18 member states have reached the 20% threshold for force modernisation (NATO Press Release 2022). The Eastern “front countries” (with the exception of Bulgaria) have met the requirements in both areas. Although decisions are always taken jointly, the scale and implementation are constantly under discussion and expenditure is constantly monitored and publicly published by the Alliance.

NATO has three financial mechanisms to ensure its operation: national funding, joint funding and multinational funding. Under national funding, member states pay essentially all the costs themselves (“costs lie where they fall”), which in practice means that the

member states finance their own force development, contribute to a certain proportion to NATO expenses, ensure the implementation of their own alliance tasks. Joint funding ensures that NATO runs its own organisation, financed by joint contributions from member states based on an agreed cost-sharing arrangement. Multinational funding is outside the remit of the organisation but in the interest of the Alliance, e.g. when two or more member states agree to jointly tackle a task or develop/procure military equipment. For example, such funding is used to maintain the military transport capability at the Pápa airbase. But it also includes Trust Funds or other financial schemes and procedures to assist recipient countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine, etc.).

The cost-sharing formula for the NATO common budget is regularly adjusted in relation to the order of magnitude agreed at the time of foundation/accession. For the period 2021–2024, the largest contributions are already shared equally between the United States and Germany (16.34%), followed by the United Kingdom (11.28%) and France (10.49%) (NATO 2021). Hungary's contribution is 0.75% of the defence budget, which is 8,818 million HUF in 2023 (Act XXV 2022). From these contributions, NATO operates three budgets: a civil budget (salaries of civilian staff, development, operation of NATO Headquarters), a military budget (expenditure on the operation of the allied military structure and military activities) and a security investment budget. The Madrid Summit in 2022 decided to increase the common budgets by 10–10–30% by 2030. The civil budget is paid by the foreign ministries and the military and infrastructure contributions by the defence ministries. The size of the NATO budget in 2023 was 0.3% (3.3 billion EUR) of the total military expenditure of the member countries combined. In addition, NATO's production and logistics development programmes are jointly funded, but only the countries participating in the programme contribute to the project budget (e.g. 15 countries participate in the work of the NATO Ground Reconnaissance System Management Office). NATO's ambition is illustrated by the fact that the size of the development programmes is several times the size of the joint operational budget (20.6 billion EUR).

NATO Article 5

The essence of collective defence – the pledge of mutual assistance – is enshrined in the famous Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which is thus the soul (in NATO terminology, the “heart”) and the most important point of the treaty. Article 5 is not an automatic aid provision, it is not enough for one country to declare that it is under attack and then the others go to help (because then Article 5 would have had to be activated several times because of the military conflicts that broke out between Greece and Turkey, for example (KOKKINIDIS 2022), but it requires the unanimous agreement of the member countries to be activated. The Alliance considers it the right of the member state to judge whether an attack is really an armed attack and whether it is really directed against the alliance. When this approach was developed at the time of the Alliance's creation, it was not only with a view to creating a decision-making democracy in NATO, but also considering

that the treaty would have to be approved by the member states. This was an important consideration, as the adoption of an automatic, binding formulation would have posed a problem even in Congressional approval in the United States. But it has also been useful in the complex political and security situations in NATO's history.

The Treaty provides institutional support for the individual choices of member countries. Article 4 of the treaty gives member countries opportunity to consult the Alliance if they feel that their territorial integrity, political independence, or security is threatened. Article 4 has been used several times by Turkey (in the context of the wars in Iraq and Syria) or by Poland (after the Russian–Georgian five-day war or in the context of the 2014 crisis in Ukraine). Article 5 clearly refers to an external armed attack against one or more countries of the Alliance but does not define the notion of aggression or external aggression.

Article 5 has only been activated once, following the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001, in specific circumstances. For example, it was not initiated by Washington but by the NATO Secretary General himself. Although the NAC Permanent Council decided on the activation of Article 5 on 12 September, it did not enter into force until 2 October (NATO 2001), after the United States had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the attack had come from outside, from the Al-Qaeda international terrorist organisation led by Osama bin Laden, which enjoyed the support of the Kabul regime. NATO developed a complex package for the global fight against terrorism: it granted overflight rights to U.S. aircraft in allied airspace, launched two anti-terrorist operations in October,³ and adopted the concept, plans and measures for the anti-terrorist operation at the Prague Summit in 2002.

The need to introduce Article 5 emerged again with great political force after the five-day Russian–Georgian war in August 2008. Several politicians, experts and analysts have expressed doubts about NATO's commitment to stand by an allied member state e.g. the Baltic States, in real “war” conflict. Since then, the threat of a traditional Russian–NATO war has been a recurring theme in the international literature (SMITH 2008; SHIRREFF 2016), especially in the U.S. and in the countries on NATO's Eastern border. The Article 5 debate has also flared up during the nearly one and a half years of preparation of NATO's new Strategic Concept for 2010. And after the 2014 crisis in Ukraine, collective defence clearly returned to the centre of NATO's activities. While the decisions taken in the period 2014–2021 have resulted in sound collective defence solutions, experience shows that maintaining the credibility of NATO Article 5 requires continuous work by the Alliance.

³ The Eagle Assist air control operation in U.S. airspace lasted for 7 months, and the Mediterranean Maritime counterterrorism operation (Active Endeavour) ended in 2016 after 15 years.

Collective defence in practice

In response to the Ukraine crisis, the Alliance has taken measures to strengthen collective defence on NATO's eastern flank. The leadership of the North Atlantic organisation feared that Russia was conducting hybrid warfare below the threshold of military intervention, influencing the internal politics of its Eastern European neighbours and discrediting NATO's security guarantees. There was also growing concern that Russia might launch a surprise attack to seize the unprotected Baltic territories, which would put NATO in a precarious position (SHLAPAK–JOHNSON 2016).⁴ The fears of the Baltic member states were not unfounded, as their countries have a significant Russian-speaking population (especially Estonia and Latvia), and there was a huge contrast between the defencelessness of the heavily armed Kaliningrad and the Baltic, which is the wing of the alliance. The demands of the Baltic were reinforced by Poland's historical fear and Russophobia, later joined by Romania and Bulgaria's policy of greater security.

At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO presented a major countermeasure called the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) (Table 1). The RAP included two types of measures: assurance measures and adaptation measures. In the area of security measures, the NAC in 2014–2015 focused on reassuring the European public, deploying NATO's "tangible" forces (AWACS air surveillance aircraft and the permanent Naval Force), reinforcing the air defences of the Baltic States, and organising large-scale exercises in the region and in the adjacent seas. It has also provided an opportunity for Member States to strengthen the protection of vulnerable countries on a bilateral basis, in which the United States has been particularly active. The adaptation decisions were aimed at NATO's long-term adaptation in terms of military command and control capabilities and rapid reaction forces. The strength of the NATO Response Force (NRF) was tripled to 40,000 contingency troops. The mission of the enhanced NRF (eNRF) has been expanded to include collective defence tasks. To improve the credibility of the NRF, the Welsh Summit established the Very High Readiness (2–7 days) Joint Task Force (5,000 personnel) (VJTF), which has a strong deterrent capability as a kind of "mobile wire barrier".

The NATO Response Force will be led by two operational headquarters (JFC Brunssum and Naples) in rotation, with Naples' command being the lead agency in charge in 2021. The NRF forces will be established based on national contributions (force generation), which will provide the appropriate commands and forces in the required structural and capability composition. The NRF is commanded by the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), but its employment is decided by the NAC.

⁴ The U.S. research institute, the RAND Corporation has modelled how the Baltic countries could be defended against a frontal Russian attack, based on military force projections at the end of 2015. The results of the computer wargame showed that attacking Russian forces would be in Tallinn and Riga in 60 hours. Such a rapid advance would leave NATO in a difficult position, with only poor and limited options for action. The researchers concluded that the deployment of 7 brigades (plus air support) in the region could prevent Russian attack.

Table 2: NATO collective defence measures (2014–2022)

No.	Measure	Features	Time
1.	Strengthening the NRF (eNRF)	Corps force	2014
2.	Establishment of VJTF	“Spearhead brigade”	2014
3.	Installation of NFIU elements	In eight countries	2015–2016
4.	Developing new headquarters	MNC-NE (Szczecin), MND-SE (Bucharest)	2014–2018
5.	Advancement of four ZHCS	Baltic countries, Poland	2016–
6.	NATO multinational brigade deployment	Romania	2016–
7.	Extension of operational planning	Graduated Response Plan (GRP)	2016–2018
8.	Strengthening air and naval forces	The airspace of the wing countries and the adjacent seas	Ongoing
9.	Investments and stocks brought forward	CEEC countries	Ongoing
10.	Declaring cyberspace an operational space	Developing cyber defence capabilities (establishment of a Cyber Operations Centre 2020)	2016
11.	Strengthening the command-and-control system	Establishment of new Combined Forces Headquarters (Norfolk/USA/GER), establishment of national division headquarters, establishment of operational logistics support groups	2018
12.	Readiness initiative (4 × 30 concept)	4 × 30 concept (30 battalions, 30 combat squadrons, 30 warships, 30 days of readiness)	2018
13.	Establishment of hybrid warfare groups	Response to Russian hybrid threats	2018
14.	Declaring space an operational space	Creation of a space centre in Ramstein (2020)	2019
15.	Placement of four Battle Group	Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria	2022
16.	New NATO force model approved	NATO Summit, Madrid (2022)	2022–2023 (planning) 2022–2028 (implementation)

Source: Compiled by the author

The reinforcement of collective defence tasks and the protection of the Northeastern flank also necessitated changes to the NATO Command System (NCS). To this end, a Corps Headquarters (MNC-NE) in Szczecin in the north and a Multinational NATO Division Headquarters (MND-SE) in the south will be responsible for the military tasks in the region. But the six NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) in the north, established in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, Slovakia and Hungary, as well as the two NFIUs in Romania and Bulgaria, are subordinate to these headquarters. The deployment of Battalion Battle Groups (BGCs) in the northeastern flank countries in 2017 was a spectacular reinforcement of collective defence. The four battalions, numbering between 1,000 and 1,500 troops, are not a permanently deployed force, but are deployed on a rotational basis to defend the Baltic States and Poland. The battalion’s lead “framework nation” responsibilities are assumed by the United States in Poland, Great Britain in Estonia, Germany in Lithuania and Canada in Latvia. On similar principles, a NATO

brigade was created in Romania in 2020 to defend Romania and Bulgaria, in line with the situation, and was initiated by the Romanians together with Bulgaria and Poland.

At the 2018 Brussels Summit, the strengthening of deterrence and protection tasks continued. NATO adopted the Readiness Initiative Programme, which will strengthen the NATO Response Force after 2020 with the so-called 4×30 proposal (30 land combat battalions, 30 combat aircraft squadrons, 30 warships, 30 days of readiness). To facilitate the mobility of the standby forces between NATO member countries, the conditions for full mobility in Europe will be created by 2024. Two new operational headquarters (Naval Headquarters [JFC HQ, Norfolk], Support and Logistics Headquarters [JSEC HQ, Ulm]) have been decided and are operational today. Also important from a Hungarian point of view was the NAC decision which gave the green light to the establishment of multinational team headquarters to ensure the military command and control of the growing number of NATO formations as required.

However, the Alliance is not only developing its land forces, but also wants to increase the capacity of its naval forces to improve maritime security (Baltic Sea, Norwegian Sea, Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea) and to address hybrid threats. The Alliance leadership would like to see more ships in the NATO Naval Forces (SNMGs), for which some nations (U.S., U.K., Canada) have already offered new ships to the subordination of the Maritime Command (MARCOM). But the organisation, faced with terrorist and migratory threats from the South, wants to go further in its naval presence, plans to develop a new naval strategy, and is supporting research under the title “Maritime Alliance”.

However, behind these measures, it is becoming increasingly clear that NATO is no longer just implementing a forward defence concept to the east, as it did during the Cold War, but is also improving the conditions for deterrence and defence in all operational dimensions and is defining new tasks. This was the purpose of the extension of Article 5 to cyberspace (2016) and space (2019), and hybrid warfare (2022) and the creation of Euro-Atlantic deterrence and defence plans for the first time.

The measures taken to strengthen the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) were aimed at a long-term adaptation, which NATO really benefited from when the Russian invasion of 24 February 2022 began. At an extraordinary virtual summit on 25 February 2022, proposed by 10 Eastern European member states under Article 4, the heads of state and government condemned the “brutal, unjust and unprecedented” attack and activated the NATO Response Force, reinforced air defence in the Baltic States and launched a new air defence plan. The Council tasked the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR) with reinforcing the NATO force defence posture. At the extraordinary summit in Brussels on 24 March 2022, NATO leadership has already activated the defence plans, deciding to create new battalion battle groups in Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The Heads of State and Government also decided that a defence budget of 2% of GDP should be reached as soon as possible and that preparations for the Madrid Summit should be continued in the light of the war.

The new NATO force model

The Madrid Summit 2022 took several important decisions, adopting a new NATO Strategic Concept and a new force model. NATO's force structure and readiness system has changed continuously throughout the Alliance's history, with the greatest transformation (lower readiness, fewer commands, smaller forces) occurring in the 1990s, after the Cold War. The current new concept envisages a larger force than before (800,000 in total), with higher readiness (100,000 of which for 10 days, 200,000 for 30 days and 500,000 for 180 days) and a structure (force, weapon, combat support and service) capable of conducting multinational, integrated operations in five operational areas (land, air, sea, cyber, space). The readiness level is a major challenge for Member States, as even the current readiness levels (30–45 days for rapid response forces, 90 days for reaction forces, 180 days for low readiness forces) cannot be “surpassed” by most national forces, as we have seen from the primary results of the 2018 Readiness Initiative (RI).⁵ The 4×30 requirement set at the Warsaw Summit could not be met by 2020, even though it would have served to reliably ensure the increased force requirements of the NATO Response Force (NRF). The new force model requires, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated, the biggest transformation of NATO forces since the Cold War (SZENES 2022: 12).

NATO wants to build up a rapid reaction force of 300,000 troops in a short time, the detailed plans for which are not yet known. For the 100,000-strong rapid reaction force, NATO is presumably calculating by considering the 40,000-strong NRF, increasing the strength of the eight battle groups in the eastern flank countries to between 4,000 and 5,000 troops per country (for a total of another 40,000 troops) and finally calculating a U.S. reinforcement of 20,000 troops. To the 200,000 troops on 30-day standby, NATO probably adds the available national forces in the eastern “frontline” countries, which number 295,000 according to a NATO statement from June. Alternatively, it could be possible to draw on the forces (pool) offered to NATO by the member countries, which will probably be combined with the ongoing DDA planning.⁶ The operational plans are already being drawn up on a territorial basis of the SACEUR's military plan, which is then broken down by the operational headquarters (JFCBS, JFCNP, JFCNF)⁷ into regional plans, within which the defence plans of each member country are drawn up. As in the Cold War, the territorial boundaries/lanes of the forward defences will be defined, which will be protected by local (in place) forces (NATO and national) and the forces that will enter the area from the depths will be designated. These dedicated forces (which will be in their own country, OTH⁸) will reinforce the forward defence forces to a total force strength of 200,000 troops with a maximum of 30 days readiness. The new strategic concept has defined a number of principles which should be taken as a guide for the

⁵ NRI: NATO Readiness Initiative.

⁶ DDA: Concept of Deterrence and Defence for the Euro-Atlantic Area.

⁷ JFCBS: Joint Forces Command Brunssum; JFCNP: Joint Forces Command Naples; JFCNF: Joint Forces Command Norfolk.

⁸ OTH: Over-the-Horizon Force.

development of the force model: an integrated and proportionate structure, reflecting the Alliance's 360-degree approach; its composition (nuclear, conventional, missile defence, space and cyber) should be adapted to the new strategic environment; readiness, responsiveness and deployability should be enhanced; it should have a digitalised command and control system, and should embrace and make creative use of new, emerging technologies (EDT).⁹ At the Madrid Summit, 22 member states (including Hungary) established the NATO Innovation Fund, which will invest one billion euros in the development of dual-use technologies (artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, biotechnology, autonomous systems, etc.) over the next 15 years.¹⁰ The Innovation Fund will be linked to NATO's DIANA¹¹ civil–military development programme, which was approved at the Brussels Summit in 2021. NATO leaders agreed to link the two programmes, to give participating startup research companies, institutes and researchers access to the DIANA institutional network (9 accelerator programmes, 63 test centres in Europe and North America) and to coordinate activities through the NATO Science Organisation.

The alliance currently has a 9,600-strong land force in the forward presence, with around 40 fighter jets always monitoring the airspace and a naval response provided by NATO's Standing Maritime Group (SNMG)¹² warships. For the first time since the Cold War, the US 6th Fleet, commanded by the aircraft carrier Harry S. Truman, has been subordinated to NATO's Maritime Command (MARCOM),¹³ bringing the total number of warships patrolling the seas to 20. This is necessary, as Russian President Vladimir Putin approved on 31 July 2022 a new naval doctrine that now identifies not only NATO but also the United States as a major threat to prevent Russia from entering the world's oceans. NATO member states have started to pool their forces, with the United States leading the way. The U.S. is significantly reinforcing its presence in Europe (an additional rotational mechanised brigade, 2 squadrons, 2 destroyers, a forward command, air defence and support forces), increasing the total number of forces in the European Command by 20,000. Significant force contributions have also been made for the defence of the Baltic region (U.K., Germany, Canada). The transition to the new force model will be completed by 2028 (SZENES 2022).

Hungary's NATO policy

Hungary's NATO membership goal has defined the Hungarian foreign, security and defence policy since the political system change (RADA–STEPPER 2019: 172–194). At the end of 1998, the Parliament adopted the new security and defence policy principles, which are still in force today, by full consensus and which place Hungary's security on two

⁹ EDT: Emerging Disruptive Technologies.

¹⁰ The signatories do not include the U.S. and Canada, Iceland, which has no military force, and the Western Balkan countries.

¹¹ NATO DIANA: Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic.

¹² SNMG: Standing NATO Maritime Group.

¹³ MARCOM: Allied Maritime Command Northwood.

fundamental pillars: national self-reliance and Euro-Atlantic integration and international cooperation. Since then, national legislation (the Fundamental Law, the Defence Act), national security and military strategies have confirmed the importance of our NATO membership and the will to cooperate. Hungary became a member of NATO on 12 March 1999, and immediately underwent the “baptism of war”: it provided inclusive national support to the NATO (US) Air Force in the air war against Yugoslavia. Upon gaining membership, the country was immediately brought under the “umbrella” of NATO’s common air defence system, the national representation system in the alliance was established, Hungarian soldiers joined the NATO command system, and the Hungarian Defence Forces began their peacekeeping role in allied missions.

Although foreign, security and defence policies have changed over the past decades, depending on the governments, all governments have considered an active Hungarian contribution to the Alliance important. In 2010, the coalition government (Hungarian Civic Alliance – FIDESZ, Christian Democratic People’s Party – KDNP) announced a new foreign policy (global opening), a more focused security policy (focusing on global security challenges, risks and threats) and a reassessment of defence policy (renewal of the armed forces). Although the changing security policy environment and the differences in values with the previous government have led to the rewriting of all legislation (new Fundamental Law, Defence Act, Service Act) and strategic documents, Hungary’s international role has not been reduced, and the government has increased the level of peacekeeping ambition to 1,200, with a Hungarian general to head the KFOR command in Kosovo from November 2021 to October 2022. The government adopted a new foreign affairs strategy in 2011, continuously updates its national security strategy (2012, 2020) and the national military strategy (2012, 2021). Modernisation visions were published in a 10-year defence and force development programme (Zrinyi 2026 Programme) in 2017, which is being implemented at a steady pace. Defence industrial and defence-related developments and force modernisation will be coordinated initially by a Government Commissioner and after 2022 by a State Secretary. The Prime Minister announced in Madrid that Hungary will reach a defence budget of 2% of GDP in 2023.

After 2014, the security environment has changed for the worse, with Hungary being back on the “front line”: while in the old world, on the western border of the Warsaw Pact, we served as a geostrategic base for the offensive doctrine, today we are part of the Alliance’s new collective defence measures on NATO’s eastern border. But as a border country of the EU, we must also protect the Schengen external borders in the southeastern direction, making Hungary, as the 2020 National Security Strategy puts it, a “border country”. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is reducing its peacekeeping activity, the European Union is launching new operations in Africa (Mali, Central African Republic) and the UN is seeking to maintain its current level of mission ambition, Hungary is strengthening its international engagement.

Hungary has been an active and useful member of NATO for almost a quarter of a century. In terms of size, it belongs to the so-called 10 million club, together with Greece, Belgium, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, but its weight and role is determined not only by its ranking but also by its government priorities, its participation in

the decision-making system and the extent of its contribution to operations and development. Hungary has been an important shaper of NATO's Balkans policy since before we became a NATO member, and afterwards, due to significant contributions to the accession of Croatia (2009), Albania (2009), Montenegro (2017) and North Macedonia (2020). In most of the disputes within the Alliance (fight against terrorism, war in Iraq, colour revolutions in the post-Soviet space, missile defence, membership of Ukraine and Georgia, military action against Russia, etc.), it has managed to take a position that strengthens the country's reputation or to balance pragmatic views between "harder Eastern European" and "softer Western European" members. This was particularly evident in the Ukraine policy, where the government, while continuing to support the modernisation programmes of the Ukrainian armed forces, blocked the convening of the NATO–Ukraine Commission in an attempt to restore minority rights for Hungarians in Ukraine. After the outbreak of war, Hungary is on the side of peace, providing substantial assistance to help resolve the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, but not supplying kinetic weapons to Ukraine.

The government has always been actively involved in new NATO initiatives (most recently the NATO Innovation Fund) and has sought to link multinational capability development initiatives with regional policy, such as the activities of the Visegrád Four (V4) or the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC). This policy gives greater visibility to the Hungarian contribution compared to countries that have focused exclusively on cooperation with the major powers of the alliance. The country has always performed very well in peacekeeping, so we have been given a prominent role in operational matters on several occasions (a Hungarian general was the KFOR commander in 2021–2022), especially when we have made offers quickly and in a timely manner or in areas of capability that were lacking (technical, medical, logistical, special operations, etc.). The country is moving up on the list of well-performing NATO countries, coming 15th in terms of defence budget in 2021 (1.65% of GDP) and 8th in terms of military investment (28.3% of defence budget). NATO's footprint in Hungary is growing, with the establishment of the NATO Intelligence and Information Centre of Excellence (NATO CIS DCM) in 2012 in Székesfehérvár, Hungary, following the establishment of the Strategic Transport Capability in Pápa (Multinational Heavy Air Wing, HAW, 2008) and the NATO Military Medical Centre of Excellence (MILMED COE, 2009), and the NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) in 2016. In 2019, the establishment of the NATO Central European Multinational Division Headquarters (HQs MND C, Székesfehérvár) and the Regional Special Operations Component Headquarters (R-SOCC, Szolnok) started. In the field of capability development, Hungary's perception has also changed, with the procurement of the Zrínyi Defence and Force Development Programme, which has started the technical modernisation of the armed forces, coupled with the development of a new Hungarian defence industry. The modernisation and the establishment of military industrial companies is European-oriented (EADS, Rheinmetall), with strong German support, which also underpins the NATO policy, which in the last decade can be described as a shift from the previous strong Atlanticist orientation towards a continental Western European, and within this, German security policy approach.

Conclusions

NATO, as the new Strategic Concept states, has “ensured the freedom and security of its allies for more than 70 years”, thanks to its changing concept of security. If it had remained only a collective defence alliance, the realist theory would have been that NATO should have ceased to exist after the end of the Cold War, since the threat that justified its creation had ceased to exist. NATO’s renewal has been successful because it has always found real goals beyond challenges, threats and dangers, and military defence, which have given it a *raison d’être*. It has survived because it has been highly adaptable, able to transform itself from a political and military organisation into an international organisation with a broader security function. Its adaptive mechanisms (regular decision-making meetings, agenda-setting, representation of Member States, information sharing, delaying cases, moderating and co-opting capabilities) have ensured that the best decisions for survival have been taken in the most difficult situations. Survival was also helped by the fact that a possible dissolution (the founding nations were thinking in terms of 20 years at the time of creation) would mean a loss of resources invested (sunk costs), the costs spent would be completely wasted. Therefore, even in a changed security environment, it is cheaper to maintain an adaptive NATO than to create a new security organisation.

NATO’s core tasks have been constantly “in flux” throughout its existence, with the security environment, challenges, risks and threats, and the interests of member countries determining which function should take priority: collective defence, crisis management/collective security or cooperative security. The proportions, balance or shift of the security “trinity” towards one or the other function, in its entirety, emerged after the Cold War. After 1991, the new security functions were strengthened, first with the emergence of partnership and cooperation, and then, after 9/11, with the strengthening of the contribution to collective security (peace support operations). But while security community-building continues unabated today, the collective security function has been “weakened” after two decades, whereas the collective defence function has been brought back to the fore after 2014. With the Russian war in February 2022, this strategic orientation is likely to remain until 2030, as the new NATO Strategic Concept provides for long-term tasks of deterrence and defence.

Hungary has been involved in shaping the recent history of NATO, directly and indirectly. Our country plays an important role in political and military decision-making, in capability development and peace operation contributions, and in the process of integration into the military, operational and combat system. The Hungarian foreign, security and defence policy considers NATO’s development “requirements” and the goals and directions of cooperation. Hungary will obviously act correctly if it incorporates these “determinations” into the country’s defence plans and the development programmes of the Hungarian Defence Forces (Zrínyi Programme). The Hungarian Defence Forces must be able to fulfil their mission in the 21st century as a member of the Alliance and independently, even in the deteriorating international security environment.

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NATO – Operations

Introduction

The strategic context posed by a globalised world has become increasingly complex, occasionally chaotic, or even erratic since the end of the Bipolar World Order. In this strategic context NATO, which is the most powerful political-military alliance of the world, must operate in an environment that continuously evolves and shows signs of constant deterioration. NATO's military capabilities, its strategic approach and posture, together with various planning activities reflect a constant adaptation to meet the challenges posed by accelerating strategic changes. The revival of great power competition and the resulting multi-polarity means that the road ahead is bumpy and often obscured (VUVING 2020: 13). The unfolding 21st century has featured volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). The strategic near- and medium-term future will be extremely conflict-laden since it yields various possibilities of different magnitude and consequence. As a result, NATO must conduct various campaigns, operations and activities on global scale in the operational level to fulfil its three core tasks such as collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. Although each campaign, operation or activity is unique, the principles that guide NATO's approach to campaigns, operations and activities must root in a sound doctrinal system.

Forces and megatrends

The volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment features certain and huge macroeconomic and geostrategic forces, called megatrends that shape the world on a global scale. Rapid urbanisation, demographic and social change, altering climatic conditions and resource scarcity, the shift in global economic power, and technological breakthroughs are the forces at play. They have the potential to change the current geostrategic status quo and definitely influence the world's collective future in a profound way. The implications of these forces are broad as megatrends stand for tremendous risks that require mitigation. The depth and the complexity of the forces involved indicate that security challenges reach deep into the very fabric of the societies on global, regional and local scale. Meaningful approaches must ease the confluence of the defence and security challenges posed by these forces and trends on mega scale (PWC 2016). A very wide variety of military and non-military risks come from multiple sources and point into multiple directions thus influencing the security of NATO member states. These risks contain uncertainty and instability, and are difficult to predict. They have the potential to cause regional problems at the periphery of the Alliance as they originate in ethnic

rivalries, religious tensions, disputed territories, conflicts over resources, especially water scarcity, inadequate income, failed reforms, human rights abuses, collapse of governments and dissolution of states. These risks can affect regional stability, cause human suffering, and ignite armed conflicts that can spill over into neighbouring countries, including NATO member states. Acts of terrorism, various forms of sabotage, organised crime, the disruption of the flow of vital resources, uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people profoundly affect the perception of security and stability on various scales (NATO 2017: 2-6 – 2-10).

According to a recent UN report (EINSIEDEL 2014), the number of conflicts has sharply increased since 2010. For example in 2015, the number of ongoing conflicts increased to 50 compared to 41 a year before with battle related deaths largely concentrating in the Middle East. Conflicts increasingly affect civilians' living in densely populated areas with the consequence that the number of forced displacements since the end of World War II is on an all-time high. Despite the relatively high number of battle related deaths, it seemed so that until the eruption of the Russo–Ukrainian War in 2022 interpersonal and gang violence killed much more people than wars. Political violence tends to be increasingly interrelated in countries where institutions are weak and social norms tolerate violence. This tendency does not affect all regions the same way; many countries and subnational areas face cycles of repeated violence, weak governance and instability. Conflict and violence also have the tendency to cross borders and can affect life in multiple ways. One result is that the poor are increasingly concentrated in countries suffering from prolonged conflicts that keep the countries themselves poor (MARC 2021). Risks on regional and global scale demand a vast range of different responses with the consequence that NATO is required to execute a variety of operations concurrently. Non-state actors attempt to achieve their goals through different forms of destabilisation by taking advantage of the VUCA attributes of the operating environment. Boundaries between state and non-state actors are increasingly blurry resulting that NATO forces may confront an enemy which blends elements of conventional and unconventional warfare; and the recent academic discussion on hybrid warfare well reflects this new reality (BILAL 2021; BACHMANN 2020). Hybrid wars arise when a compound of coincidental or uncoordinated state or non-state actors successfully mix conventional and unconventional threats in a simultaneous and coordinated manner. Their activity can gain momentum by the application of a broad range of non-military measures to exploit NATO vulnerabilities wherever they see it possible (NATO 2017: 2-10 – 2-13). State or non-state actors who wage hybrid war do not necessarily follow those legal or ethical standards that are accepted by NATO member states. The spread of nuclear capabilities, the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and devices, and the easy availability of innovative delivery remains a matter of serious concern. Despite the existence of international non-proliferation regimes, weapons technology proliferation increases access to sophisticated military capabilities. Non-state actors definitely possess the ability to acquire offensive and defensive air-, land- and sea-borne systems, various theatre missiles, and other advanced weaponry. The hallmark of the unfolding 21st century is the growing reliance on information technology and the pervasive reliance on such

systems. This creates vulnerability to cyberspace attacks that can even reduce or cancel NATO forces' superiority (NATO 2017: 2-13 – 2-17).

Strategic environment

The Russian aggression against Ukraine that started in February 2014 with the occupation and subsequent annexation of Crimea and the subsequent invasion in February 2022 resulted in an all-out, traditional war between two European countries. The unfortunate events since then have made it clear that despite all assumptions the Euro-Atlantic area is far from peaceful. It became clear that norms and principles that have long contributed to a stable and predictable European security architecture are vulnerable. This new and broader security reality features strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks of various kind. The grim reality is that states, authoritarian actors and strategic competitors can challenge and test the resilience of the member states and try to put their interests, values and way of life under pressure. Their preferred means are of hybrid nature as these actors take advantage of the opportunities posed by the cyber, space and information domains. The aggression made it clear that the Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. It applies various forms of coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation. Its military posture, rhetoric and willingness to use force to pursue certain political goals undermine the international order. This requires the significant strengthening of deterrence and defence capabilities, the enhancing of resilience against any type of coercion, and the supporting of NATO's member states to counter any form of malign interference and aggression (NATO 2022a). Over decades NATO had a primary focus on non-article five crisis response operations, which fed from many sources. The first was the steady increase of the number of non-state actors who constantly challenged the status quo. Unlike in the traditional international arena in which state actors primarily interact with other state actors, the last three decades witnessed state actors increasingly interacting with various non-state actors. The second is the proverbial complexity of the international arena that provided non-state actors with an abundance of opportunity to become successful even over a long period (PORKOLÁB 2013: 5–21). The third is that contrary to the optimistic assumptions, various forms of state versus non-state actor interaction have come to the fore. Globalisation offers a limitless terrain for these interactions that can erupt anytime and anywhere. State versus non-state actor interactions very often feature violence fed by the endless cycle of terror and counter-terror, and occasionally display an unprecedented level of lethality (HARDT–NEGRI 2004: 26–27).

State actor versus non-state actor interaction is also a strong actor versus weak actor contest and can result in hybrid wars waged in all domains. The consequence of this special type of war is serious as an examination of the outcome of such wars in the last two hundred years reveals. A comparative analysis of the *Correlates of War* data set from the Correlates of War (COW) project homepage reveals that weak actors tend to win increasingly as the percental outcome of strong actor versus weak actor conflicts of the last

200 years displays. Strong actor dominance dropped from initial 88.2 : 11.8 in the period between 1800–1849, to 79.5 : 20.5 in the period between 1850–1899, to 55.1 : 44.9 in the period between 1900–1949, and to 45 : 55 in the period between 1950–1998 (ARREGUÍN-TOFT 2001: 93–128). In a classic article published in *Foreign Affairs* half a century ago, Henry Kissinger lamented on what went wrong during the war in Vietnam. He concluded that the strong actor wanted to fight a military war, but the weak actor fought a political one. The strong actor sought physical attrition, whereas the weak actor preferred psychological exhaustion. In this process, the strong actor lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of this special type of war: the weak actor wins if he does not lose, and the strong actor loses if he does not win (KISSINGER 1969: 211–234). Things just have become worse for the strong actor since then. The dramatic increase in the number of non-state actors, the accelerating trend of technology development, the explosion in the number of information exchanges led to the result that the strong actor has to cope with a broad range of simultaneous threats and challenges (PORKOLÁB–ZWEIBELSON 2018: 196–212). Terrorism, regardless in what form and manifestation it comes, appears to be the most enduring challenge posed by non-state entities. It is direct, asymmetric, and fundamentally affects the internal security of member states, international peace and prosperity. Terrorist organisations in recent years have expanded their networks, enhanced their capabilities and invested in new technologies. They possess increased reach and lethality, and continue to exploit conflict and weak governance to recruit, mobilise and expand their influence. Terrorist organisations take advantage of conflicts, fragility and instability in the immediate neighbourhood, mostly South of the Euro-Atlantic area where security, demographic, economic and political challenges are aggravated by climate change, fragile institutions, health emergencies and food insecurity that go hand in hand with forced displacement, human trafficking and irregular migration. Emerging and disruptive technologies add to the hybrid nature of conflict, acquire greater strategic importance and become key arenas of global competition. Cyberspace activities of strategic competitors and potential adversaries can restrict NATO's access and freedom to operate in space, degrade existing space capabilities, target friendly civilian and military infrastructure, and impair the Member States' defence and harm their security (NATO 2022a).

Allied Joint Doctrine

The forces and megatrends that shape the strategic environment in a globalised world make it clear that even the strongest NATO member states are less likely to be in the position to conduct operations unilaterally in the future. Rather, they will form part of a coalition created by allied nations and coalition partners to achieve internationally agreed end-states and various comprehensive objectives. A close cooperation is necessary to be able to work effectively when unilateral action would be impractical, impossible or undesirable. Sound doctrinal principles are of utmost importance when conducting operations. A catalogue of clearly and thoroughly understood operational level doctrines is detrimental for the execution of multinational operations in an effective, integrated

and synchronised manner by all domains (PEARCE 2012: 111–112). The latest version of the Allied Joint Publication (AJP-01), the Allied Joint Doctrine issued in December 2022 is NATO's capstone doctrine for campaigns, operations and activities conducted in a joint way. The document explains the strategic context and focuses on the fundamentals of such operations. It provides commanders and their staff with a common framework for employing the military instrument of power based on a comprehensive approach by explaining the fundamentals and principles. It describes both the strategic context and provides a guidance on how NATO forces and partners operate to cause synergy and disproportionate effects. It also provides a reference for NATO civilians and non-NATO civilians operating with the Alliance (NATO 2022g).

The doctrine feeds from a diverse mix of various influences as it reflects a broader cultural, political, social and environmental context. It is a composition of an evolving relationship between militaries, states, populations, intellectual trends and scientific results, all reflecting an ultimately intangible belief system. This context is influential for its content even if doctrine developers, who are often subject matter experts themselves, are not necessarily aware of it. The latest version of the Allied Joint Publication (AJP-01), the Allied Joint Doctrine makes it clear that no doctrine stays unchanged for over a long period of time as publishing it in a written form can only capture a snapshot of a certain belief system at the time of publication. As a result, no doctrine can fully show the entirety of the situation, nor can it fully capture the state of affairs. This is because a doctrine cannot give context to itself, as various cultural, political, social and environmental factors are necessary to its creation, and understanding doctrine requires an understanding of the attributes of the underlying context (JACKSON 2017). The Allied Joint Publication (AJP-01), the Allied Joint Doctrine introduces and explains the continuum of competition, updates deterrence and lists its principles together with ways and types, and contextualises NATO's core policies with a focus on projecting stability and the fight against terrorism. It reintroduces campaign themes and describes their relationship with the aforementioned continuum of competition, as well as updates and extends the comprehensive approach. As a new element, the doctrine introduces and describes the behaviour-centric approach, the manoeuvrist approach, mission command, and the comprehensive approach as basic tenets of joint operations. It also describes the components and orchestration of fighting power, develops interoperability, and explains the operational domains by introducing the concept of multi-domain operations. The doctrine describes the operations framework alongside with its analytical, functional and geographic attributes. As a new element it changes the joint action framework to the joint function framework, and updates the command and control architecture, and the command relationships. It introduces the notion of human security by including and expanding on cross-cutting topics such as the protection of civilians, children and armed conflict, cultural property protection, women, peace and security, conflict-related sexual violence, sexual exploitation and abuse, combating trafficking in human beings, and building integrity (NATO 2022g: iii).

Generating forces

As a result of the Russo–Ukrainian War, NATO has entered the fourth period of its strategic thinking in its long existence. Both member states and the Alliance itself had to adapt rapidly in order to operate more effectively. The unfolding period of strategic competition means that emphasis must be placed on deterrence and countering of adversaries who pursue objectives below the threshold of armed conflict. This requires a better preparedness to fight and defeat adversaries if deterrence fails. NATO has responded to this change in the strategic context by producing a new *NATO Military Strategy*, the first *Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area* in 50 years, and a new *NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept*. These documents lay down the foundation on how the Alliance will operate and fight over the next decades (NATO 2022g: 1). During its history, NATO has been an active and leading contributor to peace and security. Democratic values and the commitment to a peaceful resolution of disputes resulted that the Euro-Atlantic area has not seen the outbreak of interstate wars over decades. The combined military power of the member states was a guarantee that should diplomatic efforts fail, NATO possesses the necessary military capacity to undertake crisis management operations on its own or with coalition partners and various international organisations (NATO 2022d). The changes in the strategic environment means that NATO’s military organisation and the underlying structures have to extend to all military actors, and formations are involved in and used to implement political strategic level decisions with clear military implications. Thus, key elements of NATO’s military organisation are the Military Committee (MC), composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the member states, its executive body the International Military Staff (IMS) and the NATO Command Structure (NCS) that is distinct from the NATO Force Structure (NFS). The NATO Command Structure is composed of two strategic level commands such as the Allied Command Operations (ACO) and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Whereas the first is headed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the second by the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT). The NCS is composed of permanent multinational headquarters at the strategic, operational and component levels of command. These headquarters are distributed geographically on both sides of the Atlantic. They are commonly funded, and offer the opportunity to all Allies to participate in, and contribute to, the command and control of all NATO operations, missions and activities through all services and across all domains. The NFS stands for a distinct pool of national and multinational forces and headquarters placed at the Alliance’s disposal on a permanent or temporary basis. These forces are in accordance with predetermined readiness criteria, with rules of deployment and transfer of authority to NATO command that varies from country to country (NATO 2018; NATO 2021a).

When an operation or certain mission is deemed necessary, member states and partner countries alike volunteer personnel, equipment and resources. National contributions of an expanding number of member states is needed to carry out operations or missions because NATO does not possess own military forces. Forces labelled as “NATO forces” are actually multinational forces from NATO member states and other troop-contributing

countries that come together after a force generation process with well-established steps. These forces are placed under the command of ACO that is subordinated to SACEUR, who is responsible for executing all operations and missions (NATO 2023d). The well-established, permanent and integrated command structure with military and civilian personnel in its ranks come from the member states. This staff collectively works for the achievement of the same end-goals and objectives. The 30 member states of NATO means that the Alliance can count on and benefit from the military capabilities and expertise of 30 armed forces with different weight, influence and specialisation. This diversity makes clear that every nation brings something to the table by offering personnel and military technology including big-ticket items such as tanks, airplanes and ships. Currently NATO has about 3.5-million personnel, troops and civilians combined. Each member state contributes with different strategic weight and influence. ACO, led by SACEUR, is responsible for executing all NATO operations and missions. Deputy SACEUR coordinates troop contributions. When the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decides to carry out an operation, the military authorities propose a draft concept of operations (CONOPS). This concept presents the minimum request of forces including equipment, work force and resources. All activities pointing into establishing, preparing and deploying these forces is called force generation. The force generation process follows a standard procedure in which member states allocate personnel and equipment necessary to carry out the operations and missions approved by the NAC. National funding is the final deciding factor on whether a nation will contribute or not. As a result, the member states can make direct and indirect contributions to the implementation of NATO's policies and activities. They can cover the costs involved whenever they volunteer forces or in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula they make direct contributions to NATO's common budgets to finance the costs of NATO's integrated structures and collectively owned equipment (SHAPE s. a.).

Past operations

NATO was established in 1949 shortly after the end of World War II with the aim to act as a powerful deterrent against military aggression coming mainly from the Soviet Union. In this role, NATO was successful as during the entire Cold War, it was not involved in military campaigns and operations. For much of the latter half of the 20th century, NATO remained vigilant and prepared. After the end of the Cold War, however, in the early 1990s great changes occurred in the international security environment. The emergence of new challenges and the resurgence of old threats resulted in conditions demanding new responsibilities. From being an exclusively defensive alliance for about half a century, NATO became increasingly proactive and offensive in the good meaning of the term. Although NATO conducted its first major crisis response operation in the Balkans, there were some minor operations starting with the 1990s. The following short listing provides a chronological overview of operations NATO conducted and terminated in the last couple of decades. The diverse array of operations started with *Operation Anchor*

Guard (1990–1991) in which NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft deployed to Turkey to monitor the unfolding crisis in Kuwait and provide coverage of the Southeastern part of Turkey. *Operation Ace Guard* (1991) was based on a Turkish request to assist to meet the threat posed by Iraq during the first Gulf Crisis/War. In response to that request NATO deployed the ACE Mobile Force air and air defence packages to Turkey (NATO 2022d; Freedom aNATOMy s. a.d.). Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the collapse of its centrally-controlled economic system, during *Operation Allied Goodwill I and II* (1992) NATO assisted an international relief effort by flying teams of humanitarian assistance experts and medical advisors to Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). During a period of growing Western tension with Libya after the UN Security Council imposed sanctions, NATO provided in *Operation Agile Genie* (1992) increased Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) coverage of the Central Mediterranean to monitor air approach routes from the North African littoral (NATO 2022d; Freedom aNATOMy s. a.c.).

After the breakup of Yugoslavia NATO was involved in many operations in *Bosnia and Herzegovina* where a violent conflict started in April 1992. NATO first enforced the United Nations (UN) arms embargo on weapons in the Adriatic Sea and a no-fly-zone during which NATO aircraft shot down four Bosnian Serb fighter-bombers. In August 1995 UN peacekeepers requested NATO airstrikes. *Operation Deadeye* began in the same month against Bosnian Serb air forces, but failed to result in Bosnian Serb compliance with the UN's demands. This led to *Operation Deliberate Force* (1995), which targeted Bosnian Serb command and control installations and facilities to bring the Serbs to the negotiating table and end the war. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord NATO immediately deployed the Implementation Force (IFOR) comprising some 60,000 troops. The subsequent *Operation Joint Endeavour* (1996–2004) meant the deployment of a 32,000-strong Stabilisation Force (SFOR). In January 2005 the EU took over responsibility with *Operation Althea*. Nevertheless, NATO maintains a military headquarters in Sarajevo to carry out a number of specific tasks related to assisting the government in reforming its defence structures (NATO 2022d; MULCHINOCK 2017: 45–94). *Operation Eagle Assist* (2001–2002) was NATO's first counterterrorism operation. After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, NATO agreed on eight measures to support the United States and on request it launched its first-ever counterterrorism operation. Seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft helped patrol the skies deployed in support of an Article 5 operation (NATO 2022d; AFPC s. a.). In response to the request from the Government in Skopje, NATO implemented three successive operations in North Macedonia (2001–2003). *Operation Essential Harvest* disarmed ethnic Albanian groups, *Operation Amber Fox* provided protection for international monitors, *Operation Allied Harmony* provided advisory elements to assist the government. The operations demonstrated the strong inter-institutional cooperation between NATO, the EU and the OSCE. During the second Gulf War in *Operation Display Deterrence* (2003) NATO deployed AWACS radar aircraft and air defence batteries to enhance the defence of Turkey. During that mission AWACS aircraft flew 100 missions with 950 flying hours (NATO 2022d; NATO 2022e).

Operation Distinguished Games (2004) responded to the request of the Greek Government to assist to the Olympic and Paralympic Games held in Athens. In the framework of this non-Article 4 or 5 operation NATO provided intelligence support, provision of Chemical, Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence assets and AWACS radar aircraft within the borders of a member country. Although not formally named as an operation, NATO assisted the U.S. after Hurricane Katrina (2005), Pakistan after the huge earthquake (2005) and the African Union in Sudan (2005–2007). These activities focused on providing food, medical and logistics support, humanitarian relief and air transport. Following the popular uprising against the Gadhafi regime, NATO conducted *Operation Unified Protector* (2011) also to provide a no-fly zone over Libya. After the second Gulf war NATO conducted a small support operation called *NATO Training Mission in Iraq* (2004–2011) in order to train, mentor and assist the Iraqi Security Forces. The aim of NATO was to help establish effective and accountable security forces. Member states, without exception, all contributed to the training effort either in or outside of Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment (NATO 2022b; NATO 2022d). NATO launched *Operation Active Endeavour* (2001–2016) to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity in the Mediterranean to secure one of the busiest trade routes in the world. The operation was an Article 5 operation that only involved NATO member countries until it started accepting non-NATO countries in 2004. In 2010 the operation shifted to on-call units and surge operations instead of deployed forces to provide a picture of maritime activity in the Mediterranean. *Operation Allied Provider* (2008) aimed to counter piracy activities off the coast of Somalia. NATO naval forces provided escorts to various UN vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden, where piracy threatened to undermine international humanitarian efforts in Africa. *Operation Allied Protector* (2009) as a successor operation was also a counter-piracy operation with the aim to improve the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation off the Horn of Africa. NATO naval forces conducted surveillance tasks, provided protection, deterred and suppressed piracy, and armed robbery. *Operation Ocean Shield* (2009–2016) focused on at-sea counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa to directly combat piracy. It offered useful assistance to the requesting states to develop own capacity to combat piracy activities. The most famous involvement of NATO overseas was its participation in *International Security Assistance Force* (2001–2014) in Afghanistan. ISAF had three main objectives such as to develop the new Afghan security forces, to enable Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country, and to contribute to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. This mission was one of the largest international crisis management operations ever. At its peak, ISAF brought together up to 51 different contributing nations. ISAF was succeeded by *Resolute Support Mission* (2015–2021), which was much more modest, both in size and scope. This mission aimed at supporting planning, programming and budgeting, and assuring transparency, accountability and oversight. Another important aim was to support adherence to the rule of law and promote good governance (NATO 2022d; NATO 2022f; NATO 2022h; NATO 2022i).

Ongoing operations

Current NATO operations such as *NATO Air Policing* (2004–) and *Enhanced Air Policing* (2014–) are conducted by one of three NATO standing forces on active duty that contribute to NATO's collective defence efforts on a permanent basis. NATO's standing maritime forces, the integrated air defence system and the ballistic missile defence system belong to the collective defence efforts, too. In response to the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, together with the unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022, NATO reassures security measures for its member states. Under normal circumstance, NATO's air policing missions are normally collective peacetime missions to detect, track and identify violations and infringements of airspace, and to take subsequent action. Fighter jets of those member states who possess certain air capabilities patrol the airspace of those who do not have fighter jets of their own. Starting with 2022 NATO has deployed additional aircraft to reinforce its air policing missions over the Baltic States, along the borders of Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, and in the Eastern Adriatic and the Western Balkans. Air policing missions over Iceland and Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are boosted, too (NATO 2022d; NATO 2023b). To provide assistance beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, NATO is committed to support the African Union (AU) in its peacekeeping missions. NATO has assisted the AU mission in Somalia since June 2007, by providing air and sealift support for AU peacekeepers. NATO also provides capacity-building support, as well as training support to the African Standby Force (ASF) Concept (NATO 2022d; NATO 2023a).

NATO Mission Iraq (2018–present) was launched at the Brussels Summit. The Iraqi Government requested it in coordination with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. This mission is a non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission to strengthen Iraqi security institutions and forces to prevent the return of ISIS, fight any form of terrorism and stabilise their country on their own. The mission integrates available civil and military personnel, and works closely with various international actors on the ground. It represents a broad international effort to help Iraq eradicate terrorism and promote stability. NATO advises Iraqi defence and security officials and professional military education institutions in specific areas of focus such as policy and strategy, force generation and development, resource management, women, peace and security issues, leadership development; and good governance (NATO 2022d; NATO 2023c). *Operation Sea Guardian* (2016–present) is a flexible maritime operation that performs the full range of tasks related to maritime security operations. It is currently performing maritime situational awareness, counterterrorism at sea and support to capacity-building. The operation helps to maintain a secure and safe maritime environment while supporting NATO's three core tasks such as collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security (NATO 2021b; NATO 2022d). NATO's *Kosovo Force* (1999–present) had the task to end widespread violence and halt the ongoing humanitarian disaster. Troops continue to maintain a strong presence throughout the territory. After Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 NATO agreed to continue to maintain its presence. It has since helped to create a lightly armed multi-ethnic professional Kosovo Security

Force to carry out security tasks not appropriate for the police. NATO strongly supports the Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina as normalisation of relations is key to solving the political deadlock (NATO 2022c; NATO 2022d).

Conclusions

Over the years it became clear that NATO has the willingness, the necessary structure and procedure together with the means to conduct operations even over a long period of time. Relevant strategic documents augmented by a sound doctrinal system enables the Alliance to have the right strategic-level posture, the appropriate operational-level response, and the necessary tactical-level forces to fulfil its three core tasks. Past and present operations have shown that the existing command structure and force structure of NATO is flexible enough to properly respond to the unfolding forces and trends of this war-prone century. Regardless of the underlying dynamics of the international security environment, NATO has always rightly identified and addressed the main threats and challenges. The unfolding 21st century displays interstate threats and great power competition, which is in sharp contrast with the various forms of transnational challenges and non-peer competitors. In an increasingly competitive world featuring interstate threats and indirect and hybrid forms of warfare, the emergence of disruptive technologies, the strengthening of societal resilience at home, and technological innovation is written large. Whatever the future will be, one can be certain that NATO will still be able to conduct operations when and where they will be needed.

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The European Union – Security Community

Introduction

The chapter introduces the process, which transformed the European integration from a cooperative security organisation into a security community which strengthens collective defence of Member States (COHEN 2001; MOLNÁR 2019: 81–98). The first successful European integration, parallelly to the failure of the first initiatives to establish organisations based on the idea of collective defence (the European Defence Community), started to develop in the field of economy. It grew steadily from the concise area of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and finally in 1993 the European Union (EU) was established. Besides the economic integration, cooperation in the field of foreign policy, security and defence has always been on the agenda.

For a long time, the Member States of the European Union accepted the idea that ultimately the NATO, and with that, the United States of America has been and still it is the main security provider of Western Europe. During the first decades of the European integration's development, this solution might have been seen as a win–win situation for both sides. The Second World War (WWII) devastated Europe and left it with ailing national economies and defence forces, which supported the idea of relying heavily on the help of NATO and the USA. Nevertheless, if we looked closely at the formed (economic) integrations, ECSC, EURATOM and EEC, they all had security and defence related aspects. This trait was especially prominent in ECSC and EURATOM, which addressed aspects to avoid further armed conflicts and wars in Europe, while all three organisations were ultimately aimed to strengthen Europe as a whole (MOLNÁR 2019: 81–82). However, the EEC and later the EU defined itself as a civil, soft and normative power, leaning to use its enlargement, development and trade policies to stabilise not just itself but also its immediate and extended neighbourhood. This initial thinking was represented also in the European Security Strategy (ESS), accepted in 2003, which stated that the EU was contributing to stability within Europe and the wider region (European Council 2009: 16–18). However, the ESS also acknowledged the need for the development of intervention capabilities (BAILES 2005: 17).

Nevertheless, even preceding the conclusions of the ESS, integration in the area of security and defence did not stop at the initial failures, but continued parallel with the ongoing economic integration. The first step of it was the idea of the European Defence Community (EDC), which was too early and too federalist for the countries just regaining their full control over their territories after WWII. The creation of a much less demanding Western European Union (WEU) created a niche for European countries

to work together in a NATO-like collective defence structure (COHEN 2001). This quasi-independent line of integration was moulded into the European Union with a process started in 1992 and finished in 2011, and this was reflected in the organisation's external actions as well. The EU carried on with the legacy of the WEU as a security provider, introducing military and civilian missions as a hard tool to promote security outside of the EU. To be able to capitalise on the new tools and instruments, the EU needed to modify its treaties to accommodate new elements, as well as to establish new institutions to prepare and oversee these activities. The Treaty of Lisbon gives the current legal framework of the EU, while relatively newly established security and defence related bodies include the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). The EU established one of its top positions to represent not only the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) but also the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to third partners, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) in 2009.

The EU's Global Strategy of 2016 created the strategic framework for the European Union to develop into a defence union. Then, the introduction of the Strategic Compass in 2022 carried further this idea of strategic autonomy, taking the EU one step forward in the direction to be a great power. These developments together with the deteriorating security situation in the EU's neighbourhood, which was never as precarious as in 2022 and 2023 with the unprovoked Russian aggression in Ukraine, led to further developments in the defence domain.

Historical background

The European integration has been intertwined with security from the very beginnings. In the late 1940s, the continent was left weakened and stripped from its power after WWII. This led to the first international initiatives to enhance security in the continent. In 1947, the Dunkirk Treaty about cordial friendship was signed by France and the United Kingdom (MOLNÁR 2018: 47–48). This was the first attempt to provide reciprocal security guarantees against an outside aggressor. In this setting, the fear of the renewal of German aggression was the main driver of the treaty. Based on this bilateral treaty, on 17 March 1948 France, the United Kingdom, together with Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (BENELUX states) signed the Brussels Treaty on economic, social and cultural collaboration as well as on collective self-defence. The treaty was to remain in force for 50 years, and called for “all the military and other aid and assistance in their [the signing nations’] power” in case of an armed attack on any of the contracting parties in Europe (The Brussels Treaty 1948). This meant a broadened spectrum of challenges, as a possible Soviet expansion was also considered a tangible threat. The establishment of a defence organisation, the Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO), on the bases of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 was considered the first concrete step towards the idea

of European unity in the field of defence (FIELD MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN 1993: 53; CSIKI 2010: 66).

Since 1949, with the creation of NATO, it seemed that any European initiative regarding common defence is redundant. In 1950, the WUDO decided that the military activities of the organisation should be carried out through NATO and thus it did not have a peacetime military structure as its trans-Atlantic counterpart (BAILES – MESSERVY-WHITING 2011: 9). Just a couple of years later, the failed plan of the EDC was also following this pattern, entrusting the security of Europe to NATO. The plan of the EDC was the result of multiple events. The growing fear of Soviet expansionist ambitions, events to lling European military capabilities like the First Indochina War and the war in Korea engaging French and British forces, and also unsettling events within Europe, as the coup in Prague and the blockade of Berlin all indicated the rearmament of West Germany. This idea was also supported by the USA. However, French mistrust in West German intentions made it difficult to reach a consensus, and Robert Schuman envisioned West Germany's reintegration to Europe via its participation in the ECSC of 1950. However, the USA's proposal made it clear that France should find a solution, since NATO reinforcement in Europe was tied together with the rearmament of West Germany. Thus, the idea of creating a defence organisation within Europe gained momentum. Then French Prime Minister René Pleven introduced a plan to create a common European army in 1950 following the suggestion of Jean Monnet (PASTOR-CASTRO 2006: 388–390). The army was to be subordinated to a supranational authority, under the command of a common European Defence minister, who would have been directly subordinated to the European Defence Council. The army would have consisted of 43 multinational divisions with 100,000 personnel. It was to integrate the entire West German army on a battalion level, while the other signatory parties would have kept their armies and were to contribute division level units to the structure. The European army would have been financed from a common European budget. The treaty was signed on 23 May 1952 in Paris by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. Only four of the signatory parties ratified the treaty. Italy left the question of the ratification for later, whereas the French National Assembly voted against the EDC. Thus, the plan of the EDC failed in 1954 (ANDERSSON 2015: 1; MOLNÁR 2018: 50–53).

Attempts to establish a European defence integration, however, did not cease with the failure of the EDC. In 1954, the United Kingdom proposed the modification of the 1948 Brussels Treaty, which, in its new form included Italy and West Germany as well, in addition to the original members. The Modified Brussels Treaty, establishing the Western European Union, codified a serious commitment towards collective defence. According to Article V. “[I]f any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power” (Brussels Treaty 1954). The WEU, however, inherited the decision made in 1950. The organisation did not have a peacetime military structure; it was leaning on NATO institutions. The question of European defence was thus entrusted again to the NATO practically (BAILES – MESSERVY-WHITING 2011: 12–13).

Throughout its existence, the WEU remained a reserve organisation besides the NATO. Eventually the EEC was set to enhance the WEU, and in 1992 the Petersberg Declaration was introduced. This enabled the organisation to conduct humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (TAYLOR 1994: 1–2). This resulted in the WEU taking up missions, although only those, which were not wanted by other security guarantors. Notwithstanding, the WEU operated missions, and promoted security through participation (VAN EEKELEN 1998: 151–152).

Besides the various defence initiatives, the European integration, following a functionalist approach, also continued in the field of economy (Figure 1). In 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed about the establishment of EURATOM and EEC. These organisations accepted NATO's preferential role in Europe's military defence. However, the European Communities and later the European Union took the leading role on the continent in providing security within the community's borders and externally through soft policy instruments, mainly with its most successful stabilising tools, trade and enlargement policies. Becoming an ever-growing actor in the field of economy, the European community realised the need for political cooperation as well.

The process of political integration started in 1961 with the first Fouchet Plan, aiming for an intergovernmental structure in the field of foreign policy. This initial French proposal nonetheless failed, just like the second, similar Fouchet Plan of 1962, because of the fear from French and West German dominance within the political union. Two consecutive events contributed to the renewal of foreign policy integration: the French assurance of supporting British integration efforts to the EEC (1969) and the Werner Plan on forming a monetary union (1970). In consequence, the Hague summit of foreign ministers tasked Belgian diplomat, Étienne Davignon, to create a plan on possible political cooperation. The Davignon report was presented in 1970 with the plan of the European Political Community (EPC). The EPC kept the intergovernmental structure outside of the Communities' institutional framework, and proposed cooperation in areas where Member States' interests already coincided. Just a decade after its formulation, operational deficiencies became more and more visible, and an institutional reform proposal was presented in 1984. The reform plans led to the institutionalisation of the previously voluntary EPC, and in 1986, the Single European Act established the EPC secretariat, also providing a legal basis for the cooperation (MOLNÁR 2018: 142–149; GAZDAG 2011: 244–246; GÁLIK 2020: 624–627; PENDERS 1988: 41–42). The three different lines of integration were joined together within the EU over time: the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) integrated the EPC establishing the CFSP and started the integration process of the WEU. Later, with the introduction of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) by the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), military defence structures and instruments appeared in the EU's toolbox (MOLNÁR 2019: 81–82).

The Common Security and Defence Policy is the youngest policy area of the EU. It has been developed only since the late 1990s with the institutionalisation of its own security and crisis management structures, integrating the tasks and some institutions of the Western European Union (WEU). In the early 2000s, the EU deployed its first CSDP

missions and operations. The CSDP has become an integral part of the CFSP. During the last two decades, parallel to the development of the crisis management structures and to the debate on the EU's relations to NATO, the idea of a European Security and Defence Union, and the concept of strategic autonomy appeared repeatedly (MOLNÁR et al. 2022).




Figure 1: Timeline of European defence integration

Source: Compiled by Mariann Tanczos

Theoretical framework

It is mostly agreed that the EU is a security provider, however, the nature of this has changed over time together with the security situation. Why can the EU step up as such from the beginning of the integration? It is, firstly, an example of a security community. Regional security complexes tend to form such communities, and the EU by definition is one (KELLY 2007: 200–209). The significance of a regional security complex is that “where states no longer expect, or prepare, to use force in their relations with each other” (BUZAN 2003: 142), and where a sense of community and common identity is developed. These communities tend to resolve the problems both internally and externally in a peaceful manner (TUSICISNY 2007: 426).

Secondly, according to Robert Cooper’s typology, states can be divided in three categories: pre-modern, modern and postmodern.¹ The EU itself belongs to the third, postmodern category. In the postmodern world, the imperialistic instincts of the modern

¹ The nations of the pre-modern world lost their monopoly in the use of force, and they show the signs of failed and fragile states, where all is in war with all (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan and Myanmar). The world of the modern states is full of risks, and existing peace only means a balance in the status quo. These states believe that the borders can be changed by the use of force (e.g. Russia, China and Iran) (COOPER 2002; COOPER 2003; MOLNÁR 2018: 19–20).

world are replaced by moral consciousness. Postmodern states no longer think of solving either internal or external issues with the use of force. The importance of borders fade, but the fundamental building block remains the state; however, supranational organisations like the EU are formed (COOPER 2002; COOPER 2003; MOLNÁR 2018: 19–20).

Now it is also important to establish through what approach the EU operates as a security provider. It is often debated if the EU is a military power, notwithstanding, a great power at all to provide security. Most sources agree that the elements of being a great power are a capable military, economic and political strength, which can influence international affairs. From these elements it is evident that the EU possesses at least one: economic strength (KEOHANE–NYE 1973: 158–161; Collins English Dictionary s. a.). It can be argued if the EU has the political strength to influence international affairs. If we look at the early stages of the EU's approach to external crises, through the lens of civilian, soft and normative power instruments, it is evident that the EU has political influence to some extent. This approach fuelled the elaboration of the first security strategy of the EU, the European Security Strategy of 2003, which is rather optimistic. Until 2016, normative and soft elements dominated in the EU's external actions (MOLNÁR 2019: 82–83).

The introduction of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016 however, brought some changes to this approach. The deteriorating security situation in the neighbourhood (the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014 in particular) resulted in the introduction of *realpolitik* in the new strategy. Of course, the EU gave its own characteristics to the old term. In this sense, it means that the EU should cooperate with its partners on equal terms in the areas of security, economy and politics, where both parties see a win–win situation. This might fuel a need for equality in the partaking countries as well. However, it does not mean that the EU must engage with all countries regardless of its values. This idea is called principled pragmatism in the EUGS, which also pledges to guarantee the security of its citizens (BISCOP 2019: 30–32). Thus, the EU can be considered a political power through its normative tools. The third element of being a great power is the existence of a capable military. As the previous section outlined, at the dawn of the European integration the failed defence initiatives led to a general lean on NATO military structures to seek the defence of Europe. The question if the EU could or should become a military power surfaced from time to time over the organisation's history, and was reintroduced again with the articulated need for European strategic autonomy after the launching of the European Global Strategy in 2016.

The Strategic Compass offered a practical step towards the long desired military structure, the concept of EU Rapid Deployment Capacity was introduced. This meant a 5,000 troops strong modular unit based on the modified EU battlegroup concept, including land, air and maritime components. This is of course not a common army, but a pre-identified unit (European Council 2022a: 13–14). The war in Ukraine has become a driving force for strategic autonomy and a security and defence union. The Russian aggression in the EU's neighbourhood boosted the will for greater cooperation in the field of defence among EU Member States. New initiatives were introduced, like the Hub for European Defence Innovation (HEDI) on defence innovation in the framework of the European Defence Agency. Moreover, EU Member States spent significantly more

on defence; the expenditures doubled since 2014 from 21 billion EUR to 43 billion EUR in 2021. The Russian aggression boosted the spending even further. This process, however, was also parallel with an intensified EU–NATO cooperation. Nevertheless, the EU and its Member States are becoming more and more autonomous with these investments in their defence. This also shines through the EU's engagement in Ukraine with the wide utilisation of the European Peace Facility, a financial tool, and its engagement through CSDP missions (ANDERSSON 2023).

Institutional framework by the Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty provided legal personality to the EU and abolished the former three-pillar system of the EU. The new treaty has brought significant change in the field of foreign and security policy introducing new legal instruments and institutional framework, such as the permanent structured cooperation in the field of defence (Article 42.6 and Protocol 10 of the TEU), the mutual assistance (Article 42.7 of the TEU) and solidarity clause (Article 222 of the TFEU). The Treaty of Lisbon changed the name of the European Security and Defence Policy to the Common Security and Defence Policy. The creation of a permanent chair to the European Council has, among other things, helped the European Union to act in a more united way outside its territories. The creation of the position of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) in 2009, and the creation of the European External Action Service in 2010 were important steps forward in achieving coherence between the European Union's external actions.

With the mutual assistance clause of the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 42.7), the European Union assumed an important role in the protection of its own territory. However, the text emphasises that NATO remains the primary framework of collective defence for NATO members, as twenty-two out of the 27 EU member states are also members of NATO. In terms of territorial defence, the mutual assistance clause only supplements the collective defence arising from Article 5 of NATO. Article 42.7 does not state the clear obligation to provide military assistance, this article only contains an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in the power of the member states (which can be military of course).

One of the most significant features of the Treaty of Lisbon was that it promoted a more transparent separation of competences between different levels of governance. This new contractual framework also achieved results in the separation of the competencies of external policies. By abolishing the pillar system of the Treaty of Maastricht, the CFSP is no longer clearly separable from other external actions, yet it remains a special policy which is an exception to all the general rules of the functioning of the EU. The strong connection between the two areas is nonetheless ensured by the European Council with its orientation role, the Foreign Affairs Council (i.e. the Council of the Union in charge of foreign affairs and chaired by the HR, FAC), the European Commission, the European External Action Service and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The HR has had an increased political role being also

Vice-President of the European Commission and leading the European External Action Service (MOLNÁR–CSIKI 2023).

In the context of a complex set of foreign policy instruments, a multifaceted institutional system, (both intergovernmental and community) decision-making processes have developed. The role of the acting institutions varies depending on the policy areas (LAUFFER–HAMACHER 2016: 31; VANHOONACKER–POMORSKA 2017: 97). Nowadays the external relations network of the EU can be described as the continuous interplay and development of at least eight fields: 1. common commercial policy (CCP); 2. development policy; 3. economic, financial and technical cooperation; 4. aid policy; 5. the process of enlargement; 6. association agreements (like the EEA [European Economic Area] or ENP [European Neighbourhood Policy]); 7. diplomatic relations; and 8. the CSFP/CSDP. The EU's commercial policy is closely linked to EU development policy, to the enlargement process and to CFSP. The decision-making processes and institutional systems of these external policies vary considerably and “develop according to their own integration logic” (VANHOONACKER–POMORSKA 2017: 98). The association agreement contains chapters on development or economic financial and technical cooperation, and these are closely connected to issues on stabilisation and security.

The CFSP and as an integral part of it, the CSDP continue to operate on an inter-governmental basis. The European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council have a key role in the decision-making processes of the CFSP and CSDP. The European Union is represented in international relations externally by the President of the European Commission, the President of the European Council, the HR/VP, the EU Delegations (EU's diplomatic missions) and the European External Action Service. As an integral part of the CFSP, the CSDP is shaped by the governments of the Member States and the different bodies of the Council. The main instruments for decisions are the general guidelines laid down by the European Council (European Council conclusions) and the decisions adopted by the Council. Decisions are taken by consensus. According to the treaties there are some exceptions to unanimity (e.g. appointing a special representative). Nevertheless, in the case of “vital and stated reasons of national policy”, a MS can oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the possibility of constructive abstention, when a MS abstaining in a vote, making a formal declaration about it, it is not obliged to apply the decision, but accepts the decision of the Union (Article 31 of the TEU).

One of the key players in the promotion of the CFSP and the CSDP is the European Council, which, with the Treaty of Lisbon, has become a formal EU institution and is chaired by a permanent President. The European Council is composed of the heads of state or government of EU Member States. One of the key roles of the European Council is to set political priorities and guidelines to tackle the EU's foreign, security and defence policy challenges and crises. The political weight of the conclusions issued after the meetings stems mainly from the fact that they express the common political will of the Member States at the highest possible level.

The ministerial level decision-making body, the Council of the European Union (Council), which assembles monthly, and its foreign and security policy formation, the

Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), takes decisions on the CFSP and CSDP. The FAC is composed of foreign, trade or development ministers. There is no separate Council for defence. Defence ministers attend meetings of foreign ministers twice a year. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council (excluding trade formation) have been chaired permanently by the HR/VP. The dossiers on the agenda of the meetings are prepared by COREPER II, which brings together the ambassadors of the Permanent Representatives of the Member States to the EU. The decision-making structure of the Council includes the military and civilian crisis management decision-making bodies set up since 2000: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the Politico-Military Group (PMG).

The Political and Security Committee (ambassadorial level) monitors the international situation, makes recommendations to the Council and provides political control and strategic direction of military operations (European Council 2022b). The EU Military Committee is the highest military body in the EU, its members are the Chiefs of Staff of the Member States. The EUMC provides recommendations to the PSC on military matters (European Council 2022d). The CIVCOM provides advice to the PSC on civilian (i.e. non-military areas related primarily to the rule of law and civilian security sector) aspects of crisis management (European Council 2022c). As an intermediate organisational form, the PMG is carrying out preparatory work for the PSC both on military and civilian–military issues in crisis management (European Council 2017).

The European External Action Service was established in July 2010 by a decision of the Council of the European Union (2010/427 / EU) and became operational in 2011. The EEAS is directed by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Josep Borrell in 2022). It is an independent body of the European Union, neither affiliated to the Commission nor to the General Secretariat of the Council. The EEAS is made up of a central administrative body and the EU Delegations, its diplomatic missions (2010/427 / EU Art. 1). The EEAS is responsible for assisting the HR/VP in formulating and implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The body is responsible for maintaining diplomatic relations and strategic partnerships with non-EU countries, cooperating with the diplomatic services of international organisations and countries. It also plays a key role in peacebuilding, security, EU development policy, humanitarian aid and crisis response, the fight against climate change and promoting human rights.

The Brussels-based EEAS also cooperates continuously with Member States' Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, as well as with EU institutions (such as the European Commission, the Council and the Parliament) and international organisations (such as the UN). Although the EEAS is directed by the HR/VP, the daily tasks are performed under the supervision of the Secretary General. The Secretary General relies on three Deputy Secretaries General. Like national foreign administrations, the EEAS is made up of geographical and thematic directorates. There are five geographical units: 1. Asia-Pacific; 2. Africa; 3. Europe and Central Asia; 4. the wider Middle East; and 5. the Americas. The various thematic units deal with global and multilateral issues, such as human rights,

democracy support, migration, development, crisis response, and administrative and financial issues.

The EEAS has merged and created the various institutionalised structures for crisis management related to the CSDP: the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and, as part of it, the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) from 2017, the Directorate Integrated Approach for Security and Peace (ISP), the Directorate Security and Defence Policy, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (IntCen).

The network of diplomatic missions and delegations assists the central administration. In accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon, the EEAS is responsible for the functioning of the EU Delegations, which are the successors of the delegations of the Commissions. The EU has delegations or offices in almost 150 countries and international organisations (UN, AU, OECD, COE, FAO, WTO) and has an extensive network. The delegations are responsible for representing EU citizens and the EU itself, in order to promote the values and interests of the EU. Besides liaising with the host country, they analyse and report on political and economic developments in the country, and support development cooperation through projects and grants. Delegations have an important role in raising the international visibility of the EU (GLUME–REHRL 2017; European External Action Service 2021a; MOLNÁR 2020a: 243–244).

In addition to the network of delegations, EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) also operate in many countries around the world. In order to support the work of the HR/VP, EUSRs contribute to the consolidation of EU policies and interests and the consolidation of peace, stability and the rule of law in fragile regions and countries. The EUSRs contribute to the active political presence of the EU in key countries and regions such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, Kosovo, the peace process in the Middle East, the Sahel, and the crisis in the South Caucasus and Georgia (European External Action Service 2021b).

One of the biggest innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon was the introduction of the position of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The merging of the three previous positions (High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Commissioner for External Relations of the European Commission and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council) resulted in a so-called “double-hatted” (sometimes considered a threefold identity because of the presidency) position of the High Representative. The new position became a “quasi-foreign minister”. According to Article 18 of the Treaty on the European Union, “the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The European Council may end his term of office by the same procedure”. As the High Representative also holds the position of Vice-President of the European Commission, his or her appointment must be approved by the European Parliament after a hearing in the European Parliament’s Committee.

The main purpose of creating the position of the High Representative was to enable the EU to act more consistently, to bring more continuity and play a stronger role in international politics. The High Representative prepares and chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and, as one of the EC Vice-Presidents, is also responsible for coordinating the external relations of the European Commission. The High Representative's role is to assist in the process of finding compromises among Member States in order to develop a common EU position, and to represent these foreign policy decisions on bilateral and multilateral international platforms. The High Representative complements, but does not replace, Member State diplomacy.

The High Representative is responsible for coordinating and harmonising the various areas of external actions, such as aid, trade, humanitarian aid and crisis response, in addition to traditional diplomatic activities. The HR/VP is also responsible for the management of the European Defence Agency and the European Union Institute for Security Studies. In the field of oversight and representation of foreign and security policy, the HR/VP has practically taken over the role of the country holding the rotating presidency as well, as he or she chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (MOLNÁR 2015; MOLNÁR 2020b: 237–238).

Conclusions

Following long decades of (sometimes unsuccessful) initiatives on European integration in the field of security and defence, the EU seems to achieve its long envisioned unity. This is the result of the trial and error decades starting with the Western Union Defence Organisation, through the failed European Defence Community as well as the Western European Union. This process was also supported by the security strategies of the European Union, which shaped common actions and decisions. The most significant leap forward was, besides the institutional reform dating from 1997, was the EUGS of 2016, which marked the starting point of wider cooperation on security and defence. The process has been building on at least six pillars: the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the introduction of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the establishment of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), the creation of the European Defence Fund (EDF), and the establishment of the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the introduction of the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity in the EU's Strategic Compass of 2022. These are the building blocks of the European security and defence union (ESDU), which was described in 2017, by the European Commission. The "Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence" underlined the need for the establishment of an ESDU (European Commission 2017: 11). Although the definition of the ESDU is still very broad, the gradual realisation of deeper European defence cooperation began after the adoption of the Global Strategy step-by-step based on the six pillars. These achievements were unimaginable just a decade ago (MOLNÁR–CSIKI 2023; European Commission 2016).

The war in Ukraine also gave impetus to the cooperation in the field of security and defence among EU Member States. The formerly unimaginable scale of aggression in the immediate neighbourhood resulted in increased military budgets, and intensified procurement of military equipment in EU Member States. The EU also capitalised on its existing tools and instruments, like CSDP action and the EPF to show its autonomous willingness to support Ukraine. Until May 2023 the EU contributed 4.6 billion EUR to Ukraine under the EPF framework, while it also decided to support training through a new CSDP mission, launched in October 2022, EUMAM Ukraine. These actions show that the EU is willing and capable to act alone in the field of security and defence; however, development in this domain is still ongoing. The war in Ukraine can result in a strengthened defence cooperation both within the EU, and between EU and NATO. The increased need in cooperation can also lead the EU's way forward to establish a well-defined ESDU in the long term.

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EU Missions and Operations

Historical perspective

The European Union has been conducting peace support operations with the aim of peace-keeping, conflict resolution and crisis management for more than 20 years starting with the first interventions in 2003. Today, EU missions and operations are the crucial part of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which works in the framework of the broader EU policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in line with the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and the United Nations Charter (XAVIER–REHRL 2016: 78–83). These multinational peace support operations are either of civilian nature (also including police forces) or military nature, allows the European Union to take common action against crisis and conflict with performing the so-called Petersberg tasks (Figure 1) (EUR-Lex 2022).




Figure 1: Petersberg tasks

Source: Compiled by the authors

The Petersberg tasks were integrated into the EU's external action inherited from the Western European Union. The list of tasks was agreed on by the Petersberg Declaration in 1992 which is still fundamental and present in EU CSDP today, however, substantially expanded. CFSP was introduced in the EU with the Maastricht Treaty coming into force in 1993. While in the following years, the intensification of conflicts, and later on war in the Balkans after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, directly influenced European regional security, and EU Member States started to focus more efforts and resources on cooperative measures on security and defence. Following the milestone of the Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998 by the bilateral endeavours of the United Kingdom and France, subsequent EU high level meetings led to the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) becoming operational in 2003 (LINDSTROM 2021: 16–21). ESDP

made it possible for the European Union to establish its first civilian mission and military operations in the same year, in 2003. A policing mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina – EUPM BiH), and two military operations, European Union Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUFOR Concordia), also known as Operation Concordia, and European Union Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR Artemis/Operation Artemis) (LINDSTROM 2021: 16–21).

The EU conducting peace operations the first time in its history has challenged the assumptions of its *soft*, or in other contexts called, *civilian* power identity, starting discussions on the EU's role in the world internally and externally (see DUCHÊNE 1972: 32–47). It also established the basis of the common policy, which later on have become the European Common Security and Defence Policy. The EU's intention to develop further its external action and focus more attention and capacities on security and defence was also boosted. It was closely connected to the changes in the global and transatlantic security architecture shaped first by the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 (VAN HAM 2022). Subsequently, the indirect effects of the Arab Spring in 2011, and the direct ones of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 gave further impetus to the EU to enhance cooperation on common security and defence.

*The post-Lisbon era: Decision-making and institutional background
of EU missions and operations*

Institutional background and capabilities of the EU to conduct missions and operations was significantly strengthened with the Lisbon Treaty coming into force in 2009, as a consequence of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) becoming another area of common action of the European Union, from that time on functioning as Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). CSDP providing “the European Union with an operational capacity to deploy civilian and military missions and operations abroad” is managed by the European External Action Service (EEAS), another institution born with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty (EEAS 2022). The EEAS, operational since 2011, is led by the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), who is also the Vice-President of the European Commission. The HR/VP is assisted by the Secretary General and his/her deputies in managing the external actions of the EU, including CSDP, through the EEAS. The Deputy Secretary General of the EEAS for CSDP and Crisis Response is responsible for the EU missions and operations.

As of May 2023, the EU has established 42 missions and operations, having 23 ongoing CSDP missions and operations simultaneously in Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans and in the Eastern neighbourhood (Figure 2) in 2023 late spring. Nine of them are military missions and operations, while 14 missions are of civilian nature with all together more than 4,000 EU personnel deployed (EEAS 2022). The changing security landscape in Europe and the adoption of the EU's first de facto defence strategy, the EU Strategic Compass, in 2022 both contributed to the enhanced focus on CFSP and CSDP issues in

the EU, which is also mirrored in the number of new EU missions and operations launched since then. Two of the four most recently launched missions are military in nature: the European Military Assistance Mission in Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) and the European Military Partnership Mission Niger (EUMPM Niger). EUMAM Ukraine was set up upon the decision of the Council on deploying a military assistance mission to Ukraine in the last quarter of 2022 (Council of the European Union 2022a), while EUPMP Niger was launched early 2023 (EEAS 2023a). Similarly in early 2023, the European Union established two new civilian missions as well, EU Monitoring Capacity in Armenia (EUMCAP Armenia) and EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM Moldova) (EEAS 2023b). It is also important to note that in some partner countries, such as the Central African Republic, Mali or Somalia, and most recently Niger, the European Union is present with both military and civilian missions. The parallel CSDP actions are further enhancing the comprehensive approach to conflict management in its external action, using the synergies of civilian and military tools at the same time for addressing crisis.




Figure 2: EU CSDP missions and operations

Source: Compiled by the authors based on EEAS 2022

Crucial elements and guiding principles of the decision-making process on CSDP missions and operations are legitimacy and unanimity. Strong legitimacy can be provided by the resolution of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), or by the direct request

of a partner country (the future host nation of the mission or operation) asking for support or intervention of the EU members states. The first means the authorisation of the UNSC adopting a resolution calling and/or allowing the international community to act and/or to use military force for conflict resolution or the protection of civilian population in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Charter. This was the case with today's largest ongoing EU CSDP civilian mission, EULEX Kosovo, which will be discussed later as a case study. The second option – deploying a CSDP mission based on the invitation of the partner country – is yet another practice, which also creates a legitimate framework for the establishment of the missions and operations. This was the case for example with the missions serving as a case study in the next chapter, the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM Ukraine) in Ukraine, when Kyiv requested the assistance of the EU via deploying a civilian mission to the country.

Besides legitimacy and compliance with international law, for conducting EU CSDP missions and operations, the baseline of the decision-making process is that all EU Member States need to agree and unanimously decide on setting up a mission or operation. Upon the proposal of the HR/VP or an EU Member State, this decision is made by the Council of the European Union by unanimity (MORENO 2021: 80–86). Nevertheless, a new precedent must be noted regarding the decision-making process, relying on the so-called *constructive abstention* based on Article 31 of the TEU. This allows EU countries to abstain from voting in favour of the decision of the Council on CFSP issues – such as deploying missions – without blocking the decision to be made. “In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union” (EUR-Lex 2012). Constructive abstention has never been used with regards to CSDP missions and operations up until October 2022, when Hungary decided to abstain from voting in favour of deploying the newest EU mission, EU Military Assistance Mission, EUMAM Ukraine (TIDEY 2022).

CSDP-related decision-making in the Council of the EU practically means that out of the 10 different configurations, EU governmental representatives are convening in the framework of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). This structure is usually composed of foreign ministers of the EU, but other formations exist depending on the agenda (defence, development and trade ministers). The FAC is the body responsible for elaborating the EU's external action in line of the strategic guidelines provided by the European Council, and launching CSDP missions and operations (AMORIM–KLEIN 2021: 48–50). However, operational and day-to-day work on CSDP issues, including missions and operations are managed by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) composed of ambassadors of EU members states in Brussels, who meet on a weekly basis.

The detailed procedure supporting decision-making as well as the further operationalisation of the political and strategic commitments is called the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP), which has been systemising the planning of CSDP missions and operations since 2013. The CMP integrates several different procedures describing not only how different actors engage and take responsibility in the decision-making process, but also identify crucial strategic and operational documents to be prepared and adopted (TIDEY 2022). As part of the CMP process, one of the most vital document to be pre-

sented is the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), which – in case of both civilian and military missions – provides a detailed description of how CSDP instruments, included missions and operations, should be used to prevent or handle rising or existing conflicts and crises. Accordingly, the CMP and the CMC play crucial role in missions and operations regardless of their military or civilian nature, but subsequent phases of operational planning are different based on the separate command and control (C2) structures. The latter as well as other differences and similarities are discussed in the following chapter.

Typology of CSDP missions and operations

CSDP missions and operations led by the European Union can be categorised as civilian and military. While operations are only of military nature, we can find both civilian and military missions functioning within the CSDP framework. Civilian missions are commanded by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) inside the structure of the EEAS. Most commonly we identify the two main type of CSDP missions and operations: *civilian missions* – such as EULEX Kosovo or EUAM Ukraine which will be studied further on –, and *military missions and operations*. While missions of civilian nature work with civilian experts and/or police personnel and are financed by the CSFP budget, military missions and operations always include the deployment of armed forces personnel to perform the respective mandate and are partially funded by the off-budget instrument, the European Peace Facility (EPF). Military missions and operations can be further divided into two different subgroups based on their executive or non-executive nature laid down in their mandate.




Figure 3: Types of missions and operations in the framework of EU CSDP

Source: Compiled by the authors

Additional difference between executive and non-executive military missions and operations in CSDP can be found in the command and control (C2) structure of these peace support operations led by the EU. While both types are under the “political control and strategic directions” of the PSC, operations with executive mandate are either commanded by a Member State in a national framework, or by using existing NATO command structure – based on the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements – on the operational level. Under the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, concluded in 2003, the two international organisations agreed that the EU would have access to NATO assets and capabilities to be able to lead military operations (NATO 2004). Currently, the only EU CSDP military operation functioning in the framework of the Berlin Plus arrangements – which is the fundamental and most operational pillar of the strategic cooperation between the EU and NATO – is EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia Herzegovina (RITTMAN 2021).

Non-executive military missions, which are also called military training missions, or military missions, however – primarily focusing on training and advising components – are commanded by the first permanent military structure of the EU established in 2017, the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) (EEAS 2019). Similarly to the command structure of the civilian missions led by the CPCC, the MPCC is integrated in the structure of the EEAS in Brussels. MPCC serves as the military-strategic level headquarters of EU-led military missions, while operational headquarters (OHQs) are led by an operational commander in the host country of the mission deployed by the EU. Civilian and military operational commanders leading the OHQs are responsible for the two most important operational documents of the missions and/or operations, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN). These two documents also need to be approved by Member States through the PSC (MORENO 2021).

Civilian missions and case study of EULEX Kosovo and EUAM Ukraine

As of May 2023, there were *14 ongoing civilian CSDP missions* led by the European Union. These missions are commanded – as previously discussed – by the CPCC, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, and often work with an executive mandate, meaning that in several cases civilian CSDP missions have functions to carry out tasks, prosecute cases or act as security providers in the given theatre. The mandates of these missions – currently located in Armenia, the Central African Republic, Georgia, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Mali, Moldova, Niger, the Palestinian territory, Somalia and Ukraine – are highly heterogeneous. Nevertheless, thematically all of them are built around security sector reform (SSR) processes with the aim of supporting government institutions of the host countries, such as law enforcement, judiciary, and other principal pillars contributing to maintain law, order and peace, and to strengthen democratic values, such as the rule of law or the protection of human rights.

As the TEU (EUR-Lex 2012) only prohibits the expenditure of the EU budget explicitly on military and defence-related purposes, civilian missions based on the agreement of Member States can be and are financed from the EU budget for CFSP directly (CîRLIG 2016).

Civilian CSDP missions work with a diverse international staff arriving to the missions from different institutions or agencies of the EU or its Member States. Personnel can be divided to *international staff*, who are either seconded by their national governments or contracted directly as international experts, and *local staff*, who are contracted experts, workforce as nationals/citizens of the host country of the mission. Furthermore, it is important to highlight again that civilian experts deployed in the case of EU CSDP civilian missions can be uniformed personnel, such as police officers, or other professionals from law enforcement, border management agencies and institutions other than the members of armed forces or active duty military personnel.

In the following, two case studies, EULEX Kosovo and EUAM Ukraine is presented to further enhance the understanding on the EU's work on the ground with civilian missions deployed.

EULEX Kosovo

European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) is the largest ongoing EU CSDP civilian mission which was set up in 2008. EULEX's legitimacy is based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999 (UNSCR 1999). This resolution authorised "Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo [...] for organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government and [...] supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peacebuilding activities" (UNSCR 1999). Accordingly, the mandate of EULEX Kosovo is in line with the provisions of UNSCR 1244 (1999) explicitly focusing on supporting the establishment and strengthening of the rule of law and democratic institutions in Kosovo with special attention to judicial authorities and law enforcement (EUR-Lex 2008). EU engagement in the region derives both from geographical proximity as well as experience and criticism voiced with respect to the EU; caused by the lack of decisiveness and intervention during the violent war(s) in the Balkans after the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

While the principal aim of the ongoing EU civilian CSDP mission in Kosovo is to support the rule of law, the mandate further specifies what the main tasks and focal points of the work of EULEX Kosovo are. The mission was set up as the continuation of the UN peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, Reconstruction and Economic Development of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) – coexisting with EULEX for an interim period – which shaped the mandate as well as the interpretation of the rule of law in case of EULEX "encouraging civilian state-building through political reforms" (ZUPANČIČ et al. 2018: 599–614). The mandate of the EU's longest running mission has been changed, transformed and renewed several times, extended until 2023, at the time of the writing, with the relevant Council Decision, yet the focus on supporting judicial and law enforcement institutions stayed with the main goal of EULEX (Council of the EU 2021c). Under the current mandate in 2023, the 420 personnel of the mission led by Lars-Gunnar Wigemark, a Swedish diplomat as head of mission, works in two major areas and

components: monitoring and operations (EULEX Kosovo 2022a). The monitoring pillar of the mission supports transparency and accountability via monitoring selected trials and cases dealt with by the Kosovo judicial system, while contributing to the successful functioning of the Kosovo Correctional Services (EULEX Kosovo 2022b). As the Yugoslav wars were especially violent in terms of sexual and gender-based violence, using rape and other forms of sexual violence as a tactics of war, the EULEX Kosovo monitoring pillar involves the direct implementation of gender sensitive judicial processes, victim protection and forensic services. Under this area of activity, the mission focuses on sensitisation, tackling impunity of perpetrators, as well as producing crucial documents and reports on the topic for awareness raising and training purposes, such as the *Assessment of the Handling of Rape Cases by the Justice System in Kosovo* (EULEX Kosovo 2022c).

The operations pillar of EULEX Kosovo has another, yet very different function compared to the tasks carried out under the monitoring pillar. The mission's police force, EULEX's Formed Police Unit is the secondary security responder in Kosovo with a smaller residual capability, which is the integrative and crucial part of a "three-layer security responder mechanism". Based on the latter, the first security responder in Kosovo is the national Kosovar police force, the second responder is the EULEX's Formed Police Unit, while the third is the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). Maintaining this residual police force capability provides the executive part of the mandate of EULEX Kosovo, which, however, is limited to certain crimes and functions, mostly focusing on crowd and riot control (EULEX Kosovo 2020).

It is important to note regarding the EULEX mission that five members of the EU – namely Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Slovakia – do not recognise Kosovo as an independent state, which affects the overall work of the mission on the ground especially the coordination of peace talks between Pristina and Belgrade. Nevertheless, the trust in the largest and longest standing EU civilian CSDP mission seems to be continuous. There are neither specific provisions nor concrete steps on the possible termination of the mission.

EUAM Ukraine

The EU has established EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine in December 2014 following the Maidan revolution. The mass demonstrations also known as the Revolution of Dignity were fuelled by the decision of the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovich who refused at the end of 2013 to sign the Association Agreement, aiming at further deepening of EU–Ukraine relations (LITRA et al. 2017). After violent clashes between law enforcement authorities and protesters, while European governments, Germany, Poland and France were leading negotiations between the Ukrainian leadership and the opposition, president Yanukovich fled the country in the first quarter of 2014 and the Russian Federation annexed Crimea. Upon the request of the new Ukrainian Government, the EU established EUAM Ukraine with the aim of assisting "relevant Ukrainian authorities towards a sustainable reform of the civilian

security sector through strategic advice and practical support for specific reform measures based on EU standards and international principles of good governance and human rights” (EUAM Ukraine 2022a).

Since the Revolution of Dignity and the annexation of Crimea, the ties between the EU and Ukraine have been significantly strengthened moving beyond the Eastern Partnership and the EU Neighbourhood Policy instruments. This shift was further strengthened by the establishment of EUAM Ukraine. With the set-up of an EU CSDP mission in Ukraine, the bilateral relations between Ukraine and the EU have turned to an explicitly security-oriented cooperation for the first time in their modern history (LITRA et al. 2017). The EU has already been present with its only ‘hybrid’ mission in Ukraine since 2005, but the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, EUBAM, has had only very limited and local mandate focusing on cooperation between border management institutions, and facilitating the harmonisation of border control and customs structures (EUBAM 2022). Originally, the mandate of the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine was to provide strategic advice and support Ukrainian authorities with civilian security sector reform (EUAM Ukraine 2022a). Nevertheless, after the first year, based on the strategic review process, the EU extended the mandate to include training in the mission’s main activities (LITRA et al. 2017). In 2015 the mission mandate consisted of three main areas of operation:

EUAM Ukraine areas of operation		
Strategic advice to develop strategic documents and legislation	Support the implementation of reforms with practical advice, training and equipment	Cooperation and coordination to ensure coherence and reform efforts between Ukraine and international actors

Figure 4: Areas of operation of EUAM Ukraine

Source: Compiled by the authors based on EUAM Ukraine 2023

The importance of EUAM Ukraine is based on the fact that the mission’s capacity building mandate includes advising and cooperating with all Ukrainian security sector institutions excluding the armed forces (HANSEN 2016). Nevertheless, the main focus of EUAM Ukraine between all national core security providers was law enforcement, its mechanisms and personnel. Additionally, the EUAM Ukraine mission has a system of key principles alongside which the missions intended to implement its mandate successfully. While five key principles focused on issues such as community safety and police management, or strengthening the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, additional three cross-cutting principles guided the work of the mission: gender equality, good governance and anti-corruption efforts (EUAM Ukraine 2023). Carrying out its mandate until the outbreak of the war, EUAM Ukraine trained up to 32,000 personnel, and contributed with the preparation of 72 draft laws in cooperation with the Ukrainian legislation (EUAM Ukraine 2022a).

The EUAM Ukraine mission’s structure consists of two main components: the mission headquarters in Kyiv and an operational department. Headquarters includes the office of the head of mission – at the time of the writing, Finnish civilian expert and diplomat,

Antti Juhani Hartikainen – the mission’s analytical capability and other policy and human resource-focused components. The operations department consists of three thematic components – governance, rule of law and law enforcement agencies – four field offices and a mobile unit (EUAM Ukraine 2022c).

At the time of the writing,¹ since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in early 2022, EUAM Ukraine implements different tasks with a more limited mandate (EUAM Ukraine 2023). While the civilian mission of the EU still supports civilian security sector initiatives and works with institutions on issues such as the rule of law and law enforcement capability building, most recently EUAM Ukraine mission personnel has had a crucial role in coordinating humanitarian aid. Moreover, the mission also assists and coordinates the safe route of refugees and internally displaced Ukrainians who were forced to leave their homes due to the war (LITRA et al. 2017). Additionally, in order to stop impunity, the EUAM Ukraine directly supports Ukrainian authorities investigating and prosecuting war crime cases, which was made possible by the amendment of the mandate of the mission in 2022. To carry out this new role, the mission participates in the work of the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group and supports the Mobile Justice Teams in Ukraine, in parallel with setting up a team of specialised experts for working on war crimes cases (EUAM Ukraine 2022b).

Military missions and operations

Besides the above described civilian CSDP missions, the EU in a lesser extent is engaged in military missions and operations as well. Out of the total 23 EU CSDP deployments which are ongoing in 2023, only nine were military related. Since 2005, the number of civilian missions has always exceeded the military ones, whereas in the early stages of CSDP missions, in 2003 and 2004, the figures were equal (EEAS 2021b). With previous years’ trends, the EU moves closer to these early rates, especially with launching its latest military missions: EUMAM Ukraine in 2022 (Council of the EU 2022a) and EUMPM Niger in 2023 (Council of the EU 2023). The Council of the European Union stated in 2006 that distinction between military and civilian missions is artificial, since civilian missions can be supported by the military. Nevertheless, within the four types of EU missions they specified, military missions form their own distinct group from the beginning (Council of the EU 2022b). In 2007, the TEU did not specify the terminology related to missions and operations. Article 42 of Section 2 uses the term ‘mission’ uniformly to all the out-of-area deployments under CSDP (EUR-Lex 2012). Out-of-area deployments are those engagements, which are conducted outside the EU’s territory. Despite the EU’s terminological reticence on the subject in EU Treaties, a general differentiation emerged over time, based on the nature of the mission (military or civilian – as described previously above), and the mandate of the missions. Regarding military missions, the differentiation is more obvious, those with a non-executive mandate are called

¹ May 2023.

military missions, while the ones with executive mandates are called military operations (MEYER 2022).

The distinction between non-executive and executive mandates is related to the tasks the different military missions and operations carry out. The difference between the two groups follows the distribution introduced in the context of civilian CSDP missions as well. In this sense, non-executive mandates are focused more on advisory and training tasks operating from the background. While executive military operations are taking over the tasks or acting instead of local security forces (TSITSIKOSTAS 2021: 87).

Along these lines, the current nine military deployments can be further divided. In 2023, the EU had six military missions and three military operations deployed. The six non-executive military missions were mostly training focused: EUTM Mali, EUTM Mozambique, EUTM RCA and EUTM Somalia, EUMAM Ukraine, and an advisory mission, EUMPM Niger. Among the three executive military operations, further sub-groups can be identified, since there were two naval operations, EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUNAVFOR Med Operation Irini. EUFOR Althea was the only land CSDP military operation of the EU at the examined period.

The two groups differ in the command structure, as well. As mentioned earlier, the MPCC provides the OHQs in Brussels, to EUTM type missions, while the Mission Force Headquarters (MFHQ) are located in the area of operation [Council of the EU 2021a: Annex IV. Part A, s. 1(1)(d)]. Executive military operations have a different command structure, which leans on the Member States or the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement, which makes possible the use of existing NATO infrastructure for operational purposes (NATO 2004). The two naval operations have their OHQs in EU Member States, EUNAVFOR Med Operation Irini in Rome Italy, EUNAVFOR Atalanta in Rota, Spain. EUFOR Althea is unique in this aspect, too since its OHQ is located in Mons, Belgium, with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) of NATO. Thus, this latter falls under the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement. Executive military operations have their Force Headquarters (FHQ) deployed in their area of operation, as well [Council of the EU 2021a: Annex IV. Part A, s. 1(1)(c)].

CSDP military missions and operations are financed by the EPF. This is a relatively new tool in the EU’s CSDP toolbox. The EPF replaced the Athena Mechanism in 2021. The establishment of the new instrument did not change a lot on the financing aspects of the missions and operations. Among the first statements establishing this new tool, the Council Decision firmly stated that EPF will continue to cover only the common costs, just like Athena Mechanism before (Council of the EU 2021a: Article 11). However, there were still significant changes in the amount. While the Athena Mechanism financed only up to 10% of the costs, the EPF, which remains outside the EU budget, can provide 30% of the common costs or even higher, up to 45%, based on a case-by-case decision (FIOTT 2018: 311–315).

For the better understanding how non-executive missions and executive operations work, a case study was selected from each of the deployment types. The two cases were chosen based on their educational value. Thus, EUTM RCA represents military missions and EUNAVFOR Med Operation Irini military operations. Both of these EU

deployments have gone through significant transformations, which makes them practical for showing the possible evolution of CSDP missions, besides representing two entirely different types of missions.

EUTM RCA

At first glance, European Union Training Mission Central African Republic (EUTM RCA²) seems like the other training missions launched under CSDP. However, this training mission is the result of a complex chain of EU and UN missions in the country.

The Central African Republic became independent in 1960. Since then, the country experienced multiple coups and inter-ethnic violence, even at the intensity of a war. The leadership changed multiple times, not necessarily via elections. The country had to declare itself bankrupt twice since its independence. This volatile history led to the renewal of violence in 2012. This time religious groups were formed and fought at first against the autocratic government, then against each other. In 2013, the Muslim majority Seleka grabbed power in the country. After a couple of months, due to international pressure, an interim government took over, led by Catherine Samba-Panza (VECSEY 2016: 139–141). The interim president's invitation letter, together with UN Security Council Resolution 2134 provided legal basis for the EU military operation, which lay the foundations of the current training mission. To form a mission with such objective, first safe and secure environment was needed. This was achieved with the deployment of a military operation EUFOR RCA in 2014, together with UN mission MINUSCA (Council of the EU 2014). As the mandate of the EUFOR expired in 2015, the government's renewed invitation created a niche to continuous EU action in the Central African Republic. The security situation allowed the deployment of a strategic military advisory mission, EUMAM RCA. This mission prepared the country for the SSR, and a consecutive EU mission (Council of the EU 2015a).

EUTM RCA thus, is the result of consecutive EU actions, which were necessary to re-establish government authority first in Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic. Then, with the de-escalation of the conflict, room opened up first for strategic advisory activity, and SSR, followed by a military training mission. These latter two operated alongside each other in 2022.

EUTM RCA was established in 2016 and plays an important role in the defence sector reform in the country, which is part of the wider SSR managed by the MINUSCA (Council of the EU 2016). The mission has four main tasks: it provides strategic advice, education, training and support for the strategic communication efforts (Council of the EU 2022c). To fulfil these tasks, the mission has an authorised 365 personnel of which only 225 positions were filled in 2020. Despite the shortfalls in the personnel, EUTM RCA trained and educated around 7,000 members of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) between 2016 and 2020 (HICKENDORFF–ACKO 2021: 2–7). The tasks of the mis-

² Acronym of the country's name in its official language, French: République Centrafricaine.

sion are claimed to have evolved naturally throughout the mandates. EUTM provided strategic advice to multiple bodies over time, from the President's cabinet through the General Staff of the FACA and delivered education in the topics of "human rights, international humanitarian law, gender issues, the protection of civilians, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and the Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agenda" (Council of the EU 2016). Along with the changes in the tasks, the area of operation was also enlarged, and EUTM RCA operated not just in Bangui and Bouar as during the first two mandates, but in N'Dele and Bangassou, too by 2022 (EEAS 2021a).

The chain of missions in the Central African Republic shows how CSDP action can change over time according to the needs of the host country. Success can also be assessed by the nature and area of operation of the mission, since EU activity started as an executive military operation in the country, concentrating on the creation of safe and secure environment in Bangui. By 2022, the situation de-escalated to allow the EU to gradually shift to military non-executive and civilian missions, and to enlarge the area of operation as well. However, the presence of other external actors, like the Russian Federation affiliated Wagner Group, and its activities also influenced EU action in the country (RETTMAN 2023).

EUNAVFOR Med Operation Irini

The predecessor of EUNAVFOR Med Operation Irini, Operation Sophia was launched in 2015 with one of the fastest processes, to collect information and stop migrant smuggling networks in the Mediterranean region. The main goal of the military operation was to disrupt the operation of these organised crime networks and contribute to the training of the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard (Council of the EU 2015b). The dramatic increase of migratory figures in the Central Mediterranean migration route and the lack of burden sharing however resulted in the withdrawal of the naval assets of the operation. This, in the end, led to the discontinuation of the operation in 2020 (VECSEY 2022: 138–149).

Consequently, the EU rebranded the operation, and EUNAVFOR Med Operation Irini was launched (ALAGNA 2020). The new operation was equipped with a different objective, focusing on the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya. Two supplementary tasks derived from Operation Sophia: "Assisting with the development of capacities and the training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy and contributing to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks." The prevention of illicit export of petroleum from Libya was also added to the mandate (Council of the EU 2020). Besides the renewed list of tasks, the new EUNAVFOR operates in a reduced area of responsibility, which is restricted to the eastern shores of Libya, to fulfil its main objective (RIZZI 2020). This means that the naval assets of the operation are patrolling outside the traditional migration routes. For the surveillance of the smuggling networks only aerial assets can be engaged, which eliminates the problem of disembarkation (VECSEY 2022: 139).

It is clear from the objectives that the operation is still expected to contribute to the disruption of the human smuggling business model, but it is only allowed to use its air component to do so, while the naval component enforces and fulfils the remaining tasks of the mandate connected to the enforcement of the arms embargo on Libya. In 2022, the operation consisted of two surface naval vessels and eight air assets (EUNAVFOR Med s. a.), clearly showing that the primary focus of the operation has shifted towards surveillance and drifted further away from contributing to maritime security.

Future perspectives

The history of EU CSDP missions is nearing its 20th-year mark, with 42 missions launched, and 23 running in the first half of 2023, the EU showed its willingness to take action as a security provider. The distribution of military and civilian missions shows that in parallel with the deterioration of the security situation on the international stage, the EU engages increasingly with military missions. The growing number of military interventions triggered changes in the financing as well, replacing the less favourable Athena Mechanism with the European Peace Facility. This latter covers up to 45% of the common costs of military missions, thus is believed to be able to boost previously ailing Member State participation.

The challenges of the early 21st century called mostly for civilian CSDP engagement, both in the form of executive and non-executive civilian missions, like EULEX Kosovo and EUAM Ukraine. However, the 2020s brought a slightly different era to our World considering security. Since 2020, the EU launched four new military missions and three civilian missions. This also manifests the negative trend in the security environment. The civilian missions were launched in Armenia, the Central African Republic and Moldova. One of the old-new military operations launched was EUNAVFOR Med Operation Irini, which replaced Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean in 2020, while another training mission was set up in 2021, EUTM Mozambique. This mission was the first one which experienced the generosity of the European Peace Facility. The instrument was already in effect when the Council Decision was made on the new training mission in Africa. The EPF ended up providing 45% of the common costs of the mission (Council of the EU 2021b). The youngest two military missions were launched in late 2022, early 2023. The Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) is pledged to provide training to Ukraine's Armed Forces on European soil. The mission is initially planned to last for two years (Council of the EU 2022a), while EU Military Partnership Mission Niger (EUMPM Niger) was launched on 20 February 2023 to advise Niger Armed Forces on training and development (Council of the EU 2022d).

As another answer to the Russian aggression in Ukraine, some changes happened regarding wider Common Security and Defence related issues as well. On 1 June 2022, Denmark removed its opt-out from the CSDP structure. This means the deepening of the cooperation among the EU Members in theory, which is the general aim of the organisation (GRONHOLT-PEDERSEN–SKYDSGAARD 2022). It is however not just a more unified voice and

approach to CSDP what the war in Eastern Europe brought to the EU. In Mali, where the EU was present since 2013, the EU had to downsize its training mission, EUTM Mali. The decision was made after the Russian influence on decision makers became embarrassingly clear. During the course of 2022, Russian officials, like Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and even President Vladimir Putin admitted the presence of the private military company in the country (U.S. Embassy in Mali 2022). In Mali, however, this was not the only reason for downsizing. The country experienced two military coups within 12 months, the first on 18 August 2020, and the second on 24 May 2021 (JEZEQUEL 2021). The military junta, still in power at the time of the writing, cannot give sufficient guarantees to the EU that the also present, notorious, Russian state affiliated Wagner Group will not interfere with the training. Thus, HR/VP Josep Borrell announced the suspension of the training activities of the EUTM Mali in April 2022 (BINNIE 2022).

This recent adjustment in the EUTM shows that EU missions and operations are prone to changes in the political and security environment. Another example for this is the case study on EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia/Irini. The transition between the two operations were forced by the Italian Government, following the line of national interest on migration. This means that CSDP missions and operations are exposed to security threats and political disputes, which is reflected in their tasks, objectives, or in the end in their existence.

The ever-changing mandates of the missions give room for improvement. The UN's Women Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda of 2000 based on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and 9 subsequent resolutions on WPS, is still under implementation inclusively in every mission and operation focusing on the inclusion of women in peace-building, but also protecting women and girls from the disproportionate effects of war and armed conflict. Moreover, the EU also acknowledged the relevance of climate change in security and defence. As more and more cross-cutting and intersectional policy areas are appearing in security and defence, it will be immensely important to pursue the promoted comprehensive and integrated approach on addressing crises and conflicts.

This latter needs a better harmonisation of EU projects in third countries, such as CSDP missions and operations and other initiatives in the same area of operation. Besides this, interagency cooperation is needed to represent the EU as a whole, capable international actor, who in several theatres acts as a coordinating agent with other international organisations as well as different EU agencies on the ground. With the appearance and proliferation of transnational security threats, such as migration, organised crime and terrorism, the border between the internal and external nexus became blurred. Agencies, which previously worked on the EU's immediate borders, like the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) are expanding their area of operation. Frontex deploys forces, and opens offices in distant third countries, while CSDP missions and operations move closer to EU borders (PARKES 2016).

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The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – Co-operative Security

Introduction

In international security and defence policy, a number of various frameworks of cooperation are available for different actors. In the resulting diversity, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a unique participant of co-operative security, which makes the organisation an option for arranging the settlement of crisis situations. This study aims to summarise such processes from specific perspectives.

First, an overview will be presented on the concepts supporting the theory which frames the topic. The OSCE will be examined through the theory of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde on the extended concept of security (BUZAN et al. 1998). A further dimension is offered by the theory of regional security complexes, which states that international security is founded on the relationships or the lack of relationships among actors (BUZAN et al. 1998: 11). The components of this dimension are geographical, political, military, economic and energy related factors with significant impact on the interests and values of the actors constituting regional forms of co-operation as well as subsystems, so-called security complexes (VIDA 2007: 30–40).

The security character of the OSCE

The OSCE, comprising 57 European, North American and Asian Member States is the largest regional organisation of the world with more than one billion population on its territory (OSCE s. a.m). It can be viewed as a general complex including the combination of the North American regional complex and of the European super-complex, furthermore, in some respects, it can be characterised by sub-complexes. Regional security complexes are parts of the system of collective security (BUZAN et al. 1998; REMEK 2017a). “The efficiency of collective security systems is reduced by neutrality, volunteer participation prioritising individual interests and reliance on individual force” (TISOVSZKY 1997: 9). Nevertheless, Article 52, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter supports regional efforts contributing to international peace and security: “The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council” (United Nations 1945: Article 52).

A regional organisation is defined as “an organization established by an inter-governmental treaty whose member states are bound by objectives deriving from their

common geographical, social, cultural, economic and political background” (BLAHÓ–PRANDLER 2014: 345). Beyond this, the states constituting a regional organisation or participating in specific agreements also form an independent security community (MATUS 2005: 179), which is a result of their gradually deepening co-operation. A security community is defined as a community of states “in which the participant states have made an agreement to settle possible conflicts nonviolently” (DANNREUTHER 2013: 146). In this context, the role of norms gets more and more important.

The role of norms must be emphasised in the case of the OSCE, especially because of the co-operative nature of the interpretation of security by the organisation. Co-operative security involves a system of institutions and mechanisms used by sovereign states in order to eliminate threats to security posed by state- or non-state actors (MIHALKA 2005: 114). Co-operative security is often considered a system of preventive mechanisms and institutions also related to collective security. Collective security can be defined as an effort to provide security inside a group of co-operating states (MIHALKA–COHEN 2001: 6). For example, the United Nations is a universal international organisation for collective security, the principles of which are included in its Charter. A regional example could be the OSCE, which aims at ensuring security in the Eurasian and Atlantic region. The definitions of co-operative security and collective security are, however, difficult to distinguish and are sometimes regarded interchangeable. As to collective defence, the distinction is clearer: an organisation of collective defence is established to defend its members from external aggression (MIHALKA–COHEN 2001: 7). In summary, a co-operative and a collective security organisation is focused on preventing and eliminating threats especially with non-military tools, whereas a collective defence organisation is usually based on the mutual commitment of its member states to defend each other with military tools in case of an aggression against any of them.

Co-operative security is the most general form of security political co-operation by states where a number of states try to eliminate a threat considered dangerous by each participant state. In a broader sense, it is a network of political and legal relations among states. It includes membership in international organisations as well as specific agreements, for instance, on verification of compliance with agreements on the limitation of armed forces, and other bi- and multilateral agreements. Another example for a co-operative security organisation can be the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); however, the prototype for the mechanism is the OSCE. The OSCE, like other regional organisations, “can act as a vanguard for the UN by building regional consensus around security issues before they are taken up at the global level” (ZANNIER 2015: 109).

The strategic and theoretical framework of the OSCE for security and defence

The emerging challenges of the post-bipolar era required innovative responses by the international actors (RADA 2019: 1–10). While the total number of interstate conflicts decreased in the 1990s, the intrastate conflicts increased in amount (FRIEDMANN 2007: 78). The new challenges were of such nature that their management created new tasks for

the actors seeking to cope with those conflicts. The legal predecessor of the OSCE, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) also took on new tasks from 1992 by engaging in international activities through its long-term missions, for instance, in Kosovo, the Sanjak, Vojvodina, Macedonia, Estonia and Latvia. All were crisis prevention or crisis management missions terminating in the early 2000s (DUNAY 2010: 26).

The old and new components of the strategic framework of the organisation complemented and reinforced each other. Whereas the organisation identified the 21st century challenges in its Security Strategy (OSCE: 2003), it enhanced the security of its members and environment in line with the earlier principles (Helsinki Accords; Decalogue), reliant on a comprehensive and co-operative concept of security. It was comprehensive because it placed under scrutiny each sector of security (military, political, societal, economic, environmental and cyber). Co-operative, because each participatory state has equal rights. It should be underscored that the predecessor to the OSCE, the CSCE, had already done efficient work during the Cold War, such as the confidence- and security-building measures at the Stockholm Conference in 1984–1986, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990, and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in the same year. The member states of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact stated in the latter that they no longer considered each other enemies (NAGY 2010: 20).

Although the Helsinki Decalogue (CSCE 1975) served well to enhance East–West relations in the Cold War, its guiding principles did not completely fit the changed circumstances of the post-Cold War era. In some regions, “an irreconcilable conflict of interests arose between the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, including the inviolability of borders and the right of peoples to self-determination” (NAGY 2010: 21).

In the early 1990s, the operation of the CSCE was institutionalised and in 1994 in Budapest it transformed into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The organisation remained a forum for political dialogue between its member states: “The OSCE continued to play a key role in the European security architecture as a forum for inclusive dialogue and a platform for joint action” (Istituto Affari Internazionali 2016: 2), acting as an impartial observer and mediator. Consensus based decision-making not only survived but also has become a measuring instrument for the sense of responsibility of the states.

The OSCE aims at preventing the outbreak of conflicts as well as reaching a lasting settlement of prevalent conflicts and remedy afterwards, for which the toolbox of the organisation includes early warning, conflict prevention or resolution, crisis management and rehabilitation, which can be summarised by the term conflict cycle (OSCE s. a.a).

The peculiarities of OSCE crisis management are embodied in its institutional structure (see below), principles and mechanisms; in addition, these provide its framework for action. Principles and mechanisms were established in the early 1990s and were intended to counterbalance difficulties posed by consensus-based decision-making. An example is the introduction of the principles of “consensus minus one” and of “consensus minus two”. According to these, if CSCE commitments were not honoured, decisions could be made without the consent of the countries concerned. In the first case, the state concerned

could not participate in voting, and in the second, two states in conflict would be called upon to make a compromise (REMEK 2017c: 159–160).

As to mechanisms, the Vienna, the Berlin, the Moscow and Valletta Mechanisms were introduced. According to the Vienna Mechanism, a participant state may ask another one for information if it perceives unusual military activities, and response must be given in 48 hours. If response is denied or is unacceptable, the two countries may negotiate with the assistance of the OSCE. On request, the OSCE may even arrange an emergency meeting. The Berlin Mechanism must be applied if a state suspects that an emergency situation is unfolding in another state. In such a case information can be requested for from the state in question. It also involves opportunity for an emergency meeting. The main idea of the Moscow Mechanism is that, following information exchange and a bilateral meeting, the initiating party can ask the partner state to host an expert mission. If this request is denied, the initiating party may ask for a “reporting mission”. The Valletta Mechanism is a reconciliatory one, within the framework of which any state may ask a third state to intervene in the settlement of a dispute. Less known is the Risk Reduction Mechanism, the Consultation and Co-operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities (OSCE 2011).

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides opportunity for deepening co-operation between the international actors in the area of prevention. Until the end of the 1990s, in the peaceful settlement of local disputes most efforts focused routinely on “the culture of reaction” (peacekeeping, peacebuilding, rehabilitation), not on “the culture of prevention” (early warning, early intervention). At present, the main objective of the OSCE is obviously the latter, although the intention to prevent conflicts manifested as early as the time of the CSCE.

The activities and organisational structure of the OSCE

From the 1990s, the OSCE became an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic system of institutions. On the basis of the division of work among European institutions, as a regional organisation of “soft security”, it mostly uses the tools of “soft power” (SALÁT 2010: 100–113), traditionally managing three dimensions: political, economic-environmental and human. This threefold division has prevailed since the baskets of the Helsinki Accords (CSCE 1975). The activities of the organisation are broad-range and extend to many kinds of missions.

The first dimension, for instance, comprises security political and military issues, arms control, border control, conflict prevention and management, reform of the security sector, counterterrorism efforts and confidence building measures. The second dimension involves good governance and areas related to economic, technological and environmental cooperation. The third dimension includes areas such as humanitarian and human rights issues, tolerance, anti-discrimination efforts, rule of law and freedom of the media (OSCE s. a.k). Beyond these three dimensions, some activities may be “overarching”, that is, related to more than one dimension, for example, global challenges, cybersecu-

rity, trafficking in humans, the state of education and of the youth, or the issue of gender equality (OSCE s. a.k).

The OSCE does not have a legal status in international law, so all its decisions are of political nature. The lack of a founding document has so far prevented the OSCE from establishing an international legal status for the whole of the organisation. Nevertheless, some of its bodies, for instance the OSCE Secretariat and the Parliamentary Assembly, enjoy legal status with privileges and immunities granted by the host states of their headquarters. A Draft Convention on the International Legal Personality, Legal Capacity, and Privileges and Immunities of the OSCE was created in 2007 but not adopted by all participating states (OSCE 2015). The reason was that some states insisted the organisation must have a statute, that is, a founding document first. The legal personality of the OSCE would be crucial in a number of areas such as in entering into agreements and co-operation with other international organisations and institutions or providing security, insurance and protection for members of OSCE missions (see the following chapter). However, the OSCE still meets the criteria of being an international organisation and the majority of its tools, decisions, declarations are framed in legal wording, and their interpretation requires the overall understanding of the basic principles of international law as well as of international treaties.

The declarations of the organisation have been and are issued at the highest political level and have real significance. An example could be the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which was signed by Heads of Government and Heads of State on 21 November 1990 (OSCE 1990: 2). It was the first multilateral agreement which stated the importance of the end of the Cold War and, additionally, the need for the institutionalisation of the CSCE. This institutionalisation marked the adaptation of the organisation to the changed security environment and the reinforcement of its role in conflict prevention. For instance, at the 1992 Helsinki Summit a decision was made to establish the following: Forum for Security Co-operation, High Commissioner on National Minorities, Economic Forum, Senior Council.

In 1990, the Conflict Prevention Centre was established with the mission of reducing the risk of conflicts and assisting the work of the CSCE institutions. Today the Centre works as an early warning hub facilitating talks and mediation between missions and decision-making bodies as well as regional co-operation initiatives. Furthermore, it provides assistance to the Forum for Security Co-operation, which is an independent decision-making body on military security issues.

In summary, it can be concluded that “with the Charter of Paris, the classic and spectacular period of the CSCE terminated and, since then, its history is characterised by slow evolution” (NYUSZTAY 1997: 21). A tangible result of this evolution is the current organisational structure of the OSCE, which will be discussed below.

The organisational structure of the OSCE

The OSCE has decision-making, executive and confidence building bodies. (For field missions see the following chapter.) Figure 1 describes the structure of decision-making.




Figure 1: OSCE Decision-making Bodies

Source: Compiled by the authors based on OSCE s. a.j

The Heads of State and Heads of Government gather at summit meetings, the highest political forums. The summit meetings assess the overall state of the OSCE region and determine the strategic objectives. The preparation of the summits takes place at review conferences (OSCE s. a.i).

Between summits, decision-making and related tasks of leadership are the responsibility of the Ministerial Council, which is the highest political body. Its members are the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the participant states who meet annually in the country filling the post of chairpersonship. If a country objects to a proposal, the talks may end without a result, because at the sessions of the Council consensus rarely develops, and, in lack of it, no decision can be made (BLAHÓ–PRANDLER 2014: 366). Thus, despite its importance, this body does not always support the crisis management by the OSCE.

The Senior Council prepares the meetings of the Ministerial Council and implements the decisions. Its members are political directors delegated from the Ministries for Foreign Affairs of the participating countries. It was integrated into the Permanent Council in 1997.

The headquarters of the Permanent Council is in Vienna. It works in weekly sessions led by the Chairperson-in-Office. The Permanent Council discusses conflicts, challenges and risks in the OSCE region, issuing declarations and making decisions (OSCE s. a.f).

The creation of the Permanent Council enhanced the early warning capability of the OSCE, what is more, the Council plays a decisive role in conflict prevention as it has an appropriate toolbox including fact-finding, data collecting and long-term missions. The latter is relevant because the Permanent Council grants the mandates for operations and is responsible for their extension (COHEN 1999: 91). Besides, “the efficiency of conflict prevention also depends on its influence on states so that it can motivate them to use their crisis prevention instruments for achieving the objectives” (COHEN 1999: 23).

As it was mentioned earlier, military security and the creation of stability belong to the Forum for Security Co-operation. It was established in 1992 and its members are the permanent representatives of the participant states of the OSCE. It is responsible for the exchange of military information and the implementation of confidence building and security enhancement measures, furthermore, the democratic control over security forces. Its headquarters is in Vienna, where its sessions are held weekly.

The most transparent institutions in the OSCE are the Chairpersonship and the Chairperson-in-office beside the Troika, which is reference to the collaboration of the preceding, the incumbent and the next Chairperson-in-Office. This trio-like collaboration was institutionalised by the Helsinki Document 1992. Chairpersonship is held on rotation by a different participating state each year. The Foreign Minister of the country which holds chairmanship in a particular year is the Chairperson-in Office (OSCE s. a.j). The Chairperson-in-Office is responsible for the coordination of relationships with international organisations, consultations. The Chairperson-in-Office also plays an important role in conflict prevention and crisis management. His or her work is helped to a great extent by the Personal Representatives of the Chairperson-in-Office. Several Representatives of the Chairperson-in-Office may be working and each is appointed and tasked by the Chairperson-in-Office. They are involved in prevention and crisis management, besides, ensure the “visibility” of the OSCE in areas like gender, youth and to lerance issues (COHEN 1999: 23–30).

The Parliamentary Assembly, which has its headquarters in Copenhagen and which does not directly take part in crisis management, was one of the outcomes of institutionalisation. It was established in 1990 with the mission of maintaining contact among the national assemblies of the participant states. Thus, the members of the Parliamentary Assembly are delegated by the national parliaments of the member states. Its mission includes the development of conflict resolution mechanisms, the reinforcement of democratic institutions and the facilitation of the cooperation of the OSCE institutions (OSCE s. a.d).

The bodies discussed so far have been decision-making ones, as it was said above. Executive bodies are as follows (see Figure 2 below): the Secretary General (since 1992) is responsible for administrative aspects of implementation and financial affairs together with the Secretariat (since 1990).




Figure 2: OSCE Executive Bodies

Source: Compiled by the authors based on OSCE s. a.j

The Secretary General has significant tasks in relation to crisis management, for instance, informing the Permanent Council about increasing tensions or deepening crisis in the area of operations of the OSCE. The Secretary General also consults the states concerned, makes proposals for possible solution, oversees the leadership of the OSCE missions, and coordinates the tasks between the OSCE missions and bodies. The Secretary General takes part in debates in the Permanent Council and in the Forum for Security Co-operation and oversees the management of field operations. Besides, the Secretary General acts as a representative of the Chairperson-in-Office in achieving their objectives (OSCE s. a.g).

When it comes to conflict prevention, the position of the High Commissioner on National Minorities created in 1992 needs to be mentioned, too. The High Commissioner has a role in the early warning phase of crises besides their prevention. Taking into consideration that one or more groups of ethnic minorities can be found on the territory of nearly all participant states, due to the mission of the High Commissioner, safeguarding minority rights may contribute to the stability of the region through its mission in shaping an integrated, multi-cultural society, which is in line with the mission of the OSCE.

The High Commissioner provides “‘early warning’ and, as appropriate, ‘early action’ at the earliest possible stage with regard to tensions involving national minority issues that have the potential to develop into a conflict”. [...] The High Commissioner enters into contact with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) whose headquarters are located in Warsaw (CSCE 1992: 8). The latter represents the human rights dimension of the OSCE. One of its main missions, for instance, is monitoring elections and honouring OSCE principles and commitments during the process (OSCE ODIHR 2010).

The Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM) is responsible for the independence and plurality of the media. Free and independent media is a pillar of democratic societies, that is why the OSCE pays special attention to free expression of opinion and open journalism.

Apart from the above mentioned bodies, further institutions of confidence building are connected to the OSCE. One is the Open Skies Consultative Commission, which oversees the implementation of the Treaty on Open Skies in effect since 2002. Unfortunately, the United States withdrew from the Treaty in 2020, and Russia withdrew in 2021 (Arms Control Association 2021). Another is the Joint Consultative Group, which verifies the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (OSCE s. a.h). Finally, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration seated in Geneva is committed to settling interstate debates, however, its assistance has never been requested.

The role of the OSCE in crisis management

The changes in the 1990s required the launch of OSCE missions. The objectives of missions were officially stated at the Helsinki Summit in 1992: for example, data collection, fact-finding, peacekeeping as well as their types: short term, such as data collecting, or long term, such as peacekeeping with observer missions (CSCE 1992: 13–14).

The tasks included in the crisis management portfolio of the OSCE are early warning, conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding summarised as conflict cycle in the academic literature, as it was mentioned before. They are accomplished through a network of local missions and with the participation of the above-mentioned Conflict Prevention Centre. In addition to the Permanent Council, the Security Cooperation Forum bears responsibility for crisis management. Among the major tasks of the latter are regular consultations on arms limitation and disarmament, and, in addition, assistance in the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures, for which the regulation of the exchange and mutual verification of military information is crucial.

The various field missions of the OSCE provide its peculiarities and unique character mentioned before. Currently, in 2023, eleven missions are in process in four regions Southeast Europe, East Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia (OSCE s. a.l). OSCE missions are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

For launching a mission, the consent of the host state is needed, as well as the consensus of the state parties. The mandate is determined by the Permanent Council and the Head of Mission is appointed by the Chairperson-in-Office. The mandate of the Heads of Mission can be extended annually. The civilian or military experts of the missions are delegated by the member states. Missions can enter in any phase of the crisis, thus accomplishing diverse tasks from preventive diplomacy to post-crisis peacebuilding.

The OSCE has various tools for performing its missions, for instance, involving fact-finding and rapporteur missions, missions accomplished by the Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office, or ad hoc work groups, which are set up case by case, mechanisms for debate resolution and peacekeeping, among others (OSVÁTH et al. 2002: 26–29).

Missions can be remarkably diverse in mandate, size or tasks. This requires a certain flexibility from the OSCE, while the experience gained from the many missions results in the unique capability of the OSCE to manage crises. Earlier it was mentioned that the Permanent Council plays a decisive role in controlling the missions, nevertheless,

each detail of the launch of a mission must be acceptable to the participating states. The host country must take an active part in the elaboration of the mandate of the mission in order to avoid their perception of the event as a violation of its sovereignty later. That is, the mission must be welcomed by the host governments, whose consent is required in three areas: the mandate, the budget and the Memorandum of Understanding (OSCE Network 2014: 12).

According to the rules of procedure, the Chairperson-in-Office appoints the Head of Mission on the basis of preliminary consultation with the participatory states, which is confirmed by the decision of the Permanent Council (COHEN 1999: 88). Reports by the Heads of Mission are the primary means of early warning, in addition, they provide feedback on the accomplishment of tasks. The reports are relevant but not public, and they serve as tools in the coordination of those political bodies of the OSCE that may impact the completion of the mission (COHEN 1999: 89).

On the whole, the OSCE missions have three advantages in comparison with similar activities of other organisations. These also offer an explanation for the statement in the introduction that the organisation has remained an option for addressing a number of crisis situations: its activities are characterised by inclusivity, expertise and quick reaction.

Budget

As much as 70% of the budget of the OSCE is allocated by the 28 Member States of the EU. In the 1990s, some analysts claim, the EU paid little attention to the political, military and economic environment (NÜNLIST–SVARIN 2014: 14), focusing principally on the exportation of human rights and democracy to the East. The obsolescence of the arms control mechanism of the OSCE directly resulted from the negligence of the military dimension (KORZUN 2016). Besides, NATO and the EU were more and more “competing” with the organisation in creating European security, but they had more financial resources than the OSCE, whose annual budget decreased by 25% in the past decade (NÜNLIST–SVARIN 2014: 14).

For instance, the 2016 budget of €141 million amounted to only 3% of the UN budget. Six nations granted 60% of the funding, all of them being G7 members: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States (DE WAAL 2017).

As it was seen formerly, the OSCE finances itself from the contributions of its 57 participant states. For instance, on 18 August 2021, in Permanent Council Decision No. 1413, the OSCE Permanent Council adopted the Organization’s Unified Budget for 2021, totalling €138,204,100 (OSCE 2017; OSCE 2021b). Currently, the OSCE employs 550 officials in its institutions and 2,330 in field operations. The number of local staff is three times higher than that of international employees (OSCE s. a.e).

In order to enhance transparency and accountability, and prevent fraud or mismanagement of resources, independent internal and external auditors regularly examine and evaluate the budgetary and financial activities of the organisation. If alleged or suspected

mismanagement arises, they report it to the Secretary General. Audits, assessments and investigations are conducted by international standards (OSCE s. a.e).

A major challenge of the future is to increase the contributions of the OSCE member states so that the organisation can efficiently perform its operative tasks. Secretary General Thomas Greminger recognised on entering office in 2017 that the Unified Budget of the OSCE had been decreasing in the previous years. He remarked: “If we want the OSCE to be fit for purpose, we need the participating States to come along resource wise” (LIECHTENSTEIN 2017).

Under Helga Maria Schmid, the incumbent Secretary General since 2020, the Unified Budget was the same in two following years: €138,204,100 (OSCE 2020: 104; OSCE 2021a: 104).

Summary

The OSCE addresses various aspects of security within its own range of activities. Its comparative advantages in contrast to other international actors are its political and institutional inclusivity, regional expertise, routine and quick reaction. Nevertheless, its activities are hindered by its shortcomings in planning and execution, and especially the burden of the financial sustainability of individual operations (OSCE Network 2014: 3).

The OSCE is an important factor in the European security system: a suitable political thermometer (DUNAY 2010: 24). Using Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs Didier Burkhalter’s words: the OSCE has become the eyes and ears of the international community.

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OSCE – Missions

Introduction

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is regarded as an international organisation which uses mainly tools of soft power. Indeed, it does not have military force for peacekeeping and it conducts mostly civilian missions centred on the three dimensions of crisis management: politico-military, economic and environmental, and human. Politico-military areas of co-operation in the OSCE comprise consultation and exchange of information on military equipment, arms control, the safe storage of small arms and ammunition, and defence sector reform, among other things. American political scientist Joseph Nye defines soft power as the ability to attract through cultural and political values rather than coercion (NYE 2008: 95). This may be true for the OSCE since its decisions are not legally but politically binding for its member states. It is also believed that deeds have a greater role in wielding soft power than publicity and promotion (NYE 2008: 104; LEONARD et al. 2002: 53; RADA 2019: 1–10). So the commitment of the member states to co-operation in confidence building significantly enhances security and regionally supports the objectives of the UN to maintain international peace and security.

The OSCE is unique because it does not have a founding document which could clearly describe its institutions and regulate their operation and still has been working as the largest regional security organisation with its 57 participating states. Besides, it does not have a legal personality (see the previous chapter), which means it must rely on the ad hoc decisions of its participating states. These decisions must be made by consensus, which seems to be a challenge taking into consideration its extensive membership. Even more contradictory is the fact that these two features were allegedly demanded by the two opponent powers of the Cold War (REMLER 2021: 1): the lack of legal personality was supported by the U.S., in order to prevent competition with the United Nations; and working on the principle of consensus was preferred by the Soviet Union in order to retain some of its influence.

Despite its shortcomings, the OSCE has remarkable achievements in peacekeeping in collaboration with other international organisations. Three aspects will be summarised in this section: 1. flexibility; 2. the inclusion of local people; 3. pooling equipment. 1. One reason for the success of OSCE participation in missions may be, in lack of full institutionalisation, its flexibility: it has a relatively small but very targeted budget, and its regulations allow fund raising from “extra-budgetary projects” (DIJKSTRA et al. 2019: 525). The low level of institutionalisation is not always a drawback: for instance, veto options are fewer in the decision-making process than in a more formalised system of decision-making. Thus, the deployment of a mission together with giving or extending

its mandate is faster and less complicated than in other organisations. 2. Another positive feature of the OSCE is inclusion: the rate of local staff it employs is much higher than that of its own staff. The recruitment of staff for field operations is facilitated by a roster of experts who can be invited and selected well before a mission is given a mandate. 3. Last, but not least, participating states have created a virtual pool of equipment (DIJKSTRA et al. 2019: 533), which allows the organisation to pursue specific projects flexibly. The OSCE is definitely not a large and well-funded organisation, nevertheless, in 2022 it operated 14 peacekeeping missions, with only 267 personnel and 2,199 locally contracted staff. For comparison: the United Nations had 79,447, the EU had 4,453, and NATO had 4,270 employees in the same period of time (Sipri 2022).

This chapter provides an overview of the main institutional components that have a role in crisis management and peacekeeping, then refers to the major documents which create a theoretical basis for this activity. Field missions will be characterised shortly, then a case study of the OSCE participation in crisis management in Ukraine will be presented. The last section summarises the partnerships of the OSCE and the conclusions try to forecast future developments.

The institutional background to OSCE missions

The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC)

The CPC of the OSCE is located in Vienna. It is involved in early warning, mediation and conflict resolution in all three dimensions of security and at each point of the conflict cycle (see the previous chapter on the OSCE). It monitors the developments in the regions which are of major concern to the organisation: Eastern Europe, Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. It facilitates the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) described in the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security of 1994 and the Vienna Document of 2011. Thus, it keeps track of military equipment, conventional weapons and military expenditure. The Centre operates various mechanisms developed for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for crisis response.

The priority of the CPC is field operations, which play a decisive role in crisis management taking into consideration that they employ 80% of the staff and consume 60% of the core budget of the whole organisation (OSCE 2020a: 2). The CPC plans and, if necessary, restructures or closes operations and, in addition, assesses their efficiency and puts in practice the lessons learnt from field experience. The operations tackle issues arising in all three dimensions of the activities of the OSCE: politico-military, economic and environmental as well as human. Some examples are: confidence building measures in military and non-military fields; mediation and dialogue facilitation; project management; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, destruction of small arms, light weapons and conventional ammunition; gender mainstreaming of OSCE activities.

The CPC is constituted by:

1. The Policy Support Service, which involves four regional desks and the Regional Support Service, which consists of the Planning and Analysis Team and the Mediation Support team as well as the Situation/Communications Room.
2. The Programming and Evaluation Support Unit.
3. The Forum for Security Co-operation Support Section including the Communications Network Unit.

From the Policy Support Service, the role of the Situation/Communications Room should be highlighted as it establishes a link between the Secretariat and the field operations around the clock in crisis or in an emergency situation (OSCE 2020a: 2).

In summary, the Conflict Prevention Centre provides assistance to member states in complying with their commitments. In this respect its advisory support to the Forum for Security Co-operation should be emphasised, as the Forum is a decision-making body on politico-military issues.

The Forum for Security Co-operation

The Forum for Security Co-operation is a decision-making body below the level of the Summit and the Ministerial Council. It works alongside with the Permanent Council (see Figure 1 in the previous chapter). While at the Summit the Heads of State or Government of the 57 member states meet when required, the Foreign Ministers hold the Ministerial Council annually. The Permanent Council meets every week to offer opportunity for the permanent representatives for political dialogue. In parallel, the Forum for Security Co-operation allows the permanent representatives consultation on security and military issues (OSCE 2020b: 3). In addition to the negotiation of security and confidence building measures, the evaluation of the implementation of decisions takes place within the framework of the Forum.

The Forum has its own rotational system of chairing based on four-month cycles, independently of the OSCE chairmanship but collaborating closely with the incumbent Chairperson-in-Office. The Forum for Security Co-operation Support Section (FSC Support Section) is the hub for military information exchange, which means that it provides assistance to the field operations.

The theoretical background to OSCE missions reflected by major documents

The Charter of the United Nations (1945) is referred to in OSCE documents as the principal source of the guidelines for co-operation and efforts for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The functioning of the OSCE is in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, which permits regional arrangements to participate in the maintenance of international peace and security and to take regional action for the pacific settlement of local disputes.

In the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, in short, the Helsinki Final Act (1975), the participating states agreed that they remain committed to the Charter of the UN in the event of a conflict between it and any other international treaty or agreement (OSCE 1975: 8). This already foreshadowed that all the documents of the CSCE, later OSCE would harmonise with the UN Charter. Consequently, they express the member states' commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes and to making efforts for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) welcomed the re-unification of Europe and forecast an era of democracy and co-operation. This was based on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) mentioned formerly, and, more importantly, on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1990), which was expected to establish a balance at a lower level of military equipment as a result of arms reduction (OSCE 1990: 8). Although the Treaty was considered a success at the end of the bipolar world order, its gradual erosion started from the early 2000s, leading to Russia's suspension of its obligations in 2007, then Poland stopped the implementation of the treaty with reference to Belarus in 2023 because of the Russia–Ukraine war, and Russia formally withdrew from the treaty in the same year (KIMBALL–HERNÁNDEZ 2023). In addition, the Charter reaffirmed the significance of the Open Skies Initiative on mutual air surveillance. The Open Skies Treaty was opened for signature in 1992 but took effect only in 2002. A negative outcome of the current Russia–Ukraine war is the withdrawal of the USA from the treaty in 2020, and that of Russia in 2021 (see the previous chapter).

The Helsinki Document of 1992 contains specifications on the early warning and crisis management tools of the CSCE (Confidence and Security Co-operation in Europe until its change of name in 1994; see the previous chapter). The types of missions are enumerated (CSCE 1992: 15–23): early warning, fact-finding and rapporteur, then peacekeeping missions are mentioned. As for the regulations on peacekeeping missions, the document contains the following: the missions will involve military and civilian personnel; will range from small-scale to large-scale; and will be centred on classic peacekeeping tasks, for instance, monitoring ceasefires and troop withdrawals; besides, humanitarian and medical aid (CSCE 1992: 19). This section of the document on peacekeeping also refers to compliance with the provisions of the UN Charter: peacekeeping may take place under Chapter VIII of the Charter on the role of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Chairperson-in-Office keeps the UN Security Council fully informed about the activities. The description of the chain of command and guidelines for financing are also included. Partnership with other organisations than the UN is also emphasised (see below). The document is evidence that, originally, the objective of the organisation was to develop independent peacekeeping capabilities; nevertheless, this idea was given up and now NATO fills this role (REMEK 2020: 85).

The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (hereinafter: Code of Conduct) adopted in 1994 aimed at regulating the use and preventing the misuse of armed forces in OSCE member states in both external and internal matters. Its Preamble recognises the significance and values of the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and the Helsinki Document of 1992 (OSCE

1994: 1). In the Code of Conduct, the participating states bind themselves to refraining from the violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of another state, at the same time, maintaining their right to individual and collective self-defence. Furthermore, they commit themselves to co-operation, the peaceful settlement of disputes and joint crisis management efforts (OSCE 1994: 4–5).

Field missions of the OSCE

The field missions and programmes of the OSCE reflect its comprehensive approach to security. They can be characterised based on the three dimensions of security also included in the Helsinki Final Act: politico-military, economic and environmental, and human. Historically, OSCE Missions were first launched right after the Cold War in response to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and to the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Actually, this type of OSCE activity was at its height at the end of the Yugoslav wars, in 1999, with a staff of 1,500. A recent surge in the size of missions occurred when the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine employed 850 international staff in 2018 (DIJKSTRA et al. 2019: 525). Since the Yugoslav wars, field operations have adapted to the changing political circumstances and have become more versatile.

OSCE Missions ongoing in 2023 are as follows (OSCE s. a.c):

- Presence in Albania
- Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Mission to Kosovo
- Mission to Montenegro
- Mission to Serbia
- Mission to Skopje
- Mission to Moldova
- Centre in Ashgabat
- Programme Office in Astana
- Programme Office in Bishkek
- Programme Office in Dushanbe
- Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan
- Personal representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference

The mandates of the missions are granted by the Permanent Council, by consensus of the OSCE participating states. The agreement of the host state is essential. In general, the Conflict Prevention Centre implements the decision by the Permanent Council to deploy, restructure or close a mission. It also liaises between the missions, the Secretariat and the Chairperson-in-Office.

The names of the missions vary according to their organisational structure. Some of them may have field offices or regional or training centres apart from their headquarters. A shared feature of their work is that they co-operate with the government and local

authorities as well as civil organisations and they employ only a small number of international staff. The proportion of local fixed-term staff is usually much larger. For instance, as stated in the Factsheet of the Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSCE 2022a), the mission had 34 international and 281 local employees in 2022 and its budget amounted to 11,682,000 EUR. Up-to-date information on the field operations is published annually in print by the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), apart from the OSCE home page. Since the organisation aims at transparency, all types of field and field-related operations are described in detail, with special regard to the following: basic decisions; tasks; deployment; duration; composition; financial implications (OSCE 2021).

The comprehensive perspective on security of the OSCE field operations can be illustrated with the example of the Centre in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan (OSCE s. a.a). The range of activities comprises all the three areas of security:

Table 1: The work of an OSCE mission from comprehensive security perspective

	OSCE centre in Ashgabat	
Politico-military	Economic, environmental	Human
Arms control	Economic activities	Gender equality
Border management	Environmental activities	Human rights
Conflict prevention		Combating human trafficking
Countering terrorism		Good governance
Elections		Media freedom
Rule of law		

Source: Compiled by the author based on OSCE s. a.a

Table 1 shows the intricate nature of security operations: areas may overlap, some phenomena may prove cross-dimensional and require thorough preliminary planning; an example could be economic development and environment protection. The complexity of the operation, nevertheless, also raises the questions of efficiency and staffing.

The missions of the OSCE are generally considered efficient because of their flexible and quick response to crises, regional expertise and institutional inclusivity. Typically, the missions are planned to be long-range, which adds to their benefits, but also increases their budget, which poses a challenge financially. Another problem is that the structure and procedures of the organisation has to adapt to the changing climate of international relations.

As a result of lessons learnt, the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions (2014) has made recommendations on the future of field operations. In their view, the OSCE should establish sub-regional offices in addition to field operations for more support. The parties to a field operation should continuously adjust the mandate to the changing circumstances and needs of the host country. The member states need to clarify under what conditions security sector assistance involving a police contingent should be provided. The staff must be offered improved and more customised training. The organisation needs to campaign for more extra-budgetary funds and needs to depoliticise

the budget planning procedure while making it more accurately defined. On the whole, the organisation must enhance its visibility in the media (OSCE Network 2014: 4–5). The document also includes suggestions about opening a liaison office in Brussels and establishing closer ties with other international organisations. (Co-operation between the OSCE and other organisations will be summarised later.) Despite the criticism worded in the mentioned study, the soft power of the OSCE is widely acknowledged. However, the impact of the deterioration of the security environment caused by the unfolding crisis in Ukraine and the paralysis of the OSCE mechanisms must be discussed.

The OSCE in Ukraine from 2014

The classic missions of the OSCE from the end of the Cold War seemed to revive in the Special Monitoring Mission launched in Ukraine in 2014. First, it employed 850 international staff, which was the greatest number since the war in Kosovo in 1999. Second, the activities also were similar with respect to patrolling, monitoring checkpoints and the observance of a ceasefire.

According to analysts, the current crisis in Ukraine was sparked by Russia's annexation of the Crimea and the territorial dispute over East Ukraine unfolded in three phases: 1. a “hybrid war” started by Russia; 2. “anti-terrorist operations” by Ukraine; 3. counter-offensive operations to the “anti-terrorist operations” by Russia (REMLER 2021: 7–10). The Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) of the OSCE was authorised as early as 21 March 2014 via *Permanent Council Decision No. 1117* (OSCE 2014). From the Interpretative Statements attached, it becomes clear that Ukraine had requested the deployment of the SMM; that the USA and Canada expressed their commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine; and the Russian Federation accepted the deployment of the SMM but insisted that its activities and area of deployment should be strictly limited, taking into consideration its view that “the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol have become an integral part of the Russian Federation”. In the same Interpretative Statement, Russia, however, stated that it was willing to take part in the work of the SMM.

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine was an unarmed civilian mission which informed the international community on the security situation in Ukraine and tried to facilitate dialogue (OSCE s. a.b). The SMM was actually working in close co-operation with the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) and the Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk (OM). The three components of the OSCE endeavouring to settle or at least bring under control the crisis in Ukraine involved 700 monitors from 44 OSCE participating states in 2021 (REMLER 2021: 7–10). Despite the efforts, the mission increasingly faced a shift from a conflict to full-scale hostilities. The mounting tensions were reflected by the attitude of the Russian Federation to the role taken by the OSCE: initially, as it was said above, Russia had agreed to the mission, but, as its perception of Europe changed, it started to see Europe as a rival. This was in line with Russia's standpoint adopted earlier, which resented that European security

was more reliant on NATO than the OSCE, which was implied as early as 2009 (DUNAY 2009: 30–38; RADA–STEPPER 2019: 172–194).

From the perspective of the OSCE, Russia successfully blocked the work of the mission in two ways: on the one hand, by insisting that it was not a participant of the hostilities, only a mediator between the Ukrainian Government and the Russian separatists. On the other hand, by limiting the activities and movement of the mission, which resulted in its failure to prevent the transportation of heavy weapons across the border from Russia to East Ukraine. The mandate of the Special Monitoring Mission was last extended in March 2021 until March 2022 (OSCE 2021). At the Permanent Council Meeting on 31 March 2022, due to lack of consensus, a decision was made about the closure of the SMM (OSCE 2022b).

The withdrawal of the USA and of Russia from the Treaty on Open Skies in 2020 and in 2021 already implied fractures in the European security architecture. The failure of the OSCE Permanent Council to extend the mandate of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine is also a warning sign. On 10 May 2023, Russia's formal withdrawal from participation in the CFE Treaty was announced, which was assessed by analysts as yet another symbolic blow to European security, although it had “suspended” implementation since 2007 (HERNÁNDEZ 2023). Besides, Russia has terminated a bilateral agreement with Finland on 23 May 2023. The system of mutual military evaluation visits was operated under the Vienna Document 2011 adopted by the OSCE (Finland Abroad 2023). This may have a domino effect on conventional arms control in Europe (JIREŠ et al. 2013) if other countries in the region take the same course of action because there are 23 similar bilateral agreements in the OSCE region, the press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland adds. These developments may result in either a paralysis, or a complete transformation, or a collapse of the European security system.

Conclusions

As the initial post-Cold War enthusiasm has faded, and the European countries appear to have less commitment to the Charter of Paris principles (1990), the security architecture is fragmenting. The questions arise whether the OSCE will be able to adapt to changes and evolves further or it will return to a forum-like operation serving only as a place for mediation and negotiation between blocs in a divided world.

A study entitled “The Inhospitable Sea. Toward a New U.S. Strategy for the Black Sea Region” (ARONSSON–MANKOFF 2023: 21) states that the U.S. is developing a new politico-military strategy for the Black Sea Region, which assigns a greater role to the cooperation of NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the United States European Command (EUCOM) and the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). Such developments would probably cause a move towards a more military security related perspective in the region, which would not foster the soft power civilian approach by the OSCE in the future. However, there are views that the return to a CSCE-like forum and dialogue may be beneficial for exercising soft power by keeping Russia engaged with the OSCE and incentivising it

to co-operate (CUPAĆ 2023: 75–80). In an era of renewing conflicts, operating the OSCE as a forum for communication and negotiations may prove crucial in the de-escalation of tensions in general.

The OSCE is interrelated with the other international organisations established in the prevalent world order and displays a number of parallelisms with them. For instance, the partnership policy of NATO, of the European Union and of the OSCE are remarkably similar. Even the regions in focus overlap: the Mediterranean for all, and a few Asian partners. OSCE Mediterranean partners are the following: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia. And its Asian partner countries are: Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Thailand (OSCE s. a.d). Within this framework, the OSCE has opportunity to disseminate its comprehensive approach to security, to promote democratic values and human rights.

Additional evidence for the significant role of the OSCE is its co-operation in peacekeeping operations, especially in conflict prevention or peacebuilding, with other organisations (for instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo). This role is founded on its unique capabilities to tackle civilian issues flexibly and efficiently. The achievements of the OSCE in fostering economic development and in promoting human rights are unquestionable, despite its recent forced withdrawal from Ukraine.

During its history, the CSCE and then OSCE has been a symbol of confidence building and co-operation. In the post-Cold War period it has proved that the collaboration and consensus of participating states can generate enough soft power to keep tensions and crises under control. The *OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century* (2003) forecasts the upheavals the world is faced with these days: an increasing number of intrastate and interstate conflicts and a growing threat of arms proliferation. If the OSCE retains its capabilities to adapt, it may be able to respond to new challenges and remains a valuable partner in maintaining and, in critical times, restoring international peace and security.

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The Collective Security Treaty Organization

Introduction

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)¹ is not among the most significant regional organisations, there is hardly any information about it in academic literature (BLAHÓ–PRANDLER 2011: 437; KARNS – MINGST 2010: 177–178), the Hungarian military literature does not deal with it too much either (GERGICS 2009: 16–23; LIPUSZ 2013: 14–24), it is mainly the Russian experts and their counterparts from the Commonwealth of Independent States (AZHDAR 2008; RAHIMLI 2015; MUBASHAR 2015; KEANEY 2017), who wrote about this organisation. The Collective Security Treaty was created by the successor states of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)² as a political and military intergovernmental organisation. The Treaty was signed on 15 May 1992 by the six founder countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan in Tashkent. Three more countries joined the organisation the next year in 1993: Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus. The Treaty itself was originally planned to be created for five years with the possibility of extension as the future of the post-Soviet region countries was at the time unpredictable due to the political and military turmoil. The ratification of the Collective Security Treaty Organization was completed on 20 April 1994 and was registered as international organisation by the United Nations on 1 November 1995.

Historical context

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation made significant efforts to create new regional, bilateral and multilateral cooperation forms in the fields of politics, economy and military. After the termination of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 it was important for Russia to maintain influence in the region (named as “Near Abroad” later by Russian foreign politics) and the means for these efforts was the Treaty of Tashkent signed by six post-Soviet states (Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) on 15 May 1992. Three other post-Soviet states – Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia – signed in 1993 and the treaty took effect in 1994. In these years there was a serious lack of security in the region, which forced the post-Soviet states to keep seeking the guarantee of security in Russia. From the previously enormous Soviet army significant forces remained only in three

¹ Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – Организация Договора о Коллективной Безопасности (ОДКБ) (see more at <https://en.odkb-csto.org/>).

² The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – Содружество Независимых Государств was established on 21 December 1991 in Minsk.

countries: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The inheritor of nuclear weapons became Russia which became the exclusive trustee of the nuclear aegis in the post-Soviet region. There were civil wars going on in several countries, like in Georgia and Tajikistan, serious conflicts burdened the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, and Russia took an active part in several conflict zones. It was impossible at the time to predict what the identifying factor of integration will be in the region as there was no Eurasian alternative for development created yet, as there is one these days. The Tashkent Treaty³ itself was placid too, as it confirmed “the obligation to abstain from use of force or threat by force in the interstate relations. They shall undertake to settle all disagreements among themselves and other states by peaceful means” (CST 1992: Article 1). Article 4 practically provides collective defence for the members, when it states that in case of aggression to any of the member states, this “will be considered aggression to all member states and provide a necessary help, including military one”. In the amendment process in 2010, the Alliance clarified what it meant by aggression (armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty), which proved to be very useful during subsequent decisions (e.g. intervention in Kazakhstan in 2022). In case a collective security system is created either in Europe or Asia, its member states can join that regional pact after consultation with other CSTO members.




Figure 1: Collective Security Treaty Organization (2023)

Source: www.wikiwand.com/en/Tashkent_Treaty#Membership

This interpretation made it possible that member states of the organisation joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program in 1994–1995 (except Tajikistan which only joined the program in 2002) and they take part in the activities of the Organization for Security

³ Collective Security Treaty, dated 15 May 1992 and amended by the Protocol on Amendments on 10 December 2010 (https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/dogovor_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/#loaded).

and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE 2017), trying to strengthen their relationship with Western countries. As for Asia, Russia and the three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan together with China set up the group of the five countries, which became officially the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, SCO in 2001.

Besides providing favourable security environment, other tasks were also hot cases on agenda, like the creation of national armies, which was completed by all countries by the mid-1990s, as well as the idea of the collective security and “renitent” national solutions (Turkmenistan, the countries of GUAM).⁴ The CST was set to last for a 5-year period unless extended. On 2 April 1999, six of nine countries – except for Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan – agreed to renew the treaty for five more years. Azerbaijan and Georgia were members only between 1994–1999, while Uzbekistan was member state twice, 1994–1999 and 2006–2012 showing the complexity of national interest and the alliance integrity. Until 2002, the Treaty was essentially a regional agreement which played an important role in maintaining close cooperation and understanding in the political–military field. The highest body of the CST, the Collective Security Council decided to grant the status of regional international organisation to the CST on 14 May 2002, in Moscow. The CSTO Charter was approved on 7 October 2002 at the CIS summit in Chişinău by the presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. The organisation received an Observer status in the UN General Assembly in 2004. In addition to the UN, the CSTO also develops cooperation with the OSCE, the SCO and the SIS and their specialised structures. Regarding cooperation with third countries, the CSTO established the Parliamentary Assembly in 2006 to ensure political stability in CSTO activities. First, the Union State (Belarus and Russia) joined the Assembly in 2010, then Serbia and Afghanistan became members of the political body (Figure 1).

Basic documents of the CSTO

The establishment of the CSTO, its development and official recognition was supported by two basic legal documents which are like the NATO Founding (North Atlantic) Treaty of Washington. The Treaty of Tashkent⁵ is a short document of 11 paragraphs, with the name of Collective Security Treaty (Договор о Коллективной Безопасности). The preamble of the document connects the agreement unambiguously to CIS, by emphasising the sovereignty of the Independent States. Article 1 includes the willingness of member

⁴ GUAM: A regional organisation containing Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, established by the four countries in 1997, to improve democracy and economic development. The aim of the member states is to intensify Western integration, counterweight the political, economic and military superiority of Russia. The GUAM countries and Armenia are the beneficiaries of the Eastern partnership program of the EU. Between 1999 and 2005 Uzbekistan was also a member of this group, called GUUAM at the time. The importance and the role of the GUAM has been changing from time to time, but it is still an existing and operating organisation (<https://guam-organization.org/>).

⁵ Collective Security Treaty, dated 15 May 1992 and amended by the Protocol on Amendments on 10 December 2010 (https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/dogovor_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/#loaded).

states to abstain from violence or threatening with violence in international relations and their commitment to resolve conflicts with peaceful means between each other or in cooperation with other states. The members of the alliance must not join other military alliances, they must not take part in any actions against another member state, or in any military alignment. Article 2 emphasises the importance of consultation, and Article 4 establishes the highest decision-making body, the Council for Collective Security.

The collective defence character of the agreement is included in Article 4, which is quite like Article 5 of NATO: “If one of the Member States undergoes aggression (armed attack menacing to security, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty), it will be considered by the Member States aggression to all the Members of this Treaty. In case of aggression to any of the Member States, all the other Member States at request of this Member State shall immediately provide the latter with the necessary help, including military one, as well as provide support by the means at their disposal in accordance with the right to collective defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Member States shall immediately inform the United Nations Security Council on the measures taken based on the Article. When implementing these measures, the Member States shall adhere to the relevant provisions of the UN Charter.”⁶ Article 4 also includes three sets of responsibilities as Article 5 in the Washington Treaty: Any external aggression is regarded as an attack against all member states, the member states will provide each other all kinds of support, including military support. Then the Security Council of the UN will be informed about the aggression and the decided measures in connection with it. Finally, any further action can be taken only after the decision of the United Nations Security Council.

Articles 5 and 6 authorise the Council for Collective Security to decide on the use of force and means of collective security including the activation of the mechanism of joint consultation. Article 5 also arranges for the establishment of CSTO organisational bodies based on Council decisions. Article 6 contains strict regulations regarding the use of military force and security measures abroad. “Use of force and means of the collective security system outside of the territory of the Member States may be carried out only in the interest of the international security according to the UN Charter and the laws of Member States being parties hereto.” According to Article 7, the placement and functioning of the CSTO objects are regulated by special agreements. By the modification of the agreement carried out in 2011, Russia got the right of veto about the foreign bases located on the territory of member states. Article 8 regulates the international legal aspects of the Treaty; for instance, the member states cannot conclude international

⁶ It can be discovered an identity with NATO Article 5. “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C. 4 April 1949 (www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm#Article%205).

treaties incompatible with the Collective Security Treaty. Article 9 goes back to the consultation process and the mutual consent requirement, probably because of the Russian political, economic and military dominance. It also says that “any problem may arise among the member states about the interpretation or application of any decree included in this agreement, the members will solve them together in cooperation, friendship, mutual respect and understanding”. Article 10 keeps the door open for accession of all interesting states sharing its goals and principles. Finally, Article 11 deals with the validity of the Treaty which is concluded for five years with following prolongation. All members have the right to withdraw from the Treaty which shall be announced six months in advance. Although this may seem a very polite legal phrasing, the history of this agreement (joining and secessions, withdrawal and permanent departures) makes this formula lively. The last article also regulates the ratification of the Treaty which must be approved by each member state according to its constitutional procedures. Instruments of ratification shall be transferred for storage to the Secretary General (of the Collective Security Treaty Organization), who is appointed as the depositary.

The treaty was extended on 2 April 1999 in Moscow and the next revision of it resulted in the establishment of an independent organisation in 2002. The first decade of the Collective Security Treaty was successful and very useful for the founder states and they extended its validity for another five years. From the six signing countries Turkmenistan was the only one that did not sign the extension, and its place was taken by Belarus. The documents about the structural transformation (charter, legal status) were ratified by the member states before 8 September 2003 and the UN Assembly gave it “observer status” on 2 December 2004. The CSTO as an organisation was established by the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Устав Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности) signed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Armenia and Tajikistan in Chişinău on 7 October 2002. The signature of the charter was carried out on the margins of the CIS summit, as the members discussed security issues as well.

The Treaty of Chisinau⁷ is a much longer document than the Treaty of Tashkent, it includes 10 chapters and 29 articles, and it defines the CSTO as an international regional security organisation. Chapter I declares the establishment of the organisation, Chapter II defines the goals: 1. strengthening of peace, international and regional security, and stability; 2. protection of independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty on collective basis (Article 3). In order to achieve these goals the chapter sets up principles as well: 1. cooperation with non-member states, international intergovernmental organisations operating in the sphere of security (Article 4); 2. the organisation cooperates on the basis of strict respect of independence, voluntariness of participation, equal rights and duties, and non-interference into the internal affairs of the Member States (Article 5).

Chapter III lists the different fields of activity and includes collective defence, as well as transnational internal security responsibilities. In the interest of implementing collective defence, the Organisation can take the following measures: to create a collective

⁷ Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization dated 7 October 2002 (https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/ustav_organizatsii_dogovora_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti_/#loaded).

coalition force, regional (united) groups of armies, to establish a peacekeeping force, to build military infrastructure, to establish military, technical, economic and financial cooperation, to exercise united systems, services and bodies necessary for successful joint operations. Article 8 lists those activities which belong to collective security issues as the Organisation understands: international terrorism and extremism, illicit trafficking of drugs, organised transnational crime, illegal migration, information security, border protection and crisis response operations.

Chapters IV–VIII deal with organisational structure and membership, Chapter IX includes financing issues, whereas Chapter X describes the final provisions. Chapter IV names the most important decision-making bodies: Council for Collective Security (the “Council”), Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (CMFA), Council of Ministers of Defence (CMD), Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils (CSSC), and Permanent Council (PC) (Article 11). The work of senior bodies is supported by the Secretariat and Joint Staff of the Organisation (2013), both are in Moscow. Decision and regulations are adopted by consensus like in many international organisations (Article 12). Functions, working mechanisms and operating procedures of the bodies are regulated by the Charter and other legal acts.

Chapter VI regulates the duties of the Secretary General and the work of permanent CSTO bodies. The CSTO is an open organisation, any state that agrees with the Organisation’s goals and operating principles can become a member. The Council decides on the admission of a new member by unanimous vote. It is also possible to leave the Organisation, which must be announced at least six months in advance. Chapter VI not only regulates the enlargement of the CSTO but also gives the possibility of sanctions in case a member does not fulfil its obligations under the Treaties. This is for example not possible in NATO, but it is a *modus operandi* in case of the CSTO. The Council first suspends the membership of a not performing state, in such a case, the member state concerned cannot participate in the vote (Article 20). Then, if its activities do not change, the Council can also unilaterally exclude it from the alliance. A separate chapter deals with observer status, for which both countries and international organisations can apply. The Council decides on the invitation (Chapter VII). The fulfilment of financing requirements plays a major role in the evaluation of the activities of member states. If the member state does not pay its mandatory budget contribution for two years, the country cannot fill its quota positions in the Organisation (Article 25). The final Chapter X deals with the adoption of the Charter, determines the official and working language (Russian), and decides on unanimous voting without reservation.

The Treaty of Chisinau was adopted on 7 October 2002, and modified like the Treaty of Tashkent on 10 December 2010.

The controversial nature of the CSTO

The CSTO is a collective security organisation by its name, but Article 4 of the CST has shown that it also has a collective defence character like NATO. However, there is a difference between the collective security and the collective defence concepts.

Collective security can be understood as a security arrangement, political, regional, or global (e.g. United Nations) in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and therefore commits to a collective response to threats to, and breaches of peace. Collective security is directed downwards and is more ambitious than the systems of collective defence (alliance security) in that it seeks to encompass all states within the region or globally, and to address a wide range of possible threats. Collective defence is directed outwards and referred to by the phrase “an attack on one is an attack on all” as it phrased in NATO’s Charter (BUZAN et al. 1998: 50). The functional understanding of the organisation is further complicated by terminology problems. Very likely that Moscow did not want to give openly the CSTO collective defence (NATO) character by name, just as the Warsaw Treaty was not called a military organisation either, but an organisation of “Friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance” (Договор о дружбе, сотрудничестве и взаимной помощи). But it is also possible that at the time of its formation, the founder nations still thought of a collective security organisation, only later they changed the nature of the organisation (amendment of the Treaty of Tashkent, etc.) to meet the new security challenges but they did not want to modify the name of the CSTO.

The Treaty of Tashkent was originally made to be multifunctional (RAHIMLI 2015), both for external and internal security, where internal security is connected to a collective defence function (Article 4). This is why the organisation is called “mini” UN based on its name, but it has earned the name “mini” NATO as well based on its main function expressed in Article 4.

In the nineties, for example, the organisation assisted in many civil war situations (for example, in Tajikistan there were Kirgiz UN peacekeeping forces to handle the civil war situation and after the turn of the millennium Russian peacekeepers were operating in Georgia) with the peacekeeping force expressing its collective security function. However, its latest involvement in January of 2022 when the CSTO troops were deployed in Kazakhstan to help the government keep the internal order (GLEASON–DUNAY 2022) had already collective defence function underlining that it was a terrorist attack from the outside. The main core tasks of the CSTO gradually expanded when the organisation started a combat against new types of threats too, like terrorism, drug trafficking, migration and natural disasters.

The lessons learned of the CSTO deployment also arise from the difficulties of a dual nature of the organisation. In 2010, for example, the organisation of the CSTO did not intervene in Kyrgyzstan when demonstrators were demanding the removal of the president and the government, although the Kirgiz president turned to the SCTO for help. The request of the temporary Kirgiz Government was similarly rejected at the end of 2010, when they asked for CSTO forces to suppress the Kirgiz–Uzbek confrontation. The organisation was not activated in 2015 either, when military confrontations reappeared between Azerbaijan and Armenia because of disputed territories (HERSZENHORN 2015; KEANEY 2017). Armenia requested military help from the CSTO in the military conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, yet Yerevan did not receive collective defence support. However, with the eastern extension of the NATO and with the deterioration of the relationship between the West and Russia, the CSTO became more and more of a collective defence type organisation.

Structure, operation and decision-making

The central role of the CSTO is to guarantee collective defence, and after becoming an official organisation, other responsibilities, like national security and crisis response operations, were also added to its tasks. The decision-making in the Organisation is based on consensus (unanimous decisions). The structure and operation of the CSTO is characterised by its objective – collective defence, collective security, support of a fair and democratic world system; its nature – it is a political and military alliance, and its changing responsibility system – from collective security to collective defence. The creation of the institution system is resolved in two steps in the Chisinau Treaty. First, the formerly existing leading bodies are improved, then the secretariat of the organisation is established. The activities of the CSTO are based on member states' national sovereignty and a cooperative, shared operational mechanism. In this operation Russia has a more dominant role than the USA has in NATO. Today six countries (half of the CIS countries) make up the permanent member states of the organisation, almost the same ones which signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992. Besides Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Armenia and Tajikistan, today Iran is the new potential member state. The unchanging number of member states also means that in shaping and carrying out the security policy of the CIS countries are involved in security and military cooperation on a certain level, where all the countries can find security policy advantages, even those which do not belong to the Organisation (Table 1).

Table 1: Security policy orientation of the CIS countries

No.	Country	CIS membership	CSTO membership	SCO membership	Notes
1.	Azerbaijan	1993	1994–1999		Member of the CIS organisations
2.	Belarus	1991	1993		Russia–Belarus Union State (1999)
3.	Georgia	1993–2009	1994–1999		After the 2008 Russian war it left, western integration efforts
4.	Kazakhstan	1991	1992	1996	Member of Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)
5.	Kyrgyzstan	1991	1992	1996	Aspire EAEU membership
6.	Moldova	1994			GUAM member with western orientation
7.	Russia	1991	1992	1996	EAEU leading member
8.	Armenia	1991	1992		Aspire EAEU membership
9.	Tajikistan	1991	1992	1996	Aspire EAEU membership
10.	Turkmenistan	1991–2005			From 2005 CIS observer member, security swing policy
11.	Ukraine	1991			CIS observer member, Euro-Atlantic integration efforts
12.	Uzbekistan	2000	1992–1999 2006–2012		Changing security policy

Source: Compiled by Zoltán Szenes based on <http://cis.minsk.by/>; www.odkb-csto.org/

The Collective Security Council is the supreme governing body of the Organisation, consisting of the leaders of the member states. The Council deals with strategic issues, it defines the most important objectives, makes decisions about their implementation, and it also guarantees the coordination and shared actions of member states. It is entitled to create working and subsidiary bodies on constant or temporary bodies of the Organisation. The decisions are obligatory to be accepted by member states and they must be carried out within the frame of a system of national regulations. The CSTO does not have a flexibility like NATO, where the member states can decide to what extent they can contribute to the decisions. The meetings are always chaired by the president of the hosting country – unlike at NATO – by the “Chairperson”, elected on a rotational basis. The Council work is supported not only by the Secretariat but the Permanent Council, as well. The Council holds its meetings in different forms – just as it is at NATO – it can hold secret talks, too. Ministers, Secretary General of the Organisation, Chief of the Military Committee, Chair of the CSSC and the members of the Permanent Council are generally invited to participate in the Council meeting.

The Council of Foreign Ministers and the Council of Defence Ministers operate as advisory bodies to the Council and the executor as well. The CMFA aligns the foreign policy of the member states whereas the CMD develops defence policy, carries out the defence coordination, ensures the harmonisation of activities in the military structure and in military technology. The Permanent Council (PC) is made up of appointed representatives, henceforward trustees, who carry out their activities according to national procedures and regulations approved by the Council.




Figure 2: The CSTO structure

Source: <https://en.odkb-csto.org/25years/index.php>

The structure of the CSTO's major bodies is consequently completely identical with the structure of NATO's decision-making bodies, with one exception, which is the Committee of Secretaries. This can be explained by the fact that all countries – due to the identical political structure – are represented by the state president, who is the number one liable for security and whose work is assisted by the National Security Committee (NSC) in their countries. The CSTO adapted the Russian-like state governing model (National Security Council, NSC), which allows the NSC Secretary of all member states to take part in the work of the Organisation and ensures the implementation of Council decisions at national level. The work of managing bodies is assisted by the Secretariat, which provides organisational, informal and analytical support to the member states. The Secretariat together with the Permanent Council organises and implements the decisions of managing bodies and they prepare the necessary documents. The Secretariat includes civilians and officers of member states and its composition is made up according to the defence budget proportion of members. The financing of CSTO activities is like the one of NATO, the expenses of the CSTO HQs and other institutions of the Organisation are covered from the common budget, half of which is financed by Russia, whereas the other countries' contribution to the expenses is 10% each. The total military spending of CSTO in 2022 was 89.4 billion U.S. dollars but only some percent of it goes to the operations of the Organisation's bodies.⁸ The functions of the Secretariat, its operational conditions and responsibilities are defined by regulations, approved by the Council. Similarly to NATO, it consists of two parts: civil secretariat and joint military staff. The secretariat is based in Moscow, but there is no information about its size on the website of the Organisation. The joint military staff is probably based in the Russian Ministry of Defence, which was set up after establishing the Military Committee (MC) on 12 May 2012. The Chief of Joint Staff position is always a Russian one but his deputies are appointed from other member state's military. The accredited national delegations also operate in the CSTO HQs. The conditions of the Secretariat's presence are regulated by international agreement on the territory of the Russian Federation.

The Secretary General is selected from foreign policy or military senior leaders for three years (it can be prolonged once) based on the suggestion of the CMFA and adopted by the Council. However, he does not have the same powers as in NATO, he does not chair the meetings of the leading bodies, just takes part in them. He is accountable to the Council and has the obligation to report to the Council. He is the supreme administrative official and spokesperson in the Organisation, responsible for managing the Secretariat and performing coordination in the CSTO HQs. He coordinates the development and approval of the draft documents submitted for consideration to the Organisation bodies. The Secretary General represents the CSTO before other states and international organisations, mass media. He is the depositary of the Charter, other international treaties concluded within the framework of the Organisation and the accepted documents (CHAUSOVSKY 2017).

⁸ CSTO military expenditure (Statista 2023).

The consensus decision-making is assisted by Committees in the CSTO too, behind each Committee there is a secretariat operating. The Defence Ministers are supported by the Military Committee – which means that its role is significantly smaller than in the NATO – the Foreign Ministers are backed by the Working Group dealing with Afghanistan, whereas the National Security Secretaries are supported by the Information Security Working Group.

The work of the Secretariat and the Committee of Secretaries is assisted directly by several Coordination Councils, which support the harmonisation of such activities as military industry cooperation between the countries, the fight against drug trafficking, the suppression of illegal immigration and joint actions in critical situations and improve the skills of the member states in these fields. The Secretariat does not have any subordinate supporting agencies, like in NATO, just a Research Institute and Information Institute of experts from member countries to support the analysis and evaluation work. The CSTO does not have a permanent command system either, the military command and control tasks in crisis and war are probably – just as it was in the Warsaw Treaty – carried out by Russian military leadership bases.

The CSTO does not have its own military force, but since 2009 several constant military formations were established with immediate intervention capabilities (Figure 4). A quick response force of 20,000 members was established to handle armed conflicts in 2009 (TOLPOV 2018). The Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) is based on constant national contribution, and its members are provided by Russia with 8,000 members, Kazakhstan with 4,000 members, whereas Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Tajikistan guarantee 1,000 members each. The CRRF was used just once, in January 2020 in Afghanistan when they supported the Kazakh authorities to maintain law and order and the unit was recalled after two weeks operation. In 2010, the permanent CSTO Peacekeeping Force (PF) was set up, and in 2014 the Collective Air Force (CAF) was established. The CSTO created three regions (Eastern European, Caucasus, Central Asian) for the Collective Force and built combined regional troops in each region. The CRRF, the PF, the CAF, the combined joint regional troops, military systems and infrastructure created together the basis of the CSTO Collective Force. The Organisation also set up an ‘interior’ department of 3,000 members to handle the cross-border conflicts and encounter terrorism and drug trafficking issues. Russia keeps constant forces and bases in the member states to maintain the military capabilities of the alliance, but it is hard to decide whether these operate as part of the alliance or based on bilateral agreements. Furthermore, Moscow supports the national army reforms too with shared and/or Russian financing (border defence forces, special forces, airborne forces).




Figure 3: The SCTO force arrangements

Source: <https://en.odkb-csto.org/25years/index.php>

The activities of the CSTO is financed by the member states and a new budget is made every year. Although the academic literature does not include details of financing, the operation of the Secretariat is ensured by a separated budget (like the NATO's civil budget), and the military budget is provided by the financial contribution of the member states. The size of the organisation's annual budget depends on its tasks, the proportion of national contributions is fixed, but there must not be a deficit. The annual budget is approved by the Council. The expenses of the attendance of conferences and meetings, as well as the payment of experts on other events within the organisation is financed by the member states. The principals of financing are identical in this respect with the ones of the NATO.

Although there is no information about financial debates in the alliance, according to academic literature (KROPATCHEVA 2016: 1530–1532) there are burden sharing debates in the CSTO. Russia is the most consistent about observing the rules, because “free riding” countries usually try to shift the financial burden of operation and preparations to Russia. There is information about this kind of attempts in studies analysing the bilateral relations of individual countries (JÓJÁRT 2016: 102–110).

The characteristics of the CSTO's operation

It is not easy to understand the everyday operation of the organisation, as the webpage of the CSTO is not informative enough to allow the tracking of regulations, provisions, programs or plans. Another factor which makes difficult to assess the functioning of the Organisation is that military cooperation among the nations is practiced not only within the CSTO, but as a part of the CIS activities, especially before 2002. The structure is even

more complicated by the fact that sometimes regional organisations serve only as a frame for Russian politics and the real cooperation works in multilateral and bilateral forms (Figure 5). Russia practices all forms of integration which serve the realisation of its own interests and aims, but if this is impossible, it enhances its leading role on multi- and bilateral bases. In 2016, for example, Moscow took advantage of the signs of crisis in the West – like Brexit, the election of the U.S. President, migration crisis, extreme nationalist parties – to strengthen the CSTO’s connections by creating bilateral agreements. With the new bilateral agreements with Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan the Russian leadership used the momentum to satisfy the individual military demands of the member states more easily than through the CSTO cooperation mechanism. This “field of game” means constant advantage for Russia as it can control and shape its regional, multilateral and bilateral contacts so that it can always make the best of different situations. Then Moscow communicates these efforts to international communities (especially to the UN) as Russian contribution to maintaining the peace and stability in enormous Eurasia, the Central Asian region. In 2018, for example, the CSTO agreed to support the appeal of the UN to the member states to increase the amount of their contribution to peacekeeping and conflict handling operations of the international organisation (GORKA 2018).

The military cooperation between member states started in 1995, after the ratification of the Collective Security Treaty, when the state presidents made decisions about the improvement of the cooperation in security policy. As part of this decision, they adopted the document *The Basic Directives of the Intensification of Military Cooperation* as well as the working document with the title *Plans for the Realisation of Collective Security Concepts*. In 2000 – after the 1999 extension of the collective security cooperation – the Collective Security Council published its memorandum under the title *About the Improvement of Efficiency of the Collective Security Treaty* and the adaptation of the new geopolitical situation, which marked the beginning of the establishment of the independent organisation. The ratified document included the structural model of cooperation and the coalition strategy.




Figure 4: The regional structure of the CIS countries

Source: Voltaire Network 2016

Abbreviations: GUAM (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova), CISFTA (Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area), Eurasian Economic Union, Union State of Russia and Belarus.

During the two-year preparation procedure, member states adopted the agreement about the presence and building of military forces in their countries. In 2001, the setting up of quick reaction forces began in Central Asia. In 2005, the Council approved the decision on Organising the Command and Control of the CSTO Collective Force. One year later, in 2006, it made a new decision to improve efficiency of the Organisation's activities. The publication of the Declaration about further improvements of the organisation's operations and its efficiency was the beginning of the CSTO's reform. The decisions (6 October 2007, Dusanbe) addressed four different fields for improvement: 1. peacekeeping; 2. military-economic cooperation; 3. improvement of military technology cooperation; and 4. the improvement of collective military formations. After 2008 the alliance turned its attention to non-military risks and threats, like terrorism, illegal weapon and drug trade. Besides these issues, the question of information security came also to the political agenda. The new agenda had a significant institutional novelty as well: the establishment of the Crisis Reaction Centre of the CSTO in Moscow in 2016 (OSCE 2017). In October 2016, a ten-year security strategy was adopted by the Organisation as a kind of directive for dealing with the future security challenges. The member states agreed to develop and implement a joint set of preventive and special measures to counter terrorism and religious extremism. It is an interesting fact, however, that even though the fusion of the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have allegedly been on agenda since 2014, the strategic document does not include this long-term alternative.

Although the decisions are always made by the Council of Collective Security (CSC) or by the Council of Foreign and Defence Ministers, it is still not true that the major results of the CSTO are exclusively their own achievements. A good example for this is the United Air Force, which was established in 1997 under the aegis of the CIS with the participation of 9 countries. Although the air force is a military component of the CSTO, its maintenance and operation are mainly carried out by Russia. There are regular collective military exercises, but not all countries participate in them. Turkmenistan, for example, excludes itself regularly and several other countries, like Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Belarus prefer bilateral solutions. The situation is similar about peacekeeping missions, too. Although there were several CSTO peacekeeping missions – in Georgia in 2008 with UN mandate, on a bilateral basis in Moldova, Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic – the funding of the collective activity and other technical problems are still not resolved. In non-military danger and threat prevention the secret agencies play an important role, but the cooperation in this field is also carried out within the CIS, with the control of the Federal Security Service (FSS). The Anti-Terrorism Centre (ATC) of the CIS, founded by the country presidents in 2000 against Central Asian terrorism, operates under the control of the Council that includes the leaders of security bodies and special services.

A major feature of security policy cooperation is the harmonisation of border security and immigration work, which demands an increasingly intensive intergovernmental cooperation of the member states. As a possible consequence of this, the fight against illegal migration, human and drug trafficking and crime outside the borders is getting to be present rather under the aegis of the CSTO and less and less in the territory

of the CIS. The reason for this is that it is easier to handle sovereignty problems of the shared supervision of country borders within the frames of a closer military integration. A similar operation within the military body is the development of quick-deployed forces, which means the constant readiness power of the alliance. These days the constant-ready allied forces maintain their combat readiness by doing regular training (in 2022 the Combat Brotherhood training included 12,000 members, 1,500 combat vehicles and 90 fighters) and this proves the CSTO's readiness to any military intervention. Moscow, however, could still not succeed in getting these forces to be applied outside the member states' area of influence, for example in Syria (Armenpress 2016). So now the Organisation needs to be satisfied with the modest military objective of forming a counter balance of NATO in Eurasia. This is especially so now when a war is going on in Ukraine and member states would not support the possible participation of the CSTO troops in the special military operation.

Conclusions

The CSTO celebrated the 30th anniversary of the signature of the collective security treaty on 30 November 2022 and the 20th anniversary of the organisation's establishment. The ceremonial statement of the heads of state emphasised the organisation's collective defence and security features, it declared the importance of the Alliance's activity in maintaining international peace, global security and regional stability. The CSTO is open to any country or international organisation which adopt their own collective security treaty. There are, however, only few of them, like the UN, the OSCE, the CIS and the SCO, declared as primary partners. This points to the fact that the CSTO is going to carry on its operation as a multifunctional regional security organisation, controlled by Russia in the future, too. The security policy character of the CSTO is just as changeable as the one of the NATO. Although it is a military organisation of collective defence, its schedule includes collective security responsibilities as major tasks, especially in Central Asia and in the South Caucasus. The long-term future of any regional organisation depends on the fact that the members states need to be aware of their situation and accept that their security hazard can be reduced more effectively within the framework of an organisation than independently. The opinion of the academic literature about the Moscow-based organisation in this regard is varied, depending on the articles' point of view. Sometimes the organisation is described as a Transatlantic Anti-Cooperation, an Anti-NATO, and sometimes as a chaotically operating incoherent regional organisation. The reality, however, is that the CSTO is one of the successfully operating regional organisations in the Post-Soviet region, whose existence and work is recognised by the UN, last time in 2023. There is an organised cooperation between the Secretariat's and the world organisation, and the UN would increasingly like to rely on the Eurasian organisation with respect to the fields of crisis management and peacekeeping in the region. The CSTO is undoubtedly a Russia-controlled regional organisation, but the predominant role of Moscow is reduced by the fact that the organisation meets all the

requirements of international standards and the membership is optional for all countries. By all accounts the leading Russian leadership is just as important in this region as the one of the USA in the NATO. Although the organisation's willingness to adapt has spectacularly been proved in the past thirty years, as it proved in 2022 in Kazakhstan. Moreover, its contribution to the international peace and security has also been quite humble. The CSTO will have to face continual challenges of cohesion and efficiency, although its regional bodies with numerous numbers and the bilateral and multilateral features provide Russia a large margin to achieve its goals. The tensions between the member states as well as the differences between European and Central Asian activity orientations will probably not allow the foreign consensus-based application of the CSTO's collective forces in the future either. Therefore, the CSTO's sphere of action and its skills will stay limited. Nevertheless, this Organisation will keep functioning as a viable platform for carrying out collective military activities and for dealing with non-military security challenges, risks and threats.

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An Aspiring Security Organisation in Africa – The African Union

Introduction

Africa is often deemed to be weightless in international organisations, despite its growing population and sheer geographical extent. To demonstrate the continent's neglected state, it is enough to mention that despite its sheer geographical size and population, the continent does not have any representation among the permanent members of the United Nations' Security Council. Moreover, Africa was not an active participant in the establishment of the UN either, since most of its territories, save Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and the Union of South Africa, had a colonial status in 1945. Over the years the continent gave two Secretary Generals to the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, but the special envoys and advisers to the Secretary General, who handled subjects related to Africa remained outsiders until 2017. This neglect can originate from Africa's turbulent history, and from the fact that it achieved its independence rather late (BÚR 2019: 9–19).

Despite its unfavourable position, the continent showed a strong willingness to take matters into its own hand. First, the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 provided a framework for cooperation. When support from competing superpowers decreased dramatically in the post-bipolar system, authoritarian regimes started to crumble. Yet, instead of a peaceful transition, long civil wars erupted on the continent, which also showed the pitfalls of non-interference policy. With the realisation that Africa cannot rely on external actors in solving problems on the continent, a new institutional framework was born, the African Union (AU). The organisation, founded in 2002, broke with the formerly mentioned practice of non-interference, and introduced a stronger commitment in solving its Member States' internal problems, placing regional stability over state sovereignty (MARSAI 2019: 131–132).

Both organisations stemmed from the idea of continental unity, Pan-Africanism (MATHEWS 2018: 15–36). This ensured continuity, however, some changes were introduced in this approach. The security domain also went through significant changes, nonetheless both organisations were conceptualised as collective security organisations. Although the OAU also led peace operations, the AU embedded a more comprehensive and sophisticated institutional framework, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) into its system. Moreover, the AU started to formulate the African Standby Force (ASF), a regional, brigade strong military asset to contribute to peacekeeping (KENT–MALAN 2003: 72–73) and launch its next generation of operations. The organisation even thought about the finances of the operations, introducing a new, 0.2% levy on selected import items to ease its dependency on external actors, and to accumulate funds to finance AU missions (MATLOSA

2018: 95–96). This step shows a certain level of commitment towards the realisation of the stated *African solutions to African problems* approach (FRANKE–ESMENJAUD 2008: 143). Steps in the direction of this commitment were necessary, since four (AMIB, MISCA, AFISMA, AMIS II)¹ of the total nine AU operations launched until 2023 were taken over by the United Nations (UN), due to lack of finances, and ATMIS–AMISOM² until 1 April 2022 (DESSU 2022) is leaning heavily on third party donors both in case of finances and logistics (Peace and Security Council 2022). Notwithstanding these constraints, the AU still shows willingness to introduce its homegrown solutions, and still carries out its operations in the continent. Thus, this chapter is dedicated to provide an introduction to the African Union as a security provider, and examine its security institutions as well as the missions and operations it has launched.

The African Union as a security provider

The clear conceptualisation of the OAU and its successor organisation, the AU as a collective or cooperative security organisation is rare in international literature. However, when researchers (like Franke and Esmenjaud) or the AU itself refers to it so, it is stated, that based on its collective identity, the AU forms a collective security organisation to resolve collective African security problems. This approach mirrors the preceding OAU self-definition as well. The aforementioned collective identity is provided by the theory of Pan-Africanism. “Pan-Africanism may be described as a politico-cultural phenomenon which in its early stages regarded Africa, Africans and persons of African extraction as a unit. It has consistently aimed at the regeneration and uplift of Africa and the promotion of a feeling of unity among Africans in general. It also glories in the African past and inculcates pride in African culture” (ESEDEBE 1970: 127). In practice, it meant the pooling of African assets in the promise of mutual support and assistance in order to counter neo-colonialist incentives of external powers. It was a predominant concept even before the formulation of the OAU of which two further ideas derived, Africanisation and African ownership. These two ideas were the primary vehicles of the development of African integration in the field of security (FRANKE–ESMENJAUD 2008: 139–140). The African continental integration followed a similar path to the European. Following a functionalist approach, it started in the field of economic integration. A similar spill-over effect was expected as was in the case of the EU (MARSAI 2019: 130). As it was already mentioned, integration in the field of security is still an incomplete process in the much smaller EU. The African integration is double the size, and it relies on external donors, thus integration development in the field of security has proven to be a slow process.

¹ The African Union’s missions, namely the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine (African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic [MISCA]), African-led International Support Mission (AFISMA), African Union Mission in Sudan II (AMIS II).

² African Union missions, namely African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).

Nevertheless, both the OAU and the AU implemented initiatives in order to enhance African ownership and the Africanisation of security. However, the lack of financial resources created a situation where external actors were also providing support to African projects. The African reliance on donations however re-establishes a neo-colonial-like relationship with external powers. This can be explained by the dependence theory, which states that recipient countries have a decreased autonomy over policy making (APUULI 2018: 172). Thus, applying this analogy to the AU, the implementation of the peace and security agenda also suffers of this eroded autonomy. As the AU does not have the financial assets and sufficient military equipment to act independently, it relies heavily on international partners, like the UN in this domain, which raises the question of ownership again (ENGEL–PORTO 2014: 138). Despite the drawbacks, Africanisation of security continues, and African ownership is still advertised. The most prominent elements of this idea are the African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Standby Force.

The African Peace and Security Architecture

The transformation of the OAU into the African Union was the first step towards establishing a more credible partner in the security domain both to internal and external partners. The Constitutive Act of the African Union provided a more solid and willing legal framework for the organisation as a security provider. The Constitutive Act presented a clearer and firmer standpoint on the AU's role in promoting peace, security and stability in Africa than the OAU Charter. One of the new aspects is the articulated willingness to intervene in Member States if requested, with the aim to restore peace and security (African Union 2000). With the establishment of the AU, new institutions were created, like a full-fledged and more capable AU Commission, but most of all, a new African Peace and Security Architecture was established. This latter has a great significance, since it institutionalised a framework in which missions and operations can be better managed by the AU (ENGEL–PORTO 2009: 82–83).

The Peace and Security Council Protocol (PSC Protocol), which defines the components and responsibilities of the APSA was adopted on 9 July 2002 and entered into force in December 2003 (African Union 2023). The PSC Protocol defined five main pillars of the APSA: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force and the Peace Fund (Figure 1). The PSC Protocol also provided an overview of the decision-making process within the APSA framework. To establish institutions to the APSA, in 2004 the AU adopted its Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). The PSC Protocol and the CADSP together provide the legal framework of the APSA (ENGEL–PORTO 2009: 84).




Figure 1: The institutional framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture

Source: Compiled by Mariann Tánczos

In line with the incentive of the Africanisation of security, the APSA can be seen as the most important development in the framework of the AU (SÖDERBAUM–TAVARES 2009: 71). The institutional pillars also show a commitment towards African ownership. In this realm, the AU seemed to achieve its aim, since in the case of crisis or conflict on the continent, either a regional organisation, or the AU itself is expected to intervene (CRAVINHO 2009: 198).

The main decision-making body of the APSA, which decides on how to prevent, manage or resolve conflicts and crises is the Peace and Security Council. The PSC has the power to initiate action in all the aforementioned periods of conflict and crisis (APUULI 2018: 156). It consists of 15 members, based on the principle of *equitable regional representation* [African Union 2002: Article 5 and s. (2)]. As the first step of conflict prevention, the PSC is provided with information by the CEWS. This body is responsible for coordinating with the UN, and it is the most important tool in conflict prevention. The Situation Room collects information 24/7, and produces various reports and updates to the PSC. To be more efficient, the Protocol sought for the establishment of regional and national early warning systems, which is still incomplete by 2023 (African Union 2002: Article 12; APUULI 2018: 158; ENGEL–PORTO 2009: 86). The PSC has two advisory bodies, the Military Staff Committee, a technical advisory body consisting of the military attachés of the PSC members, and the Panel of the Wise. The latter is a civilian advisory body consisting of five prominent African personalities selected in line with the equitable regional representation principle. Technically, the PSC can seek the advice of both institutions after considering information provided by the CEWS. This, however, is proven to be very limited, in case of the Military Staff Committee because

of African general prejudice against the military approach towards peace operations, and in the case of the Panel of the Wise because of the unclarified relationship between the bodies. However, the latter has already fulfilled conflict prevention and mediation roles since its establishment in 2007 (PORTO–NGANDU 2014: 191; APUULI 2018: 159–164; ENGEL–PORTO 2009: 87).

The AU set up the Peace Fund or Special Fund to finance APSA with the peace operations included. The Fund was established in 1993 by the OAU to provide reserves in case of emergencies. 6% of the OAU's budget was allocated to it. The PSC Protocol, however, explicitly calls for voluntary contributions not from only Member States, but from civil society and external actors as well. In 2009, the AU decided to raise the regular budget allocation to the Peace Fund gradually to 12%, but in 2016 it stood only at 7% (African Union 2022: Article 21; APUULI 2018: 160–161; BADMUS 2015: 100–101). Notwithstanding, with the introduction of the 0.2% levy in 2017 on import items, the state of AU finances could become more balanced. However, this step led to negative repercussions in the World Trade Organisation, as concerns were raised with respect to compatibility with trade principles. The Peace Fund had been reliant on external donations before, such as the UN Trust Fund, and the EU's European Peace Facility (preciously called African Peace Facility) (APIKO–AGGAD 2018). This pattern does not seem to change soon, with the consequence that APSA decision-making processes remain less autonomous.

The African Standby Force

The idea of establishing the African Standby Force emerged from a UN initiative originating in 1947, to create multinational standby units for peacekeeping tasks. After a series of reports and renewed interest in the standby forces concept in the late 1990s and early 2000s, African leaders decided to operationalise the idea in 2003 as the fifth pillar of the APSA. The notion behind the creation of the ASF was to equip Africa with a tool to be able to provide timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis on the continent (KENT–MALAN 2003: 72). The PSC Protocol of 2002 made the establishment of the ASF possible. The document equipped the Force with the following tasks:

- observation and monitoring missions
- other types of peace support missions
- intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security
- prevention of a dispute or conflict from escalating
- peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation
- humanitarian assistance
- any other functions mandated by the PSC or AU Assembly (African Union 2023)




Figure 2: The geographical display of African Standby Force regional brigades

Source: Compiled by Mariann Tánczos

According to the Protocol, the ASF would have been composed of 15,000 troops from different regional brigades. This idea was recently changed to regional forces, relying on five regional economic organisations recognised by the AU. These are, as shown in Figure 2, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). All these organisations are responsible to prepare their regional forces, namely the East African Standby Force (EASF), the ECCAS Standby Force (FOMAC), the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), the North African Regional Capability (NARC) and the SADC Standby Force (SSF) (SÖDERBAUM–TAVARES 2009: 71; APUULI 2018: 165).

Over the years, multiple roadmaps were adopted on the full operationalisation of the ASF. It was first scheduled between 2005 and 2008, later pushed to 2010 and finally operationalised in 2016 after the conclusion of the 2015 Amani Africa II field training exercise, which marked the end of a four-year long training cycle. The exercise was held with the participation of 5,400 members of the military, police and civilian (APUULI 2018: 164–169). Despite the optimistic take on the ASF by the AU Assembly, it is arguable if the ASF and the RDC are truly deployable. The establishment of the regional brigades has proven to be even more problematic. The internal political division within AMU countries of achieving any progress in setting up the NARC, the FOMAC in Central Africa was facing capacity constraints, and could not equip fully its brigade, thus it remains undeployable, while the SSF of South Africa also experienced backlashes due to political divisions among SADC member states. The

only two brigades, which showed some progress, were the EASF and the ESF. In the doctrinal level, the EASF followed a bottom-up process, starting with a tactical doctrine, while the ESF derived its own strategic level doctrine from the existing African peace and security operations doctrine (FITZ-GERALD 2017: 623–624). These latter two regions' economic organisations have played important roles before in the formulation of African security. While the ECCAS, responsible for EASF, led successful political mediation in the Central African Republic, the ECOWAS has a more complex agenda to promote peace and security in West Africa. Besides political mediation, the organisation offers assistance in transition and stabilisation, promotes good governance and engages in counter-terrorism and counter-piracy efforts as well. Thus, the ECOWAS possesses crucial capabilities and experience, as the regional organisation deployed ECOMOG in 1990 to Liberia (MOLNÁR 2008), to advance the Africanisation of security (MARSAI 2019: 147–149).

The missions and operations of the African Union

The evaluation of first two decades of the African Union would not be complete without the examination of operations and missions, launched by the organisation. The AU made huge efforts and demonstrated significant development in this field. It is not accidental if we take into account that on the one hand, as a collective security organisation the AU is responsible for the peace and stability of its own members, and on the other hand, the countries of Africa are still suffering from numerous challenges. Of course, the deployment of AU troops was and is not without contradiction and hardships. Nevertheless, the Union has managed to maintain its commitment for operations, and peacekeeping and peace enforcement have become integral part of its profile.

The beginnings – Burundi, Darfur and the Comoros Islands

The first military operation of the AU was the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). The AMIB was deployed in April 2003 after the ceasefire agreements between the government and different rebel groups fell apart and the United Nations was not capable to deploy rapidly peacekeeping forces to the East African country. The AMIB was the early sign of the AU's ambition to engage in peacekeeping operations on its own continent and provide "African solutions for African problems". In this context, AMIB was an archetypical AU operation. The collapse of the ceasefire between the competing hardliner Hutu and Tutsi militias threatened an all-out fight and the continuation of the civil war which had broken out in 1993. To stop the spiral of violence, the AU decided to launch its first peacekeeping/enforcing operation to Bujumbura. The composition of the troops fitted well the impartiality and neutrality of the mission: the Republic of South Africa acted as a lead nation, which had already some troops in the theatre. Besides Pretoria, Ethiopia and Mozambique contributed to the mission. Altogether, 3,128 peace-

keepers were deployed to Burundi – the overwhelming majority from South Africa. The mission managed to maintain stability and stop violence in the country. The AMIB also conducted a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) activity for the combatants, but it was less successful: instead of the planned 20,000 people, only some hundred participated in the programme. AMIB's deployment ended 31 May 2004, when the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) arrived in the country with almost 6,000 personnel (SVENSSON 2008a).

The AMIB could be considered mainly a success story. It could hold the line and maintain the stability in Burundi until the arrival of a more robust UN peacekeeping force. Nevertheless, the deployment also highlighted the challenges which overshadowed the next AU operations, too. The financial background of the operation was fragile, and dependent on external donors (the U.K., the U.S.). Last, but not least, in spite of its "AU" mandate, the AMIB was mainly in the hands of one single troop contributing country, South Africa (SVENSSON 2008a).

Unfortunately, the African Union could not repeat the successes of the AMIB in its next missions in Darfur, Sudan. According to the intention of the organisation, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS I) was an answer from the Union to provide protection for the population of Darfur against Janjawid militias against the spiralling violence which had already killed at least 300,000 people. Since the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) became an integral part of the thinking of the APSA, including the Peace and Security Council, Darfur seemed a veterinary house for R2P with the involvement of Khartoum in the massacre and the potential role of the AU as the protector of Fur and other ethnic groups. The original mandate of the mission was to monitor the ceasefire reached in Abuja talks between Khartoum and the different rebel groups. The first branch of 150 Rwandan troops arrived in the country in August 2004 to protect monitors. Other contingents also arrived soon. Nevertheless, the lack of necessary transport (vehicles, helicopters) and logistics as well as the low number of peacekeepers made it almost impossible for the mission to achieve its goals in the huge operational area (EKENGARD 2008: 17). Furthermore, the rise of violence also made it evident that the mandate and the tools of the mission were inadequate. To solve the challenges, the AU suggested the expansion and rebranding of the operation. AMIS II involved an increase in military capacity to more than 2,300 troops, and the introduction of a civilian police (CIVPOL) component of 815 officers. The operation also received an enhanced mandate from the PSC. With the new mandate AMIS II came to function as an "enhanced observer mission" (EKENGARD 2008: 19). The mission was expanded also geographically with three additional sectors in Kutum, Zalingue and Al Daien. Nevertheless, the arrival of new troops lagged behind schedule because of poor logistics. Until April 2005, only 2,200 of the authorised 3,320 troops had arrived into Sudan (EKENGARD 2008: 19). In the same year, the mission was enlarged to almost 8,000 personnel, and the U.K. provided 1,000 vehicles for AMIS II which was essential for the maintenance of operations. European partners financed air components in the form of 18 unarmed Mi-8 helicopters and different aircraft. In addition, NATO also provided assistance for the strategic airlifting of almost 32,000 peacekeepers to the

theatre (EKENGARD 2008: 22–23). Since the beginning, the EU has also assisted the mission with logistics and planning (BESENYŐ 2009: 31–45).

In spite of the increased number of troops and equipment, AMIS II was incapable to fulfil its objective. Despite AU's presence, Khartoum relaunched its military offensive against the rebel forces in August 2006. Because the AU could not maintain the ceasefire, its reputation was significantly harmed among local population, which led to mistrust, and sometimes, violent incidents. The worst attack happened in Haskanita camp in September 2007 when Darfur rebels overran an AMIS II military base and killed ten peacekeepers. Altogether 59 peacekeepers died during the mission (BESENYŐ 2009: 23–24).

By the end of the day, it was revealed that the AU – even with the *ad hoc* support by external partners such as the EU, the NATO and bilateral partners – could not cope with its responsibilities and did not have the necessary tools to handle the crisis. Therefore, after long negotiations between the partners, the mission was transformed into a hybrid UN–AU operation, UNAMID on 31 December 2007. Although having strong African component, UNAMID was much more a UN than an AU mission. Its mandate consisted of protecting civilians; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance by UN Agencies and other aid actors; providing the safety and security of humanitarian personnel; mediating between the Government of Sudan and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur; supporting mediation of community conflicts, including thorough measures to address its root causes, in conjunction with UN country team (UN 2022). At its highest peak, the mission had almost 26,000 authorised personnel with a one-billion-USD annual budget. Still, UNAMID faced numerous logistical and security constraints as it had to operate “in unforgiving terrain and in a complex and often hostile political environment” (UN 2022). In spite of its widening logistic support, UNAMID also struggled with shortfalls in transport, equipment, infrastructure and aviation assets. The mission was finished at the end of 2020. The main reason was not success, but the fact that after the military coup in 2019, the new political leadership of Sudan did not want to contribute to the further deployment of the mission. Perhaps it is not accidental that after the departure of UNAMID in 2022, Darfur witnessed a new wave of violence (ACAPS 2022).

As Arvid Ekengard concluded, “AMIS was too small to reach its objectives. The mandate included protecting civilians, but this task was formulated ambiguously. [...] Where deployed, AMIS prevented murder and displacement. However, because of its limited resources, large-scale violence and displacement continued, and the mission could do little to support the Darfur peace process”. In addition, “AMIS was dependent on donors, especially the EU” (EKENGARD 2008: 4). All these factors contributed to the failure, or at least partial success of the mission.

Last, but not least, we have to mention in this section the African Union's Operations in Comoros in the Indian Ocean: MAES and Operation Democracy. MAES was deployed to secure the elections in Comoros in 2008. Nevertheless, the mission could not have achieved its mandate without the parallel intervention of the AU mission ‘Operation Democracy’ to keep the territorial integrity of Comoros Islands against the secessionist movements in Anjouan. Although some analysts consider Operation Democracy

a “breakthrough for the AU when it comes to planning and conducting peace operations”, and eventually it succeeded in accomplishing its tasks (SVENSSON 2008b: 4), similarly to the previous operations, Operation Democracy could be launched only with significant external logistical assistance. Furthermore, neither the head of the secessionist movement, Colonel Mohamed Bacar, nor his approximately 500 troops demonstrated significant resistance (AMIR 2008).

The African Union in Somalia – AMISOM and ATMIS

Without question, the most robust peace support operation of the African Union is its commitment in Somalia, which has also been the longest and bloodiest operation in the history of APSA.

Somalia fell into chaos in the early 1990s and became the “failed among failed states”. After the rule of warlords, the increasing influence of different Islamist militias transformed the political landscape. The Courts of Islamic Union unified Mogadishu in 2006 and started to expand its authority into the countryside. In December 2006 Ethiopia, which was suspicious of the presence of radical elements in the Courts, launched a military offensive against the Islamists with the support of the U.S. The invasion of Addis Ababa fuelled nationalist feelings among Somalis and significantly contributed to the rise of one of the most brutal groups within the Courts, al-Shabaab. While the Ethiopian troops have managed to maintain their presence in bigger cities, al-Shabaab took control of the countryside. To make a shift in the stalemate and to replace the Ethiopians as well as to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, the African states launched the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The first troops arrived in Mogadishu from Uganda in March 2007. The first authorised number of the AMISOM contingent was 8,000, and their mandate aimed at the support and protection of TFG institutions, training Somali national forces, mediation between the different groups, and monitoring the situation. Nevertheless, it was soon revealed that AMISOM faced hard resistance from the Jihadists and it had to act more as a second generation than a first generation peace support operation.

At the beginning, AMISOM controlled only the Mogadishu International Airport (MIA), the Presidential Palace (Villa Somalia), and the main roads between the two locations. Al-Shabaab launched regular attacks to threaten the positions of AU peacekeepers. Nevertheless, Ugandan, and since late 2007, Burundian peacekeepers with the logistic support of DynCorps and Bancroft Global private security companies, held the line. The UN, the EU, the NATO and bilateral partners, such as the U.K. and U.S. also assisted the operation. In January 2009, thanks to the Djibouti Agreement between Somali factions, Ethiopian troops left Somalia. Nevertheless, the game changer, which gave a huge impetus for AMISOM, was the attack committed by al-Shabaab in the Ugandan capital, Kampala in July 2010. The bombing demonstrated well that al-Shabaab is not only a Somali but a regional problem. The successful and foiled attacks in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti between 2012–2015 also fuelled the perception that regional forces had to contain the

Jihadists. Therefore, besides Burundi and Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and for a shorter period, Sierra Leone also joined AMISOM, while the number of deployment reached 22,000 personnel. In August 2011, al-Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu, and allied forces liberated huge areas and dozens of big cities between 2011 and 2015.

Nevertheless, the expansion from Mogadishu to South Central Somalia overstretched the capacities of AMISOM. While the Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM could control main cities, most of the countryside remained in the hands of al-Shabaab. In addition, the protection of main supply routes between different AMISOM and SNA bases proved to be a huge challenge because of the regular guerrilla attacks by the Jihadists. In addition, many vulnerable AMISOM and SNA forward operating bases (FOB) were overrun by al-Shabaab. In the different Somali transitional security plans, SNA should have taken responsibility for FOBs and, later, the security of the whole country. Nevertheless, as years passed, newer and newer deadlines were determined for the exit of AMISOM. Although the relocation of troops, and later, the reduction of them started in 2017 (AMISOM 2017), almost 19,500 AU troops were deployed to Somalia still, by the end of 2022 (ZIP 2022), and SNA was only partially capable of keeping security and stability. Donors who finance the mission are exhausted, and with the current numbers and assets AMISOM cannot shift the equilibrium which exists between the allies and al-Shabaab. The re-configuration and re-branding of the mission from AMISOM to ATMIS has tried to address the challenges and handicaps of the operation (ATMIS s. a.). Nevertheless, it does not seem that the new mandate could provide real answers for them.

In the last fifteen years, AMISOM–ATMIS has reached significant successes. It liberated Mogadishu and dozens of big cities and provided a background for the capacity building of the Somali political transition, state building and security sector reform. Nevertheless, it cost a lot both in human and financial resources: although there are no official statistics, according to solid estimations, thousands of AU peacekeepers had sacrificed their lives in East Africa, while the financial burden of the mission exceeds one billion USD annually. Furthermore, a huge part of the countryside has still remained under the control of al-Shabaab, and ATMIS has no capacity to liberate it. The only solution for the Somali conundrum could be a unified Somali elite who consider al-Shabaab the main threat for the country, and not other clans and politicians (for this section see WILLIAMS 2018).

After AMISOM

AMISOM–ATMIS took most of the resources and attention of the African Union, and later military involvement demonstrated that even with foreign assistance the AU had limited capacity to launch other missions. First, in late 2012, the AU wanted to launch a capacity building mission in Mali to strengthen the security sector of the country after the Tuareg rebellion. Nevertheless, the rise of Jihadist groups and their offensive against Bamako in January 2013 washed away the original plans, and the first components of AFISMA were deployed as a protection unit for humanitarian workers and civilian

population. In spite of the arrival of thousands of AU troops, it soon turned out that neither AU nor donors had the will to support financially and logistically the operations: only half of the requested budget had arrived. Therefore, to avoid the collapse, the United Nations and the Security Council decided to take over the mission and transform it into a full blue helmet peacekeeping operation, MINUSMA in July 2013 (WPF 2017: 4–6).

Similar pattern could be observed in case of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA). The AU made the decision on the deployment of MISCA after the civil war in the CAR in 2013. The main role of AU peacekeepers would have been to assist political negotiations, protect civilians and humanitarian workers. The 6,000 troops together with the forces of the French Operation Sangaris made tremendous efforts to restore peace and stability in the country (MISCA 2014). Yet, the wide-scale violence, the hard terrain and the lack of necessary logistics and mobility made it impossible for the mission to achieve its goals. Therefore, similarly to AFISMA, the UNSC made the decision to take over the mission. This change took place in mid-2014 (UN 2014).

The failures of AFISMA and MISCA, and the ongoing burdens of AMISOM–ATMIS deterred the African Union from other missions. Therefore, the AU did not launch other peace support operations in the coming years.

Nevertheless, the political and security turmoil of Africa forced certain actors to act. Although the African Union did not start new operations, in the 2020s three regional blocks decided to have a role in the military operation. First, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – with the contribution of Rwanda – deployed troops to Mozambique to cope with the Jihadist insurgency in Gabo Delgado province. The SAMIM (Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique) which arrived in Mozambique in 2021, consisted of approximately 2,000 troops and an additional 1,000 soldiers from Rwanda. It managed to pull ‘the country’s north back from the brink’ (CHEATHAM et al. 2022). The second new initiative was the mission of the East African Community (EAC) to the Democratic Republic of Congo in the last quarter of 2022, whose objective is to build stability in East Congo and stop the rule of local armed groups, such as the M23 movement (VAN DE WALLE 2022). Last, but not least the Economic Cooperation of West African Countries (ECOWAS) also decided on the establishment of a force, in order to contribute to the stability of the Sahel region (DW 2022).

Conclusions

The self-definition of the African Union as a collective security organisation is based on the concept of collective identity. This is interlinked with the idea of Pan-Africanism, which leads to two additional concepts in the security domain, the Africanisation of security and African ownership. The AU thus set up its African Peace and Security Architecture along these lines.

The APSA’s five pillars consist of the Peace and Security Council as the main decision-making body, with the Continental Early Warning System to provide it with essential

information, while the Panel of the Wise can advise the body. The financing tool of the APSA is the Peace Fund, and the operational pillar is the African Standby Force. The Architecture does seem to be a well-organised system at first glance, and if we step closer and investigate the workings of the system, shortcomings become visible. The PSC was accused multiple times in the past that despite the reports provided by the CEWS, it ignored serious situations (ENGEL–PORTO 2009: 90; WILLIAMS 2014: 149). Internal communication and the relation between the different bodies of the APSA was not detailed in the PSC Protocol establishing the system, which led to discrepancies. For example, the Panel of the Wise was left completely unused for years, and later on the body was resorted to almost solely in conflict prevention procedures. Problems on the political level influenced the military structure as well. Although the African Standby Force was pronounced operational in 2016, three of the five regional brigades are far from ready to be used, and it would be overly optimistic to call the remaining two fully operational either.

Additionally, despite the willingness of the AU to find a solution for funding, the Peace Fund remains highly reliant on external actors' donations. This practice jeopardises the freedom of decision-making and affects the organisation's autonomy to act. This also influences peace support operations, as at the end of 2022, the AU still lacks not just the financial but also the logistic background for independent operations. Therefore, we can observe the rise of regional actors, which are trying to stabilise their own immediate neighbourhood in small scale, brigade-size missions. Nevertheless, they also need more stable financial background to maintain and continue their activities. Therefore, in the long term, the AU should find a stable and sustainable solution for the financing of its military operations.

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Security Organisations of East Asia: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Introduction

This chapter will provide an overview of two organisations that can be considered security organisations relevant to the international relations of East Asia. The region is home to some of the world's largest economies, including China, Japan and South Korea, which have contributed to its growing global relevance. However, ongoing dynamics have also brought about a shift in the balance of power, an arms race and territorial disputes, which pose potential points of escalation.

The South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea are some of the main conflict zones where tensions have been rising due to territorial disputes and other clashes of interests. Despite this, the region lacks multilateral regional institutions with binding legal frameworks or a multilateral alliance system like NATO. This makes the geopolitical developments in the region more volatile and uncertain.

However, stability in the region has been built on deterrence, constant dialogue, and slow but steady regional integration. Most countries in the region have been investing in their military capabilities to deter – mainly Chinese – adventurism and maintain peace. Diplomatic dialogues have also been ongoing to address and manage the territorial disputes and other security concerns. Additionally, efforts towards regional integration through trade agreements and other initiatives have also contributed to stability in the region.

East Asia's international relations have undergone significant changes in recent years due to its increasing global relevance and growing economic and military capabilities. The region is poised to play an increasingly important role in the global arena in the coming years. As such, it is vital to understand the two organisations that have some degree of security aspects regarding East Asia and the wider region of Eastern Eurasia.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN

ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 as a community of five states with very different characteristics and political arrangements: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. Their motivation was both to act as a collective check on the rise of domestic communist aspirations and to counter Vietnam, which was becoming a dominant force in the region. But beyond the need for a balance of regional power

and for collective action for domestic political stability, as early as 1967, the leaders of the founding states had already articulated their vision that, entering a new era in the history of Southeast Asia, the region would finally be able to shape its regional internal relations through the means of genuine independence, equality and peaceful cooperation (ACHARYA 2009).

The signing of the organisation's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 1976 was the cornerstone of the ASEAN community. In it, the parties agreed on the following basic principles of common relations:

- a. mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations,*
- b. the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion,*
- c. non-interference in the internal affairs of one another,*
- d. settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means,*
- e. renunciation of the threat or use of force, and*
- f. effective co-operation among themselves (ASEAN 1976).*

The signing of the TAC in all cases of membership enlargement has preceded the admission to ASEAN of countries that had joined the organisation.

The first expansion took place in 1984, when Brunei was admitted to ASEAN membership just a week after it had gained independence. The next major milestone was the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), first announced in 1992, with a 15-year horizon. However, due to long, consensual negotiations among ASEAN countries and the organisation's highly informal methods of negotiation, these progressed slowly, with conflicts of interest being resolved behind closed doors and through informal channels. Therefore, the AFTA was implemented gradually, with tariffs on certain product groups being reduced and then items expanded, with the gradual involvement of member countries and members joining in the course of enlargements, but eventually by 2010 most member countries had successfully reduced import tariffs on most products to 0–5% (ASEAN 2002).

The next stage in ASEAN's expansion was Vietnam's accession to the organisation in 1995. The development of the organisation and the region is illustrated by the fact that the community, initially united in fear of the rise of communism and seeking to counterbalance Vietnam's strength, unanimously accepted the still communist country as a member.

Laos and Myanmar (Burma) joined in 1997, but the latter's admission has cast the organisation in a somewhat problematic light. While the enlargement of the organisation could previously be understood within the framework of a "democratic security organisation" (although this approach was already somewhat more nuanced with the accession of Vietnam), in the 1990s Myanmar, led by a military dictatorship, emerged as a pariah on the international stage. The repressive nature of the regime and its human rights abuses were heavily criticised by both the EU and the U.S., yet neighbouring countries were increasingly inclined towards Myanmar's integration. The ASEAN countries have come to the conclusion that by accepting Myanmar as a full member, they can support

the building of elements of a market economy and democratic institutions through slow but clear rapprochement and contribute to a political opening, with positive feedback communication in the future. This approach has been called constructive engagement.

This constructive tone also corresponded to the inclusion of Laos in the Community. The country, which had fallen into serious economic turmoil after the Vietnam War, partly due to dwindling U.S. aid, had shown an increasing willingness to move towards market economy reforms since the 1990s. Yet these had not led to major changes, thus it needed regional support to carry out the necessary reforms.

ASEAN countries agreed in 1995 to declare Southeast Asia a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The agreement was enshrined in the Bangkok Treaty, which entered into force in 1997. It banned the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by member states (ASEAN s. a.).

The ASEAN+3 initiative in 1997 promoted the deepening of East Asia's overall regional integration relations. This consists of regular meetings and conferences to improve relations between ASEAN, the People's Republic of China, South Korea and Japan.

The final element in the enlargement process of the organisation so far was the accession of Cambodia in 1999. ASEAN's development since the 2000s has shown signs of ever closer integration of the current ten member states. In 2008, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Charter, which sets out the organisation's goal of becoming an EU-like community. The Charter complements the TAC's earlier principles by seeking to promote the rule of law, good governance, democracy, constitutionalism, human rights and social justice.

At its ninth summit in 2003, ASEAN agreed to build a three-pillar community of endeavour on the new direction of integration processes. These are the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The ASC aims to develop a comprehensive security community, build normative frameworks, conflict prevention and resolution processes and other peace-building mechanisms. The ASC was complemented by a political dimension (ASPC). The starting point for the integration process was set in 2015 in the ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint, which had been drawn up in 2009. In the spirit of the ASPC, in addition to the normative framework of cooperative security efforts laid down earlier, cooperation has been complemented by meetings to coordinate joint action against drug trafficking: the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings on Drug Matters (ADMM) and the increasingly regular ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime Plus China (AMMTC + China). The ASPC's role in security beyond ASEAN is based on the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASPC's programme relies heavily on strengthening the ARF, in particular the development of its preventive diplomacy role (ACHARYA 2009).

One of ASEAN's greatest achievements since its inception is that, although the region has experienced armed conflicts between the countries that have become members since the organisation was founded in 1967 (the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, 1978–1989; the border conflict between Thailand and Laos in 1986; and border disputes between Vietnam and Thailand in 1978–1989), no armed conflicts have broken out between ASEAN countries since joining the organisation. Other notable achievements in the security

dimension of the organisation include the nuclear-weapon-free region and the TAC and its extension to parties beyond its member countries (ASEAN 2019).

The central platform of the organisation is the annual ASEAN Summit of Heads of State and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), which is responsible for setting common orientations for Community efforts and coordinating ASEAN activities. In addition to the Foreign Ministers' Summits, ASEAN countries also hold sectoral ministerial meetings. The central figure in the institutional framework of the organisation is the ASEAN Secretary General, who is appointed by the ASEAN Leaders' Community at the ASEAN Summit on the recommendation of the AMM. The Secretary General is also the head of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC), based in Jakarta. This body is responsible for coordinating ASEAN's common affairs between AMM meetings, reviewing various policy activities and implementing the directives adopted by the AMM in the area of policy contributions. The Secretary General of the ASC is always the Foreign Minister of the host country of the forthcoming AMM meeting, but the Committee is chaired by the ASEAN Secretary General except for the first and last Committee meeting of his/her chairmanship. The Standing Committee is directly accountable to the AMM (ASEAN 2008a).

The basis for the integration of economic relations within ASEAN has been strengthened by the progressive development of free trade agreements (FTAs), which have made the Economic Community efforts largely successful. ASEAN has also successfully concluded FTAs with several important partners outside the organisation, including Japan in 2008 and the People's Republic of China, India, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand in 2010 (ASEAN 2008b).

The ASEAN Regional Forum – ARF

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is organised around a regular annual meeting of the participating countries to provide a forum for dialogue on security issues. Its creation is one of the most important advances in ASEAN's regional policy and is also an implementation of the objectives of the Singapore Declaration issued after the 1992 ASEAN Summit. In it, ASEAN leaders set out, as a next step in political and security cooperation, inter alia, to broaden ASEAN's relations with external partners, building on the positive experience of the organisation in the past.

The first meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994, chaired by ASEAN countries. The purpose of the meeting and the resulting security organisation was to develop a consultative community with the world's major players (including China, Japan, Russia, the United States and the European Union) to develop a regional security system with cooperative security cooperation at its core. The ARF is not intended to replace the balance of power in the region, but to complement it by creating a dialogue within an institutional framework. As the Australian Foreign Minister who attended the first meeting put it, "building security with others, not against others". The first meeting of the ARF was attended by 18 founding members: the ASEAN

countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei), the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, China, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam, Laos and the European Union.

The ARF thus held its first meeting in 1994, practically as an extension of the tradition of conferences that had followed ASEAN ministerial meetings, but over time the organisation has grown to become the largest security dialogue forum, now involving 27 countries and the European Union. At the first inaugural meeting, the participants were the ASEAN member countries (in 1994: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the United States, China, Russia, Laos, Vietnam, Papua New Guinea and the United States. The aim of the ARF is not to resolve individual problematic issues, such as the island disputes in the South China Sea, but rather to develop a more careful confidence building process, not least to help maintain ASEAN's relevance as a regional security actor.

The ARF's organisation culminates in the annual meeting of Foreign Ministers, which is always hosted by an ASEAN member. This is not only strongly linked to the ASEAN model of similar summits in terms of its organisational logic, but also seeks to create an atmosphere of regular political-security dialogue in which participants can ensure adherence to the normative framework, the so-called ASEAN Way, in order to maintain stability in the region. Following the establishment of the ARF, the consensus among the participating parties did not involve the joint adoption of a ready-made framework based on a set of principles, but rather the intended evolution and development of the normative integration of the organisation. However, in addition to the development of the normative framework, a more tangible element of ARF's integration policy is that it has been guided by the principles of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (ASEAN TAC) from its inception. Although the issue of accession to the treaty initially divided the participating parties, the ARF has resulted in the ARF participating parties all having signed the ASEAN TAC treaty.

The rationale behind the development of the ARF has been seen by some as a necessary consequence of the lack of a region-wide security structure and ASEAN's response to this. Indeed, since the 1990s, increasing attention has been paid to the strengthening of great power regional interests and the lack of a platform for security-related dialogue. ASEAN countries feared that the region would once again become exclusively dominated by the interests of the great powers. They saw the need to take the initiative on security issues. In fact, the ARF supported the aspiration to have ASEAN countries play a central role in the dialogue on security policy processes in the region.

The supporting framework behind the annual summit can be seen as the institutional backbone of the ARF. The organisation's annual Foreign Ministers' Meeting is preceded by the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and is supported by the organisation to hold related expert conferences and professional interactions on issues such as international crime and drug prevention to promote confidence building. Beyond the summits, the ARF's work therefore also promotes regional, yet limited, professional exchange and cooperation on relevant issues across the security spectrum.

Since 2004, the ARF Unit, a permanent unit within ASEAN reporting to the ASEAN Secretary General, has been operational. The ARF Unit is tasked with supporting the work of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) Secretary General, who also serves as the ARF Secretary General during his term of office. The ARF Unit is also responsible for liaising with other regional and international organisations and supporting dialogue between defence sector officials, as well as being the repository of official ARF documents and the general institutional infrastructure support and administrative unit of the ARF.

In the context of the ARF's interpretation of security policy, there is an opportunity both to present the merits of the organisation and to identify the criticisms and limitations of the ARF. On the one hand, by accepting the principles of the TAC, participants express their willingness, albeit to a limited extent, to settle conflicts of interest peacefully, in addition to ARF membership. However, neither participation in the organisation nor the ARF has any coercive mechanisms or institutionalised legal frameworks that could be seen as a primary pressure factor in any problematic case. The consensus-oriented tone of the dialogues and the importance of the role of informal frameworks tend to make ARF more a space for efforts to maintain high level channels of communication in spite of any problems that may exist, rather than a space for resolving problematic issues. An example of both phenomena is the issue of the PRC and Taiwan, which tested the regional integration efforts within a year of the organisation's creation.

The adoption of the 'One China Policy' – only maintaining formal diplomatic relations with China and not Taiwan – was a major precondition for the PRC's participation in the ARF before its creation. This was the reason why Taiwan was not given the opportunity by ASEAN to participate in the ARF. Furthermore, the China–Taiwan conflict, which is formally regarded as a domestic issue with the adoption of the 'One China Policy', is not even on the ARF agenda, despite being one of the most serious sources of tension in the region. Leaving aside these, it is precisely the Taiwan question that has shown that the ARF is a useful forum for the dialogue needed to defuse tensions. In 1995–1996, tensions over the Taiwan Strait entered a particularly heated phase, following the visit of Taiwanese President Lee Teng Hui to the United States in 1995 to speak at Cornell University, and the 1996 elections in the island nation, which led to symbolic missile tests by the People's Republic of China to exert pressure, with missiles passing over Taiwan Island. The events had a serious impact on U.S.–China relations, and the U.S. also sought to strengthen its alliance with Japan. However, in a period of tension, the ARF and the pre-meeting meetings provided a useful channel of communication between the parties, and some believe that the ARF's interface helped to ease tensions.

The ASEAN Regional Forum can therefore be seen as both a relevant security organisation in the region and an underdeveloped initiative that is not yet a structural integration force that could, by itself, make a significant contribution to regional stability through its institutional framework. However, the ARF has the potential to do so. The ARF, like ASEAN itself, has a declared commitment to slow but steady normative development and has not been disingenuous in its efforts in recent years. Today, with 18 participants present at the inaugural meeting, the organisation has grown significantly to become one of the largest security cooperation communities in the world.

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian intergovernmental organisation founded in Shanghai on 15 June 2001. Following its latest membership expansion (Iran) in September 2022 now accounts for about 42% of the world's population and 20% of world GDP, and is one of the most important multilateral organisations on the Eurasian continent. The SCO, which is also the successor to the Shanghai Five, established in 1996 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan primarily for security purposes, has undergone major changes in its objectives and institutions since its creation. Initially focused on the Central Asian region in the narrow sense, the SCO has now become an organisation with a broad political, economic and cultural profile, covering most of the Eurasian continent. The SCO currently comprises nine Member States (China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), three Observer States interested in acceding to full membership (Afghanistan, Belarus and Mongolia) and thirteen "Dialogue Partners" (SCO 2023).

Historical overview

In the 1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the successor states in the Central Asian region faced a number of internal (social, political, economic) and external (border disputes) challenges. Border disputes, minority conflicts, the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist and separatist groups, illegal trafficking of arms, drugs and human beings were the most pressing problems that prompted China and Russia to join forces regionally, together with three newly independent Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In 1996, in order to calm the situation and build confidence, the so-called Shanghai Five were formed and an Agreement on Military Confidence Building in the Border Area was signed in Shanghai (UN 1996). This was followed in 1997 by a new treaty to reduce military forces in border areas. The aim was to build confidence between China and the former Soviet states (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) bordering or close to it, and to demilitarise the common border areas (ODGAARD 2009: 181–182).

In 2001, with the accession of Uzbekistan, the Shanghai Five was restructured, creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a permanent intergovernmental consultative forum. A year later, in St Petersburg, the members signed the organisation's Charter (the SCO officially became an international organisation), which entered into force in 2003. The Charter set out the guidelines and objectives of the organisation. These objectives included developing more effective cooperation in the fields of neighbourhood policy, confidence building, politics, trade, economy, research, energy, transport, tourism and the environment, as well as maintaining peace, stability and prosperity in the region and moving towards a democratic, fair and peaceful international order (SCO Charter 2002). In terms of foreign policy, it was specified that they do not wish to become a military alliance, that their cooperation is not directed against third countries. The organisation's objective

was also defined as fighting the “three evils” of terrorism, extremism and separatism (ARIS 2009: 463). In order to give a formal framework to this endeavour, another permanent organisation, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), was created alongside the SCO Secretariat (ARIS 2013: 5).

Initially focused on the Central Asian region in the narrow sense, the SCO has now become an organisation with a broad political, economic and cultural profile. The number of members and cooperating countries has expanded considerably, so that the SCO covers most of the territory of the Asian continent.

Permanent Members	Observer States	Dialogue Partners
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • China (1996) • Russia (1996) • Kazakhstan (1996) • Kyrgyzstan (1996) • Tajikistan (1996) • Uzbekistan (2001) • India (2017) • Pakistan (2017) • Iran (2022) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mongolia (2004) • Belarus (2009) • Afghanistan (2012) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2009: Sri Lanka • 2012: Turkey • 2015: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal • 2021: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar • 2022: Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Myanmar

Figure 1: Member states, observer states and dialogue partners of the SCO in 2023

Source: SCO 2023

Collective security as a basis of the SCO

The SCO was set up primarily to address the main security challenges identified as common to the Member States. Its Statute sets out as its main objectives to maintain peace and strengthen security and confidence in the region, and to achieve international cooperation in traditional security areas such as the coordination of disarmament and disarmament efforts. At the same time, Member States’ main security concerns are increasingly linked to non-traditional security problems such as terrorism, separatism, drug trafficking and organised crime. This is because security problems in Central Asia are generally trans-national rather than internal (ARIS 2009: 465).

Although the cooperation between the Shanghai Five was clearly based on military issues, its aim was to strengthen trust between them, not to defend against an external power. The main promoter of the SCO’s creation was China, which for the first time undertook to set up an international organisation, signalling its more active involvement in world politics, and the organisation became an important prestige institution for Beijing. In addition to the confidence building mentioned above, it was also important for China to increase its political and economic leverage in Central Asia – to which it

wanted to draw on Russia's influence there – and to discourage Muslim states in the region from supporting Muslim Uighur separatist groups operating in China's Xinjiang province (KERR–SWINTON 2008: 89–112).

This is reflected in the adoption of the three evil terms, which were originally used in Chinese political terminology. All this also shows that the purpose of forming the organisation was not to protect its members from something, but rather to prevent them from harming each other.

The SCO clearly represents the concept of *collective security*, as its members seek to maintain peace among themselves and in the region, primarily through dialogue, for which the organisation provides a forum. The SCO is not a military alliance – even if in the mid-2000s some members used to call it 'Asian NATO' – but can be defined as a "partnership rather than alliance" (LANTEIGNE 2010: 166–167). If we look at the objectives, we can see that the SCO is primarily focused on solving internal problems, and its members even state that they do not intend to become part of a military alliance or to target any other country (SCO Charter 2002). Of course, the picture is much more nuanced than that, but it is clear that the SCO has no collective defence character at all, and this is unlikely to change in the future.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is an important regional forum for member countries, observers and dialogue partners. It includes the three most powerful powers in Asia (China, Russia and India) and is an important forum for Asian issues. The organisation was originally created as a Russian–Chinese forum, with Central Asian countries joining as extras. The dominance of China and Russia over the organisation is reflected in the fact that Chinese and Russian are the official languages. However, Central Asian states benefit from being members because they do not have to negotiate separately with Russia or China. Instead, they can develop a common position and more effectively represent their interests by exploiting the differences of interest between the two major powers (ARIS 2013: 8–9).

For the above reasons, a military alliance of the SCO is out of the question, because if we look at it, there are several participating states that would not defend each other, as it would be the case in a military alliance. While China and Russia agree on many issues, under the surface the relationship is not nearly as cordial as it first appears to be. Beijing and Moscow have a major common interest in reducing the global power and influence of the United States, but they are already rivals in the Central Asian region. Other members of the organisation, such as India and Pakistan, have several problems with each other. Iran's accession has further complicated this complex set of relations, which, with the potential accession of Arab states, is likely to increase internal disagreements on a number of issues. Therefore, the cooperative nature of this cooperation, confidence building and dialogue are crucial.

Organisation and decision-making

The SCO's highest decision-making body is the Council of Heads of State, which meets annually to take decisions and set the guidelines for the organisation's operation and activities. Below this is the Council of Heads of Government, which also meets annually to discuss cooperation strategies, set priorities and discuss emerging issues, particularly economic ones, and adopt the organisation's annual budget. Meetings are also held at ministerial level and at the level of the heads of the specialised agencies, covering practically all relevant areas. The Foreign Affairs Council is normally convened one month before the Heads of State meetings, but an extraordinary meeting can be convened at the request of at least two Member States with the consensus of all Member States. The SCO also has two non-governmental organisations, the SCO Business Council and the SCO Inter-Bank Consortium (SCO 2023).




Figure 2: The Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Source: PRADT 2020: 60

As mentioned above, the SCO has two permanent bodies: the Secretariat and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. The Secretariat, based in Beijing, is the main permanent executive body, headed by the Secretary General, who is nominated by the Council of Foreign

Ministers and approved by the Council of Heads of State. Its mandate is for a three-year, one-time term, rotating among member states according to the Russian alphabet. His deputy is elected by the Foreign Affairs Council, while the members of the Secretariat are drawn from the Member States' experts on a quota basis. The Secretariat is responsible for coordinating the SCO's activities and providing information, analytical, legal and technical support. The Secretariat coordinates cooperation with partner countries and NGOs. They oversee election observation operations, manage external relations, and produce publications, analysis, preliminary legal and financial assessments (SCO 2023).

Established in 2004, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is based in Tashkent (formerly in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan) and is tasked with promoting cooperation in the fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism. To this end, they carry out analyses and produce materials and studies to support decision-making processes. Its head is elected for a three-year term by the Council of Heads of State, and all SCO member states are represented in the organisation (SCO 2023). The RATS Council is composed of the heads of the national security services of the Member States. In addition, RATS has an Executive Committee, which coordinates data exchange and operations (OHCHR 2023). The working language of the organisation is Russian. RATS creates databases of known terrorist organisations and individuals, although mainly Western rights organisations criticise what they see as a broad definition of terrorism (GRIEGER 2015: 7).

Decision-making in the SCO is by consensus, and Member States must incorporate the outcome of the agreements into their own systems, according to their national specificities. Other decisions fall under organisational competence and are also applied there. Any Member State may formulate a dissenting opinion, which will be recorded, but it must not hinder the decision-making process. However, States have the right to opt out of certain cooperative arrangements, but they cannot prevent them from being established between other States, nor do they lose the right to join them at a later stage. The only time a state may not participate (vote) in the decision is if its membership has been suspended or was excluded from the organisation (SCO 2023).

Strengthening peace, security and stability in the region

Although the SCO is a collective security organisation that was initially based on military issues, its character as a general regional forum has now become more pronounced. Military cooperation among SCO members has recently increased, particularly in the fight against terrorism, accompanied by an intensified exchange of information between intelligence services (ALBERT 2015). It is questionable how far it can maintain this trend with its expanding membership and partner states.

Strengthening peace and security

Countering terrorism, extremism and separatism

The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was established in 2002 as a permanent body to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism. It has become an important coordinating centre for the SCO and has made contributions to regional and global security. The organisation has focused on establishing an organisational and legal framework, ensuring the proper functioning of its working bodies, and improving its regulatory framework to implement joint measures by the competent authorities of the member states. This work includes the introduction of provisions of relevant international law and legal acts of the SCO into national legislations. With the help of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, hundreds of people have already been trained to fight terrorists in the Member States, several attacks have been prevented through information sharing and numerous arrests have been made (Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 2023).

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has always been sensitive to security risks emanating from Afghanistan, as it has been a hotbed of terrorism, drug production and trafficking, and organised crime for decades (OMELICHEVA 2021). To counter these effects an SCO–Afghanistan contact group was established in 2005, revitalised in 2015, and served as a springboard for the deepened counterterrorism cooperation due to shared goals and existing frameworks and structures for coordinating counterterrorism activities among its members (GRIEGER 2015: 11). Since the Taliban returned to power in Kabul, the region is worried about the spillover of terrorism and conflict again. Although the Taliban have sought to assure their neighbours that civil strife and terrorism inside Afghanistan will be contained, recent years have shown that they are unable (ISKP) and/or unwilling (al-Qaeda) to prevent terrorist organisations from being active in the country.

In addition to countering terrorism and transnational crime, RATS has developed protocols for state control of cyberspace, which also aims to prevent the spread of extremist and separatist propaganda (GRIEGER 2015: 12). In 2009, the SCO signed an agreement on cooperation in international information security, and in 2011 and 2015 submitted drafts of an International Code of Conduct for Information Security to the UN General Assembly. The concept of international information security is controversial, as SCO members advocate for content regulation to mitigate potential security threats, while the Western consensus views this as a threat to human rights. In 2018, the secretaries of the SCO's National Security Council stressed that ICT is often used to promote terrorism, separatism and extremism, and called for practical cooperation and universal regulation under the auspices of the UN (NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 2023).

Military cooperation

The Dushanbe Declaration in 2021 stated that the member states will continue the expansion of defence cooperation in a wide range of areas, from capacity building, training

of military personnel, or confidence building measures to maintain regional peace and security (SCO 2021). SCO members usually carry out counterterrorism exercises as joint military exercises, as this is one of the main challenges that all members of the organisation face. These exercises serve multiple purposes, including improving the skills of member states' security forces, demonstrating their new capabilities, and increasing their interoperability. They also provide an opportunity to foster bilateral relations with other SCO members and, last but not least, they have a force demonstration effect (WEITZ 2011). The first exercise was held in 2002 with Sino–Kyrgyz participation, on bilateral basis but within the SCO framework. The most prominent exercises were the so-called “Peace Mission” exercises. The first Peace Mission was held in 2005 which was a primarily Chinese–Russian exercise with SCO observers. In 2007, after the first real SCO military exercise – where all the 6 members participated – they agreed on similar joint exercises on a regular basis. Uzbekistan tends to stay away from these, as it refrains from joint military participation (ARIS 2013: 5). The largest exercise to date was held in 2014 in Inner Mongolia (China), with 7,000 troops from Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. It simulated an insurgency in one country, which called for the help of the SCO to restore order (SMITYUK 2014). The SCO's last multinational military exercise was held in Russia in 2021, and at the end of 2022, the members decided to prepare for the next counterterrorism exercise to be held in August 2023 (Reuters 2022). Although it can be argued that the level of military cooperation in the SCO has increased, no joint forces, no joint command and no joint planning group have been established (ODGAARD 2009: 191–193).

The SCO does not provide collective security guarantees for its members, nor does it have a mandate for peacekeeping. However, in 2012 members approved a new non-military collective response mechanism for “responding to situations that put peace, security and stability in the region at risk”. This means that SCO members can, in theory, intervene politically and diplomatically in the event of internal conflicts with other SCO members. This new mechanism has not yet been tested (GRIEGER 2015: 9). In 2007, a joint declaration was issued on the need to develop options for joint action in the event of threats to the peace, security and stability of member states. Russia and China can deal with problems potentially requiring peacekeeping operations on their own territory with their own law enforcement agencies, the relevance of which would be with the Central Asian states. However, if we look at what has happened in such situations over the past decades, we see that the SCO has stayed away from such actions. The SCO could have intervened in 2010 in cases of unrest during the revolution in Kyrgyzstan and violence against the Uzbek minority, and most recently in the 2022 protests in Kazakhstan, but in neither case was it the SCO that intervened. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, humanitarian aid was delivered bilaterally, while in the case of Kazakhstan, CSTO peacekeepers intervened (KHALIQ 2022). This was not a surprising turn of events, since the Dushanbe Declaration stated clearly that the SCO will not launch independent peacekeeping missions, even though it assured the UN that the Member States support cooperation with the UN in the field of peacekeeping (SCO 2021).

Strengthening stability in the region

Expanding membership – Advantage or disadvantage?

Although the SCO officially identifies terrorism, extremism and separatism as the most important common threats, the legitimacy of which would be hard to deny, the divisions among its members, the interests of great powers, geopolitics and geostrategy, the balance of power and historical grievances pose a serious threat to the cohesion of the organisation. The two main founders are also at odds with each other in Central Asia, as the region is rich in resources, which until the 2000s were exploited by Russia alone, but recently China has also increasingly extended its power westwards. In China's new Silk Road plans, the region is again being given a prominent role, which further harms Russian interests. In addition, China has now significantly outgrown Russia economically, so what might have seemed an equal relationship in the early 2000s has now become a Chinese-dominated relationship. Moscow has, moreover, repeatedly blocked Chinese proposals within the SCO that would have brought significant benefits to the PRC, such as the adoption of a regional trade agreement and the creation of a bank to this end (GROSSMAN 2017).

Furthermore, the Central Asian states are not necessarily on the same platform either, given that they have their own counter-interests, which are driven by economic interests and disputes over minorities and natural resources. The situation has been further complicated by the inclusion of India and Pakistan, as India–Russia and China–Pakistan relations have traditionally been very cordial, while India–China relations are contentious and Russia–Pakistan relations are not very significant. The inclusion of Iran could create additional ethnic, religious and economic tensions with other member states (and even with dialogue partners).

For these reasons, it is unlikely that the SCO can move further towards closer cooperation. Instead, it is more likely to remain a forum to discuss regional and global issues and to give the three major powers more space of their own. The expansion of the SCO is underway, and it seems likely that it will broaden its ties both with the Middle Eastern and the Southeast Asian countries. Expansion is therefore very much dependent on interest and on the above-mentioned great power games, which aim to counterbalance each other's influence in the organisation.

Cooperation with other international and regional organisations

Throughout its history, the SCO has sought to develop cooperation with international and regional organisations in various fields. Since 2005, the organisation has strengthened its links with the following organisations:

- Commonwealth of Independent States (2005)
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2005)
- Collective Security Treaty Organisation (2007)
- Economic Cooperation Organisation (2007)

- United Nations Organisation (2010)
- UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2011)
- Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (2014)
- UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2015)
- International Committee of the Red Cross (2017)

With four of the above-mentioned organisations (CIS, CSTO, ASEAN, CICA) the SCO shares a common area of interest, which is definitely security. Memorandum of understandings were signed between the SCO and the four regional organisations which clearly defined the areas open for cooperation. The majority of these are concerned with the threat of terrorism, extremism, transnational crime, and illicit drug and arms trafficking. Besides the security related issues, the SCO showed willingness to cooperate on further fields, such as economy, finance, and other ‘soft’ areas like culture, education, healthcare or social development (SCO 2017).




Figure 3: SCO's cooperation areas with regional organisations

Source: SCO 2017

Cultural and political cooperation

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) prioritises political rather than cultural cooperation, with a common interest among members to maintain stability in their authoritarian regimes and prevent Western-style democratic uprisings. The SCO Charter emphasises non-interference in internal affairs as a means of countering Western exports of democracy, with democracy and human rights only mentioned as goals in international relations. The SCO has created an alternative cadre of election observers

and holds cultural events annually, including a fashion show, children's art exhibit, and tennis tournament (ODGAARD 2009: 194–195).

Recently, the organisation has also focused on developing other areas of cooperation, including a common cultural space, through initiatives and projects that aim to establish greater connections between member state populations. These programs include creating common education standards, a joint SCO university, and providing scholarships for students to study in China. The organisation has also sponsored exhibitions and art projects to promote greater understanding and trust among its member states (ARIS 2013: 8).

The SCO is a Eurasian regional political, security, economic organisation. It clearly represents the concept of *collective security*, as its members seek to maintain peace among themselves and in the region primarily through dialogue, for which the organisation provides a forum. Even though in the previous decades the SCO started closer cooperation in the military area, the members still not intend to become a military alliance. They perceive the 'three evils' (terrorism, extremism and separatism) as the major threat to both internal and regional security, therefore, the SCO offers mechanisms to tackle these challenges.

The SCO strengthens cooperation in new areas from time to time (political, security, economic, cultural and humanitarian projects), although most of them do not function effectively. Furthermore, no deepening of the organisation is expected, mainly due to the growing number of member states.

Summary

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are both regional intergovernmental organisations, but they differ in their membership, geographical coverage and areas of focus. The geographical coverage of the SCO extends beyond Southeast Asia to include Central Asia, South Asia, and parts of the Middle East, while ASEAN is limited to Southeast Asia. Additionally, the SCO is seen as being more dominated by China and Russia, while ASEAN operates on the principle of consensus among its members.

Both organisations aim to promote regional cooperation and integration. Although the SCO primarily focuses on security cooperation, both organisations emphasise economic cooperation and development as important areas of collaboration. They also aim to promote regional stability and peace by fostering dialogue, cooperation, and mutual understanding among their members. Both the SCO and ASEAN share the principle of non-interference, which means that they respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states.

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Security in the Americas

Introduction

The security structure of the Americas is composed of levels of differing geographical domain. The largest, the continental dimension is constituted by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas (GATICA BÓRQUEZ 2018: 3). Regional and subregional dimensions include a great number of initiatives, linked to organisations such as the UNASUR and the PROSUR. This chapter will focus on the continental dimension, in particular on the Organization of American States. Regional and subregional schemes will be discussed only briefly.

Organization of American States

The Organization of American States is the oldest regional organisation. Its roots go back to the 1889–1890 1st Inter-American Conference, and the Pan-American Union founded in 1910 by the 4th Inter-American Conference. Its immediate antecedents include the 1945 Act of Chapultepec, and the 1947 Rio Treaty, also referred to as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947). The OAS was formally set up by the 9th Inter-American Conference in 1948 in the wake of WWII, amidst increasing international tensions. The United States wanted partners to ensure the security of the American continent, focusing on prevention of the growth of Soviet influence and the containment of the spread of communism. Therefore, the purposes and the functioning of the OAS were greatly impacted by the Cold War. During its first four decades of existence, the organisation was a foreign policy instrument of the USA, helping to ensure its hegemony over the region (BARRETO VELÁZQUEZ 2019: 116).

Founding document (OAS Charter)

Amidst gloomy auspices of growing violence in Colombia (*Bogotazo*), sparked by the assassination of the popular politician, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the Charter of the Organization of American States was signed on 30 April 1948 in Bogota by 20 Latin American countries and the United States of America. It came into force on 13 December 1951, after the document was ratified by two-thirds of the signatory states.

The Charter is divided into three main parts. Part I covers the nature, the purposes and the principles of the organisation. It also includes articles on the fundamental rights

and duties of states, the pacific settlement of disputes and collective security. Part II first lists and then defines the tasks and the functioning of the different OAS bodies. Part III contains miscellaneous provisions as well as articles on the ratification and entry into force of the charter. The original document has been amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires in 1967, the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias in 1985, the Protocol of Washington in 1992 and the Protocol of Managua in 1993.

The Charter named the following essential purposes in 1948, in its original form: “a) to strengthen the peace and security of the continent; b) to prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member States; d) to provide for common action on the part of those States in the event of aggression; e) to seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems that may arise among them; f) to promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social, and cultural development” (Article 4).

Structure

The main bodies of the OAS include the General Assembly (GA), the Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Council and the General Secretariat.

The General Assembly – described in Chapter IX of the OAS Charter – is the supreme OAS body. It is a plenary body where every member state is represented, and each has one vote. Decisions are made by absolute majority or supermajority (two-thirds). The General Assembly evolved from the Inter-American Conferences – mentioned in the introduction of this chapter – substituting them from 1970. The General Assembly gathers for one regular session a year, where the date and time of the next regular session must be decided upon. In case of emergency, a special session can be convened. The General Assembly decides on the policies of the organisation, the structure and functioning of its bodies, the budget, the financial contributions of the member states (quotas) as well as on new admissions (upon the recommendation of the Permanent Council). It elects the Secretary General, the members of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Juridical Committee.

The Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Chapter X of the Charter) is a consultative body of the OAS, which meets occasionally upon request. The Permanent Council (Chapter XII) is responsible for carrying out the daily work of the organisation, executing and implementing the policies decided upon by the GA. It is made up of one representative of each member state, in the rank of ambassador. Evolved from the Pan-American Union, the General Secretariat is the chief administrative body of the OAS (Chapter XVI), located in Washington, D.C. It is headed by the Secretary General, who is elected for 5 years and can be re-elected once. Luis Almagro, Foreign Minister of Uruguay under the presidency of José Mujica (2010–2015), has held this position since 2015, being re-elected in 2020. The Secretary General is also the public face of the organisation.

Other bodies of the OAS specified in the Charter include the Inter-American Council for Integral Development (Chapter XII); the Inter-American Judicial Committee (Chapter XIV); the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Chapter XV); the Specialized Conferences (Chapter XVII) and the Specialized Organizations (Chapter XVIII). The latter are intergovernmental organisations which are linked to the OAS by special agreements – similarly to the UN and its specialised agencies. They are not listed in the charter but can be found on the webpage of the OAS. All of them predate the organisation. They comprise of the Pan American Health Union (founded in 1902 and headquartered in Washington, D.C.); the Inter-American Children’s Institute (f: 1927, l: Montevideo, Uruguay); the Inter-American Commission of Women (f: 1928, l: Washington, D.C.); the Pan American Institute of Geography and History (f: 1928, l: Mexico City) and the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture (f: 1942, l: San José, Costa Rica) (OAS 2022g).

There exists also a category of other autonomous and/or decentralised bodies of the OAS, usually set up by the General Assembly. It includes various bodies closely related to the security approach of this book: 1. the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and 2. the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), established in 1986 and 1991, respectively, in response to emerging challenges; and 3. an old entity, dating from 1942, the Inter-American Defence Board, set up to study and recommend measures for the defence of the Americas. It defines itself as “the oldest multilateral military organization in the world” (OAS 2022c). It functions as an advisory body to the OAS and also supervises academic programs in the Inter-American Defence College, in Washington, D.C. It is closely linked to the Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas (CDMA),¹ as the Board supports the pro-tempore secretariat of the CDMA and is also in charge of preserving the institutional memory of the forum (CDMA 2022b).

¹ The CDMA is a multilateral political forum for debates attended by the ministers of defence of all the countries of the hemisphere in order to promote the exchange of ideas on issues of Security and Defence. It met for the first time in 1995 in Williamsburg, USA, and established the Williamsburg Principles (CMDA 2022a). These six principles include the commitment of the countries that their “Armed Forces should be subordinate to democratically controlled authority, act within the bounds of national Constitutions, and respect human rights through training and practice”. The aims of increasing transparency in defence matters, the promotion of cooperation in the fight against narcoterrorism, the recognition of the importance of economic security as well as the encouragement of “greater defence cooperation in support of voluntary participation in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations” figure in the principles (U.S. Department of State 1995). The requisite for membership in the CDMA is being an American country and complying with the Williamsburg Principles. The CDMA is made up of a plenary body (assembly), working committees and a pro-tempore secretariat. The presidency rotates every two years, and the country of the current president is also in charge of organising the biennial conference. The XV Conference took place in Brazil in summer 2022. Some of the highlighted issues included integrated deterrence and trans-frontier security as well as the discussion of the results of the 2021–2022 working groups, focused on cyber defence and cyberspace; women, peace and security as well as cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster management, respectively.

Budget

The OAS budget consists of various funds, the two most important are the Regular Fund and the Specific Funds (CFR 2022). The Regular Fund is composed of member-state quotas, “based on gross national income, with adjustments for debt burden and low per capita income” (U.S. Senate 2010). It supports the General Secretariat. Specific programs and projects are financed via the so-called Specific Funds – voluntary contributions – created in 1997 in order to ease the organisation’s dependency on the willingness of member states to pay their quotas. The biggest financial contributor of the OAS is the United States. It used to pay 66% of the regular funds. In the 1980s, however, it started not paying its quota, bringing the OAS on the brink of bankruptcy (VÁKY–MUÑOZ 1993: 39). The organisation came under strong pressure once again during the Trump Administration to ease the financial obligations of the USA. In the fiscal year of 2019, U.S. contributions reached only 41.9% of regular funds. For the 2022 budget they stand at 53.15%, meaning that the USA would still cover more than half of the 81 million USD allocated to the Regular Fund (OAS 2022a).

Membership

Membership grew from the original 21 states to over 30, due to the decolonisation processes, resulting in a growing number of independent countries in the Caribbean since the 1960s. The OAS came to cover the whole continent with the joining of Canada in 1990.

Cuba was ousted from the organisation in January 1962, following the announcement of Fidel Castro on 1 May 1961 that the island would embrace Socialism. The OAS revoked its decision in 2009 adopting resolution AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09), which allowed for the reincorporation of Cuba (OAS 2022f). But the Cuban Government did not want to, pointing to the damage caused to the island by the OAS during the Cold War. The same year, in 2009, Honduras was suspended due to the coup against President Manuel Zelaya and was only re-admitted after elections and the return of the Zelayas to the country.

In 2017, the Venezuelan Government announced its intention to leave the organisation, accusing it of meddling in internal affairs (GALLÓN et al. 2017). In November 2021, Nicaragua followed suit, as the majority of OAS members had condemned the 2021 Nicaraguan general elections for the lack of being “free, fair or transparent” (Reuters 2021).

Democracy

Democracy was not mentioned among the original goals of the OAS. It did not figure in the original version of the founding document. The promotion of democracy was added later to the objectives of the organisation. The current charter of the OAS also contains – besides the goals set in 1948 and listed previously – the following purposes: “To promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle

of non-intervention; to eradicate extreme poverty, which constitutes an obstacle to the full democratic development of the peoples of the hemisphere; and h) to achieve an effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible to devote the largest amount of resources to the economic and social development of the Member States” (Article 2).

Fostering democratisation, in other words, supporting the creation of conditions that favour democratic development emerged as new goals for the OAS from the 1980s, in a parallel way with the fall of various military dictatorships and a transition to civilian rule in South America (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, etc.). In 1991 the foreign ministers of the OAS countries adopted the Santiago Declaration and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, to be followed by Resolution 1080 which can be considered a kind of anti-coup mechanism. Resolution 1080 tasks the OAS Secretary General to call for an immediate meeting of the Permanent Council of the organisation “in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government” in any member states to examine the case and convene – if necessary – a meeting of the foreign ministers or a special session of the OAS General Assembly, all of which need to take place within the next 10 days after notification (VAKY–MUÑOZ 1993: 108).

Resolution 1080 was evoked four times: in 1991, after a military coup ousted President Aristide in Haiti; in 1992 due to the self-coup of President Fujimori in Peru; a coup of similar style of President Serrano in Guatemala in 1993 and finally, in 1996, in case of Paraguay (SANTA-CRUZ 2005: 123–140), when army commander General Lino Oviedo tried to resist President Wasmosy’s decision to send him to retirement, by challenging the democratically elected leader and threatening to take over power. Resolution 1080 was replaced after ten years of existence by the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001, considered as a landmark document (SANTA-CRUZ 2005:134). Its creation was linked to a great extent to the efforts of the former UN Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuellar, who was foreign minister of the transitional Peruvian government which took the lead of the country after the fall of Fujimori. The Charter consists of 28 articles, organised in the following sections: I. Democracy and the Inter-American System; II. Democracy and Human Rights; III. Democracy, Integral Development, and Combating Poverty; IV. Strengthening and Preservation of Democratic Institutions; V. Democracy and Electoral Observation Missions; and VI. Promotion of a Democratic Culture. The Charter states that: “The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it. Democracy is essential for the social, political, and economic development of the peoples of the Americas.” (Article 1) and that “Democracy and social and economic development are interdependent and are mutually reinforcing” (Article 11). The Charter allows for the suspension of a member state in case democratic processes are interrupted. The Inter-American Democratic Charter has been invoked several times, for example in connection to the coup in Honduras in 2009, for which the right of the country to participate in the OAS was temporarily suspended (OAS 2009).

Human rights

The original 1948 OAS Charter “did little more than mention human rights” (CAMINOS et al. 1988: 114). It established neither a body nor a mechanism to ensure human rights on the continent. It was in parallel, and not within the charter, that the first international human rights instrument² was introduced: the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Unlike the Charter, it was only a non-binding conference resolution. Later, in 1959, the Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs mandated the establishment of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR). “What is interesting about the establishment and evolution of the Commission [...] is that, first, it was not created by a human rights treaty; second, the OAS Charter did not provide for it expressively; and, third, the human rights, respect for which the Commission was to promote, were set out in a nonbinding resolution [...] rather than a human rights convention” (CAMINOS et al. 1988: 116). These ambiguities were settled with time. The first amendment of the OAS Charter, the Protocol of Buenos Aires,³ elevated the IACHR to the status of an OAS body. The American Convention on Human Rights, also known as the Pact of San José, was adopted in San José, Costa Rica in 1969, and came into force after due number of ratifications in 1978, soon to be followed by the establishment of a new OAS body in 1979, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, situated in the Costa Rican capital.

Security

The articles on collective security (Chapter V, Articles 24 and 25 in the 1948 OAS Charter and Chapter VI, Articles 28 and 29 in the current OAS Charter) form the core of the constitutional document of the organisation.⁴ Article 28 states: “Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American States.” Article 29 follows as: “If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by an extracontinental conflict, or by a conflict between two or more American States, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the American States, in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective self-defence, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject.” Despite these provisions, the collective security system did not always work (HEGEDŰS 2019: 207). Upon the outbreak of the Falkland War

² It antedated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, A/RES/217(III), adopted by the UN General Assembly later that year (see DREIER 1962: 103).

³ It was signed in 1967 and entered into force in 1970.

⁴ The Charter in vigour of the time of writing this chapter is used for references in the whole text.

in 1982, the OAS called on Great Britain to refrain from any action that might endanger peace and security on the American continent, yet the USA openly supported Britain in the conflict, sanctioning Argentina and providing armed support for the British. From the perspective of this chapter, it does not matter who was right or wrong in the conflict. What matters is that the United States, despite being an OAS member, did not stick to the resolution of the organisation and helped an extra-regional power against an OAS member state. The organisation proved powerless, it could not enforce its will upon the USA. “The OAS is a schizophrenic organization, one rich nation and a passel of poor ones, one superpower and a number of others firmly perched on the third echelon in the geostrategic scale of things. The United States can look to no nation of last resort in the event of a threat to its security. Latin American countries find themselves in a quite different circumstance. The United States is their ultimate security guarantor [...]. All but one of the OAS members rely on another for protection against external threats but perceive that the most serious and most proximate of potential challenges to their territorial independence and political integrity is the very nation by virtue of whose security umbrella they continue to exist” (CAMINOS et al. 2019: 104).⁵ to counter U.S. strength and influence, Latin Americans insisted on the principle of non-intervention within the OAS and formed their own regional and subregional organisations.

New goals and activities

The end of the Cold War and the corresponding change in the international order as well as the vanishing of ideological considerations questioned the existence of the OAS, yet the organisation was able to adjust to the new circumstances. It has focused on the following major areas since 1990: promotion of democracy; human rights; socioeconomic development and regional security cooperation. It had already had experience in electoral observation missions, launched since 1962, first in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic (OAS 2022b), whereas political missions including the applications of resolution 1080 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter as well as peace missions, often related to boundary disputes in particular in Central America (between El Salvador and Honduras; Honduras and Nicaragua, and Belize and Guatemala) or focused on Haiti, started to be launched in the post-Cold War era (OAS 2022d; OAS 2022e).

Regional initiatives

Latin American regionalism experienced two intensive waves since the end of the 20th century: one from the mid-1980s and beginning of the 1990s, called new regionalism, characterised by organisations such as Mercosur, and another, even more dynamic wave, starting from the beginning of the 21st century, often referred to as globalised regionalism

⁵ Remarks by William D. Rogers.

(UNASUR, PROSUR, ALBA, CELAC, Pacific Alliance, etc.). The drivers of new regionalism included on the one hand the democratisation of various Latin American countries following the fall of military dictatorships (including Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay), and on the other, the end of the Cold War which led to a change in U.S. foreign policy priorities and less U.S. interest in Latin America. All these contributed to the strengthening of local initiatives for regional cooperation. Globalised regionalism emerged after 9/11, which resulted in a further ‘retreat’ of the USA, giving rise to the so-called post-hegemonic era in Latin America. It was a period characterised by economic growth as well as by the presence of progressive governments in the majority of the South American countries. They considered regional integration crucial and were willing to spend some of their revenues on that cause. Political will, financial resources, coupled with favourable external circumstances for Latin America, resulted in the formation of several new regional organisations. For the sake of this chapter, only two, UNASUR and PROSUR will be outlined, with a special focus on security aspects.

Institutions within the framework of the UNASUR

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was born with the signing of its constitutive treaty in 2008, starting its formal life from 2011 when the treaty entered into force. UNASUR was a unique initiative in various senses: it built on the already existing organisations of the Andean Community and Mercosur; it comprised of all 12 South American countries – independently whether they had or did not have a Spanish/Portuguese colonial past, and it was not a Latin American, but a South American regional organisation, including Suriname and Guyana (PAJOVIĆ–LALIĆ 2023: 249). Defence-related institutions formed within the UNASUR included the South American Defense Council, the Center for Strategic Defence Studies, and the South American Defense College.

The South American Defense Council (SADC) was established by the UNASUR member countries in December 2008. It became “the first Latin American regional defense structure in which the United States [had] no participation” (BRAGATTI 2019: 75). It is important to add that it lacked an anti-U.S. stance and did not formulate defence concepts against the United States. Its presidency worked on a rotating basis and the head of the SADC was the country which held the pro tempore presidency of the UNASUR. It had a parallel institutional structure: the Council of Defense Ministers (a higher-ranked forum) which met twice a year and a more active Executive Body, formed by vice-ministers (VITELLI 2017: 6). The SADC developed annual action plans, focused on one of the following thematic fields: “Axis 1 – Defense Policies; Axis 2 – Military Cooperation, Humanitarian Action and Peace Operations; Axis 3 – Defense Industry and Technology; and Axis 4 – Education and Training” (MOUSSALLEM s. a.: 7; BRAGATTI 2019: 77). More than 150 cooperation activities were planned in the period of 2008–2017 and most of them were in fact carried out. The implementation rate stayed high (92% in 2013 and 80% in 2014) until the middle of the 2010s (SANAHOJA – VERDES-MONTENEGRO ESCÁNEZ

2021: 1–20). Afterwards economic problems, political polarisation, the crisis in Venezuela, the growing presence of external actors in the region increased the debates among UNASUR members and reduced the desire to cooperate, resulting in less activities and less effectiveness.

The Center for Strategic Defence Studies (CEED) was established in 2011 in Buenos Aires. It was founded to carry out research in the fields of defence and international security, in order to help the work of the South American Defense Council. The statute of the institution lists among its objectives the identification of challenges, threats and opportunities with respect to regional and international security, as well as possible contributions of the CEED to policy formation (RESDAL 2010). The news agency Merco Press defined its goal as the “consolidation of a South American identity in defence affairs” (Merco Press 2011). The experts working in the CEED were selected and sent by the Ministries of Defense of UNASUR member states (maximum two/country). Spanish was the working language, but the CEED had four official languages: Spanish, Portuguese, English and Dutch (RESDAL 2010). The decline of the UNASUR seriously affected the functioning of the CEED, its webpage and the materials displayed on it are no longer accessible.

The South American Defense College, also known as ESUDE, (VAZ et al. 2017: 8), established in 2015 in Quito,⁶ was inaugurated by the UNASUR Secretary General, Ernesto Samper. He insisted that the goal of the institution “was not to prepare the armies of South America countries for war but for peace” (Deutsche Welle 2015). ESUDE had a lot of potential, but its activities were rather limited to courses organised by each country and did not have a common program, as each country had a different focus and understanding of security and defence (FERNÁNDEZ RODRÍGUEZ 2021: 527; FRENKEL 2016: 49). The ESUDE launched its last course at the end of 2017 (Facebook 2017).

Although the majority of its members have left and the secretariat has not been active since 2018 (LONG 2022b; NOLTE 2022: 16), UNASUR is still legally operational, as four countries have not withdrawn, and the founding treaty does not set a minimum number of members. Yet the future of the organisation is uncertain due to political polarisation and economic stagnation in the region, the need to adapt to global processes, and the lack of cohesion (COMINI–FRENKEL 2021: 143–144; SZENTE-VARGA 2020: 45–61). Despite the uncertainty, political changes that have been taking place since the beginning of the decade of the 2020s could even bring a turnaround, due to the success of Latin American political left at the elections. A common ideological ground coupled with the general support of the left behind regional integration could even revitalise the organisation (LONG 2022a; SZENTE-VARGA 2022).

⁶ The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA), set up by Cuba and Venezuela in 2004, had opened a parallel institution, the ALBA School of Defense and Sovereignty, in 2011 (BRAGATTI 2019: 76).

Counter initiative: Forum for the Progress and Development of South America (PROSUR)

The disintegration of UNASUR led to the establishment of a new regional organisation, PROSUR in March 2019, created on the initiative of the right-wing presidents Sebastian Piñera of Chile and Iván Duque of Colombia. Its declared objectives cover cooperation related to infrastructure, energy, health, defence, security as well as fight against organised crime and natural disasters (FRENKEL 2019; PROSUR 2022a; SOTO 2019).

The foreign ministers signed a declaration in autumn 2019, which established different working groups within the organisation. However, due to the pandemic, their functioning started late or remained incomplete. The members of the working group specialised in security and fight against transnational organised crime are Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay (PROSUR 2022b).

The latest security-related news involves the Declaration of the PROSUR presidents on regional security, emitted in July 2022. Besides emphasising the need and determination to enhance cooperation among member states and with regional and international organisations, they also expressed “concern about the economic and social effects of the conflict in Ukraine, which generate recessionary and inflationary situations in the [LAC] region” (PROSUR 2022c).

The future of PROSUR has become uncertain due to political left-wing turns, the victory of Gustavo Petro in Colombia, Lula in Brazil and Gabriel Boric in Chile. Boric announced the departure from PROSUR in April 2022, which he has not formalised yet, so Chile is still a member of the organisation as of the end of 2022 (GARCÍA-MIGUEL 2022; Deutsche Welle 2022).

Conclusions

The Organization of American States is special among American regional organisations in various aspects: membership, time of existence and ability to adapt. The USA is an OAS member; the roots of the organisation go back to the 19th century and was formally established in the 1940s, more than 70 years ago; and the OAS was able to modify its goals and activities in a successful way during the course of time, nonetheless, preserving security at its core. In contrast with the OAS, the majority of American regional organisations comprise of Latin American countries only, and tend to have shorter life-spans. They were established during the different waves of integration which characterised the region (LEHOCZKI 2007). Currently, at the beginning of the 2020s, based on the return of progressive governments to power in several Latin American countries and the post-crisis situation after Covid-19, a new wave of regionalism can be expected. Due to growing and ever more complex regional security challenges – including drug and human trafficking, terrorism, lack of public security, corruption, etc. – as well as mounting uneasiness and insecurity in international relations (see for example the Russo–Ukrainian War), it is very likely these organisations will focus more on security aspects.

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The aim of this volume is to present and evaluate the structure, functioning and areas of activity of the most important organisations from a security policy perspective, namely the world organisation, and the organisations of the Euro-Atlantic area and the other continents. It does so in a coherent structure that first introduces the organisation itself and its operational characteristics, and then, the crisis management activities. The United Nations is the first of these organisations to be introduced as the only universal international organisation. The reader gets an insight into what the theoretical construct of collective security means and how it works in practice. The authors then introduce four organisations that are key to the Euro-Atlantic area: NATO, the EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and then examine the mission activities of each organisation. The authors have devoted the three concluding chapters of the volume to an introduction to the security organisations of the three continents, Africa, Asia and the Americas.



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