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## **Demography and Migration: The Case of Ukraine**

### **General Remarks on Population Dynamics and Demographic Trends since 1989**

#### **1. Introduction**

In the latest population census taken by the USSR in 1989, the Ukrainian population amounted approximately 51.707 million. After ten years since the preceding census in 1979, the number of inhabitants increased here by 1,949,000 or by 4.0%. Just in Ukraine the lowest rate of population growth was observed in the 1980s being twice less than the USSR average. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the formation of independent states constituted a breaking point in the development of migratory processes in Ukraine, and led to a change in their direction, structure and intensity of migration. The immigration into Ukraine in 1991 and 1992 (148.4 and 228.1 thousand, respectively) supported its population growth right up to late 1992. In 1993, immigration into Ukraine fell to 49.6 thousand, and in 1994 quite an appreciable flow of emigration from Ukraine was recorded for the first time. That year the migration losses amounted to 143.2 thousand people. Throughout the following years, Ukraine's population invariably shrank in the course of migration exchange with other countries. Under pressure from the deepening problem of depopulation and increasing emigration, the population of Ukraine decreased in size quickly.

The motive power of depopulation was founded on the transformation of the demographic regime completed in Ukraine in the 1970s. Accumulated in the age structure potential of demographic growth due to high fertility in recent times proved to be very near the exhaustion. In consequence of its loss, the natural increase of the population reduced steadily and its transition into natural decrease became inevitable. It has happened in Ukraine in 1991 and coincided in time with the beginning of unpopular market reforms. Though these reforms are regarded as the main cause of losses in the natural increase of the population, in reality the connection of fertility tendencies with the political situation at the beginning of the 1990s is relatively weak.

In the present case more deep evolutionary conditionality of population reproduction processes take place. The transition to the regime of narrowed reproduction has started long before the reforms. A crisis of post transitional fertility has arisen in Ukraine still before the USSR dissolution. Already from the early 1960s, the net reproduction rates went down below mark 'one': the population of Ukraine stopped to reproduce itself.

The migratory accumulations of Ukraine have increased its populations in the period of 1960–1990 by 1128.6 thousand inhabitants. The portion of migration inflows in the total growth of population made up 10.0% during this time. In 1991–1993, the inflow of

immigrants into Ukraine from abroad has partly compensated the natural decrease of population having provided it with 488.3 thousand of new inhabitants. At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Ukraine lost the migration accumulations made in the early 1990s. By 2000, the migratory situation in Ukraine has gradually improved, and this tendency is becoming stronger. Already in 2004, the Ukraine became a receiving part in the migratory exchange with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and with other countries – since 2006. This can be regarded as a turning point in the migration dynamics in Ukraine.

On the whole, the population of Ukraine has increased from 42.469 million in 1960 to 52.244 million in 1993. Later on, its diminution led to sizable demographic losses: as of 1 January 2006, the population number in Ukraine amounted to 46.930 million inhabitants. Without the population of the temporarily occupied territory of the Crimean peninsula and Sevastopol, as well as the occupied territory of Donbas, the number of Ukrainians amounted to 42.217 million as of 1 January 2018 according to the estimate of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. The estimates of the resident population are carried out on the basis of statistics according to the state registration of births and deaths and change of registration of the constant place of inhabitants.

## **2. Population by sex and major age groups**

When discussing the distribution of resident Ukrainian population by sex, it is necessary to point out the gradual increase in the male share of the population from the early 1990s onward. While the percentage of males was 46.2% in 1989, it had reached 46.5% by 2000. Within 2001–2017, the male share came back to the initial level and demonstrated a steady time series of the indicator: 46.2–46.3%. Overall, there were 860 males for every 1000 females in Ukraine in 1989. As of January 1, 2017 this number was 863. The most balanced ratios of males and females were noted at the beginning of 2017 in the Western region of Ukraine: in the Zakarpats'ka, Rivnens'ka, Lvivs'ka, Ivano-Frankivs'ka and Volyns'ka oblasts/regions: there were 925, 904, 901, 897 and 893 males per 1000 females, respectively (PRIBYTKOVA 2003, 226–227).

The structure of Ukraine's population by major age groups is characterised by a gradual increase in the retired contingent. At the same time, the share of the population in the 0–15 age group (children and teenagers) has tended toward stable reduction. However, in the late 1990s the share of the population which had reached active working age (16–54 for females, 16–59 for males) began to increase, from 55.7% in 1991 to 57.9% in 2000. On the whole, the age structure of the Ukrainian population is regressive and provides evidence of decreased reproduction in the population. This slowdown in reproduction is also accompanied by depopulation and the development of imbalanced age structure. At present (as of 1 January 2017), the largest number of persons in the over-65 age group is concentrated in the northern regions of Ukraine as well as in its central ones where the portion of this age group now exceeds 16.2% (the average indicator for Ukraine on the whole). The most aged population lives in the Chernihivs'ka, Sums'ka, Poltavs'ka, Cherkas'ka, Kirovograds'ka, Vinnyts'ka regions, where their share reached 19.2%, 18.3%, 17.7%, 17.5% and 17.3% respectively. (PRIBYTKOVA 2003, 226–227).

### 3. Dynamics of ageing and life expectancy at birth

The ageing of the population has a marked influence on changes in the mortality level. The rising proportion of inhabitants aged 65 and over, in conjunction with the steadily declining standards of living is accompanied by a reduction of life expectancy at birth. Since the early 1990s, this index has dropped by 2.8 years, falling to 67.9 years in 1999–2000. The rate of decrease in life expectancy at birth is higher for men than for women: during the 1990s, this index decreased by 3–5 years for men, dropping to 62.4 years in 1999–2000; the rate for women has only dropped by 1.4, to 73.6 years. It should be noted that the mortality decrease recorded in Ukraine in 1996–1998 was accompanied by a rise in life expectancy at birth for this short period of time, although the index never managed to reach the level seen in 1990. Since the early 2000s, life expectancy at birth in Ukraine was characterised at first by stabilisation and from 2009–2010 this index showed a steady tendency for increasing. In 2016 average life expectancy was 71.7 years as a whole, (66.7 years for men and 76.5 for women). In spite of the rising in life expectancy at birth during the 2010s, the number of retired contingent in the meantime was characterised by a gradual decrease from 14.447 million persons as of 1 January 2001 to 11.956 million as of 1 January 2017. As for the contingent of pensioners by age, their number has shortened by 1.183 million – from 10.299 million in 2001 to 9.116 million in 2017. According to official returns of Pension Fund of Ukraine, the proportion of pensioners of all categories per 1,000 in average annual population has dropped, falling from 295 in 2001 to 282 persons in 2017.

To sum up, the decrease in average life expectancy declined after the collapse of the USSR. The drop in standards of living, unemployment and worries about the future forced many people to reconsider marriage and reproductive plans. The structure of Ukraine's population by major age groups was characterised at this period by a gradual increase in the retired cohort. On the whole, the age structure of the Ukrainian population is regressive and provides evidence of decreased reproduction in the population. This slowdown in reproduction is also accompanied by depopulation and the development of imbalanced age structures. There is no doubt that the Russian aggression and the economic burden, connected with it, played a major role in the development of modern demographic processes, forcing people to postpone their marriage and childrearing plans and wait for better days.

### 4. Ethnic self-identification and its changing dynamics

As of January 12, 1989, 72.7% of the inhabitants in Ukraine identified themselves as Ukrainians, 22.1% as Russians and 5.2% attributed themselves to another nationality. Out of 37.4 million Ukrainians living in the country at this moment, 87.7% defined Ukrainian as their native language and 45.5% of them spoke fluent Russian. In distinction from Ukrainians, almost all Russians (98.3%) considered Russian as their native language though every third of them (32.7%) spoke fluent Ukraine.

In the latest population census taken by Ukraine in December 5, 2001 there were essential changes in the ethnical structure of the population. The share of title nation representatives increased in size and totalled 77.8%. The share of Russians has decreased

to 17.3% and a portion of other nationalities from different ethnic groups in Ukraine has dropped to 4.9%. The analysis of regional-civic and ethnolinguistic self-identification of the inhabitants in Ukraine, fulfilled by the author in 2014, revealed that the overwhelming majority of the population identify themselves as representatives of the Ukrainian ethnicity (88%), while the share of ethnic Russians in Ukraine (as they define themselves) has decreased to 10.1%. Besides, the native language and the language of family communication (even to a greater extent) often do not coincide with self-identification of Ukrainians. Representatives of other ethnic groups residing mainly in the Southern and Eastern parts of the country, as well as in the Transcarpathia region have decreased to 1.9%.

The decrease of the Russian population's share is the result of many causes, such as migration losses, change of ethnic self-identification in case of birth in a mixed family or decrease of mixed marriages. At the same time the share of people having parents of the same nationality has grown from 73.7% in 1992 to 84.9% in 2016. Nevertheless, the convincing argument in favour of the further strengthening of national group identities (Ukrainian, Russian and others) is the growing share of marriages with partners of the same nationality from 53.4% in 1992 to 70.7% in 2016 (PARASHCHEVIN 2016, 542).

## **5. Language self-determination and language policy under the challenges of war**

The language self-determination has also changed. In the period of 1991–2012 there existed some kind of balance between Russian and Ukrainian languages identified as native by inhabitants of the country. This situation is still preserved. In a rough outline the status quo is supported by the symbolic meaning of official Ukrainian as the core spiritual value for the whole history of Ukrainian state-building, but in many respects, particularly regarding the practices of everyday usage, it did not and still does not prevail. Although the Russian language is – as before – an unofficial language, it is still widespread in the sphere of unofficial communication and also in the media.

One of the important issues on the language policy in Ukraine is the status of the Russian language, particularly in the situation when the Russian 'language card', has become one of the main political justifications for Russian's aggression towards Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea and inspirations of armed separatism in Donbas. These changes have actualised the issues of forming the Ukrainian civic nation (STEPANENKO 2017).

The informal status of Russian was broken with the adoption of a new Law on languages *On Fundamentals of the State Language Policy* in 2012, replacing the Law on languages from 1989 adopted in the Soviet period. The new Law has brought some clarity in the policy on languages with the attempt to fix the split between formal and informal practices in the language usage, above all regarding the status of the Russian language.

Public opinion in Ukraine is diverging regarding the issue of the Russian language. In the recent period, the number of supporters of its official status has decreased. In various polls, at least one third of the respondents supports the idea of its official status, according to the monitoring survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Science during the period from 1996 to 2016 (Table 1).

Table 1  
*In your opinion, should the Russian language be given  
 the official status in Ukraine? (%)*

Variants of responses	1996	2000	2004	2008	2010	2012	2013	2014	2016
No	32.9	36.2	32.2	38.4	39.6	41.6	49.3	49.6	55.5
Hard to say	16.2	19.3	20.0	13.0	17.0	14.8	14.2	18.1	14.1
Yes	50.9	44.0	47.5	48.6	43.3	43.4	36.5	32.2	30.3
No responses	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1

Source: PARASHCHEVIN 2016, 476

Sociological accounts, accumulated on the basis of the results of public opinion polls conducted in Ukraine, usually claim that the language issue is not a priority on the list of the troubles for Ukrainians. However, even though language is not considered to be the priority question for the major part of Ukraine's population, which is predominantly Ukrainian–Russian bilingual (at least, in terms of understanding both dominant languages), this issue used to be at the focus of regular manipulations from different wings of Ukraine's political spectrum. In Ukraine, the issue of language as a dividing indicator for voters' differentiation and also as the way for their mobilisation usually comes in periods of electoral campaigns, in the times of crisis, and in situations when politicians have little or nothing to say or prove any significant achievements in the socio-economic sphere.

After the Euromaidan's victory in February 2014, the parliament cancelled the new legislation on languages proclaiming Russian as the official regional language. Formally it would mean nothing more apart the return to the previous status-quo based on imperfect but compromising legislation on languages. Later on the legislative decision on the cancellation of the 2012 Language Law was recognised to be politically mistaken at the Ukraine's official level. But this decision had not been signed by the President and therefore – it has no legal force, though veto was also not put on in. It was announced that a new language Law is at the stage of preparation. Meanwhile, this means that the 2012 Language Law is acting now. However, as a result of the real threat of Russia's further military intervention and the ongoing military armed conflict in Donbas in 2014–2018, Ukraine was forced to leave aside language differences. The external threats to the country's security and its territorial integrity have accelerated the processes of forming Ukrainian civic nations, particularly through developing Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriotism. Particularly it was revealed in the active participation of citizens from Russian-speaking Eastern and Southern parts of the country, both Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, in the defence of Ukraine's territory in opening hostilities in Donbas (STEPANENKO 2017, 205).

The experts involved in the analytical activity in the domain of language policy believe that long term delayed issues of languages in the Ukraine, particularly on the status of Russian and the lack of clear, compromising and consistent language policy, contributed to a fertile ground for the growth of political conflicts within and Russia's external military aggression against Ukraine. The Ukraine's language policy in order to be successful should also overcome the shortages of the still Soviet institutional legacy with its division of social reality into official and informal domains and its neglect to the rule of law. The current challenges for inclusive language policy in Ukraine, particularly regarding the Russian language, are searching for wise balance between the guarantees of the rights of Russian-

speaking citizens of Ukraine and the need for the country's protection against Russia's aggression, in which the Russian language is used as a propagandist tool in a hybrid war against Ukraine (Table 2).

Table 2  
*The attitudes of the population towards giving the Russian language  
official status in Ukraine, 2014 (%)*

Characters of response	Should the Russian language be given official status in Ukraine?		
	Yes	No	Hard to say
Age			
• Under 30	29.8	52.6	17.6
• 30–54	31.0	49.0	19.3
• 55 and over	34.5	48.8	16.6
Education			
• Elementary school	24.1	53.6	22.3
• Secondary school	32.1	49.9	18.0
• Secondary special school	31.4	49.4	19.3
• Incomplete higher education	30.3	48.7	21.0
• Complete higher education	35.9	49.1	15.0
Place of residence			
• Kiev	19.1	74.6	6.3
• Big city (over 250,000 of residents)	38.6	41.4	19.9
• Town (under 250,000 of residents)	43.2	40.5	16.3
• Countryside	17.1	61.6	21.3
Region			
• Centre	15.9	64.9	19.2
• West	8.1	75.1	16.8
• North	16.4	70.8	12.8
• South	40.7	38.7	20.6
• East	47.3	33.7	19.0
• Donbas	72.6	5.3	22.1
Nationality			
• Ukrainian	27.8	53.8	18.4
• Russian	70.3	15.4	14.3
• Others	35.3	38.2	26.5
Native language			
• Ukrainian	18.9	63.6	17.5
• Russian	61.8	18.9	19.3
• Others	44.0	32.0	24.0
Language of family			
• Mainly Ukrainian	12.2	71.5	16.3
• Mainly Russian	60.6	21.6	17.7
• Both Ukrainian and Russian (dependent on circumstances)	31.2	47.2	21.6
• Another	33.3	41.7	25.0

Characters of response	Should the Russian language be given official status in Ukraine?		
	Yes	No	Hard to say
Choice of the language when filling in the questionnaire			
• Ukrainian	22.3	79.2	50.3
• Russian	77.7	49.8	49.7

Source: PRIBYTKOVA 2014, 208–209

## 6. Migration trends and their perception

In the late 1980s, before the disintegration of the USSR, a new tendency appeared in the dynamics, structure and direction of migrant flows in Ukraine. The flow of immigrants of Ukrainian origin into the former Soviet republics decreased, and at the same time the flow of Ukrainian emigrants back into Ukraine increased. The absolute and relative proportions of Ukrainian residents in the former Soviet Republics, with the exception of Russia and Belarus, were getting lower and lower.

In 1992, the development of migration processes took a radical turn: formerly unknown forms of migration as well as new migration priorities began to show up in Ukraine. Emigration of Ukrainians increased markedly, and a new form of short-term “shuttle migration” to move goods between Ukraine and Eastern European countries, and Turkey and China became more popular. Ukraine thus became an arena of illegal transit migration. Between 1989 and 1990, formerly deported people, such as Crimean Tatars, Germans, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Turks/Meskhetians, began to return to the Crimea. After the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, ecological migration became a national problem. Similarly, ‘brain drain’ also continued to gain ground. Migration flows between urban and rural areas changed their direction: in 1992, a positive net migration to the countryside was recorded for the first time. This tendency persisted until 1997. In 1997, rural inhabitants started to move to the cities once again and by 1999 their number had reached 22.1 thousand. However, the influx of migrants to the countryside numbered 12.1 thousand once again in 2000.

The main migration trends in Ukraine at the turning-point of the millennium looked as follows:

- a gradual reduction of ethnic Ukrainians returning home;
- the reduced tendency among formerly deported people to return to the Crimea;
- decreasing ecological migration from the Chernobyl disaster zone;
- the aggravation of the danger of illegal migration;
- increasing ‘brain drain’.

It should be noted that the intensity of migration flows in and out of Ukraine are generally decreasing. The dynamics of gross migration confirm this trend as well: it has diminished from 299,244 migrants in 1998 to 154,037 in 2000 (almost halved). Thus, the sharp rise in migration activity caused by the collapse of the USSR was basically over. Migration flows tended to decrease, and the migration situation was stabilising. The bulk of immigrants returning to Ukraine were ethnic Ukrainians arriving from Russia. The contribution of such



countries as Moldova, Kazakhstan and Belarus to the repatriation of ethnic Ukrainians was not as big, but still significant in comparison to other CIS and Baltic countries.

However, the emigration of Ukrainians to foreign countries as compared with the previous years has shown a tendency to increase. Meanwhile, the absolute number of Ukrainians who have emigrated on the whole has been decreasing gradually. The same tendency has arisen in case of emigration to CIS and Baltic countries. Compared to previous years, the absolute and relative proportions of Jewish emigration from Ukraine have decreased. The same tendency has been observed concerning German emigration. Thus the contribution of migration processes to Ukraine's demographic losses has been reduced considerably. As before, the major contribution to progressive depopulation in Ukraine was the natural decrease of the population.

During the 2000s, Ukraine experienced the diversification of interstate migration flows. If the total number of registered movements of the population between Ukraine and other states, including all migrants regardless of the directions for their travels, regions and countries of destination, decreased by two times, migration exchange with the far abroad countries during the same period has reduced by 2.2 times and with CIS countries by 1.9 times. The contribution of CIS countries to gross migration increased in 2002–2008 from 71.9% to 74.3%, and of the far abroad countries – decreased from 28.1% to 25.7%. Thus, the geography of interstate migration flows in Ukraine was gradually turning into the spatial structure of migration movements, existing at the beginning of the 1990s.

Changes in the size and structure of migration flows were followed by the improvement of the migration situation in Ukraine. Already in 2005, Ukraine turned into the country admitting immigrants and its migration losses over 2004–2005 were compensated by former citizens from CIS countries. However, for the first time since the 1990s, the increase of the population due to migration exchange with the far abroad countries was recorded in 2006. Over the next years this tendency has intensified. Even though the size of migration flows from abroad was not large, the very fact showed the turning-point in the development of the migration situation in Ukraine and its transformation from the country of emigrants into the country of destination for immigrants both from CIS and far abroad countries.

Migration situation in Ukraine turned out to be stable until the end of the 2000s. This meant a new migration balance, which has been inaccessible for twenty years. A certain stage of transformational changes in this sphere has been completed. The development of labour migration inside of Ukraine created a counter balance for the external migration due to the population movements from the rural areas and small towns and thus it strengthened their demographic potential. At the same time, the external labour migration of the Ukrainian population became the strongest movement of migrants abroad. Therefore, the issue of state policy development in the sphere of migration management and ensuring the protection of the human rights of Ukrainian citizens going to work abroad as labour workers remained as before.

In 2008, a large majority of Ukrainians have experienced the disastrous collapse of the mechanisms regulating the world economy and supporting the balance of world financial system. The difficulties in job placement, current unemployment rate and low wages were decisive reasons for people to look for a job outside of Ukraine.



## 7. Radical change of the migration doctrine of Soviet pattern in Ukraine

The migration doctrine of the Soviet period as a system of official views and regulations, as a leading political principle was based on the passport system, labour legislation and housing policy. The Soviet model of industrialisation with its orientation on labour-intensive sectors of national economy, labour division between large economic regions and levelling of economic development in the republics of the USSR was accompanied by the acceleration of labour resources mobility. The large-scale state programs were spread out for regulating the migration flows. The organised recruitment of workers and agricultural resettling of families were the most efficient ones. The system of professional and regional differentiation of wages and salaries was created for attraction of workers to regions with a lack of labour resources. But the main instrument of controlling and regulating migration flows in the USSR remained during the Soviet period without change: it was the passport system not economic policy, human rights and civil freedoms.

The migration doctrine has radically changed in Ukraine after the dissolution of the USSR. In January 1994, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the Law *On the Procedure of Exit from and Entry into Ukraine by Citizens of Ukraine* that guaranteed the right to leave the country and to return without restriction. This law burst the previous order. With its adoption, Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine *On Employment* admitting the labour or undertaking activity of Ukrainian citizens during their stay abroad acquired the additional force. Innovations in the sphere of migration policy were contained in Articles 24, 25, 26, 33 of the Constitution of Ukraine adopted on 26 June 1996.

And at last, in December 2003, the Parliament adopted the Law *On the Freedom of Movement and Free Choice Residence in Ukraine*. *Propiskas* did not exist any longer.<sup>1</sup> It was changed by a registration procedure having the notification meaning. The freedom of movement is defined in the Law as a right of the citizen of Ukraine, as well as the foreigner and stateless person, staying in Ukraine on legal grounds, to move without restriction and by own wish throughout its territory in any direction, by any way, at any time, with the exception of restrictions established by Law. The Ukraine passed from the passport regime to the freedom of movement and free choice of residence and working place. The migration doctrine of Soviet pattern was exhausted. Its ideological and political postulates lost its validity.

## 8. External and internal labour migration of Ukrainians

According to the data of the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine obtained in the public opinion poll concerning living conditions, economic and political situation, interethnic relations, social well-being, public moods and estimates of quality of life, conducted in 2016, the extension of mobile labour markets is lasting

<sup>1</sup> *Propiskas* was the main attribute of the Soviet passport system established in the USSR in 1932. It was a complex of legal sanctions for restriction of the right to choose the place of residence and direct attachment of citizens to their localities. The stamp of *propiskas* in the passport of Soviet citizens confirmed their legal trustworthiness. The Soviet Passport System had a police nature and totalitarian character.

in the Ukraine against the background of growing unemployment. The distribution of employed compatriots by place of work regarding their permanent place of residence was also analysed. Special attention was paid to the migration attitudes and plans of all employees: both those earned at home and abroad. It was stated that in comparison with “pre-Maidan” times their migratory intentions have not become stronger until 2016. But later on the turning point in the migration trend becomes obvious.

## 9. Forced unemployment and mobile labour markets

According to the results of the survey of the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine 11.0% of all inhabitants of Ukraine proved to be unemployed against their own will and actively looked for a job. Most of them were living in towns and the countryside. As a matter of fact, the number of Ukrainians who had not any paid work was four times higher (44.1%). Many of them lived at somebody's expense, received social grant-in-aid, pension or stipend. Some of them were self-employed persons. More often people having no paid work live nowadays in the countryside (PRIBYTKOVA 2016, 372).<sup>2</sup>

The main root of unemployment consists in the limited chances to find a job. Distribution of judgements regarding the opportunity of successful placement unequivocally points out the difficulties to make feasible a given initiative. Inhabitants from the countryside, small settlements and towns are the most deprived groups. The problem of looking for a job is really immanent first of all to the poor. People are ready to get any job but more than a half of them (55.2%) states that it is difficult. And in this case, the peasantry is the most suffering stratum of the population (65.2%). Inhabitants of towns and small settlements note as well that to get any job is a very complicated task for them (57.8%). Only citizens of the capital consider the search of any job a hard problem relatively rarely (only 25.7%). But inhabitants of large cities regard looking for any job as a difficult undertaking almost twice more often than metropolitan people (47.4%). (See Table 3.)

<sup>2</sup> According to official returns of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine on the economic activity of the population in the first quarter of 2016, the economically inactive population of Ukraine numbered 11,067.0 thousand inhabitants in the age of 15–70 (38.3% of the whole population of corresponding age). Out of them 7,147.9 thousand of Ukrainians belonged to the cohorts of able-bodied age (29.4%). The level of unemployment of the economically active population in the age of 15–70 has increased from 9.6% in the first quarter of 2015 to 9.9% in the first quarter of 2016. This index calculated for the persons of able-bodied age has exceeded the level of registered unemployment calculated for the economically active population of able-bodied age by almost four times (10.3% vs. 2.9%). On the whole the level of employment of the population in the age of 15–70 amounted to 55.6% and in the able-bodied age – 63.4%. Only 16.0 million of Ukrainians from 17.8 million of all economically active population were occupied by economic activity, the rest 1.8 million inhabitants of the country put together the considerable contingent of jobless compatriots looking actively for a job (PRIBYTKOVA 2016, 372).

Table 3  
*Forced unemployment and prospects for getting a job  
 by place of their residence of Ukrainians in estimates, July 2016 (%)*

Employment status and prospects for getting a job of Ukrainians in estimates	All inhabitants of Ukraine	Including those living in			
		Kyiv	City (Over 250,000 residents)	Town	Countryside
Are you now unemployed and actively looking for a job?					
Yes	11.0	9.3	9.1	11.5	12.2
No	89.0	90.7	90.9	88.5	87.8
Do you have nowadays any paid work?					
Yes	55.9	60.7	56.3	57.8	52.3
No	44.1	39.3	43.7	42.2	47.7
Does your work correspond to your education and professional level?					
Yes	38.8	44.2	41.1	37.6	37.2
No	25.1	29.0	24.0	26.9	22.8
Difficult to say	7.3	4.3	9.2	7.9	5.8
I am currently not working	28.8	22.5	25.7	27.6	34.2
It is difficult to find a job					
According to my qualification and with a decent salary	83.0	75.4	76.1	84.0	88.9
According to my qualification but without a salary	62.7	39.1	49.8	64.9	75.8
According to a decent salary but without my qualification	72.0	59.0	63.4	74.4	79.1
Any job	55.2	25.7	47.4	57.8	65.2
How many times have you left Ukraine in order to gain temporary employment abroad?					
Never	59.8	70.6	68.1	54.8	57.0
1 time	14.9	11.8	12.5	12.4	18.8
2 times	8.5	—	8.3	11.5	8.3
3 times	6.1	—	1.4	7.1	9.0
More than 3 times	10.7	17.6	9.7	14.2	6.9
In the next year, will you leave the country for temporary work?					
Yes	10.9	10.7	8.0	11.2	12.7
No	89.1	89.3	92.0	88.8	87.3

Source: PRIBYTKOVA 2016, 372

The distribution of estimates of Ukrainians regarding forced unemployment and prospects for getting a job by the regions of their residence points out the territories of disaster

generated by unannounced war unleashed by the Russian Federation in the Donbas region and annexation of the Crimea. The forced unemployment in different forms is spread mostly at the Eastern and Southern regions and especially at the non-occupied parts of Donbas where to find any job is a hard task by the evidence of 71.1% of the inhabitants.

*Thus, forced unemployment is characterised by a high level of development and possesses additional potential of eventual growth. When the needs to get a job in the place of residence proved to be unrealisable, people are looking for employers at another place. Thus, the mobile labour markets arise from lack of workplaces and are in progress on the ground of unreformed national economy, a vast unemployment and incompetence of the government management.*

### *9.1. Mobile labour markets*

When the whole resources of a placement at the local labour markets are exhausted, people look for a job at another country region, city, town or countryside. These urban and rural settlements, tied by labour migration flows, form the internal and international territorial migration systems (TMS). An essential premise of their forming is the transformation of migration doctrine and reconfiguration of migration flows.

The process of radical diversification of migration flows took place at the beginning of the Third Millennium. Already in 2005, the Ukraine turned into a country receiving immigrants and its migration losses were compensated by repatriates of Ukrainian origin who formerly lived in the countries of the collapsed USSR. In 2006, the increase of immigrants from the non-CIS countries was registered in Ukraine for the first time from the beginning of the 1990s. This trend lasted in the following years and in 2012 the number of newcomers from foreign countries increased by comparison with the preceding year 2.4 times more and run up to 76.4 thousand of immigrants. The labour commuting of workers have been possessing till now the qualification of a key form of internal migration in Ukraine, as well as the labour migration flows abroad are today the integral parts of mobile labour markets providing their continuous functioning (PRIBYTKOVA 2016, 368).

According to the data of the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine obtained within the project *Ukrainian Society: Monitoring Research of Social Changes* in 2016, every fifth Ukrainian family (20.2%) has at least one member with experience of temporary work abroad. Among them, every fourth farmer household has sent own representative to earn a living in foreign countries. Urban inhabitants attend to the labour markets abroad more seldom: only 17.5% of families among townsmen and 16.4% among citizens have a member with temporary work experience abroad in 2016. Ukrainians employed abroad acquire diverse vital and labour experience dependent on duration and frequency of their life among foreigners. Most of our people (59.8%) have never left the Ukraine in order to gain temporary employment abroad (Table 3).

Internal mobile labour markets are existing and functioning in the Ukraine for a few decades in spite of the pressure and prohibitions generated by the migration doctrine of the Soviet period. Let us examine the structure of internal migration flows formed by labour commuting of working Ukrainians in their modern sample and design. The principal signs of internal mobile labour markets are a territorial disunion of permanent places of

residence and places of employment inside a country and everyday or weekly labour trips of working Ukrainians to another locality and return back home. Using a metaphor, we may define the inner space of Ukraine as a pulsing demographic field with a variable character of population. In this case we can state that the urban and rural settlements have a quite different day-time and night-time population with another size, structure, way and style of life (PRIBYTKOVA 2016).

As for coincidence of place of residence and place of employment, we would like to discuss the contents of Table 4. Attention of the reader is drawn to the considerable share of Ukrainian employees engaged in a labour activity out of their place of residence (19.8% or every fifth). An especially high index of participation in the consolidation of labour bond between city and countryside is inherent to the working peasantry (38.0%). The overwhelming majority of them are employed at the urban settlements (81.6%).

Employed townsmen in a close alliance with the working peasant masses render considerable support to the urban labour markets (83.6%). Data presented in Table 4 confirm the existence of mobile labour markets within Ukraine, united in the common system that are promoting employment both for the urban and rural population. There is a bilateral exchange of labour power between urban and rural areas in all regions of the country. In conclusion we would like to underline that *unemployment is not only a quantitative but also a structural problem*.

Table 4

*Distribution of working Ukrainians by place of employment regarding their permanent place of residence, July 2016 (%)*

Distribution of working Ukrainians by place of employment	All employed inhabitants of Ukraine	Distribution of employed Ukrainians by place of residence			
		Kyiv	City (over 250,000 residents)	Town	Countryside
Does your place of employment coincide with your permanent place of residence?					
I am working at my permanent place of residence	79.4	92.9	93.9	81.3	61.3
I am working at another place (city, town, countryside)	19.8	4.7	5.3	18.2	38.0
I am working abroad	0.8	2.4	0.8	0.5	0.7
What type is the place of employment where you are working nowadays: urban or rural?					
Urban	80.7	75.0	58.3	83.6	81.6
Rural	19.3	25.0	41.7	16.4	18.4

Source: PRIBYTKOVA 2016, 373

## 10. Migration attitudes and plans

The current dynamics of migration attitudes demonstrates practically stable time series of indicators in 2002–2016 (Table 5). However, a steady trend, as one would think, has experienced an unforeseen turning-point in 2016. The share of Ukrainians who wanted to leave the locality where they resided increased almost by 10% and ran up to 29.8% in 2016. Such considerable growth of attitudes towards eventual leaving for another place of residence was noted for the first time in Ukraine from the very beginning of Monitoring Research founded in 1994. According to the monitoring data, the share of the Ukrainian population having intention to move in the direction of Russia became less as compared with 1994 (4.5% vs. 12.7%). A fall in the size of this indicator was noted from the beginning of the Russian territorial expansion in 2014. The dynamics of migration attitudes towards countries located beyond the borders of the former USSR has an inexpressive trend: the share of eventual emigrants of foreign orientation is characterised by the same in size indicators: 10.8% in 1995, 10.2% in 2002 and 10.9% in 2016. But within of this time series, the indexes of a lesser size filled the intervals between them. Indicators with insignificant increase can be found only twice (12.1% in 2013 and 12.3% in 2015). Very likely it was the reaction of people to the Maidan events and the war at the Donbas. For the first time, the share of eventual emigrants had an intention to change the current place of residence in favour of another republic of the former USSR which has increased a little in 2015 and 2016 to 2.3% and 2.6% accordingly.

In any case, the attitude towards emigration has a tendency of growth. In 2016, 21.9% of compatriots announced that they have thought about emigration. Four years before (2012) only 14.5% of Ukrainians confirmed that during the last three years they have considered in earnest an eventual emigration. At the same time, the labour trips abroad became more numerous and frequent with a simultaneous decrease in population having never moved to foreign countries in search of a job. The share of those who never worked abroad was rapidly shortening (91.7% in 2002, 87.9% in 2014, 87.3% in 2015, 59.8% in 2016). Unprecedented growth of labour trips abroad taking place this year was observed at all groups of migrants with different frequency of occurrences. In 2016, the personal experience of work abroad had 14.9% of Ukrainians who went away for work once (4.7% in 2015), 8.5% – twice (2.6% in 2015), 6.1% – thrice (1.3% in 2015) and 10.7% – more than 3 times (3.8% in 2015). And 10.9% of our compatriots intended to leave the Ukraine for temporary work abroad the next year (Table 5).

Table 5  
*Migration attitudes and plans of Ukrainians,  
current dynamics: 2002–2016 (%)*

Migration attitudes and plans	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<i>Would you like to leave the village/city where you currently reside?</i>										
Yes	19.3	21.1	20.1	19.4	19.6	20.1	24.4	16.2	20.2	29.8
Difficult to say	25.1	20.9	16.8	18.2	16.6	20.4	14.1	17.6	16.4	18.2
No	55.2	57.8	62.6	62.4	63.7	59.4	61.1	66.1	62.9	52.0

<b>Migration attitudes and plans</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
No answer	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.1
<i>If you decide to leave your current place of residence, where would you go?</i>										
To another location in Ukraine	9.8	9.9	12.6	14.4	11.2	10.7	7.9	10.0	10.3	9.9
To Russia	10.5	10.3	7.9	9.6	8.3	7.1	7.0	4.2	3.7	4.5
To another republic of the former SU	0.6	1.1	1.6	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.6	1.9	2.3	2.6
Beyond the borders of the former SU	10.2	10.1	7.0	5.3	7.9	8.4	12.1	7.8	12.3	10.9
I do not know	19.8	18.4	16.9	16.3	18.3	19.2	19.9	18.2	19.7	19.2
I would never leave my home city/village	48.6	49.9	53.4	53.5	53.0	53.3	50.6	57.6	45.9	52.9
No answer	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.8	0.4	5.8	–
<i>Have you ever thought in earnest about emigration?</i>										
Yes						14.5	–	–	–	21.9
No						85.1	–	–	–	76.9
Other						0.4	–	–	–	1.2
<i>How many times have you left Ukraine in order to gain temporary employment today?</i>										
Never		91.7	89.5	89.9	91.6	90.8	87.6	87.9	87.3	59.8
1 time		3.4	4.7	4.2	3.3	3.3	5.4	4.3	4.7	14.9
2 times		1.7	2.2	1.5	1.4	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.6	8.5
3 times		0.8	1.1	0.8	0.4	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.3	6.1
More than 3 times		2.0	2.2	3.3	2.2	2.2	2.7	4.1	3.8	10.7
No answer		0.3	0.3	0.3	1.1	0.6	0.9	0.1	0.2	–
<i>In the next year, will you leave the country for temporary work?</i>										
Yes	6.9	5.7	6.1	6.2	6.2	5.3	7.2	7.4	9.9	10.9
No	92.7	94.3	93.6	93.7	92.9	94.0	91.8	92.4	89.8	89.1
No answer	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.9	0.7	1.0	0.2	0.3	–

Source: PRIBYTKOVA 2016, 374

### 10.1. Migration attitudes and plans of employed Ukrainians in 2016

The inhabitants of Ukraine working at different places of employment regarding their permanent places of residence are inclined to make various migration plans. Every fourth person (24.8%) working at the permanent place of residence would like to leave the locality where he or she resided. Almost every third person (29.8%) working at another city, town or countryside wanted to change the place of permanent residence. But labour migrants having temporary work abroad make a choice in favour of leaving for somewhere more often (37.5%). On the whole 25.9% of all employed Ukrainians have a predisposition to move towards places with a better quality of life (Table 6). They are going to look for such opportunities first of all beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union (14.2%) or at another location in Ukraine (10.8%) in the hope to maximise the earned income, improve the living standards and optimise their way of life. The same migration attitudes are immanent to the inhabitants working at their permanent places of residence (13.8% and 9.9%



correspondingly). A share of those working at another city inside Ukraine and wanting to leave their place of residence amounts to 14.6% both inside Ukraine and beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. The inhabitants of Ukraine participating in the temporary labour tours abroad are the most motivated stratum of population inclined to move abroad forever (37.5%). This conclusion is confirmed by a very high share of volunteers among labour migrants who earned their living abroad and who have already thought in earnest about emigration (62.5%).

Table 6  
*Migration attitudes and plans  
of employed Ukrainians, July 2016 (%)*

Migration attitudes and plans	All employed inhabitants of Ukraine	Distribution of working Ukrainians by place of employment		
		Permanent place of residence	Another place (city, town, countryside)	Abroad
Would you like to leave the village/city where you currently reside?				
Yes	25.9	24.8	29.8	37.5
Difficult to say	18.2	19.3	14.1	12.5
No	55.9	55.9	56.1	50.0
If you decide to leave your current place of residence, where would you go?				
To another location in Ukraine	10.8	9.9	14.6	12.5
To Russia	4.8	5.3	3.0	—
To another republic of the former Soviet Union	3.0	2.8	3.5	12.5
Beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union	14.2	13.8	14.6	37.5
I do not know	22.4	22.7	21.7	12.5
I would never leave my home city/village	44.7	45.5	42.4	25.0
In the next year, will you leave the country for temporary work?				
Yes	13.3	10.4	23.6	50.0
No	86.7	89.6	76.4	50.0
Have you ever thought in earnest about emigration?				
Yes	25.9	25.3	27.1	62.5
No	72.4	73.4	69.8	37.5
Other	1.6	1.3	3.1	—

Source: PRIBYTKOVA 2016, 375

The labour migration movements inside and out of the country are a kind of self-organising socio-economical behaviour of individuals directed by a system of their preferences. The basic ones having a dominating nature are: maximisation of earned income, minimisation of efforts when achieving one's object and optimisation of their way of life.

In any case, the European markets of labour, as in former times, will remain attractive for Ukrainian labour migrants, even if its leading positions will be redistributed in favour of labour markets in other countries or continents.

The state policy and legal regulation of internal and transnational labour migration flows in and from Ukraine are to solve the following urgent problems:

- to examine the question of the Ukraine joining to a number of International Conventions in the sphere of labour migration and migrant workers;
- to systematically conduct the work in collection and analysis of information on migration processes, with its further using for solution of regional problems, connected with labour migration;
- to broaden international cooperation of Ukrainian law enforcement services with appropriate foreign structures with a purpose of improvement of effectiveness of struggle against organised criminality, directed against Ukrainian labour migrants;
- to elaborate normative-legal documents for the organisation of a simplified system of money transfer from Ukrainian citizens working abroad and some others;
- to prepare the proposals for a partial redistribution of income taxes paid by Ukrainians at the place of work in favour of budget at the place of their residence at another locality.

As the State Statistical Service of Ukraine informs, about 1.303 million workers went abroad as labour migrants in 2015–2017. Most of them were aged 40–49 years. Every third of them were educated at a special professional training school. According to official statistics, their number corresponds to the size of departing labour migrants. It follows that the Ukrainian professional training institutions are working for export of labour resources in other countries. Officially 0.8 million of Ukrainians are engaged today in different spheres of the Polish economy. Still, according to unofficial information, the real number of labour migrants from Ukraine exceed 2.0 million. As compared with a number of inhabitants in Kyiv, the contingent of labour migrants from our country in Poland constitutes two-thirds of the capital's population or exceeds the size of inhabitants in Kharkiv by half a million. Thus, the scale of a labour migration abroad from Ukraine confirms its essential contribution to the strengthening of the national economy of a neighbouring country. Besides, every Ukrainian labour migrant working in Poland has a legal status, pays the taxes and membership fees of the *ZUS* and for all that do not wait for pension, do not receive the pecuniary aid from *social programme 500+*.

In 2017, the influential Polish edition *Gazeta Prawna* published the List of 50 persons having the largest influence on Polish economics in 2017. The second place was given to the community of labour migrants from the Ukraine, as the collective competitor participated in the proceeding of nomination. As a matter of fact, the Ukrainians have outstripped even the Polish President Andrzej Duda who took the third place.

## 11. Concluding remarks

Recently, a steadily growing tendency towards very negative appraisal of the quality of own life has arisen in Ukraine. In spite of being one of the states signing the Budapest

Memorandum and undertaking obligations to guard peace, security and the territorial inviolability of Ukraine, the Russian Federation has annexed the Crimea and occupied Donbas without a declaration of war. The Ukraine is at war, qualified as anti-terroristic operation, more than four years. Donbas and the Crimean Peninsula turned into real hot spots. Ukrainians suffer heavy casualties (more than 5,750 casualties including soldiers and civilians, as well as 242 children; 1,584,000 involuntary displaced persons; 3,144 prisoners of war, 144 of them are still not released). Considerable social tension and absence of physical, psychological, legal and financial safety of the people are vital problems in Ukraine today. The image of modern society is associated in public opinion, first of all, with ruin, disorder and deadlock. Migration policy has not yet become a priority for Ukrainian authorities regardless of the fact that according to media reports, the existence of migration problems is among social concerns. There are some doubts related to the problem whether the State Migration Service will turn into the institution capable of providing effective migration management as it was created on the basis of police departments and only a part of competences in this field was transferred to it, without administering functions in the domain of labour migration flows.

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