

*Péter Tálas*

## POLAND

### INTRODUCTION –

#### ON THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE THAT HAVE SHAPED POLISH STRATEGIC CULTURE AND SECURITY PERCEPTION

The aim of this study is to present how the security and defence policy of Poland, seeing itself as a Central European regional power, has been developing, including the current challenges and capabilities of its armed forces, as well as the development of Polish military reforms, and finally, the Polish roles within NATO and the European Union.<sup>1</sup>

Polish is one of those European nations which did not have an independent state during the classical period of European nation development from the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> to the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Moreover, Poland completely lost its independence at the very time (1795) when the idea of modern nationalism was emerging and spreading throughout Europe from France. Before the partitions, Poland had been one of the great powers of Europe for almost two centuries (1466–1667), through which period Polish security was threatened from the south (Turks and Habsburgs) and from the north (Teutonic Knights and Sweden), while from the east only since the time of Peter the Great (1707). The threat from the West covered an even shorter period in Polish history (from the 1760s to 1945). The weak and divided German states and the peoples of Eastern Europe did not pose an existential threat to Poland for centuries. However, from the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century until 1989, for more than two hundred years, the most important period in the development of modern nations, the Germans and the Russians became the main actors and often the determining factors of Polish security, and their expansive actions were accompanied by the collapse of the Polish state on several occasions

<sup>1</sup> Even though there was a change of government in Poland in 2024, there is no need to fundamentally differentiate between the PiS and PO-lead governments' defence policies because there is general continuity in, and a united understanding of threat perceptions prioritising Russia, and defence needs centred around national territorial defence capabilities, the bilateral strategic defence relationships with the United States and the primacy of NATO in allied defence.

(1772, 1793, 1795, 1939) and extended periods of occupation (1795–1918, 1939–1944, 1944–1989). Furthermore, their departure was accompanied by the ‘rebirth’ of the Polish state (1918, 1989).

According to many experts, these state collapses, the statelessness, and especially the historical role of the Russian Empire and Germany in these, explain why the struggle for survival became a strong and integral part of Polish national consciousness, and, thus, of the Polish security perception after the re-establishment of independent Poland in 1918 (DAVIES 1991: 14; GRUDZIŃSKI 2008: 72; PAWŁUSZKO 2022: 15–18). Historical events affecting Poland in the 20<sup>th</sup> century – such as the period of strategic balancing between Germany and the Soviet Union between the two world wars, the fourth partition of the Polish state as a result of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, and its transition to the Soviet sphere of influence after the Second World War – only reinforced this conviction of the non-communist Polish political elite. These also supplemented Polish strategic culture and security perception with a strong demand for hard security guarantees (ZAROBNY 2019: 63–76).

While there is a consensus among experts that Poland has the potential to become a European middle power and that its ambitions should be commensurate with this, we can find much more diverse opinions regarding the practical obstacles to this. While some believe that the German and Russian great power neighbourhood already relativises Poland’s middle power status (TÁLAS 2000; PAWŁUSZKO 2022: 55–59), others believe that the elements of Polish political culture stemming from the lack of a permanent statehood are restraining factors (PAWŁUSZKO 2022: 60–61). These include emotionality, an inward-looking stance, reluctance to reflect and plan, and the distrust towards other actors (ZYBAŁA 2016: 48–49). Still others believe that Poland is unable to meet the criteria of becoming a European middle power in terms of economic performance (BENDYK–BURAS 2022: 6–7), and for this reason they also consider Poland’s increased importance following the escalation of the Russian–Ukrainian war to be only temporary (PAWŁUSZKO 2022: 60). However, there is also a consensus among Polish experts that the main focus of Polish security policy, as a Central European power, should be on the Central and Eastern European region.

These factors also determine Poland’s highly sceptical attitude towards European strategic autonomy. Since the Polish political elite did not see / does not see any strong great power(s) in Europe that would be able to deter Russia, and the behaviour of European continental great powers – like Germany and France – is often considered too permissive towards Russia, Poles look to the United States and the U.S.-led NATO as the main guarantors of Polish security (ŻURAWSKI VEL GRAJEWSKI 2022: 109–110).

THE TRANSFORMING FOCI OF POLISH  
SECURITY POLICY AFTER 1989

Polish security policy after the 1989 change of regime can be broadly divided into two major periods: the first covers the 1990s, the period when Poland followed the doctrine of independent security and defence, while the second covers the decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, when Warsaw strengthened its security as a member of alliance systems (OCHYRA-ŻURAWSKA – OCHYRA 2022: 33). While in the first period Poland still had to maintain its mass conscript army, in the second it transited to a professional military force, maintaining conscription, but suspending mandatory military service in peacetime (ISAP 2009). In the latter, Poland was also motivated, like other new NATO Member States in Central and Eastern Europe, by its increasing participation in allied missions, to which, according to Polish law, Warsaw was not allowed to send conscript soldiers. Almost all Polish security policy experts frame the country's accession to NATO in 1999 as the most important security policy milestone of the decades since the change of regime in 1989 (CZAPUTOWICZ 2014: 15–31).

Compared to Central and Eastern European countries Warsaw has been extremely sceptical of the European Union's foreign and security policy from the very beginning. In addition to NATO membership and the strategic alliance with the United States, the Polish political elite first officially started talking about EU membership as the third pillar guaranteeing Polish security only in 2009 (KUŹNIAR 2012: 339–340).

Sometimes doubts arose among the Polish political elite regarding NATO's reliability, especially at times when the alliance's reaction to certain security policy developments was not considered decisive enough – for example, regarding the 2008 Russo–Georgian war or the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. When, in parallel, Warsaw did not consider its own military reforms successful enough, this kind of dissatisfaction led to undertaking significant development of its own defence capabilities as a key task after 2012, and actually starting to do so after 2017 (TÁLAS 2014: 17–35; RAUBO 2022).

Based on Polish strategic documents, the years spanning between 1989 and 2023 can be divided into five major periods in terms of changes in Polish security and defence policy:

- ♦ 1989–1999, characterised as a period of providing for the country's security independently
- ♦ 2000–2006, characterised by adaptation efforts following NATO membership (and partly EU membership)
- ♦ 2007–2011, the period of transition to a professional military force

- ♦ 2012–2015, dominated by the strategic review run by the Civic Platform (PO), and subsequently by the Komorowski Doctrine, which turned towards territorial defence and the development of domestic capabilities (Doktryna Komorowskiego 2014: 1–2)
- ♦ 2015– in which Law and Justice (PiS) conducted its own strategic review and embarked on the technical modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces

#### POLAND'S RELATIONSHIP WITH GREAT POWERS

After the 1989 change of regime, Polish security policy followed the doctrine of assuring its security independently until its accession to NATO in 1999. Since Warsaw's relations with the neighbouring great powers (Germany, the Soviet Union/Russia) and the United States played a decisive role in this, we cannot ignore a brief and sketchy overview of these relations.

##### *Polish–Russian relations*

Looking back, one of the biggest changes in Polish–Russian relations was paradoxically not Poland's accession to NATO, but Vladimir Putin's rise to power in 2000. Putin believed from the beginning that Moscow should make a determined effort to reduce the influence of the United States in Eastern and Central Europe, and he also spoke out strongly against NATO's further eastern expansion (ZIĘBA 2018: 9–34; Konferencja Ambasadorów RP 2023: 16–17). However, it was not these steps, or even Poland's accession to the European Union that really cooled Polish–Russian relations, but Poland's support for the colour revolutions in the post-Soviet region – primarily the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004–2005. After this, Moscow threatened Warsaw with the suspension of gas supplies for the first time. The plan to install an element of the long-planned American missile defence system on Polish territory in 2007 also caused tension, and the Russian leadership threatened Warsaw once again, if the plan was implemented (TÁLAS 2007: 1–4).

Regarding Russian ambitions, the Russo–Georgian war of August 2008 was a serious warning for Warsaw, but the Polish and Baltic political leaders failed to draw the attention of the West, which was at the time busy dealing with the international financial and economic crisis (TÁLAS 2014: 17–35).

The Smolensk disaster of 10 April 2010, in which Polish President Lech Kaczyński and his wife, as well as 78 other members of the country's political and military

elite lost their lives, not only devastated Poland, but also sharply and permanently divided political sides. While the left-wing and conservative-liberal political camp believes that it was a terrible accident, which case should be considered investigated, closed and must be overcome (Prezydent.pl 2011), the national-conservative camp, led by the late president's twin brother, Jarosław Kaczyński, denies that there was an accident, suspects an assassination plot, and over the years has built a narrative – not supported by evidence – that Poland was directly targeted by the assassination plot (MTI 2023; ROZGONYI 2023).

Finally, we must definitely mention Russia's military interventions in Ukraine (the illegal annexation of Crimea, the Russian support and maintenance of separatism in eastern Ukraine, and the escalation of the Russian–Ukrainian war after 24 February 2022) as factors that have strengthened the Polish political elite's distrust and fear of Russia. They also defined the starting point of Polish defence policy since 2008 (the Russo–Georgian war) as the aggressive policies and acts of Putin's Russia threaten the security not only of Poland, but of the Central and Eastern European region, furthermore, of the whole of Europe. In addition, they sharpened Russian–Polish antagonism to such an extent that Warsaw became one of the most radical and active advocates and instigators of international military support for Ukraine and of sanctions against Russia.

### *Polish–German relations*

Polish–German relations since 1989 have shown particular contradictions (SCHULZ–HILLEBRAND 2021; Konferencja Ambasadorów RP 2023: 11–13). Although many believe that – similarly to Polish–Russian relations – this bilateral relationship is primarily burdened by historical grievances, according to Polish and German experts, these play at most a secondary or tertiary role in the development and quality of bilateral relations. The same experts define the most important breaking point within contemporary Polish–German relations in 2015, when the national-conservative coalition came to power in Poland. Since then bilateral relations have definitely deteriorated (since 2018 the parties have not even held joint government meetings). Meanwhile, it is also important to see that despite the deterioration of bilateral relations, the rules of cooperation within NATO and the EU protected a number of areas from declining bilaterally (HILLEBRAND 2021: 31).

The Polish–German Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation was signed in June 1991, and both the Polish and German press at that time assessed the agreement as a historical breakthrough, and some even compared it to the

Franco–German reconciliation after World War II. In addition, two factors played a decisive role in the improvement of Polish–German relations: first, the fact that Germany had become Poland’s largest and most important economic partner, second, harmonising relations opened up the possibility of cooperation with the European Communities and NATO for Poland. In other words, Warsaw was convinced that Germany had indeed become one of the most committed supporters of Poland’s integration efforts. So much so, that even Polish experts admit that the successful conclusion of accession negotiations with the EU would not have been possible without the strong support of Berlin (OCHYRA-ŻURAWSKA – OCHYRA 2022: 35).

New points of contention have also risen between the two countries. For example, the German policy on Russia, which has often and sharply been criticised in Warsaw, on a number of related issues – the construction of the Nord Stream 1 and then Nord Stream 2 pipelines, Merkel’s cooperative stance towards Putin – or the issue of minority rights of the Polish population living in Germany (as Berlin is unwilling to recognise Poles living in Germany as an ethnic minority group). On the German side, however, the Polish judicial reform, family and gender policies, and Warsaw’s position on immigration and the deepening of European integration have regularly been criticised (HILLEBRAND 2021: 24).

At the same time, an example of successful cooperation within NATO is the Multinational Corps HQ Northeast in Szczecin, the command in charge of Eastern Flank defence operations of the Alliance. Bilateral military cooperation also has significant results, for example in the field of increasing interoperability of the land forces, such as through the exchange of staff officers, joint training and exercises, or the long-term goal of reassigning battalions of the Polish 10<sup>th</sup> Armoured Cavalry Brigade and the Bundeswehr’s 41<sup>st</sup> Armoured Grenade Brigade to each other (MALINOWSKI 2021: 86). Public opinion has shown a surprisingly high level of acceptance of the militaries’ assistance to each other’s defence efforts (KUCHARCZYK–ŁADA 2021: 33).

### *Polish–U.S. relations*

Relations between Poland and the United States improved and deepened very quickly after the change of regime. American administrations followed the political transformation of Central and Eastern European countries with special attention, whose largest and most populous diasporas live in the U.S. (WINID 2001: 208–231; MATYSEK 2020: 119–138). The importance of Poland was also clearly indicated by the visits of American presidents, namely George H. W. Bush (1989, 1992), Bill

Clinton (1994, 1997), George W. Bush (2001, 2003, 2007), Barack Obama (2011, 2014, 2016), Donald Trump (2017) and Joe Biden (2022, 2023), respectively. The U.S. Government supported Warsaw in negotiations with Moscow on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, and intelligence sharing between the two countries also rapidly deepened.

Polish foreign and security policy has consistently identified the United States as a 'strategic partner' or 'the most important partner' over the past three decades, although the reality is more nuanced. Law and Justice (PiS) Party indeed views the United States as a strategic partner and the most important guarantor of the security of both Poland and the European continent, and therefore seeks to strengthen bilateral security and defence cooperation with Washington. The Civic Platform (PO), however, prioritised economic, military-technological and scientific cooperation, and sought to develop a more balanced relationship between the United States and the European Union (and Poland) than PiS (MATYSEK 2021: 91–92).

It is important to emphasise, however, that the country's political elite is unanimously committed to Atlanticism. This is underpinned by the fact that, since 1989, Poland has participated in 93 international missions (34 UN, 26 NATO, 14 EU, 10 OSCE, 7 U.S.-led and 2 other), 18 of which are still ongoing, with NATO taking the largest share in term of troops and resources committed. Since 1991, the Polish Armed Forces have participated in seven U.S.-led missions, including those in which Poland was the only Central European participant (Operation Iraqi Freedom) or European contributor (Uphold Democracy). Another sign of the strong security commitment to the U.S. is that the country's defence spending has always been around 2% of GDP over the past thirty years, and even the constitution stipulates a mandatory level of defence spending (currently at 3%, exceeding NATO expectations) (POSTOLKO 2022).

#### THE ROAD TO NATO AND EU ACCESSION

As most Central and Eastern European countries, Poland also witnessed a heated debate about possible ways of guaranteeing Polish security between 1989 and 1992. During this period, neutrality, the idea of a Central European subregional defence alliance, and cooperative security models based on the OSCE framework were raised as theoretical options besides joining Western defence organisations (OTŁOWSKI 1998: 113–124). Warsaw's decision in favour of the latter stemmed mainly from two realisations. On the one hand, although the transforming security environment in the country's immediate neighbourhood following the end of the Cold War was

clearly favourable, Russia still posed a potential threat from the east (ZAJĄC 2014: 194). On the other hand, after the collapse of the bipolar world order, the United States remained the sole, unrivalled global power in world politics for about a decade, whose interest was vested not only in maintaining an effective operation within NATO but also expanding it, filling the security vacuum in Central Europe (WALTZ 2000: 18–29).

#### POLISH PARTICIPATION IN NATO

The greatest added value of NATO for Poland lies in collective defence, and the fact that NATO's leading power has been the United States seen by the Polish political elite as the only actor that can credibly deter Russia from aggressive behaviour. Warsaw's insistence on solid security guarantees stems from Poland's geopolitical situation and troubled past. The perceived Russian threat also explains why Poland, as a NATO member has always advocated strengthening the alliance's primary function, collective defence, and has openly criticised any changes that were perceived as undermining this function of shifting NATO's policy focus (e.g. the creation of an autonomous European defence, European duplication of capabilities) (KUŹNIAK 2018: 59). Like most Central European countries, Poland clearly expected an acceptance to a collective defence alliance. Although Poland has participated very actively in the alliance's international operations, and according to some, sometimes even beyond its means, it was always one of those NATO Member States which believed that the alliance's capabilities should be developed in a way that maintained a balance between collective defence and 'out of area' engagements (KLICH 2009: 85–93).

In exchange for solid security guarantees, the Polish governments have shown strong security policy and military commitment and solidarity towards the Alliance and its Member States, primarily towards the United States. Poland took high-stake roles in almost all major NATO missions, and the Polish Government regularly adopted the United States' position in disputes within the Alliance. In fact, it often went further: in 2003, for example, Poland undertook military roles in the United States' Iraq intervention.

Moreover, since the Russo–Georgian war of August 2008, Warsaw – together with the Baltic countries – has perceived Russia as a rapidly growing threat to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, therefore argued that the Alliance should focus much more on the challenges posed by Russia (TÁLAS 2014: 25–27). From then on, Warsaw increasingly emphasised the need of strengthening the Alliance's basic



tasks of collective defence and territorial defence, and in Polish–American relations, the need for any additional security guarantees provided by the United States (EK 2008: 6). Since Poland could not formally achieve the latter bilaterally, Warsaw sought to assume a role in defence issues that would/could make it an inescapably important player. In the past two decades, the best opportunity was provided by the plans to develop a NATO (from 2004 on) or an American (2007–2009) missile defence system deployed in Europe (NYCZ 2013: 63–66; ADAMCZYK 2014: 40–44), as well as the Russian–Ukrainian war from 2014 and its 2022 escalation.

The costly, negative experience in the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions and then stabilisations led to a strong belief that Warsaw should significantly reduce Poland's expeditionary role. This resulted in the 'Komorowski Doctrine' announced in 2013, which summarised the new direction of Poland's security strategy in four points:

1. The Republic of Poland should shift its strategic priorities from expeditionary participation to tasks related to directly ensuring the security and defence of the country.
2. Poland's national defence capabilities provide a key pillar and guarantee of the country's security.
3. In addition to territorial defence, deterrence capabilities should become Polish assets within NATO and the European Union, especially in situations where it is difficult to build consensus within the Alliance.
4. Poland must strengthen its presence and roles internationally, and represent its strategic interests in international organisations, shaping their agenda in accordance with Polish interests (Doktryna Komorowskiego 2014: 1–2).

The new strategic direction of Polish security policy – which also became part of the 2014 Polish National Security Strategy – essentially put the emphasis on the development of national capabilities, while maintaining the prominent role of NATO and the United States in Poland's defence (FRYC 2014: 52–56). As a result, the security of Poland today rests on four fundamental pillars: the development of national capabilities, the collective defence of NATO, the special security relationship with the United States, and Poland's membership in the European Union. As it was shown above, the doctrine of moving towards developing independent military capabilities was adopted well before the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russian support for separatism in eastern Ukraine, which signalled the start of the Russian–Ukrainian war.

Therefore, it was no coincidence that Poland initiated strengthening NATO's eastern flank with a rotational military presence in March 2014 (ZAJĄC 2014: 197–198), which was followed by several further steps at the 2014 Newport Summit to

strengthen collective defence (CSIKI et al. 2014: 113–117). The establishment of four multinational battalion-size battlegroups in 2016 under NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence – with Canadian (in Latvia), American (in Poland), German (in Lithuania) and British (in Estonia) framework nation roles – was a landmark event for Warsaw. As the next step, another four such multinational battlegroups were created in 2022 – with Italian (in Bulgaria), French (in Romania), Czech (in Slovakia) and Hungarian (in Hungary) framework nations – to be increased to brigade level (each with 3–5,000 personnel) by the end of 2023 (CSIKI VARGA – TÁLAS 2023: 4). In addition, the United States also increased the number of American troops in Poland in the bilateral framework, so that more than 10,000 troops are currently stationing in the country, while a forward deployed element of the HQ of the 5<sup>th</sup> U.S. Corps was deployed to Poznan (Camp Kościuszko) (PISM 2023).

In addition to strengthening NATO's core collective defence mission, Poland has also been one of the most active advocates of the Alliance's enlargement since 1999. This was the case with the Baltic countries (2004) and then the membership of Ukraine and Georgia (2008), as well as Albania, Croatia (2009), Montenegro (2017) and North Macedonia (2020). Polish support for the NATO membership of the Baltic states, Ukraine and Georgia is closely linked to the so-called 'Ukraine–Lithuania–Belarus Doctrine', which assumes that a key guarantee of Poland's security is the independent statehood of these nations (MITROVICS 2023a; 2023b; 2023c).

After 2014 Poland became one of Ukraine's main supporters, and, since 2016, along with the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, it has been one of the most important training and logistical supporters of the Ukrainian armed forces (MIŁOSZ 2022). In response to the Russian troop deployments around Ukraine in 2021, Poland was supplying weapons to Ukraine since early 2022, and following the escalation of the Russian–Ukrainian war, Warsaw has been one of Ukraine's most committed and active supporters (and provided Ukraine with nearly 4 billion Euros worth of aid by mid-2023, including 3 billion Euros (or nearly 1% of Poland's GDP) in military support (Ukraine Support Tracker 2023).

#### POLISH PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The new Polish political elite that came to power after the change of regime sees the European Union primarily as an international organisation that promotes Poland's economic modernisation (SZYNOL 2014: 211). They consider NATO to be the organisation most relevant to Polish security, and have always opposed any European effort that is believed to potentially weaken the North Atlantic Alliance.

Polish leaders are sceptical of the effectiveness of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), primarily due to the diverging strategic interests of EU Member States. They also see the lack of an integrating force in the EU that the United States represents within NATO.

Although initially very distrustful, Warsaw eventually came to support CSDP between 1999 and 2011, as politically it could not afford to be left out of such an important EU initiative. The first Polish steps took place in May 2003: Warsaw offered 1,500 soldiers to carry out EU crisis management (Petersberg) tasks; then from the spring of 2004 participated in the development of the EU Battlegroup Concept. In 2006, Warsaw decided to establish joint multinational battlegroups (a 'German-led' with Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia; a 'Weimar Battlegroup' with Germany and France, and the 'V4' Battlegroup with the Visegrád countries), and even assumed the role of a framework nation in the latter (ZIĘBA 2012: 160–162). From July 2004, Poland joined the European Defence Agency (EDA). The confidence of Polish decision-makers in CSDP was also significantly boosted by the Lisbon Treaty for its solidarity clause and Article 42.7 on mutual assistance, which also explicitly contains a collective defence provision (BONDE 2009: 41, 146–147). Since 2009, Warsaw has been talking about three external pillars of Poland's security: NATO, the European Union and the United States (KUŹNIAK 2012: 339–343).

However, the support for CSDP and the increased Polish confidence in the EU's defence policy did not mean that Poland also supported the concept of European strategic autonomy. For the reasons mentioned earlier, it also did not see Poland's contribution to EU missions as changing the attitude of European powers towards Polish security needs for stronger support (for example, in relation to Georgia or Ukraine), despite the fact that Poland, the sixth largest country in the EU, ranks fifth in terms of participation in the organisation's military operations (ŻURAWSKI VEL GRAJEWSKI 2022: 113–114).

Moreover, Polish confidence in the European Union as a security policy actor stalled from the end of the 2000s and began to weaken again. The various crises affecting Europe (and more broadly, the West), and the debates surrounding the European Union's crisis management steps played a decisive role in this. Not to mention the fact that since the fall of 2015, a Eurosceptic political force (PiS) came to power in Poland, which was sharply critical of the Union in terms of both its internal and external policies. PiS often portrayed the EU as a threat to Polish sovereignty in its political communication (KUŹNIAK 2018: 66). In addition, previous Polish reservations versus strategic autonomy, such as the lack of a hegemonic European integrating force, the diversity of national security priorities of EU Member States, the lack of a 'European' political nation and the associated European solidarity,

the low level of European defence budgets, and the lack of European military capabilities, persisted (ŻURAWSKI VEL GRAJEWSKI 2022: 109–110). Specific Polish arguments against European autonomy included the German–Russian cooperation in the construction of Nord Stream 2, the (later not realised) sale of Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia by France, and the construction of a Russian military training centre in Mulino (near Nizhny Novgorod) equipped with modern Bundeswehr technology sold by the German company Rheinmetall (ŻURAWSKI VEL GRAJEWSKI 2022: 113–114).

As a result, the national-conservative Polish elite found itself in a very peculiar situation at the end of the 2010s: even though Poland participates in all European defence initiatives – and since it identifies itself as a European middle power, it could not do otherwise – it is far from being as proactive as one would expect from a European middle power. However, many believe that Warsaw manages the EU's common security and defence policy according to its weight: Polish firms are participating in 13 PESCO projects, and are observers in another 17, and also have been coordinating the Special Forces Medical Training Centre (SMTTC) project since 2019. Besides being a member of EDA and several EU Battlegroups, Warsaw has also participated in 14 EU missions since 1994 (three of which are currently ongoing).<sup>2</sup>

The Russian–Ukrainian war significantly increased Poland's prestige not only within NATO, but also within the European Union. Partly because the escalation confirmed Polish concerns about Russian aggression that had been voiced for years, and partly because the geopolitical situation of the Russian–Ukrainian war permanently increased the importance of Poland, neighbouring Ukraine, and finally also because it once again strengthened the relationship between the United States and Europe, putting the question of European strategic autonomy on hold for a while, which corresponds to Polish strategic aspirations. Another

<sup>2</sup> Poland participates in the following projects: 1. Military Mobility (coordinator: Netherlands); 2. European Secure Software-Defined Radio – ESSOR (coordinator: France); 3. European Logistics Centre Network and Support for Operations (coordinator: Germany); 4. Maritime Semi-Autonomous Mine Countermeasures – MAS MCM (coordinator: Belgium); 5. Port and Maritime Surveillance and Protection – HARMSPRO (coordinator: Italy); 6. Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cybersecurity (coordinator: Lithuania); 7. EU Radio Navigation Solution – EURAS (coordinator: France); 8. Integrated Unmanned Ground Systems – IUGS (coordinator: Estonia); 9. Integrated European Joint Training and Simulation Centre – EUROSIM (coordinator: Hungary); 10. European Medical Command (coordinator: Germany); 11. EU Collaborative Warfare Capabilities – ECoWAR (coordinator: France); 12. Protection of Space Assets – DoSA (coordinator: France) (Ministry of National Defence Republic of Poland 2022).

important factor in increasing its prestige is that Poland is one of the most committed supporters of Ukraine in political, military and humanitarian terms towards Ukraine (BENDYK-BURAS 2022; PAWŁUSZKO 2022: 55–57). Warsaw has also provided support for all EU initiatives aimed at increasing European military capabilities, which could enable the European Union Member States to participate more in the continent's defence, thus relieving the United States of the burden (ŻURAWSKI VEL GRAJEWSKI 2022: 118–121).

#### THE POLISH ARMED FORCES

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland are designated to safeguard the interests of Poland and conduct armed combat, they are one of the main elements of the Polish defence system and the basis of the country's defence potential. They are also the fundamental institution established for the implementation of Polish security and defence policy (Sejm of the Republic of Poland 2022: Articles 11.1, 11.2). According to the Polish Constitution, their main task is to protect the independence and territorial integrity of Poland, as well as to ensure the security and inviolability of the Polish state borders (Konstytucja RP 2023: Article 26). However, one must see that the importance of these tasks in the Polish case also strongly depends on how the country's political elite judges the actual state of the security environment and its changes; and how it prioritises threats and challenges affecting the country. For example, a serious turning point in the development and status of the Polish military was brought about by NATO accession (1999), participation in the Alliance's international crisis management and stabilisation missions, the global financial and economic crisis (2008–2012), the Russian–Ukrainian war in 2014, and its escalation since 2022, to name just the most important events.

#### *The tasks of the armed forces*

In connection with the above-mentioned core functions, the Polish Armed Forces have a number of tasks, which can be grouped into the following three major batches. First, ensuring the defence of the state and resistance to aggression against the state within the framework of allied commitments, i.e. to maintaining the deployability of troops to ensure the protection and inviolability of Poland's borders, to counterterrorism actions and to resolve local or regional armed conflicts, as well as to participation in domestic and foreign defence operations. Second,

participation in stabilising the international security environment and in crisis and humanitarian assistance operations, i.e. peacekeeping and crisis management operations conducted by NATO, the EU and the United Nations, as well as other operations arising from international agreements; and maintaining forces and capabilities suitable for participation in humanitarian operations conducted by international, governmental and other organisations. Third, supporting domestic security and assisting the population, including by controlling and protecting airspace, supporting the protection of land borders and territorial waters, and conducting reconnaissance and intelligence activities. In addition: controlling radioactive, chemical and biological contamination in the country; clearing the territory of explosives and dangerous objects of military origin; conducting search and rescue activities; and supporting state authorities, public administration and the population in responding to threats (Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej s. a.).

As can be seen in Polish strategic documents, the tasks of the Armed Forces have gradually been expanding with military elements of countering newly emerging, such as cyber or hybrid, threats.

Currently Poland have been participating in 9 international operations carried out under the auspices of the UN, NATO and the EU. About 1,400 soldiers and military personnel are participating in them. Of these, three CSDP and one UN missions, as well as four NATO operations and one ad-hoc international coalition operations. The Polish Armed Forces are participating with most troops in NATO's KFOR in Kosovo, the UN UNIFIL mission in Lebanon, NATO's tailored Forward Presence (tFP) in Romania and its enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Latvia, and the United States' Operation Inherent Resolve against ISIS in the Middle East (Misje s. a.; Misje zagraniczne z udziałem polskich żołnierzy s. a.).

According to the Polish Homeland Defence Act, the armed forces in Poland may participate in disaster management, counterterrorism, the protection of public properties, search and rescue operations, operations aimed at saving or protecting human health and life, cyberspace protection, clearing areas of explosives and hazardous materials of military origin and their disposal, and performing tasks related to crisis management (Sejm of the Republic of Poland 2022: Article 11.3). This has been illustrated in recent years by the response operation to the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 (Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej 2021; POWAŁKO 2022: 18–39), and involvement of the armed forces in closing the Belarusian–Polish border from irregular mass immigration. For example, in 2022, around 15,000 soldiers were involved in border guard duties, their number was reduced to 1,300 by the summer of 2023, only to be increased again to 10,000 after the Wagner Group appeared in Belarus in July (AL SHEHABI 2023).

### *The structure and key assets of the armed forces*

The Polish Armed Forces have five branches: Land Forces (Wojska Lądowe – WL), Air Force (Siły Powietrzne – SP), Naval Forces (Marynarka Wojenna – MW), as well as Special Operations Forces (Wojska Specjalne – WS), which were declared an independent branch of the Armed Forces in 2007, and Territorial Defence Forces (Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej – WOT), which had been upgraded to an independent branch in 2017 (Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej 2023).

### Personnel

The official number of professional soldiers in the Polish Armed Forces in the end of 2024 was 205,100 (PAP 2024). This meant that the number of the Polish Armed Forces decreased by 50% compared to 1990 (414,000), and has fallen by only 15% since 1999 (240,000) (ROCHOWICZ 2019). However, it is important to point out that, on the one hand, before joining NATO, during the period of self-sustained security, the size of the army was intentionally kept very high, while on the other hand, the size of the army was the lowest in the first period after the transition to a professional army, that is, between 2010 and 2015 (99,000–100,000, or 41–42% of the 1999 number) (KAJETANOWICZ 2021: 85–97).

The Polish governments communicate to the domestic and international public a higher military strength than the official number underpinned by the budget (for example, 164,100 people in 2022, 172,500 people in 2023) (ISTEL 2023). According to the Polish Ministry of Defence on 28 June 2024, the Polish Armed Forces were consisted of: almost 139,500 professional soldiers; more than 4,800 professional soldiers in training; more than 2,500 soldiers in Voluntary General Military Service (DZSW, Dobrowolna Zasadnicza Służba Wojskowa) in training; almost 17,500 soldiers in Voluntary General Military Service (DZSW, Dobrowolna Zasadnicza Służba Wojskowa); almost 35,000 soldiers in Territorial Military Service (TSW, Terytorialna Służba Wojskowa) (CIŚLAK 2024). The professional strength of the armed forces (134,362 professional soldiers) as of 31 December 2023 was as follows: 134 generals; 22,574 officers; 52,223 NCOs; 59,421 privates (CIŚLAK 2024).

According to the current force development plans, the strength of the Polish Armed Forces is planned to be increased to 300,000 by 2035, consisting of: 187,127 professional soldiers, 9,373 professional soldiers in training, 3,000 soldiers performing voluntary military service during training (first-year students of military academies), 50,000 soldiers performing voluntary military service and 50,000 non-professional

soldiers performing territorial defence military service (PIEKARSKI 2023: 18; CIŚLAK 2024). It is currently not possible to assess whether demographic processes and budgetary conditions will allow the implementation of this extremely ambitious plan (PIEKARSKI 2023: 33–37).

### The organisational structure and equipment of the armed forces

Following the 2012 Defence Review, the transformation of the Polish Land Forces (WL) reached the point of formulating a comprehensive modernisation program covering the entire Polish Armed Forces in 2013 (LIPKA–SMURA 2014: 12). However, this was only partially implemented, partly due to insufficient resources and partly due to the change of government in 2015. The new coalition – similarly to the practice of many Central and Eastern European countries – ordered a new defence review in 2016, citing partly the changes in the security policy environment and partly the previous government's flawed ideas of the defence reform (Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej 2016). This resulted in the defence reform program adopted two years later, in November 2018, which is still ongoing after amendments in 2019 and in 2022.

The backbone of the Polish Armed Forces is formed by four divisions of the Land Forces (WL), three of which are mechanised and one is armoured. The Land Forces also have four independent brigades and 11 independent regiments (Military Units s. a.). The main armaments of the ground forces in 2023 consisted of 538 tanks (Leopard 2, PT-91 Twardy, T-72, K2 Black Panther, M1 Abrams), 1981 armoured fighting vehicles (BWP-1, Rosomak Hitfist-30), 701 self-propelled artillery pieces (2S1 Goździk, M120 Rak, 1977 Dana, K9 Thunder, AHS Krab), and 206 multiple rocket launchers (BM-21 Grad, WR-40 Langusta, RM-70/85, M142 HIMARS, K239 Chunmoo) (KUCHARSKI 2019; WACHOWSKI 2020; MICHALUK 2022b; CIŚLAK 2023b; MAŁECKI 2023; SABAK 2023).

According to many experts, the Polish Air Force (SP) was the most developed branch of the Polish Armed Forces after 1990. The Air Force was the first to receive, from the early to mid-2000s, a relatively large amount of modern Polish, European and American equipment and weapons, such as CASA C-295 (2003–2013), F16 (2006–2008) and C-130 (2009–2012) aircraft and Orbiter UAVs (2005) (SZOPA 2022b). Today, the Polish Air Force has two tactical aviation regiments, each consisting of 3 squadrons, an air transport group consisting of 3 squadrons, an air training group consisting of 7 squadrons, an air defence missile brigade, and a radio engineering brigade (PIEKARSKI 2023: 9–10). Two of the tactical aviation regiment's squadrons consist of MiG-29s, one Su-22 and three F-16s. The MiG-29s are



planned to be transferred to Ukraine, while the Su-22s are expected to be withdrawn from service. The air transport group has American C-130 and C-295M CASA and Polish M28 Bryza aircraft commissioned (MICHALUK 2022a; SZOPA 2022a; 2022b; CIŚLAK 2023a), as well as W-3, Mi-8, Mi-17, Mi-2 helicopters. The air training group operates M-346 Bielik, PZL-130 Orlik and M28 Bryza aircraft, as well as SW-4 and Mi-2 helicopters (SZOPA 2022a; 2022b).

Within the Polish Armed Forces, the naval forces were the most poorly financed branch, and suffered the greatest reduction since the change of regime. During the Warsaw Pact period, the Polish Navy had the closest relationship with the Soviet military, as Soviet war plans assigned it a major task by occupying the Jutland Peninsula (Denmark) and ensuring the supremacy of the USSR in the Baltic Sea (LIPKA-SMURA 2014: 73–74). According to experts, in addition to underfunding, the lack of a concept in Polish military thinking regarding the navy, as well as the deep economic crisis hitting Polish shipbuilding, also contributed to this branch of the armed forces becoming the most neglected within the Polish armed forces. Poland's accession to NATO did not change this situation much, as Polish military leaders could not really find the proper function of the navy within the armed forces, thus, this branch has consistently remained de-prioritised (SMURA-OLEKSIEJUK 2022: 8–12). The Polish Navy consists of three major units, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Naval Flotilla, the 8<sup>th</sup> Coastal Defence Flotilla and the Naval Air Brigade. In 2023, the main naval units of the Polish Navy included 2 frigates, 2 corvettes, 3 fast attack crafts and 1 submarine – while most of the naval units were aging. The Naval Air Brigade was equipped with PZL M28 aircraft, as well as W-3, SH-2G, Mi-14, Mi-2 and AW101 helicopters (Forsal 2021; WILEWSKI 2023; SMURA-OLEKSIEJUK 2022: 16–18; LIPKA 2022; PIEKARSKI 2023: 10–11).

The Special Operations Forces have been considered an independent branch of the Polish Armed Forces since 2007, which include six independent special operations units (PIEKARSKI 2023: 11). This branch is the best known and most respected part of the Polish Armed Forces due to its successful participation in missions run by NATO and the United States (LIPKA-SMURA 2014: 87–93). It uses Mi-17 and S-70i Black Hawk helicopters to carry out its tasks.

The Territorial Defence Forces (WOT) are the fifth and youngest branch of the Polish Armed Forces, which were classified as an independent branch of the Armed Forces in 2017 after two years of preparation. The territorial defence brigades of the WOT had been established – basically from moving east to west in geographical sense – from 2016 onwards, so that today there are 20 territorial defence brigades covering the whole territory of the country. At the end of 2024, the WOT consisted of 20 brigades (70 battalions and 199 light infantry companies)

with more than 42,500 soldiers, of which 36,000 were territorial military service, 6,400 professional soldiers and 140 active reserve soldiers. In 2016, the original goal of establishing a territorial defence force of 53,000 was set, but this has not yet been achieved (MilMag 2022). The WOT has an independent command and two training centres: the Territorial Defence Forces Training Centre – CSWOT (Toruń), and the Communication and Information Technology Training Centre – CSŁiI (Zegrze), which also houses the command (Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej 2023).

## OUTLOOK

In the 35 years since the change of regime, Poland has been one of the most sensitive and reactive countries in the Central and Eastern European region to changes in the European security environment. Polish political leaders have tried to seize the most opportunities in the country's alliance systems with great pragmatism, often taking on serious burden to be considered 'a good ally' by its partners and to be able to credibly guarantee the security of Poland and Polish society. At the same time, Poland has also practised harsh criticism and initiated debates within the same relationships if allies were perceived as taking a path that was different from Poland's interests. In the early 2010s, Warsaw realised early that the country's security environment was deteriorating rapidly and that its own armed forces must take on much greater responsibility for sustaining Polish security than before. The Polish political and military elite unequivocally sees the increasingly aggressive Russia as the main cause of this.

This is also one of the main motives of the currently ongoing military reform. Due to the growing threat, the Polish leadership plans to establish two additional combined arms divisions in the land forces, to be stationed in the central part of the country. Due to the threat, it believes that the Polish Air Force should have at least 160 combat aircraft, instead of the current 95–97, and that it is necessary to modernise the helicopter fleet of the armed forces while also reducing the number of types of rotary-wing aircraft, as the Polish military currently operate 11 types of helicopters (CIŚLAK 2023a). It also intends to modernise the naval flotillas, which means not only replacing obsolete ships with a new generation, but also putting new equipment into service, the capabilities of which the Polish Navy has never had before in its history, such as long-range anti-ship missiles (WILEWSKI 2023).

It is easy to see that these ambitious development goals can only be achieved within the framework of a serious and extremely costly modernisation program. That is why the Polish Government plans to spend about 524 billion Zlotys (about 133 billion U.S. dollars) on 24 priority programs for the technical modernisation

of the Polish Armed Forces in the period from 2021 to 2035 (Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej 2019). These plans clearly demonstrate that Poland has embarked on an extremely ambitious military development program even by European standards, and intends to create one of the strongest military forces on the continent.

According to Polish experts, the Polish governments may face obstacles upon realising these goals in two areas. On the one hand, from a financial point of view, because it is far from certain that the Polish economy will be able to sustainably generate the resources necessary for the large-scale military modernisation, and on the other hand, in terms of human resources, because it is questionable whether there will be enough suitable candidates for the new military force planned to reach 250–300 thousand troops in the all-volunteer force.

Since the Polish political elite is fundamentally distrustful of the European Union's defence capabilities and the solidarity of Western Member States with regard to the security of Eastern Member States (namely withstanding Russian aggression), they reject the idea and aspirations of European strategic autonomy. This rejection does not mean, however, that Poland does not support or wish to participate in EU security and defence initiatives that could improve and expand the EU's military capabilities. Rather, Poland sees these efforts as complementary to NATO's capabilities, and it seeks to ensure that others also see them as such. From this perspective, the modernisation of the Polish military is a tool with which the Polish Government, in addition to protecting the country and NATO's eastern flank, also seeks to achieve increased political authority and influence to counterbalance the influence of those Member States (especially France and Germany) that it considers to be the most important and influential representatives of European strategic autonomy (ŻURAWSKI VEL GRAJEWSKI 2022: 118–121).

#### REFERENCES

- ADAMCZYK, Natalia (2014): Znaczenie amerykańskiej tarczy antyrakietowej dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski [The Importance of the U.S. Missile Defence Shield for Poland's National Security]. *Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i praktyka*, 15(2), 39–49. Online: <https://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.mhp-fb8f2c6d-1c31-4590-b1eb-d1313eb82f9c>
- AL SHEHABI, Daria (2023): Szef MON: 10 tysięcy żołnierzy na granicy polsko-białoruskiej [Head of the Ministry of National Defence: 10,000 Soldiers on the Polish–Belarusian Border]. *Polska Agencja Prasowa*, 10 August 2023. Online: <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1607026%2Cszef-mon-10-tysiecy-zolnierzy-na-granicy-polsko-bialoruskiej.html>
- BENDYK, Edwin – BURAS, Piotr (2022): Polska wobec wojny, Polska w świecie po wojnie. Zadania na nowy czas [Poland and the War, Poland in the Post-war World. Tasks for a New Era]. *Fundacja*

- Batorego, *Forum Idei*, 1–9. Online: [https://www.batory.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/E.Bendyk.P.Buras\\_Polska.wobec\\_wojny\\_Polska.w.swiecie.po\\_wojnie.pdf](https://www.batory.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/E.Bendyk.P.Buras_Polska.wobec_wojny_Polska.w.swiecie.po_wojnie.pdf)
- BONDE, Jens-Peter ed. (2009): *Consolidated Reader-Friendly Edition of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). Third edition*. Brussels: Foundation for EU Democracy. Online: <http://en.euabc.com/upload/books/lisbon-treaty-3edition.pdf>
- CISŁAK, Jarosław (2023a): Wojska Łądowe 2035. Jakie będą? [Land Forces 2035. What Will They Be Like?] *Defence 24*, 10 July 2023. Online: <https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/wojska-ladowe-2035-jakie-beda-analiza>
- CISŁAK, Jarosław (2023b): Wielkie zmiany w Wojsku Polskim. Jaka będzie armia za dekadę? [Major Changes in the Polish Army. What Will the Army Look Like in a Decade?] *Defence 24*, 15 August 2023. Online: <https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/wielkie-zmiany-w-wojsku-polskim-jaka-bedzie-armia-za-dekade-analiza>
- CISŁAK, Jarosław (2024): More Soldiers in the Polish Armed Forces. New Data. *Defence 24*, 7 July 2024. Online: <https://defence24.com/armed-forces/more-soldiers-in-the-polish-armed-forces-new-data-exclusive>
- CSIKI VARGA, Tamás – TÁLAS, Péter (2023): A vilniasi NATO-csúcstalálkozó napirendje [Agenda for the NATO Summit in Vilnius]. *SVKI Elemzések*, (9), 1–7. Online: [https://svkk.uni-nke.hu/document/svkk-uni-nke-hu-1506332684763/SVKI\\_Elemzesek\\_2023\\_9\\_A\\_NATO\\_vilniasi\\_csucstalalkozojanak\\_napirendje\\_\(Csiki%20Varga%20T\\_Talas%20P\).pdf](https://svkk.uni-nke.hu/document/svkk-uni-nke-hu-1506332684763/SVKI_Elemzesek_2023_9_A_NATO_vilniasi_csucstalalkozojanak_napirendje_(Csiki%20Varga%20T_Talas%20P).pdf)
- CSIKI, Tamás – TÁLAS, Péter – VARGA, Gergely (2014): A NATO walesi csúcstalálkozásának napirendje és értékelése [Agenda and Assessment of the NATO Summit in Wales]. *Nemzet és Biztonság*, 7(4), 112–128. Online: <https://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/letoltes.php?letolt=602>
- CZAPUTOWICZ, Jacek (2014): Ewolucja polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa: w kierunku strategicznej samodzielności? [The Evolution of Polish Security Policy: Towards Strategic Independence?] *Studia Politologiczne*, 34(4), 15–31. Online: <http://www.studiapolitologiczne.pl/pdf-115878-45205?filename=Ewolucja%20polskiej.pdf>
- DAVIES, Norman (1991): *Boże igrzysko. Historia Polski*. Tom II. Od roku 1795 [God's Playground. The History of Poland. Volume II. From 1795 Onwards]. Krakow: Znak.
- Doktryna Komorowskiego (2014). Online: [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwipgp6UtaAAxXXgPoHHeecA2EQFnoECAoQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbn.gov.pl%2Fdownload%2F1%2F15538%2Fdoktrynakomorowskiego-zalozenia.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2o8Mu3OQ\\_DEhDUXuaAEkm4&opi=89978449](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwipgp6UtaAAxXXgPoHHeecA2EQFnoECAoQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbn.gov.pl%2Fdownload%2F1%2F15538%2Fdoktrynakomorowskiego-zalozenia.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2o8Mu3OQ_DEhDUXuaAEkm4&opi=89978449)
- EK, Carl (2008): Poland's New Government: Background and Issues for the United States. *CRS Report for Congress*, 15 February 2008. Online: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RS22811.pdf>
- Forsal (2021): MON wraca nad morze i do 2035 r. planuje wydać 60 mld zł na nowe okręty wojenne [The Ministry of National Defence Is Returning to the Sea and Plans to Spend PLN 60 Billion on New Warships by 2035]. *Forsal*, 16 March 2021. Online: <https://forsal.pl/gospodarka/inwestycje/artykuly/8121812,marynarka-wojenna-do-2035-r-plan-wydac-60-mld-zl-nowe-okrety-wojenne.html>
- FRYC, Mariusz (2014): „Doktryna Komorowskiego” – próba scharakteryzowania. Idea, zakres, priorytety, realizacja [“Komorowski's Doctrine” – An Attempt at Characterisation. Idea, Scope,

- Priorities, Implementation]. *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, 2(30), 41–72. Online: <http://www.bbn.gov.pl/download/1/17029/41-72sMariuszFryc.pdf>
- GRUDZIŃSKI, Przemysław (2008): *Państwo inteligentne. Polska poszukiwaniu międzynarodowej roli* [The Intelligent State. Poland in Search of an International Role]. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
- HILLEBRAND, Ernst (2021): Dialog głuchoniemych? Stosunki polsko-niemieckie dziś [A Dialogue between the Deaf? Polish–German Relations Today]. In SCHULZ, Justyna – HILLEBRAND, Ernst (eds.): *Między przyjaźnią a frustracją – Polska i Niemcy 30 lat po podpisaniu traktatu o sąsiedztwie* [Between Friendship and Frustration – Poland and Germany 30 Years after Signing the Neighbourhood Treaty]. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 23–34.
- ISAP (2009): *Ustawa z dnia 9 stycznia 2009 r. o zmianie ustawy o powszechnym obowiązku obrony Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz o zmianie niektórych innych ustaw. Dz.U. 2009 nr 22 poz. 120* [Act of 9 January 2009 Amending the Act on the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland and Certain Other Acts]. Online: <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20090220120>
- ISTEL, Michał (2023): Błaszczak: “mamy 172 500 żołnierzy pod bronią”. Co to za liczba? [Błaszczak: ‘We Have 172,500 Soldiers in Service.’ What Does this Number Mean?] *Konkret* 24, 9 June 2023. Online: <https://konkret24.tvn24.pl/polska/wojsko-polskie-blaszczak-mamy-172-500-zolnierzy-pod-bronia-co-to-za-liczba-st7165347>
- KAJETANOWICZ, Jerzy (2021): Transformacja Sił Zbrojnych RP 1999–2020. Aspekt organizacyjny [Transformation of the Polish Armed Forces 1999–2020. Organisational Aspect]. *Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, 19, 83–103. Online: <https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2021.1.5>
- KLICH, Bogdan (2009): NATO: A View from Central Europe. *Politique étrangère, Hors série*, (5), 85–93. Online: <https://doi.org/10.3917/pe.hs3.0085>
- Konferencja Ambasadorów RP (2023): *Polska polityka zagraniczna w ruinie. Okres rządów PiS (2015–2023). Problemy wybrane* [Polish Foreign Policy in Ruins. The PiS Government Period (2015–2023). Selected Issues]. Online: <https://ambasadorowiedotorg.files.wordpress.com/2023/10/22.09.2023-polityka-zagraniczna-w-ruinie-1-1.pdf>
- Konstytucja RP (2023). Online: <https://konstytucja.online/>
- KUCHARCZYK, Jacek – ŁADA, Agnieszka (2021): *Polacy i Niemcy we wspólnej Europie: ocena wzajemnych relacji i sytuacji międzynarodowej 30 lat po podpisaniu traktatu o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy* [Poles and Germans in a United Europe: An Assessment of Mutual Relations and the International Situation 30 Years after the Signing of the Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation]. *Barometr Polska–Niemcy 2021*. Online: <https://www.isp.org.pl/pl/publikacje/polacy-i-niemcy-we-wspolnej-europie-ocena-wzajemnych-relacji-i-sytuacji-miedzynarodowej-30-lat-po-podpisaniu-traktatu-o-dobrym-sasiedztwie-i-przyjaznej-wspolpracy>
- KUCHARSKI, Bartłomiej (2019): Poznańska propozycja modernizacji BWP-1 [Poznań’s Proposal for the Modernisation of the BWP-1]. *Wojsko i Technika*, (10). Online: <https://zbiam.pl/artykuly/poznanska-propozycja-modernizacji-bwp-1/>
- KUŹNIAR, Roman (2012): *Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczypospolitej* [Foreign Policy of the Third Republic of Poland]. Warszawa: Scholar.
- KUŹNIAR, Roman (2018): Wspólna polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej [The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy]. In BARCZ, Jan – DOMARADZKI, Spasimir – KULIGOWSKI, Rafał – SZEWCZYK, Marcin – SZKLARCZYK-AMATI, Eliza (eds.):

- Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Nowe wyzwania* [Poland in the European Union. New Challenges]. Warszawa: Komisja Europejska, Przedstawicielstwo w Polsce, 55–67. Online: <https://doi.org/10.2775/911897>
- LIPKA, Michał (2022): Marynarka wojenna w 1995 r. i 2022 r. Porównanie [The Navy in 1995 and 2022. A Comparison]. *Trojmiasto*, 16 February 2022. Online: <https://www.trojmiasto.pl/wiadomosci/Marynarka-wojenna-w-1995-r-i-2022-r-Porownanie-n164314.html>
- LIPKA, Rafał – SMURA, Tomasz eds. (2014): *Sily Zbrojne RP stan, perspektywy i wyzwania modernizacyjne* [Polish Armed Forces: Current Status, Prospects and Modernisation Challenges]. Warszawa: Kazimierza Pułaskiego. Online: [https://pulaski.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/FKP\\_Raport\\_Sily-Zbrojne-RP-%E2%80%93-stan-perspektywy-i-wyzwania-modernizacyjne.pdf](https://pulaski.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/FKP_Raport_Sily-Zbrojne-RP-%E2%80%93-stan-perspektywy-i-wyzwania-modernizacyjne.pdf)
- MALINOWSKI, Krzysztof (2021): Perspektywy współpracy w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa [Prospects for Cooperation in the Field of Security]. In SCHULZ, Justyna – HILLEBRAND, Ernst (eds.): *Między przyjaźnią a frustracją – Polska i Niemcy 30 lat po podpisaniu traktatu o sąsiedztwie* [Between Friendship and Frustration – Poland and Germany 30 Years after Signing the Neighbourhood Treaty]. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 83–90. Online: [https://polska.fes.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/images/events/2021/12\\_16\\_Ksiazka/Miedzy\\_przyjaznia\\_a\\_frustracja\\_.pdf](https://polska.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/images/events/2021/12_16_Ksiazka/Miedzy_przyjaznia_a_frustracja_.pdf)
- MAŁECKI, Mikołaj (2023): Jak będzie wyglądać nowy bojowy wóz piechoty? Rzecznik Agencji Uzbrojenia opowiedział o tym projekcie [What Will the New Infantry Fighting Vehicle Look Like? A Spokesperson for the Armaments Agency Spoke about the Project]. *Polska Agencja Prasowa*, 14 March 2023. Online: <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1547907%2Cjak-bedzie-wygladac-nowy-bojowy-woz-piechoty-rzecznik-agencji-uzbrojenia>
- MATYSEK, Ksymena (2020): Partnerstwo strategiczne jako doktryna i kategoria definiująca relacje polsko-amerykańskie [Strategic Partnership as a Doctrine and Category Defining Polish–American Relations]. *Społeczeństwo i Polityka*, 1(62), 119–138. Online: <https://doi.org/10.34765/sp.0120.a07>
- MATYSEK, Ksymena (2021): Węzłowe elementy relacji polsko-amerykańskich w świetle analizy ramowania [Key Elements of Polish–American Relations in the Light of Framing Analysis]. *Historia i Polityka*, 42(35), 77–94. Online: <https://doi.org/10.12775/HiP.2021.005>
- MICHALUK, Kamil (2022a): Ile samolotów ma Polska? Możliwości bojowe polskiego lotnictwa [How Many Aircraft Does Poland Have? The Combat Capabilities of the Polish Air Force]. *Gazeta.pl*, 10 March 2022. Online: <https://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,168571,28196285,ile-samolotow-ma-polska-mozliwosci-bojowe-polskiego-lotnictwa.html>
- MICHALUK, Kamil (2022b): Ile czołgów ma Polska? Stan uzbrojenia polskiej armii [How Many Tanks Does Poland Have? The State of the Polish Army's Armament]. *Gazeta.pl*, 10 March 2022. Online: <https://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,168571,28196286,ile-czolgow-ma-polska-stan-uzbrojenia-polskiej-armii.html>
- Military Units (s. a.): *Jednostki wojskowe*. Online: <https://jednostki-wojskowe.pl/>
- MilMag (2022): Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej liczą już 35 tysięcy żołnierzy [The Territorial Defence Forces Now Number 35,000 Soldiers]. *The Military Magazine*, 22 November 2022. Online: <https://milmag.pl/wojska-obrony-terytorialnej-licza-juz-35-tysiecy-zolnierzy/>
- MIŁOSZ, Maciej (2022): Soloch: Polska rozmawia z Ukrainą o dostawach broni [Soloch: Poland Negotiates Arms Supplies with Ukraine]. *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna*, 24 January 2022. Online: <https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/kraj/artykuly/8340194,polska-ukraina-dostawy-broni-pawel-soloch-bbn.html>



- Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej (2016): *Strategiczny Przegląd Obronny* [Strategic Defence Review]. Ministry of National Defence. Online: <https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/strategiczny-przegląd-obronny>
- Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej (2019): *524 miliardy złotych na modernizację Wojska Polskiego do 2035 roku* [PLN 524 Billion for the Modernisation of the Polish Army by 2035]. Ministry of National Defence. Online: <https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/524-miliardy-zlotych-na-modernizacje-wojska-polskiego-do-2035-roku>
- Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej (2021): *Wojsko Polskie cały czas zaangażowane jest w walkę z Covid-19* [The Polish Army Remains Committed to the Fight against Covid-19]. Ministry of National Defence. Online: <https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/wojsko-polskie-calz-czas-zaangazowane-jest-w-walke-z-covid-19>
- Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej (2022): *Podstawowe informacje o budżecie resortu obrony narodowej na 2022 r* [Basic Information about the Ministry of National Defence Budget for 2022]. Ministry of National Defence. Online: <https://www.gov.pl/attachment/26405540-aaic-49b4-b906-11028df393>
- Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej (2023): *Podział limitów stanów średniorocznych żołnierzy i funkcjonariuszy na 2023 r. w ujęciu działów i rozdziałów klasyfikacji budżetowej* [Breakdown of Average Annual Limits for Soldiers and Officers for 2023 by Budget Classification Sections and Chapters]. Ministry of National Defence. Online: <https://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/zalaczniki/2023/02/bzaaczyniki-sig.pdf>
- Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej (s. a.): *Sily Zbrojne RP* [Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland]. Ministry of National Defence. Online: <https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/sily-zbrojne-rp>
- Ministry of National Defence Republic of Poland (2022): *Poland – European Union*. Online: <https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/poland---european-union>
- Misje (s. a.): *Wojsko Polskie* [Polish Armed Forces]. Online: <https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/misje/>
- Misje zagraniczne z udziałem polskich żołnierzy (s. a.): *Foreign Missions Involving Polish Soldiers*. Online: <https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/weterani/miszag/>
- MITROVICS, Miklós (2023a): A lengyel geopolitikai gondolkodás története I. – A kezdetek [The History of Polish Geopolitical Thought I – The Beginnings]. *Horizontok Blog*, 12 July 2023. Online: <https://www.ludovika.hu/blogok/horizontokblog/2023/06/12/a-lengyel-geopolitikai-gondolkodas-tortenete-i-a-kezdetek/>
- MITROVICS, Miklós (2023b): A lengyel geopolitikai gondolkodás története II. – Az újjászülető Lengyelország [The History of Polish Geopolitical Thought II – Poland Reborn]. *Horizontok Blog*, 19 June 2023. Online: <https://www.ludovika.hu/blogok/horizontokblog/2023/06/19/a-lengyel-geopolitikai-gondolkodas-tortenete-ii-resz-az-ujjaszuleto-lengyelorszag/>
- MITROVICS, Miklós (2023c): A lengyel geopolitikai gondolkodás története III. – A „lengyel Ostpolitik” [The History of Polish Geopolitical Thought III – “Polish Ostpolitik”]. *Horizontok Blog*, 28 June 2023. Online: <https://www.ludovika.hu/blogok/horizontokblog/2023/06/28/a-lengyel-geopolitikai-gondolkodas-tortenete-iii-resz-a-lengyel-ostpolitik/>
- MTI (2023): Merénylet címén kezdeményeznek eljárást a szmolenszki légikatasztrófa ügyében [Proceedings Initiated on Grounds of Attempted Murder in Connection with the Smolensk Air Disaster]. *Infostart*, 16 April 2023. Online: <https://infostart.hu/kulfold/2023/04/16/merenylet-cimen-kezdemenyeznek-eljarast-a-szmolenszki-legikatasztrofa-ugyeben>

- NYCZ, Grzegorz (2013): Tarcza antyrakietowa w polityce bezpieczeństwa Polski [The Missile Defence Shield in Polish Security Policy]. In: ŻEBROWSKI, Andrzej – JAESCHKE, Andrzej – KŁACZYŃSKI, Robert (eds.): *Bezpieczeństwo RP: historia, ekonomia, polityka: studia z zakresu bezpieczeństwa państwa* [Security of the Republic of Poland: History, Economics, Politics: Studies in the Field of State Security]. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, 57–75. Online: [https://rep.up.krakow.pl/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11716/3005/04\\_tarcza\\_antyrakietowa\\_w\\_polityce\\_bezpie\\_nycz.pdf?sequence=1](https://rep.up.krakow.pl/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11716/3005/04_tarcza_antyrakietowa_w_polityce_bezpie_nycz.pdf?sequence=1)
- OCHYRA-ŻURAWSKA, Katarzyna – OCHYRA, Patryk (2022): Polish Foreign and Security Policy after 1989. *Aviation and Security Issues*, 2(2), 31–46. Online: <https://doi.org/10.55676/asi.v2i2.16>
- OTŁOWSKI, Tomasz (1998): *Polska w procesie integracji z NATO i Unią Zachodnioeuropejską 1991–1998* [Poland in the Process of Integration with NATO and the Western European Union, 1991–1998]. Toruń: Wyd.
- PAP (2024): Rośnie liczba żołnierzy w Polsce. Armia mierzy się jednak z problemem [The Number of Soldiers in Poland Is Growing. However, the Army Is Facing a Problem]. *Polska Agencja Prasowa*, 31 December 2024. Online: <https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/polscy-zolnierze-odchodza-ze-sluzby-nowej-wladzy-nie-udalo-sie-odwrocic-trendu/tqe80ki>
- PAWŁUSZKO, Tomasz (2022): *Bezpieczeństwo Polski po szczycie NATO w Madrycie* [Poland's Security after the NATO Summit in Madrid]. Warszawa: Instytut Sobieskiego.
- PIEKARSKI, Michał (2023): *Rozbudowa liczebności Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Możliwości i uwarunkowania* [Expansion of the Polish Armed Forces. Possibilities and Conditions]. Warszawa: Kancelaria Senatu. Online: <https://www.senat.gov.pl/gfx/senat/pl/senatekspertyzy/6709/plik/oe-447.pdf>
- PISM (2023): Stała obecność wojsk USA w Polsce wskazuje, że Amerykanie planują trwałe zaangażowanie w regionie [The Permanent Presence of U.S. Troops in Poland Indicates that the Americans Are Planning a Long-term Commitment to the Region]. *Defence 24*, 21 March 2023. Online: <https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/pism-stala-obecnosc-wojsk-usa-w-polsce-wskazuje-ze-amerykanie-planuja-trwale-zaangazowanie-w-regionie>
- POSTOLKO, Paweł (2022): Ustawa o obronie ojczyzny a postulat zmiany Konstytucji RP [The Homeland Defence Act and the Proposal to Amend the Constitution of the Republic of Poland]. *Russell Bedford Poland*, 24 March 2022. Online: <https://www.russellbedford.pl/aktualnosci/zmiany-w-prawie/item/2538-ustawa-o-obronie-ojczyzny-a-postulat-zmiany-konstytucji-rp.html>
- POWAŁKO, Olga (2022): Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej w walce w pandemię Covid-19 [Territorial Defence Forces in the Fight against the Covid-19 Pandemic]. In: KORDONSKI, Roman – KORDONSKA, Aleksandra – MUSZYŃSKI, Łukasz (eds.): *Wojna–konflikt–spór. Obszary rywalizacji w przestrzeni międzynarodowej* [War–Conflict–Dispute. Areas of Rivalry in the International Arena]. Łwów: Olsztyn, 18–39. Online: <https://www.uwm.edu.pl/inp/docs/wojna-4.pdf>
- Prezydent.pl (2011): Prezydent o przyczynie katastrofy smoleńskiej: „sprawa jest w sposób arcybolesny prosta” [The President on the Cause of the Smolensk Disaster: “The Matter Is Extremely Simple”]. *Prezydent.pl*, 1 January 2011. Online: [https://www.prezydent.pl/kancelaria/archiwum/archiwum-bronislawa-komorowskiego/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/prezydent-o-przyczynie-katastrofy-smolenskiej-sprawa-jest-w-sposob-arcybolesny-prosta,14055?\\_\\_cf\\_chl\\_\\_tk=V3P8U5sTQ9fB8ix8zzjc.KQYEvqb9sSoPBww66fLd8-1687186009-o-gaNycGzNDTs](https://www.prezydent.pl/kancelaria/archiwum/archiwum-bronislawa-komorowskiego/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/prezydent-o-przyczynie-katastrofy-smolenskiej-sprawa-jest-w-sposob-arcybolesny-prosta,14055?__cf_chl__tk=V3P8U5sTQ9fB8ix8zzjc.KQYEvqb9sSoPBww66fLd8-1687186009-o-gaNycGzNDTs)



- RAUBO, Jacek M. (2022): Czy rzeczywiście dostrzegamy realny obraz NATO? [Do We Really See the True Picture of NATO?]. *Defence 24*, 4 January 2022. Online: <https://defence24.pl/polityka-obronna/czy-rzeczywiscie-dostrzegamy-realny-obraz-nato-opinia>
- ROCHOWICZ, Robert (2019): Ostatnia dekada wojsk lądowych Sił Zbrojnych PRL cz.2 [The Last Decade of the Land Forces of the Polish Armed Forces, Part 2]. *Historia – Wojsko i Technika*, (2). Online: <https://zbiam.pl/artykuly/ostatnia-dekada-wojsk-ladowych-sil-zbrojnych-prl-cz-2/>
- ROZGONYI, Ádám (2023): Az ukrajnai orosz invázió megalajozza a szmolenszki merényletgyanús tragédia perét [The Russian Invasion of Ukraine Fuels the Trial of the Suspected Smolensk Assassination]. *Infostart*, 17 April 2023. Online: <https://infostart.hu/kulfold/2023/04/17/az-ukrajnai-orosz-invazio-megalajozza-a-szmolenszki-merenyletgyanus-tragedia-peret>
- SABAK, Juliusz (2023): Defence 24 DAY: Zniwelować przewagę liczebną przeciwnika: zdolności operacyjne Wojsk Rakietowych i Artylerii [Defence 24 Day: Overcoming the Enemy's Numerical Superiority: The Operational Capabilities of the Rocket Forces and Artillery]. *Defence 24*, 2 June 2023. Online: <https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/defence24-day-zniwelowac-przewage-liczebną-przeciwnika-zdolnosci-operacyjne-wojsk-rakietowych-i-artylirii>
- SCHULZ, Justyna – HILLEBRAND, Ernst eds. (2021): *Między przyjaźnią a frustracją – Polska i Niemcy 30 lat po podpisaniu traktatu o sąsiedztwie* [Between Friendship and Frustration – Poland and Germany 30 Years after Signing the Neighbourhood Treaty]. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni. Online: <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/warschau/1869s.pdf>
- Sejm of the Republic of Poland (2022): *Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2022 r. o obronie Ojczyzny* [Act of 11 March 2022 on the Defence of the Fatherland]. Online: <https://sip.lex.pl/akty-prawne/dzuzdziennik-ustaw/obrona-ojczyzny-19220069>
- SMURA, Tomasz – OLEKSIEJUK, Michał (2022): *Jak planować rozwój marynarki wojennej? Doświadczenia polskie i brytyjskie* [How to Plan the Development of the Navy? Polish and British Experiences]. Online: <https://pulaski.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Raport-Pulaskiego-Jak-planowac-rozwoj-MW.pdf>
- SZOPA, Maciej (2022a): Coś się zaczyna, coś się kończy. Polskie Siły Powietrzne w 2022 roku [Something Begins, Something Ends. The Polish Air Force in 2022]. *Defence 24*, 30 December 2022. Online: <https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/cos-sie-zaczyna-cos-sie-konczy-polskie-sily-powietrzne-w-2022-roku-raport>
- SZOPA, Maciej (2022b): *Armie Świata: Siły Powietrzne Rzeczypospolitej* [Armies of the World: The Polish Air Force]. *Defence 24*, 22 July 2022. Online: <https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/armie-swiata-sily-powietrzne-rzeczypospolitej>
- SZYNOL, Monika (2014): Wspólna Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE w polskiej polityce bezpieczeństwa [The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy in Polish Security Policy]. In CZORNIK, Katarzyna – LAKOMY, Miron (eds.): *Dylematy polityki bezpieczeństwa Polski na początku drugiej dekady XXI wieku* [The Dilemmas of Polish Security Policy at the Beginning of the Second Decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century]. Katowice: Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty Międzynarodowej w Katowicach, 206–225.
- TÁLAS, Péter (2000): A középhatalmi szerep lehetőségei és korlátai Közép-Európában – a lengyel eset [The Possibilities and Limitations of the Middle Power Role in Central Europe – The Polish Case]. *Védelmi Tanulmányok*, (40), 1–108. Online: [https://www.academia.edu/38262426/A\\_k%C3%B6z%C3%A9phatalmi\\_szerep\\_lehet%C5%91s%C3%A9gei\\_%C3%A9s\\_korl%C3%A1tai\\_K%C3%B6z%C3%B6p-Eur%C3%B3p%C3%A1ban\\_a\\_lengyel\\_eset](https://www.academia.edu/38262426/A_k%C3%B6z%C3%A9phatalmi_szerep_lehet%C5%91s%C3%A9gei_%C3%A9s_korl%C3%A1tai_K%C3%B6z%C3%B6p-Eur%C3%B3p%C3%A1ban_a_lengyel_eset)

- TÁLAS, Péter (2007): Válaszúton a lengyel atlantizmus? [Polish Atlanticism at a Crossroads?] *ZMNE SVKK Elemzések*, (2). Online: <https://svkk.uni-nke.hu/document/svkk-uni-nke-hu-1506332684763/svkk-elemzesek-2007-2-valaszuton-a-lengyel-atlantizmus-talas-p.original.pdf>
- TÁLAS, Péter (2014): A grúz–orosz háború hatása a kelet-közép-európai biztonságfelfogásra [The Impact of the Georgian–Russian War on Security Perceptions in Central and Eastern Europe]. *Nemzet és Biztonság*, 7(2), 17–35. Online: <http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/letoltes.php?letolt=532>
- Ukraine Support Tracker (2023). Online: <https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/>
- WACHOWSKI, Tomasz (2020): Zmodyfikowana DANA-M z Grudziądza [Modified DANA-M from Grudziądz]. *Wojsko i Technika*, (1). Online: <https://zbiam.pl/artykuly/zmodyfikowana-dana-m-z-grudziadz/>
- WALTZ, Kenneth N. (2000): Structural Realism after the Cold War. *International Security*, 25(1), 5–41. Online: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2626772>
- WILEWSKI, Krzysztof (2023): Marynarka wojenna – wyczekiwane zmiany [The Navy – Long-awaited Changes]. *Polska Zbrojna*, 4 September 2023. Online: <https://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/40261?t=Marynarka-wojenna-wyczekiwane-zmiany>
- WINID, Bogusław (2001): Zagadnienia bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego w stosunkach polsko-amerykańskich w latach 1989–2000 [International Security Issues in Polish–American Relations in the Years 1989–2000]. In KUŹNIAK, Roman (ed.): *Polska polityka bezpieczeństwa 1989–2000* [Polish Security Policy 1989–2000]. Warszawa: Scholar, 208–231.
- ZAJĄC, Justyna (2014): NATO w polityce bezpieczeństwa Polski [NATO in Polish Security Policy]. In CZORNIK, Katarzyna – LAKOMY, Miron (eds.): *Dylematy polityki bezpieczeństwa Polski na początku drugiej dekady XXI wieku* [The Dilemmas of Polish Security Policy at the Beginning of the Second Decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century]. Katowice: Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty Międzynarodowej w Katowicach, 191–205.
- ZAROBNY, Stanisław (2019): Przemiany w polskiej kulturze strategicznej w kontekście wyzwań i zagrożeń XXI wieku [Changes in Polish Strategic Culture in the Context of the Challenges and Threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century]. *Studia nad bezpieczeństwem*, (4), 63–76. Online: <https://doi.org/10.34858/SNB.1.2019.005>
- ZIĘBA, Ryszard (2012): Polska we wspólnej polityce bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej [Poland in the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy]. *Polityka i Społeczeństwo*, (10), 161–169.
- ZIĘBA, Ryszard (2018): Główne problemy w stosunkach polsko–rosyjskich [Main Problems in Polish–Russian Relations]. *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, 54(3), 9–34. Online: <https://doi.org/10.7366/020909613201801>
- ZYBAŁA, Andrzej (2016): Polskie kody kulturowe wobec wyzwań przyszłości [Polish Cultural Codes in the Face of Future Challenges]. In SZOMBURG, Jan – LEŚNIEWICZ, Adam (eds.): *Na jakich wartościach oprzeć rozwój Polski?* [What Values Should Poland's Development Be Based On?]. Gdańsk: Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową, 47–53. Online: <https://www.kongresobywatelski.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/wis-70.pdf>
- ŻURAWSKI VEL GRAJEWSKI, Przemysław (2022): Europejska autonomia strategiczna i europejska suwerenność strategiczna (2017–2022). Część II [European Strategic Autonomy and European Strategic Sovereignty (2017–2022). Part II]. *Kwartalnik Bellona*, 709(2), 83–128. Online: <https://doi.org/10.5604/013001.0016.0858>