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Spain and the EU Eastward Enlargement

Introduction

Spain joined the European Communities on 1 January 1986, once the required accession treaty had been signed at the historic setting of the Columns Hall of the Royal Palace in Madrid on 12 June 2015. Consequently, when the process of approximation between the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the then-European Communities got started, at the beginning of the 1990s, Spain was just a newly incorporated partner in the process of European construction struggling to gain a foothold among the 'big five' member States and a role commensurate with its demographic weight and the aspirations of its diplomacy, and a country that aspired to be decisive in determining the political future of a Union that was on the verge of the most decisive decade in its history.

It goes without saying that, as a member State, Spain took part and had to position itself not only with regard to this specific enlargement, but also in each of the processes carried out since its integration into the European Communities,[1] assessing in each case the level of adaptation of candidate countries to community standards, their ability to contribute to the purposes of the Union and – of course – the repercussions that their accession would have on its own position in the Community and on its own political, strategic, economic and other interests.

Additionally, and to the extent that it has been holding relevant positions in the EU institutional framework – among them, the six-monthly Presidency of the Council of the European Union, held successively in 1989, 1995, 2002, 2010 – Spain has also found itself in the position of leaving its peculiar imprint on several key moments of these enlargement processes.

As it is equally obvious that Spain has supported the successful culmination of each and every one of these enlargement processes, if only because the incorporation of a new

[1] It should be noted that from 1986 to date, the European Community – currently the European Union – has successfully completed four enlargement processes: the first one in 1995, resulting in the incorporation of Austria, Finland and Sweden; the great Eastern enlargement of 2004, which made possible the incorporation of eight countries of Central and Eastern Europe, plus the Mediterranean islands of Malta and Cyprus; the 2007 enlargement, which added to the Union two additional post-communist states, Romania and Bulgaria, which had lagged behind in the previous enlargement; and finally the accession of Croatia, the twenty-eighth and so far the last EU partner, formalised on 1 July 2013. On the other hand, the number of failed and not yet completed enlargements is even larger: these should comprise Norway's third bid in 1994, and the frustrated Icelandic candidacy; as well as the enlargements still in progress, which to date expressly affect a total of five 'official candidates' – Turkey (candidate since 2004), Macedonia (since 2005), Montenegro (since 2010), Serbia (since 2012) and Albania (since 2014) – plus two other 'potential candidates': Bosnia–Herzegovina (which presented its candidacy in February 2016, but has not yet reached the status of such), and the territory of Kosovo (which due to its disputed international status, has not yet been able to take that step yet).

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member State into the Union counts among the decisions for which the EU Treaties require the unanimous and express consent of all the existing member States – so without that of Spain, no enlargement would have ever been possible.

Departing from these premises, the purpose of this paper is to analyse what the vision from Spain has been on the EU enlargement in the specific case of the so-called Great Eastward Enlargement(s) of 2004 and 2007, and which were specifically the positions adopted by Spain throughout that process, putting both issues in relation to the policies developed by this country in the European institutions during that accession period. In doing so, we will momentarily put aside both the 1995 enlargement,[2] insofar as it was scarcely problematic and hardly affected the political and economic interests of Spain,[3] but also as it took place within a normative framework – prior to the application of the Copenhagen criteria, and the creation of a Directorate General for Enlargement within the European Commission – not comparable to those currently in existence; as well as that which in 2013 made Croatia the last EU partner, since due to its limited impact did not arouse the slightest debate – neither social nor political – in Spain, or almost elsewhere in the EU.[4]

The interest of this research is, in our opinion, twofold. On the one hand, it will contribute to better understand the position adopted by Spain in one of the most decisive and defining policies – enlargement processes – of the European Union, an issue that we consider has been little studied to date; and on the other will help anticipate what outcome can be expected from the ongoing enlargement processes, whose dependence on the parliamentary and executive institutions of the member States – which is as much as saying, their national political dynamics –, to the detriment of the influence of EU institutions that traditionally had directed them, is increasingly evident.[5]

[2] On this specific issue, see John Redmond (ed.), *The 1995 Enlargement of the European Union* (Farnham: Ashgate, 1997); Jarosław Jańczak and Thomasz R Szymczyński, *The Experiences of the 1995 Enlargement: Sweden, Finland and Austria in the European Union* (Logos, 2003).

[3] See, nevertheless, José María Casado Raigón, 'Desafíos para España de la ampliación de la Unión Europea hacia el Norte', *Derecho y opinion* 2 (1994), 167–176; Carlos Westendorp, 'España y la ampliación de la Unión Europea', *Boletín económico de ICE, Información Comercial Española* 2442 (1995), 3763–3768.

[4] On this specific issue, see Carlos Flores Juberías, 'Croacia y su camino hacia la integración europea. Inicios tardíos, obstáculos sobrevenidos y futuros inciertos', *Revista de Estudios Europeos* 42 (2006), 49–70; Gabriela A Oanta, 'Profundizando en la ampliación de la Unión Europea hacia los Balcanes occidentales, la adhesión de Croacia', *Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo* 47 (2014), 205–232.

[5] This is the position of Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat in the 'Introduction' of Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat (eds), 'EU Member States and Enlargement Towards the Balkans', *EPC Issue Paper* no 79 (2015), 1, in whose opinion "Compared to previous rounds of expansion, the European Commission has lost its position driving EU policy in this dossier to the member states. Increasingly, opinions motivating key political decisions are sought not from the Brussels executive but from national parliaments". The consequence of such developments should not be underestimated since, in their opinion, "the enlargement process is far more unpredictable and dependent on politics in EU member states than on progress in the region, according to the Brussels-based institutions. This can undermine the credibility of integration and the transformative leverage that the EU can have in the region, with potential negative spillover effects both for the Union and the Balkan countries" (Balfour and Stratulat, 'Introduction', 2). See also the remarks by Graham Avery, 'Enlargement Policy in Perspective', in Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat (eds), 'EU Member States and Enlargement Towards the Balkans', *EPC Issue Paper* no 79 (2015), 15–16; Christophe Hillion, 'Masters or Servants? Member States in the EU Enlargement Process', in Rosa Balfour and Corina

Spain's initial position

In such circumstances, being drawn into such a gigantic political project as the EU Eastern enlargement meant an important political challenge for Spain:[6] that of being able to skilfully play its cards in order to obtain, out of an initiative which was far from counting among its priorities and from whose success had little to expect, the highest possible return. And also accrediting throughout the process its status as a first-rate community partner, a skilled and reliable negotiator, and a convinced promoter of the European construction.

To begin with, the Eastern expansion of the European Union was bound to be, in strictly economic terms, highly detrimental for Spanish interests.[7]

Spain counted among the EU partners with the weakest commercial links with the prospective enlargement countries. Quite logically, following four decades of mutual political and diplomatic isolation, in the late nineties exports from Spain to Central and Eastern Europe only accounted for 2 per cent of the total Spanish exports (and 7.4 per cent of those made to countries outside the Union), which in turn meant for these countries only a similar percentage of their imports. Similarly, Spanish investments in the region were minimal, and those of these countries in Spain virtually non-existent.[8]

Additionally, Spain's economic structure in the 1990s was clearly in competition with that of the future enlargement countries. On the one hand, it featured an agricultural sector that was still relevant for the Spanish economy as a whole and was highly export-oriented as well, for which the threatening competition of some of the new candidate countries, such as Poland or Romania, could be highly detrimental. And on the other, it also featured a problematic industrial sector, in the process of being transformed, for which the challenge represented by the industrial sector of these new competitors, perhaps less technologically developed but endowed with a well-qualified and cheaper workforce, and lower transport costs – due to their geographical position – represented a serious threat.

Stratulat (eds), 'EU Member States and Enlargement Towards the Balkans', *EPC Issue Paper* no 79 (2015), 19–28.

[6] A more global perspective can be found in Enrique Viguera Rubio, 'Las negociaciones para la ampliación: la posición española', *Boletín Económico ICE* no 2629 (1999), 21–42; José Ignacio Torreblanca, 'Principios, intereses, instituciones y preferencias: un análisis de la racionalidad de la ampliación de la Unión Europea', *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* no 4 (2001), 71–95; Ángel Viñas, 'The Enlargement of the European Union: Opportunities and Concerns for Spain', in *Spain: The European and International Challenges,* ed. by Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs (London: Frank Cass, 2001); Juan de la Cruz Ferrer and José Carlos Cano Montejano, *Rumbo a Europa: La ampiación al Este de la Union Europea. Repercusiones para España* (Madrid: Dykinson, 2002).

[7] The repercussions for Spain in terms of trade balance, foreign direct investment, migratory flows and community cohesion policy were anticipated by Josep María Jordán Galduf, 'La ampliación de la Unión Europea hacia el Este: repercusiones para España', *Boletín económico de ICE, Información Comercial Española* 2733 (2002), 9–18; and, from the same author, 'Análisis de los efectos de la ampliación de la Unión Europea para España', *Revista del Instituto de Estudios Económicos* 3, (2001), 211–228.

[8] See Enrique Viguera Rubio, 'Posturas y perspectivas ante la ampliación', *Economía Exterior* 16 (2001), 69–81.

But perhaps, the most damaging aspect for the Spanish interests deriving from the prospect of a future Eastern enlargement had to do with the foreseeable transfer of EU funds which the incorporation of the candidates from Eastern Europe would certainly bring along. From the very moment of its incorporation into the Union, Spain had been counting among the countries with the lowest level of development, and consequently, among the largest net recipients of EU funds; but as a result of the incorporation of ten new member States from Central and Eastern Europe with much lower GDPs, Spain would automatically be placed in the middle of the development scale of the EU25 and EU27. And consequently, the flow of community funds, of which Spain was a singularly privileged recipient, and which until that moment had been vital for its economic takeoff, would be substantially reduced.[9]

But neither in political terms was the Eastern enlargement a project of special interest to Spain. Its relations with the countries of the region, interrupted during the many decades when one and the other edge of the continent lived under authoritarian regimes of opposite signs, were still recent and of little importance. But above all, the Eastern enlargement was bound to put an end to the projection of the European Communities towards the Mediterranean, of which Spain had been the main beneficiary,[10] and to relegate relations with Latin America, of which Spain was the main supporter, to a very secondary level.

In view of all this, it is inevitable to wonder – with Sonia Piedrafita –[11] 'why the Spanish governments of the time did not veto the EU Eastern enlargement despite the foreseeable negative impact it would have on Spain'. And why, if they were also persuaded about the negative consequences which that enlargement was about to have on the EU integration process, common policies, institutions and budget, 'they never threatened to veto accessions and they continued to profess their solidarity with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) and confirming the moral duty to help these countries in their process of socio-economic and political transformation, considering their accession as the best means to achieve this objective and thus overcome the division of the continent'.

A first answer to the question – provided by the author herself – is that any attempt to make use of the veto power on future enlargements which EU treaties confer on any Member State by Spain authorities would have had seriously counterproductive consequences for the country. Taking into account the interest of major EU partners in bringing it to completion, any opposition coming from Spain would undoubtedly have resulted in strong diplomatic pressure and attacks on her interests in other areas. Faced

[9] In particular, by 1999 Spain was the first net recipient of EU structural funds, and the fourth in terms of agricultural funds, with a positive financial balance of six billion euros.

[10] Although, according to Jordán, this was not an inevitable consequence of the enlargement. See Josep María Jordán Galduf, 'La (falsa) dicotomía entre la ampliación al este de la Unión Europea y la asociación con el Mediterráneo', *Revista Valenciana de Economía y Hacienda* 8 (2003), 27–46.

[11] Sonia Piedrafita, 'The EU Eastern Enlargement: Policy Choices of the Spanish Government', *European Integration Online Papers* 9 (2005), 3. See, from the same author, 'España ante la ampliación al Este de la Unión Europea: ¿un apoyo conveniente o apropiado?', in *De la Europa del Este al este de Europa,* ed. by Carlos Flores Juberías (Valencia: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Valencia, 2007), 233–248.

with this eventuality, the Spanish governments decided to apply the old strategy of 'making necessity a virtue' and endeavour in obtaining – in the coming section we will see whether successfully or not – the largest possible number of concessions in exchange for a support that on the other hand they could not refuse to give.

However, it would also be useful to remind what March and Olsen have called 'the logic of appropriateness':[12] the thesis the actors operating on the international scene define their strategies not only based on their future interests, but also on what is expected from them and, hence, they act following rules they are expected to comply with, and interpreting roles they are supposed to perform. At the time the EU Eastern enlargement began to be considered, Spain was still – as we have already recalled – a recently incorporated EU partner, which still kept fresh in its memory how that incorporation had – first – helped secure its transition towards democracy and – second – meant a definitive boost for the transformation of its economic fabric and social structure. Furthermore, Spain happened to be one of the community partners most firmly committed to deepening European integration and building a strong Europe. Thus, opposing enlargement would have meant not only refusing to extend to other countries in transition to democracy the same advantages that it had enjoyed a decade and a half before, but also attacking the model of the European construction that it was supposed to defend. If support for enlargement was economically indefensible, and from a diplomatic point of view unavoidable, from a political point of view it was absolutely necessary. The fact that Spain finally adopted the position it adopted clearly illustrates the priorities of its successive governments in the design of Spain's European policy.

Spain's negotiating strategy

The process leading to the two successive EU Eastern enlargements of 2004 and 2007 was almost entirely developed under the mandates of Socialist and Popular Party Prime Ministers Felipe González (1982–1996) and José María Aznar (1996–2004). Although both processes culminated when the Socialist PM José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004–2011) was already presiding over the Spanish Government, his arrival to the Moncloa Palace happened once the negotiating process was already concluded.

With regard to Felipe González,[13] the negotiating strategy of his successive governments consisted of supporting the Eastern enlargements but at the same time demanding a far-reaching institutional reform of the European Communities aimed – among other things – at increasing the relative weight of Spain in the Council, which was estimated to be lower than the country deserved. Or in other words: to stand in favour of the Eastern

[12] James G March and Johan P Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', *International Organization* 52, no 4 (1998), 943–969 (cit. in Sonia Piedrafita, 'The EU Eastern Enlargement: Policy Choices of the Spanish Government').

[13] On this specific period, see Ricardo Martín de la Guardia, 'España en las Comunidades Europeas: el desafío de la ampliación al este de Europa', in *Historia de la época socialista. España: 1982–1996,* ed. by Álvaro Soto Carmona and Abdón Mateos López (Madrid: Sílex, 2013), 315–332.

enlargements in order to become a central actor in the decision-making process of the Union, and to take advantage of this situation in order to advance in his demands for structural changes.

Along these lines, there were three actions taken by the Socialist governments.

On the one hand, actions aimed at defending the economic interests of Spain. Taking advantage of the fact that the signing of the Association Agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe required the unanimity among EU partners, in November 1991 Spain threatened to veto the agreements with Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, arguing that the financial aid planned for their steel exports would negatively affect that sector in Spain. Spanish pressure was so effective that the Agreements were signed only after the inclusion of a safeguard clause to control imports coming from Central and Eastern Europe.

On the other, actions aimed at defending EU policies that happened to be especially relevant for Spain. In exchange for her support for the enlargement, Spain succeeded at the Corfu European Council (June 1994)[14] in reaching a compromise to promote the Union's Mediterranean policy, and at the Essen European Council (December 1994) to begin negotiations for trade liberalisation with several Latin American countries. Spain would also successfully engage in the negotiation of an improvement in the conditions of the association with the Maghreb countries, and in the review of fisheries policy, both of which were crucial for her economy.[15]

And, thirdly, actions aimed at defending Spain's vision regarding the future of the European construction process. Spain maintained the thesis that EU enlargements should be carried out without negatively affecting the process of advancing into European integration initiated with the Single Act (1987) and continued by the Maastricht (1993), Amsterdam (1999) and Nice Treaties (2003), the last two negotiated while the enlargement was also being debated. Consequently, Spain advocated for a rigorous interpretation of the Copenhagen criteria (1993) that would ensure that all new EU partners were in a position to fully meet their obligations as such; for a postponement of the enlargement until the institutional reform that was being debated had put the Union in a position to assume it; by a gradual incorporation of candidates – the colloquially called 'regatta criteria' – which may join the Union only after having proved their level of preparation, and not by an expansion 'en bloc' which disregarded this requirement; and by the establishment of long transitional periods to cushion the impact of enlargement on the structures of older Member States.

[14] It was also in Corfu where the Southern partners of the Union supported the inclusion of Malta and Cyprus in the upcoming enlargement, countries the two of them completely alien to the geographical and political framework of post-communist Europe, thus giving a sort of 'Mediterranean dimension' (however marginal) to this 'Eastern enlargement'.

[15] A strategy that was simultaneously applied to the integration process of the EFTA countries, then in its last stages. At the European Council in Edinburgh (December 1992), Spain agreed to start negotiations with Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway in exchange for an increase in the spending ceiling, and a more favourable distribution of cohesion funds.

With regard to the Popular Party governments, although it could be argued that José María Aznar introduced some nuances into the Spanish agenda that his predecessor had not emphasised so much, the truth is that the essential lines of the Spanish position did not substantially change.

The peculiarities introduced by PM Aznar in the discourse of Spanish diplomacy during this period were mostly directed at emphasising the need to preserve the general interest of the Union and, more generally, the European spirit that the Popular Party governments had made entirely their own. However, Aznar did not hesitate to present the Eastern enlargement as a historic opportunity to close the long parenthesis of division of the peoples of Europe opened in Yalta, and also continued to put political considerations – well rooted in ideological, and even moral, grounds – before strictly economic ones, presenting the Eastern enlargement as an essential element for the consolidation of democracy in the entire continent and for the reinforcement of the project born with the Treaty of Rome.

PM Aznar's stance on EU enlargement was complemented by a resolute and ambitious negotiating policy, which placed Spain at the centre of the debate on the future of the Union's institutional design, financial perspectives and common policies, and translated into important achievements incorporated, on the one hand, into the Treaty of Nice – which increased Spain's decision-making power in the Council – and, on the other, into the so-called Agenda 2000 – which guaranteed the consolidation of the advantages that Spain was already enjoying in agricultural and structural policies despite of the enlargement.

Undoubtedly, the most decisive intervention by Spain in this entire process took place in the first half of 2002, on occasion of its performance as rotating presidency of the Council of the Union. The Spanish semester coincided with a high point in the accession process in which the most decisive negotiating chapters and those with the most important financial and budgetary implications had to be closed, in order to virtually conclude the entire negotiating process and make it possible to draw up the accession treaties in time for their ratification before the European elections of 2004.

As Torreblanca has written,[16] the assessment of the Spanish semester must necessarily be ambivalent. Although Spain's management of her responsibilities at the helm of the Council of the Union was generally regarded as good, the Presidency was not able to promote a common position on some of the most decisive issues faced on occasion of the enlargement negotiations, thereby jeopardising the timeframe set for enlargement to

[16] José Ignacio Torreblanca, 'The Spanish Presidency of 2002 and the European Union's Eastern Enlargement: A Lesson on the Potentials and Limits of EU Presidencies', *Working Paper del Real Instituto Elcano* 14 (2002). Also, Josép Piqué, 'La Presidencia ante los retos de la ampliación de la UE', in *Rumbo a Europa. La ampliación al Este de la Unión Europea: repercusiones para España,* ed. by Juan de la Cruz Ferrer and José Carlos Cano Montejano (Madrid: Dykinson, 2002), 9–12; Miguel Angel Moltó Calvo, 'La ampliación y la presidencia española de la UE', in *Rumbo a Europa. La ampliación al Este de la Unión Europea: repercusiones para España,* ed. by Juan de la Cruz Ferrer and José Carlos Cano Montejano (Madrid: Dykinson, 2002), 165–170.

materialise. The responsibility for this failure lies in the inability of the EU partners to agree on the renewal of their respective contributions to the EU budget and on the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, both of which delayed the closing of the negotiating process. In this way, it could be concluded that although the Spanish semester was not particularly positive for the expansion process, it was so for the consideration of Spain as a capable manager. As Torreblanca states, 'after having been forced in recent years to deal with the bad reputation of being against enlargement and having been constantly accused […] of not paying due attention to it, the Spanish government has now shown itself satisfied to show that it is not opposed to enlargement (or, more cynically, that Germany can be as tough as Spain when it comes to enlargement). This collateral result should not be underestimated. The new approach to enlargement shown by the Spanish government […] has served to highlight that in the enlargement game 'all' the member states, and not just Spain, have particular interests that they want to make compatible with enlargement'.

A major issue at this juncture was the level of popular support for the enlargement, on which the position that any government may adopt in this regard often depends – although the existence of a causal relationship in the opposite direction cannot be ignored, either. In case of Spain, support for the Eastern enlargement was not only unexpectedly, but even inexplicably high. According to Eurobarometer data, synthesised and reasoned by Piedrafita, Steinberg and Torreblanca,[17] at the most decisive juncture of the expansion process – from 2000 to 2004 – the net support – those in favour, minus those opposed – of Spanish citizens to the European enlargement was around 44 per cent, the second highest figure in the whole Union, second only to Greece (52 per cent), but considerably higher than the average of the then fifteen Member States of the Union, which stood at a modest 13 per cent, and higher than in countries such as Germany, Austria or Italy, commonly considered the greatest beneficiaries of the enlargement. As we have said, the figure is, in addition to abnormally high, also difficult to explain, given – on the one hand –, the inexistence of national interests at stake, and – on the other –, the more than foreseeable damages that the Eastern enlargement would generate for Spain in terms of EU funds not to be received and the displacement of the decision-making centre of the new Union to the East. Thus, it is only possible to think – as the aforementioned authors point out – in 'historical and solidarity reasons' as a justification for this broad support for enlargement, understanding by such the disinterested solidarity of the Spanish people with citizens of countries that at the beginning of the previous decade were transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy, a market economy and European integration in terms relatively similar to those experienced by Spain two decades ago. Although before we stressed the spontaneity of this support, it would be perhaps necessary to note the impossibility of carrying out a genuine social debate on enlargement, in a context in

[17] Sonia Piedrafita, Federico Steinberg and José Ignacio Torreblanca (eds), *20 años de España en la Unión Europea (1986–2006)* (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2006), 108–109.

which the political forces with parliamentary representation had reached a substantial agreement that allowed them to largely ignore any debate happening among public opinion or in the media.[18]

Conclusions

The position adopted by Spain in view of the prospect of the EU Eastern enlargement and the strategy followed by her governments during the subsequent negotiating process provides new evidence to confirm at least four of the assumptions that we have currently held to be true regarding the enlargement processes of the European Union.

The first is that the motivation for these processes is always, in a prevalent way, political; while the economic motivations are secondary, to the extreme of being carried out even when the overall result of them is, at least in the short term, detrimental to the interests of the Union. It was for this reason that Spain seconded a decision in which in principle had little to gain, but which fit its perspective of a broader, stronger and more integrated European Union.

The second is that the opposition to a measure that enjoys a majority support among European partners by countries that disagree with it or, simply, consider its adoption contrary to their interests, rarely takes the form of a frontal veto, but rather the requirement of compensation in other areas of community policies that are of interest to them. It was for this reason that Spain never seriously considered vetoing a decision that in the short term was going to be detrimental to her economic interests and in the long term contrary to her priorities regarding the Union's foreign relations, opting rather to wrest concessions from the rest of community partners in both areas.

The third is that the Eastward enlargement of the European Union was mainly motivated by the desire to put an end to the historic division of Europe derived from the Yalta and Potsdam pacts and to strengthen democracy in the Eastern half of the continent, and only secondarily for the purpose of strengthening the Union and expanding its market. This would explain the support of a young democracy like the Spanish one, where the memory of the years of authoritarianism was still alive, and the importance that for the effective transition to democracy had the support of the European institutions was well known.

And the fourth is that in major European affairs, national interests take precedence over partisan differences, which take a back seat; among other things, as a consequence of the great consensus framed around the process of European construction between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, authentic pillars of continental stability. Also

[18] Perhaps it is also worth noting – as Sonia Piedrafita, Federico Steinberg and José Ignacio Torreblanca do in *20 años de España en la Unión Europea,* 108 – that this broad support for enlargement came along with another equally broad support for the constitution-making process then under way. A fact which somehow goes against the thesis of an existing dilemma 'enlargement vs. deepening' of the Union, that has so often contaminated the debate on the EU enlargement.

in Spain, the continuity between the negotiating policies of the Socialist and Popular governments was remarkable, as was the consensus between both forces when it came to ratifying the result of the expansion process towards the East.

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