

Ilán Bizberg

# Politics and the Pandemic in the World

## Introduction

The health crisis that humanity is currently going through must not prevent us from thinking about how we want and how we are going to come out of it. Undoubtedly, despite the very serious sacrifices this pandemic will demand of all of us, humanity will survive. But how? What are we ready to sacrifice to overcome it? Stefan Zweig wrote a famous autobiography: *The World of Yesterday*, which until a few months ago was being quoted profusely as a premonition of what our future may look like. The dissatisfaction of citizens with their democracies, the rise of populist movements, the fear of the other, were all cited to attest the similarities of the two worlds: the one of Zweig and ours. All of a sudden, the coronavirus appeared and we stopped talking about the utopia of the Austrian Empire that had vanished and the terrible reality of the 1930s in Europe. Two dystopias appeared, two worlds that have nothing to do with yesterday's, but with the ones of the future that Orwell and Huxley described.

This article will deal with the forms of government that we have seen emerging since some time in the past and how they have been strengthened or weakened as a result of the present state of emergency and their alternatives.

## The authoritarian forms

Since before the outbreak of the current pandemic, two contrasting models have been offered to global society: the authoritarian one, exemplified by China, which has been rapidly developing its economy, expanding its infrastructure, upgrading its industry to reaching high technological standards, lifting 600 million of its inhabitants out of poverty, and ensuring that the emerging new middle-class can access the comforts of the developed world. It has also reacted against the tremendous pollution generated by growth: China has been heading towards the ecological transition faster than much of the rest of the world, as witnessed by the fact that this country has become the world producer of solar panels. All in just 30 years.

The leaders and partisans of this model claim that democracy and individual freedom, as we know it in the West, would jeopardise the State's ability to continue this impressive process. The majority of the population accepts this premise: democracy and individual rights can wait in exchange of the fact that a country that, until recently was poor, develops at surprising speed. That the values that are at the base of democratic societies could be delayed in exchange for economic development. Some who disagreed with this premise were the youth of Tiananmen at the end of the 1980s and those from Hong Kong today.

The latter have been seeing how the rights they have enjoyed while the ‘one country, two systems’ model exists, are being gradually battered by the central communist government.

The current health crisis and the effective manner in which the Chinese Government has been able to stop the infections and deaths, is giving arguments to those that defend this model. Byung Chul Han<sup>1</sup> states that what democratic countries and their populations consider an intrusion on their privacy is what has allowed Asian countries to fight the health crisis with less human, social and economic costs. They have achieved this through the administration of its population such as the State’s capacity to credibly threaten its citizens and to make use of various control devices; this allowed the government to test millions of people, measure their temperature, force them to isolate themselves if they had any symptoms, and monitor their slightest displacement and that of their families. In sum, authoritarian control over the population has been extremely effective in order to stop the spread of the virus. Although, we must remember something that the promoters of this model do not mention, that they hid for more than a month the existence of this new disease and that we probably still do not know the real number of the infected and dead.

The population control mechanisms that the Chinese Government has implemented have included: supervision of mass media, censorship of social networks, access to cell phones and other private media, access to electronic payment data, and facial recognition.<sup>2</sup> The information that results from the fact that cash has practically disappeared and that all commercial transactions are carried out through electronic means, allows the government to tell what products individuals buy, if they pay their debts on time, if and where they travel, and so on. In fact, by matching the individual data with other consumers’ (something that has been perfected in the current epidemic for the sake of detecting the contacts of those that are contaminated), the government can uncover the interactions of each person. Since before the current health crisis, the central government had been using these mechanisms not only with the purpose, as in democratic countries, of preventing crime, but in order to uncover political opponents.

Using these surveillance instruments, the Chinese Government had begun to rank individuals based on their observance of social rules, allocating ‘social credits’ to every individual, in order to give discounts on public transportation, hotels and other types of activities, to those positively ranked and, the contrary for those negatively ranked, who would have either to pay more for those events, or they would be barred from attending them, traveling somewhere on vacation, and so on. It is expected that all this population administration instruments will be reinforced in the future due both to the technical expertise that was perfected during the pandemic and its acceptance by the population owing to its capacity to control it. It is almost certain that authoritarian countries will continue using these mechanisms, imposed at a time of crisis, in order to strengthen and perpetuate their control.

<sup>1</sup> Byung-Chul Han, ‘La emergencia viral y el mundo de mañana. Byung-Chul Han, el filósofo surcoreano que piensa desde Berlín’, *El País*, 22 March 2020.

<sup>2</sup> Jorge G García, ‘China prepara un sistema de ‘rating’ para sus ciudadanos’, *El País*, 06 November 2017.

## Democratic forms imposing intruding surveillance mechanisms

The situation of the democratic forms of governments is both similar and different. Similar because the pandemic obliged almost all countries in the world to impose restrictions that would have been unthinkable in other circumstances. Different in that they were imposed to countries that had democratic governments and populations accustomed to a great array of individual freedom. Democratic countries implemented measures that a few months before were unimaginable. Decrees that did not pass through congress and that forced citizens to stay home, to have a safe-conduct to go to the pharmacy, the corner store, do exercise and impose a limit to the distance they could move from their homes. And not only that, but in some countries, the police was allowed to fine or even arrest individuals if they considered they did not justify being outside. Although the democratic countries imposed these measures, according to Han, the authoritarian countries fared much better in terms of infections and deaths.

Nonetheless, democratic countries may not disarm all the authoritarian mechanisms that have been temporarily implemented, with the justification that they may serve for other crises, as it happened with the fight against terrorism. While authors like Habermas<sup>3</sup> consider that this is not a source of danger in the case of democratic countries like France or Germany, other authors consider that even in these countries there is a real risk that population control may be compatible with democracy. For Agamben, in times of fear the population accepts restrictions that in normal situations it would not. When the population is faced with the choice between health and freedom it will choose the first. As this author puts it:

‘...the state of fear that has evidently spread in recent years in the consciousness of individuals and that translates into a real need in situations of collective panic... [leads to] ...a perverse vicious circle: the limitation of freedom imposed by governments is accepted in the name of a desire for security... [from a threat] ...induced by the same governments that now intervene to satisfy it.’<sup>4</sup> In the reaction to the epidemic, Agamben has also raised the idea that it reinforces ‘...a growing tendency to use the state of exception as a normal paradigm of government’.<sup>5</sup>

Naomi Klein considers that, in the final count, there is a real threat that the measures imposed during this exceptional situation may lead to a world of control that will destroy democracies and individual rights. Something that may be achieved through an association between politics and capital, and not centred on the State as in the Chinese case. With the information technology devices, business and government would ‘permanently integrate technology into every aspect of civic life, not as a painful necessity to save lives, but as a living laboratory for a permanent — and highly profitable — no-touch future [...] a future in which our every move, our every word, our every relationship

<sup>3</sup> ‘Jürgen Habermas: « Dans cette crise, il nous faut agir dans le savoir explicite de notre non-savoir »’, *Le Monde*, 10 April 2020. Interview by Nicolas Truong.

<sup>4</sup> Giorgio Agamben, ‘La invención de una epidemia’, 26 February 2020.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

is trackable, traceable, and data-mineable by unprecedented collaborations between government and tech giants'.<sup>6</sup>

It was Michel Foucault who first analysed how modern forms of control are no longer exercised by a centralised command, by the king or the State, as Machiavelli thought, but that power has been diffused. Starting with the invention of the police, capitalist economy, state administration and statistics, the population is administered by apparatuses focused on each individual, defining what is normal and abnormal, regulating what is allowed or not, and what are our obligations. Modern states have increasingly sophisticated mechanisms to achieve that individuals internalise these norms and abstain from any external pressure to comply with them.<sup>7</sup> Agamben writes that fear has become another way of controlling population, an emotion that was reinforced with the war against terrorism and that threatens to be fortified with the contention of the pandemic.

Foucault's main idea is that in modernity, external domination carried out by political power, centralised in the State, becomes 'internal' domination driven by language, classification and money. Domination is no longer exercised in a restrictive way, by a prohibition external to human freedom, it is deployed from within freedom itself; the freedom that modern man enjoys is his own domination. According to Foucault '...the freedom that is left to the population is used by power for control purposes and discipline is included in the freedom that modern governance grants us'.<sup>8</sup> Foucault's sociology is based on the concept of the individual who faces: '...forms of incentives instead of coercion.'<sup>9</sup> 'While the law prohibited, discipline prescribes, biopolitics cancels, slows, favors, or regulates.'<sup>10</sup> This is what explains why Foucault was so interested in liberalism and neoliberalism as the final phase of a self-regulated society, based on the freedom of all and self-regulation through freedom. In fact, liberalism is defined as the government by the economy '...liberalism values the preservation of life, the freedom to move, to take risks; on the other hand, it limits these freedoms at the same time that it makes them possible.'<sup>11</sup>

'Liberalism and neoliberalism move away from the disciplinary society insofar as they are not based on restrictions, even self-imposed, but on individual freedom. In the society based on the approach of Foucault, conflict is internal to the control mechanisms and resistance gives rise to new control measures and a greater capacity for domination. Now everything is being played amid the individual and the system.'<sup>12</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Naomi Klein, 'Under Cover of Mass Death, Andrew Cuomo Calls in the Billionaires to Build a High-Tech Dystopia', *The Intercept*, 08 May 2020.

<sup>7</sup> Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality', in *The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality*, ed. by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1991).

<sup>8</sup> Jean-Yves Grenier and André Orléan, 'Michel Foucault, l'économie politique et le libéralisme', *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 62, no 5 (2007), 1155–1182.

<sup>9</sup> Jeanpierre, Laurent, 'Une sociologie foucauldienne du néolibéralisme est-elle possible?' *Sociologie et sociétés* 38, no 2 (2006), 90.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 92.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. 93.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. 93.

The current pandemic strengthens this individualisation of control that has already been maximised by the neoliberal economy. Both Harari<sup>13</sup> and Agamben consider fear to be an even more powerful factor than the neoliberal economy, as it is more subjective. While neoliberalism pushes the human being to increase his individual capacity to succeed in the market and privatises the social policies that were allocated by the State and social organisations, in the current epidemic fear of death leads the individual to adopt an even more defensive attitude. A situation that further strengthens individualism and that, as we fear the other as a source of infection, may extinguish any type of social action.

## **Two alternative models: Populism and authoritative democracy**

### *Populist forms*

In contrast to the two models of population control that we have analysed in the first part of this article, populist governments have failed to efficiently combat the pandemic, as can be seen by its evolution in the United States, Brazil and Great Britain, among others. In this article we are going to limit our definition of populist to its most common and ‘external’ characteristics, we will thus not make the necessary distinctions between left and right, popular and elitist populisms, or national-popular and proto-fascist forms of government as we have done in other articles. We will circumscribe this form of government by its definition of politics as the struggle between friend and foe. Its demagogic discourse is focused on the leader and on his speaking in the name of the unprotected sectors of society against the privileged strata, or of the national group against the immigrants and foreigners. According to Hermet, ‘...populism aims to abolish the distance, the barriers, and even the existing differences between government and the governed, between those above and those below. It is an anti-political movement that rejects traditional political mechanisms because they delay the resolution of fractures and social injustices.

It also denies the temporality of politics, demands and promotes an instantaneous response to problems and to the aspirations that no governmental action has the power to resolve.’<sup>14</sup> Targuieff adds that, in this manner, the time of populism is a mythical time and its action highlights the magic of politics.<sup>15</sup> Populism is the opposite of representative or participative democracy, since it calls for a direct and voluntarist policy that both deepens and purifies democracy, and that strips it of what it considers to be ‘...its false institutional and constitutional limits’.<sup>16</sup>

Facing the pandemic, most of these types of leaders began by questioning its gravity, thereby significantly delaying the adoption of measures to deal with it, and thus having much higher causalities. The main reason why these governments acted belatedly is that

<sup>13</sup> Yuval Noah Harari, ‘The world after coronavirus’, *Financial Times*, 20 March 2020.

<sup>14</sup> Guy Hermet, *Les populismes dans le monde. Une histoire sociologique XIX–XXème siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 49–50.

<sup>15</sup> Pierre-André Targuieff, *L'Illusion populiste* (Paris: Champs Flammarion, 2007), 285.

<sup>16</sup> Hermet, *Les populismes*, 70.

as they are based on a very close relationship between the leader and the people (actually part of him, his followers) they depend very closely on performance, which is basically measured in economic terms. This is why they hesitated long before being convinced (if ever) that there were scientific reasons to shut down the economy. On the other hand, while economic performance is measured month by month, avoiding deaths is not quantified as precisely in a context of an epidemic that is affecting the whole world and where data are missing. The economic slowdown has very clear and immediate deleterious effects, while the deaths avoided cannot be accounted for as precisely. In fact, they try to hide the death toll, something which is possible in Brazil, Russia and Turkey, but not in the United States or Great Britain. On the other hand, insofar as the leader concentrates power and decisions, occupies the totality of the political scene, and thus depends highly on public opinion, he is hesitant to stop production; he quickly reaps successes, but also failures. This also prevents him from speaking clearly and transparently about the challenges, the problems, the mistakes. And just as they hesitated long before sacrificing the economy, they try to open it as soon as possible. All of this has led to the fact that the countries led by populist leaders, mainly Brazil, the United States, Britain, have had the highest number of infections and deaths.

### *Political forms based on democratic values and authority*

The health crisis has revealed that there is a fourth form of government, a democratic option that does not aspire for greater control of the population, but is based on democratic authority and values. The way in which this political form tackled the health crisis exposed the basis on which it rests: fundamentally truth, authority and a democratic and civic culture of the population. The message that the government addressed to its citizens was focused on the sheer necessity of radical measures to be taken and on the need that they be respected individually and collectively. This political form has not only been the most democratic, but it is among the most successful in tackling the pandemic.

We will focus on one of the most exemplary cases, which is that of Germany, although we will also make references to other ones such as Taiwan, New Zealand, Finland, Iceland and Norway, but also Portugal, Uruguay and the province of Kerala in India; several of them governed by women, something which should arouse more attention but is out of the reaches of this paper.

Contrary to the attempts by the authoritarian and populist governments to hide or withhold information on the seriousness of the epidemic, an action that eroded the confidence of the population and, therefore, the effectiveness of the measures once they were decided, in the German case, the gravity of the situation was recognised and communicated from the very beginning. A Canadian political scientist has put it in these terms ‘...the most successful democratic leaders have been those who have not been afraid to tell the public the truth, to spread the bad news [...] even when it is painful. One of the most difficult acts in a democracy is for the leader to tell the public something he doesn’t want to hear.’



Angela Merkel's speech is a very clear example of founding the response of the government on transparency, authority and civic culture.

The coronavirus is changing daily life in our country dramatically at the present. Our idea of normality, of public life, social togetherness – all of this is being put to the test as never before [...] part of what open democracy is about: that we make political decisions transparent and explain them. That we justify and communicate our actions as best we can, so that people are able to understand them [...] this is serious. Please also take this seriously. Since German reunification, no, since the Second World War, there has not been a challenge for our country in which action in a spirit of solidarity on our part was so important I would like to explain where we currently stand in this epidemic and what the Federal Government and the state levels are doing to protect everyone in our community and to limit the economic, social and cultural fallout. However, I also want to tell you why all of you are needed here, and what each and every individual can do to help.

As long as this is the case – and this is what is guiding all of our actions – then only one thing matters, namely that we slow the spread of the virus, flatten the curve over the course of several months and buy time. Time in which the research community can develop a medicine and vaccine. But, above all, time to allow those who fall ill to receive the best possible treatment.

Every individual counts. We are not condemned to accept the spread of this virus as an inevitable fact of life.

These are not just abstract numbers in statistics, but this is about a father or grandfather, a mother or grandmother, a partner – this is about people. And we are a community in which each life and each person counts.<sup>17</sup>

This speech clearly revolves around the fact that the government intends to be totally transparent and that the population is asked for its collaboration to stop the epidemic, while respecting democratic principles and the civic responsibility of the citizens. This is not an imposition on individuals of instructions that have been decided by the central state. Nor are these measures to be implemented through the intensification of the control mechanisms of the government, the end of deliberation between the different political powers and levels of government as some other governments in central Europe did. On the other hand, the speech also makes it clear that the main goal is to save lives; that no other principle prevails, that no utilitarian compromise may predominate and that the government is not looking for a compromise between the economy and health as populist governments attempted. The president of Argentina was equally clear about this fact when he declared: 'The economy has gone through a lot of bad times and we've recovered, but we will not recover our dignity if we let our countrymen fall into illness and death.'<sup>18</sup>

This attitude generated a setting of trust in what the government said and made authoritarian measures useless. In contrast, in China, given the lack of confidence generated by the attempt to silence the doctors who first warned of the existence of an unknown disease, the government had to impose extremely authoritarian measures. For their part, to the extent that the populist countries did not have the support of the population because

<sup>17</sup> 'An address to the nation by Federal Chancellor Merkel', s. a.

<sup>18</sup> 'Alberto Fernández sobre el coronavirus y la economía: "No estamos aquí para dejar caer empresas y argentinos sin trabajo"', *Página 12*, 15 April 2020.

they began by ignoring the gravity of the situation, the measures taken have been much less effective and these countries have not successfully controlled the pandemic.

In the case of Germany and Taiwan, the measures were applied by means of authority, as defined by Arendt. Hannah Arendt (1954) states two fundamental characteristics of authority: in the first place, it is the result of neither force, nor conviction, in the second place, freedom is preserved within authority. This means two things, that it is not necessary to convince the population of the correctness of the actions to be taken, but that they are accepted because they trust the government, its decisions. In contrast, where there is no authority, everything is questioned and it is either necessary to impose the measures forcefully or fail to enforce them with dire consequences. Arendt also says that the use of force makes, in turn, that both authority, as well as freedom are reduced. There is a vicious circle between the imposition of force and the decline of authority.

The counterpart of authority is political or civic culture which, as is well known, was the most important characteristic of democracy for Tocqueville. He wrote that the custom of living in democracy is more important than the laws themselves; to a large extent democracy is a tautology insofar as its possibility depends on the existence of democrats. Laws, their authority, can only be imposed on citizens willing to follow them, if they are not, you would then need a (non-corrupt) policeman behind every one of them. In the cases we are analysing, authority and civic culture made it unnecessary to impose sanctions to ensure that individuals respect confinement and social distancing, as well as the use of masks in public places. In Japan, Taiwan and Germany, these measures were implemented without the need of fines or arrests, or even without stopping the economy entirely, as it had to be done in Italy, France, Spain and Argentina, to name some countries.

Although Han considers that, in the case of Asia, the success against coronavirus was aided by an authoritarian mentality, which derives from their cultural tradition, we can consider it democratic or civic, based on an attitude of care for the other, a stance that limits individualism, that orients individuals' will to the common good. The very use of masks is proof of this as in these countries their use is very common, not so much as a way to prevent being infected, but rather the contrary, in order to avoid infecting others when sick. Going out in public without a mask in an epidemic, like the current one, is perceived as a disinterest for others, in the West, on the contrary, walking around with a mask is perceived with suspicion.<sup>19</sup> In addition, some of these countries were better prepared as they had already lived through SARS and MERS, and they based their strategy on carrying out many tests in order to identify the contacts of those infected, in order to isolate them and separate them from their families.

Although Hannah Arendt wrote that authority is not based on conviction, it is interesting that the epidemic has permitted us to understand that it can, nevertheless, be reasserted by certain consultation mechanisms. On the one hand, the fact that Parliament is always involved gives additional legitimacy to the decisions. On the other hand, as several authors have affirmed, federal governments have appeared better equipped to handle the epidemic to the extent that there is an understanding between the federal

<sup>19</sup> Han, 'La emergencia viral'.



government and the federations which generates trust. This is especially important as the implementation of the concrete measures is the task of the local governments. The deliberation between the different levels of government permits to agree on general measures which are then applied at the local level.

## Conclusions

Although one may be led to think that the two first forms of government we have described: the authoritarian and the democratic that imposes surveillance mechanisms, go in the same direction of population administration that Foucault described, the way in which a country like China and western democracies tackled the epidemic by imposing more and more controls on the population are not equivalent. The first case is that of an authoritarian government that uses the capacity offered by new technologies, in order to advance toward a totalitarian government à la Arendt or Orwell. In contrast, what both Klein and Harari describe is a democratic government that is, effectively, imposing population administration mechanisms as described by Foucault. In one case we are in a pre-Foucaultian situation, in which power and control are being centralized and concentrated on the State, while the second is a situation in which individuals voluntarily accept the restrictions and even internalise the rules, within the Foucaultian scheme.

It is possible that, as Agamben thinks, fear has become another way of controlling the population in democratic countries that will be reinforced as Klein and Harari believe, putting democracy and individual freedom at risk. Fear was the source of the imposition of control mechanisms at the onset of the war against terrorism, and there is a risk that they may be reinforced after the struggle against the pandemic. This author has drawn attention to the fact that our existence cannot be restricted to 'naked life', as he calls survival. That the essential goal of human beings, unlike what the viruses that colonise our cells, is not simply to survive, but to pose an aim that each individual defines and projects into the future, through our aspirations, desires and dreams. To emerge triumphant from the current struggle for survival, abandoning everything to the power of the State or to control mechanisms, would not only defeat democracy and freedom, but the essence of life itself.

On the other hand, it seems that, at least in some countries the populist leaders have managed the epidemic so badly that they may lose the support with which they arrived into power. The health crisis may thus mark a decline of the populist wave we were witnessing before the epidemic. At least at this moment, it seems that, for example, Trump, the AfD in Germany and the Front National in France have seen their popularity retreat. However, there is also the possibility that, due to the economic crisis that is starting to hit most of the countries, we may experience the opposite.

But the main argument of this article is that the democratic governments, based on truth, authority, and empathy, as well as on a democratic/civic culture, have done a very good job in preserving lives as well as democracy and freedom, and that they most probably be heightened in their prestige. Whether this impression will be confirmed in

the future or not depends on the next steps, the way these countries will deal with the economic crisis that hovers upon the world.

## Literature

- ‘An address to the nation by Federal Chancellor Merkel’, s. a. Online: [www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/coronavirus/statement-chancellor-1732296](http://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/coronavirus/statement-chancellor-1732296)
- Agamben, Giorgio, ‘La invención de una epidemia’, 26 February 2020. Online: <https://ficcione-delarazon.org/2020/02/27/giorgio-agamben-la-invencion-de-una-epidemia/>
- ‘Alberto Fernández sobre el coronavirus y la economía: “No estamos aquí para dejar caer empresas y argentinos sin trabajo”.’ *Página 12*, 15 April 2020. Online: [www.pagina12.com.ar/259840-alberto-fernandez-sobre-el-coronavirus-y-la-economia-no-esta](http://www.pagina12.com.ar/259840-alberto-fernandez-sobre-el-coronavirus-y-la-economia-no-esta)
- García, Jorge G, ‘China prepara un sistema de ‘rating’ para sus ciudadanos’. *El País*, 06 November 2017. Online: [https://retina.elpais.com/retina/2017/11/03/tendencias/1509729357\\_368520.html](https://retina.elpais.com/retina/2017/11/03/tendencias/1509729357_368520.html)
- Foucault, Michel, ‘Governmentality’, in *The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality*, ed. by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller. Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1991.
- Grenier, Jean-Yves and André Orléan, ‘Michel Foucault, l’économie politique et le liberalism’. *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 62, no 5 (2007), 1155–1182.
- Han, Byung-Chul, ‘La emergencia viral y el mundo de mañana. Byung-Chul Han, el filósofo surcoreano que piensa desde Berlín’. *El País*, 22 March 2020. Online: <https://elpais.com/ideas/2020-03-21/la-emergencia-viral-y-el-mundo-de-manana-byung-chul-han-el-filosofo-surcoreano-que-piensa-desde-berlin.html>
- Harari, Yuval Noah, ‘The world after coronavirus’. *Financial Times*, 20 March 2020. Online: [www.ft.com/content/19d90308-6858-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75](http://www.ft.com/content/19d90308-6858-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75)
- Hermet, Guy, *Les populismes dans le monde. Une histoire sociologique XIX–XXème siècle*. Paris: Fayard, 2001.
- Jeanpierre, Laurent, ‘Une sociologie foucaldienne du néolibéralisme est-elle possible?’ *Sociologie et sociétés* 38, no 2 (2006), 87–111.
- ‘Jürgen Habermas: « Dans cette crise, il nous faut agir dans le savoir explicite de notre non-savoir »’. *Le Monde*, 10 April 2020. Interview by Nicolas Truong. Online: [www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/04/10/jurgen-habermas-dans-cette-crise-il-nous-faut-agir-dans-le-savoir-explicite-de-notre-non-savoir\\_6036178\\_3232.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/04/10/jurgen-habermas-dans-cette-crise-il-nous-faut-agir-dans-le-savoir-explicite-de-notre-non-savoir_6036178_3232.html)
- Klein, Naomi, ‘Under Cover of Mass Death, Andrew Cuomo Calls in the Billionaires to Build a High-Tech Dystopia’. *The Intercept*, 08 May 2020. Online: <https://theintercept.com/2020/05/08/andrew-cuomo-eric-schmidt-coronavirus-tech-shock-doctrine/>
- Targuieff, Pierre-André, *L'Illusion populiste*. Paris: Champs Flammarion, 2007.

## Further literature

Arendt, Hannah, *Between Past and Future*. New York: The Viking Press, 1954.